Si tratta, in senso stretto, di operazioni giuridiche tendenti a creare un’unit\u00e0 decisionale tra le societ\u00e0 sia attraverso la creazione di legami strutturali che modificano l’identit\u00e0 giuridica delle societ\u00e0 interessate,<\/span><\/p>\n3. \u2013 Queste definizioni si applicano alle fusioni e acquisizioni bancarie.\u00a0Tuttavia, solo le operazioni che coinvolgono enti creditizi o istituti finanziari sono qualificate.\u00a0L’espressione copre diverse situazioni: concentrazioni prettamente bancarie, concentrazioni finanziarie, concentrazioni bancarie e finanziarie, ma anche concentrazioni prevalentemente bancarie o finanziarie.<\/span><\/p>\n4. \u2013 Pur presentando analogie con le fusioni realizzate in altri settori dell’economia, gli ostacoli alla realizzazione di tali operazioni sono molto pi\u00f9 numerosi e complessi.\u00a0Indubbiamente pongono problemi specifici legati alle loro condizioni istituzionali, alle loro interazioni con questioni di politica monetaria e ai requisiti prudenziali legati in particolare all’esistenza di rischio sistemico.\u00a0La ragione essenziale di questa situazione risiede nel fatto che il sistema bancario \u00e8 specifico.\u00a0Le banche, infatti, drenano il risparmio e allocano i prestiti secondo scelte o criteri di valutazione decisivi per l’orientamento dell’economia.\u00a0Nella misura in cui questi sono depositari di fondi appartenenti ad altri,il sistema bancario non \u00e8 solo il principale detentore di liquidit\u00e0 ma anche il principale prestatore di servizi di pagamento.\u00a0Pertanto, costituisce una parte vitale della maggior parte delle transazioni economiche.\u00a0Essa permea cos\u00ec tanto l’economia da influenzarne il funzionamento in modo tale che nessun altro ramo di attivit\u00e0 potrebbe corrispondervi.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi tradizionalmente considerato strategico dallo Stato francese.\u00a0\u00c8 quindi soggetto a una specifica legge professionale che ne disciplina il corretto funzionamento.<\/span><\/p>\n5. \u2013 Ritorneremo alle fonti delle concentration bancarie (I) per presentare meglio il movimento delle fusioni e acquisizioni bancarie contemporanee (II).\u00a0Ci\u00f2 consenter\u00e0 di definire la metodologia da adottare per cogliere questo processo in modo innovativo (III).<\/span><\/p>\nI\/ Fonti delle concentration bancarie<\/span><\/p>\n6. \u2013 Ci si richiama volentieri alla metafora della sorgente per dimostrare che un contesto normativo favorevole alle concentrazioni bancarie (A) nonch\u00e9 le cause economiche e gestionali si rivelano fundamentali (B) per far crescere il fiume.<\/span><\/p>\nA\/ Un contesto giuridico favorevole alle concentrazioni bancarie<\/span><\/p>\n7. \u2013 La Francia \u00e8 un paese latino di diritto scritto.\u00a0The evolution of the banking system has traditionally determined the leggie that regulates the vigilance on the bank, so it relates to the bank and the State.\u00a0Questa caratteristica induce a sua volta frequenti scambi tra i steer delle banche e quelli dello Stato.\u00a0Anche i rapporti banca-economia si basano essenzialmente sul diritto commercial scritto.\u00a0It results, from part of the formwork, to an atteggiamento and a funzionamento pi\u00f9 giuridico and administrative che economico e finanziario.\u00a0The legge ha quindi un posto preponderante all’interno delle banche.<\/span><\/p>\n8. \u2013 In origin erano soggetti al diritto comune, ma in seguito alla clamorosa crisi degli anni Trenta, furono loro imposti specifici regolamenti.\u00a0Ci\u00f2 riorganizz\u00f2 la professione bancaria e cre\u00f2 un sistema di controllo pubblico.\u00a0Queste disposizioni erano giustificate dal desiderio di proteggere i depositanti da eventuali fallimenti degli istituti.\u00a0Tuttavia, in sostanza, dietro le giustificazioni statali, c’\u00e8 l’intero settore che la legge ha organizzato con l’obiettivo di controllare questo ingranaggio essenziale dell’economia.\u00a0Il sistema bancario inglese \u00e8 quindi da tempo sostanzialmente sottomesso all’autorit\u00e0 pubblica, sia per quanto riguarda la detention del capital, sia per quanto riguarda la fissazione delle regole di funzionamento del mercato.<\/span><\/p>\n9. \u2013 La vigilanza sulle banche \u00e8 stata istituita con le leggi del 13 e 14\/06\/1941.\u00a0Questa struttura ha successivemente subtilo delle modifiche.\u00a0Lo Stato ha nationalizzato con legge del 02\/12\/1945 i quattro istituti di credito nazionali.\u00a0Infine, all’inizio degli anni ’80, nazionalizz\u00f2 anche trentasei banche per estendere il suo controllo sul 75% dei crediti distribuiti con l’idea di controllare questo ingranaggio essenziale dell’economia.\u00a0La tecnica utilizzata \u00e8 sempre stata la stessa: le azioni representative del capital delle societ\u00e0 nazionalizzate interessate sono state trasferite allo Stato in piena propriet\u00e0, ad eccezione delle azioni detenute da persone giuridiche gi\u00e0 appenenti al settore pubblico o destinate ad entrarvi.\u00a0say diritto.Tutte le principali banche sono quindi passate sotto il controllo statale.<\/span><\/p>\nFusioni e acquisizioni bancarie europee: quadro normativo e sfide: \u2013<\/span><\/h2>\nGli interventi statali nel sistema bancario erano quindi frequenti.\u00a0Sono state adottate misure relative all’ambiente bancario, come la riforma del diritto societario, la creazione della Commissione di Borsa, la partecipazione dei lavoratori per abituare le classi popolari all’azionariato e contribuire cos\u00ec allo sviluppo della marcia.\u00a0finanziario.\u00a0A ci\u00f2 si aggiungono le norme direttamente tese a rimodellare il sistema bancario e a concentrarlo: ricordiamo i decreti del 25\/01\/1966 e 23\/12\/1966 di decompartimentazione delle banche di investimento e di deposito, il decreto del 26\/05\/1966 di fusione della Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie e del Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris per formare la Banque Nationale de Paris.Questa operazione avviata dallo Stato costituisce la prima grande concentrazione bancaria francese.\u00a0Tuttavia,<\/span><\/p>\n10. \u2013 Dalla met\u00e0 degli anni ’80, il governo organizz\u00f2 cos\u00ec una liberalizzazione lasciando pi\u00f9 spazio alla libera concorrenza nell’ambito della legge bancaria del 24\/01\/1984.\u00a0Le disposizioni di questa legge hanno quindi creato un contesto normativo favorevole alle concentrazioni bancarie.\u00a0Questo \u00e8 l’obiettivo implicito delle \u201ctre D: Disintermediazione, Deregolazione, Decompartimentazione\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\nWith regard to intermediation, the main banking function consists in creating money by granting loans, then collecting it from depositors and savers. One of the essential changes of the 1970s and 1980s was the considerable development of disintermediation by issuing mainly shares and bonds subscribed either directly or indirectly by savers or investors. Traditional banking intermediation, within the framework of retail banking, has decreased. On the other hand, securities transactions occupy a growing place in banks\u2019 balance sheets. \u201cFinancial disintermediation thus tends to increase competition between banks and markets. Due to increased market competition,
Regarding deregulation, two essential measures have lifted the constraints weighing on French banks.\u00a0The first concerns the freedom to open counters, which has favored the growth of banks.\u00a0The principle of prior authorization issued by the Credit Institutions Committee, established in 1982, was repealed in 1986. The second concerns the abolition of the credit framework which favored the development of competition and the process of concentration.\u00a0Finally, the decompartmentalization aimed to allow the integration of financial markets as well as to establish a healthy competition between the main protagonists of the financial scene.\u00a0This decompartmentalization is indisputable, because until the arrival of liberal measures, the French system was characterized by a double mosaic of credits and institutions which preserved monopolies.\u00a0However,<\/span><\/p>\n11. \u2013 The first innovation of the law of 01\/24\/1984 concerned the change in the institutional framework.\u00a0Thus, article 1 of the law, inserted in the Monetary and Financial Code in article L. 311-1, defines not the notion of bank, but of credit institution.<\/span><\/p>\nBefore 1984, there were more than thirty different statutes of credit establishments often giving their beneficiaries a monopoly on the exercise of certain activities, often accompanied by fiscal and financial advantages.\u00a0The law partially unifies banking statutes and recognizes the universal vocation of credit institutions.\u00a0This measure favored the process of concentration by limiting the number of existing statutes.\u00a0This relative trivialization of statutes was of paramount importance for the organization of the profession.\u00a0Indeed, once they emerged from a special legal regime, the establishments concerned regained their freedom of organization and were able to envisage mergers that had been difficult to achieve until then.<\/span><\/p>\nCependant, malgr\u00e9 cette unification, le droit n\u2019a pas une vocation totalement universelle.\u00a0C\u2019est une loi de compromis qui respecte les diff\u00e9rents int\u00e9r\u00eats en pr\u00e9sence.\u00a0M\u00eame si un cadre juridique unique a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tabli, cela ne signifie pas que les sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s statutaires des banques coop\u00e9ratives ou mutualistes ont disparu.\u00a0Cela a n\u00e9cessairement un impact sur la concentration du syst\u00e8me bancaire.<\/p>\n
D\u00e8s lors, il n\u2019est pas interdit de s\u2019interroger sur les justifications du maintien de plusieurs statuts.\u00a0Leur suppression constituerait un facteur suppl\u00e9mentaire de concentration qui stimulerait les fusions n\u00e9cessaires pour permettre la constitution de groupes d\u2019une taille adapt\u00e9e \u00e0 la dimension du march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en.<\/p>\n
12. \u2013 L\u2019article 18 de la loi bancaire, ins\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019article L. 511-9 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier, d\u00e9finit cinq cat\u00e9gories d\u2019\u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit :<\/p>\n
\u2013 Les banques : elles peuvent effectuer toutes les op\u00e9rations.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Banques mutualistes ou coop\u00e9ratives : il s\u2019agit des Banques Populaires, du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel et des Caisses d\u2019Epargne.\u00a0Ces derniers \u00e9taient \u00e0 l\u2019origine une cat\u00e9gorie ind\u00e9pendante.\u00a0En 1999, ils ont \u00e9t\u00e9 int\u00e9gr\u00e9s au secteur mutualiste.\u00a0Le l\u00e9gislateur leur a donc donn\u00e9 une situation hybride.\u00a0En effet, ce groupe est compos\u00e9 d\u2019actionnaires publics et mutualistes.\u00a0De plus, la perte du caract\u00e8re non lucratif des fonds a une cons\u00e9quence importante.\u00a0Ces derniers peuvent acqu\u00e9rir des banques commerciales ou d\u2019autres \u00e9tablissements \u00e0 but lucratif.\u00a0Puis, quelques semaines apr\u00e8s la r\u00e9forme l\u00e9gislative, en ao\u00fbt 1999, le groupe des caisses d\u2019\u00e9pargne rach\u00e8te le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Cooperative municipali di credito: pur avendo ormai il monopolio del prestito su pegno, questa attivit\u00e0 \u00e8 diventata marginale a favore di altre forme di prestito al consumo che esse concedono.<\/span>
BR> Queste tre categorie di enti possono svolgere tutte le operazioni bancarie, ma \u201cnel rispetto dei limiti risultanti dai testi legislativi e regolamentari che le disciplinano\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\nLa legge \u00e8 ancora pi\u00f9 restrittiva per la quarta e la quinta categoria.\u00a0Non possono ricevere depositi a vista dal pubblico o di durata inferiore a due anni.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 Le societ\u00e0 finanziarie possono svolgere esclusivamente operazioni bancarie risultanti o dal provvedimento autorizzativo che le riguarda, ovvero dalle disposizioni legislative e regolamentari ad esse proprie.\u00a0Riuniscono una vasta gamma di stabilimenti tra cui societ\u00e0 di costruzioni e societ\u00e0 di leasing.\u00a0Questi ultimi concedono una particolare forma di credito, denominata leasing o leasing finanziario, acquistando beni che vengono poi “locati” ai clienti per un periodo determinato, avendo questi ultimi al termine del contratto la possibilit\u00e0 di acquistare i beni al loro valore residuo .\u00a0.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 Gli istituti finanziari specializzati sono organismi specializzati ai quali lo Stato ha affidato una particolare missione di pubblico interesse.\u00a0Le loro operazioni devono essere collegate a questa missione.\u00a0Includono in particolare il Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France.\u00a0\u00c8 anche la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 des Bourses Fran\u00e7aises che gestisce il mercato mobiliare francese.\u00a0Hanno accolto con favore la Banca di sviluppo per le piccole e medie imprese, risultante dalla fusione tra il Cr\u00e9dit d’Equipement des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises e la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Fran\u00e7aise d’Assurance sur Capital \u00e0 Risque des PME.\u00a0La sua missione \u00e8 promuovere l’accesso delle piccole e medie imprese al finanziamento bancario e aiutarle a rafforzare la loro struttura finanziaria.Comprendono, inoltre, le Societ\u00e0 di Sviluppo Regionale, che mirano a promuovere,\u00a0attraverso partecipazioni, lo sviluppo delle imprese di medie dimensioni.\u00a0Quest’ultima \u00e8 entrata in crisi negli anni ’90.\u00a0Pertanto, non potevano mantenere la loro indipendenza.\u00a0Le societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale Champex, Expanso, Tofinso, Solder e Sodero sono state cos\u00ec rilevate dalle casse di risparmio.\u00a0Sodecco \u00e8 stata acquisita dalla Banque R\u00e9gionale de l’Ouest.\u00a0La societ\u00e0 di sviluppo territoriale del Nord-Pas de Calais si \u00e8 rivolta al Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais.\u00a0SADE ha assunto il controllo della Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de d\u00e9veloppement r\u00e9gional du Sud-Est, poi \u00e8 stata oggetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto da parte della Banque G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Luxembourg.\u00a0Infine, la Societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale della Bretagna si \u00e8 rivolta al BDPME.Quest’ultima \u00e8 entrata in crisi negli anni ’90.\u00a0Pertanto, non potevano mantenere la loro indipendenza.\u00a0Le societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale Champex, Expanso, Tofinso, Solder e Sodero sono state cos\u00ec rilevate dalle casse di risparmio.\u00a0\u00e8 stata poi oggetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto da parte della Banque G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Luxembourg.\u00a0Infine, la Societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale della Bretagna si \u00e8 rivolta al BDPME.\u00a0\u00e8 stata poi oggetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto da parte della Banque G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Luxembourg.\u00a0Infine, la Societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale della Bretagna si \u00e8 rivolta al BDPME.\u00a0\u00e8 stata poi oggetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto da parte della Banque G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Luxembourg.\u00a0Infine, la Societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale della Bretagna si \u00e8 rivolta al BDPME.\u00e8 stata poi oggetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto da parte della Banque G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Luxembourg.\u00a0Infine, la Societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale della Bretagna si \u00e8 rivolta al BDPME.\u00a0\u00e8 stata poi oggetto di un’offerta pubblica di acquisto da parte della Banque G\u00e9n\u00e9rale du Luxembourg.\u00a0Infine, la Societ\u00e0 di sviluppo regionale della Bretagna si \u00e8 rivolta al BDPME.<\/span><\/p>\n13. \u2013 Si precisa che lo stato attuale del diritto bancario non \u00e8 solo opera della legge 24\/01\/1984.\u00a0Negli anni successivi furono adottati vari testi che contribuirono a rafforzare il fenomeno della concentrazione.\u00a0In primo luogo, sono state previste diverse tipologie di coefficienti per garantire la liquidit\u00e0, la solvibilit\u00e0 nonch\u00e9 l’equilibrio della struttura finanziaria degli enti creditizi.<\/span><\/p>\nLa maggior parte dei rapporti era basata sui fondi propri degli enti creditizi.\u00a0Per garantire l’uniformit\u00e0 delle soluzioni in Europa, una direttiva sui fondi propri del 17\/04\/1989, modificata il 03\/12\/1991 e il 16\/03\/1992, si \u00e8 impegnata a definire tale concetto.\u00a0Si ispira principalmente alle regole emanate sotto l’egida del Comitato di Vigilanza Bancaria che ha sede a Basilea presso la Banca dei Regolamenti Internazionali.\u00a0Il suo contenuto \u00e8 stato introdotto in Francia dal regolamento del comitato di regolamentazione bancaria n. 90-02 del 23\/02\/1990, pi\u00f9 volte modificato.<\/span><\/p>\nTale direttiva comunitaria \u00e8 stata integrata da una direttiva del 18\/12\/1989 relativa al coefficiente di solvibilit\u00e0 degli enti creditizi, recepita in Francia dal Regolamento n.\u00a091-05 del 15\/02\/1991.\u00a0Successivamente, la direttiva comunitaria del 21\/12\/1992 sul monitoraggio e il controllo dei grandi fidi degli enti creditizi \u00e8 stata recepita in Francia dal regolamento n. 93-05 del 21\/12\/1993.\u00a0Infine, la direttiva comunitaria del 15\/03\/1993 sull’adeguatezza patrimoniale delle imprese di investimento e degli enti creditizi ha definito regole comuni in materia di rischi di mercato.\u00a0\u00c8 stato recepito dai regolamenti del comitato di regolamentazione bancaria n. 95-02 e n. 95-05 del 21\/07\/1995, che hanno modificato il regolamento n. 91-05.<\/span><\/p>\nQuesti rapporti restrittivi hanno portato a riconciliazioni tra assicuratori e banche.\u00a0Quest’ultimo, infatti, aveva bisogno di una notevole liquidit\u00e0 da parte degli assicuratori.\u00a0Questi rapporti hanno anche generato il sostegno degli istituti di credito, che non dispongono di capitale sufficiente, con gruppi pi\u00f9 grandi.<\/span><\/p>\nInoltre, la seconda direttiva bancaria ha liberalizzato le attivit\u00e0 bancarie nell’Unione Europea, in particolare stabilendo un’unica licenza bancaria in tutti i paesi membri.\u00a0Ha inoltre consentito di uniformare le regole prudenziali tra gli Stati membri, in particolare in termini di capitale minimo.<\/span><\/p>\nInoltre, la Direttiva CEE n. 93\/22 adottata il 05\/10\/1993 ha agevolato la libera prestazione dei servizi e la libert\u00e0 di stabilimento nei mercati finanziari dell’Unione Europea per qualsiasi prestatore di servizi di investimento avente la propria sede legale o la propria direzione effettiva in uno degli Stati membri.\u00a0A tal fine \u00e8 stato introdotto un cosiddetto sistema di \u201cpassaporto europeo\u201d.\u00a0Ci\u00f2 non implica una completa armonizzazione degli standard relativi alle condizioni di accesso all’attivit\u00e0 di prestatore di servizi di investimento.\u00a0Si basa sul principio del riconoscimento delle omologazioni concesse dalle autorit\u00e0 dello Stato membro di origine.La direttiva stabilisce alcune condizioni minime di armonizzazione relative al rilascio del passaporto europeo, ma lo Stato membro di origine resta libero di emanare regole pi\u00f9 severe.<\/span><\/p>\nDi conseguenza, la legge del 1984 \u00e8 stata modificata dalla legge n\u00b0 92-665 del 16\/07\/1992 che recepisce la direttiva CEE del 15\/12\/1989.\u00a0Essa sanciva il principio della libert\u00e0 di stabilimento, della prestazione di servizi negli Stati membri della Comunit\u00e0, del mutuo riconoscimento delle autorizzazioni rilasciate da queste ultime e del principio del controllo da parte del Paese di origine.\u00a0La novit\u00e0 pi\u00f9 significativa risiede dunque nel sistema della patente unica: l’omologazione rilasciata dallo Stato della sede \u00e8 valida una volta per tutte in tutta la Comunit\u00e0.\u00a0Questa creazione di un mercato bancario unico \u00e8 stata ovviamente la prima causa di concentrazione poich\u00e9 gli istituti di credito hanno potuto competere liberamente in tutta Europa.<\/span><\/p>\nFinally, EEC directive n\u00b0 93\/22 of 05\/10\/1993 was transposed into French law by law n\u00b0 96-597 of 07\/02\/1996. The latter adopts a new legal structure based on trades and no longer on markets. It consecrates the unity of the financial market while maintaining the specificity of financial intermediation in relation to credit businesses.<\/p>\n
14. \u2013 Ultimately, the banking law as well as the texts drawn up subsequently allowed deregulation, harmonization of prudential rules and logically an activation of competition between credit institutions. This constituted a factor of concentration in the banking system. In particular, Community law has been at the origin of a large number of developments resulting in the acceleration of mergers.<\/p>\n
15. \u2013 In tale contesto, lo Stato doveva privatizzare le banche.\u00a0Questo processo ha contribuito anche ad aumentare la concentrazione del sistema bancario.\u00a0Infatti, tornate al settore privato, le principali istituzioni riconquistarono la loro libert\u00e0 di iniziativa e poterono impegnarsi in concentrazioni che la loro appartenenza al settore pubblico aveva a lungo ostacolato.\u00a0Il passaggio delle banche dal settore pubblico al settore privato \u00e8 avvenuto principalmente in tre fasi.\u00a0Le privatizzazioni dal 1986 al 1988 hanno coinvolto 73 banche, principalmente la Banque du B\u00e2timent et des Travaux Publics, la Banque Industrielle et Immobili\u00e8re Priv\u00e9e, la Caisse Nationale du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, la Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de Paribas, la Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de Suez, la Compagnie Financi\u00e8re Credit Commercial de France e Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale.\u00a0Dopo una pausa di cinque anni,\u00a0corrispondente al periodo “ni-ni”, il programma di privatizzazioni \u00e8 ripreso nel 1993. Le privatizzazioni del 1993 e del 1994 hanno riguardato in particolare BNP e Banque Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Da allora sono stati effettuati nuovi trasferimenti dal settore pubblico al settore privato: nel 1995 hanno riguardato BFCE e Cr\u00e9dit Local de France, nel 1996 due banche del gruppo Renault e tre filiali del Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, nel 1997 una filiale del gruppo GAN, nel 1998 le altre filiali del GAN, in particolare il gruppo CIC nonch\u00e9 la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit e le sue controllate, nel 1999 il Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais e infine nel 2001 la banca Hervet.\u00a0Le privatizzazioni del 1993 e del 1994 hanno riguardato in particolare BNP e Banque Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Da allora sono stati effettuati nuovi trasferimenti dal settore pubblico al settore privato:\u00a0nel 1995 hanno riguardato BFCE e Cr\u00e9dit Local de France, nel 1996 due banche del gruppo Renault et tre filiali del Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, nel 1997 una subsidiary de la gruppo GAN, nel 1998 le altre filiali del GAN, in particolare anche il gruppo CIC comme la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit and the sue subsidiary, nel 1999 Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais and infine nel 2001 Banque Hervet.\u00a0The privatizzazioni del 1993 e del 1994 hanno riguardato in particolare BNP and Banque Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit.Da allora sono stati effettuati nuovi trasferimenti dal settore pubblico al settore privato: nel 1995 hanno riguardato BFCE e Cr\u00e9dit Local de France, nel 1996 due banche del gruppo Renault et tre filiali del Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, nel 1997 una subsidiary de la gruppo GAN, nel 1998 le altre filiali del GAN, in particolare il gruppo CIC notch\u00e9 the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit and the sue controllate,<\/span><\/p>\n16. \u2013 Di fronte a question cambiamenti del mercato bancario, gli istituti di credito stanno ora basando la loro strategia sulla redditivit\u00e0.\u00a0Il trasferimento del sistema bancario dalla sfera institutionale, anche amministrativa, a quella commercial, ne ormai un’attivit\u00e0 competitiva.\u00a0Tuttavia, \u00e8 indiscutibile che la concorrenza \u00e8 all’origine del processo di concentration.<\/span><\/p>\n17. \u2013 Inoltre, nell’ambito dei controlli legali, va notato che le banche favoricono la concentration rispetto ad altre strategy suscettibili di generare risparmio, perch\u00e9 le autorit\u00e0 guaranteed della concorrenza le guardano con benevolenza.\u00a0.\u00a0In effect, the cooperazione pu\u00f2 essere condannata sur la base dell’accordo quando il suo scopo \u00e8 impedire, restringere o falsare la concorrenza su un mercato.\u00a0The guaranteed authority of the national concorrenza e comunitarie rigorously controls the anticoncorrenziali practice.\u00a0Cos\u00ec, le banche aggirano the difficolt\u00e0 concentrating.\u00a0Ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 proibito \u00e8 sostituito da ci\u00f2 che \u00e8 incoraggiato.Queste concentration sono soggette a un controllo pi\u00f9 ambiguo che mira in particolare a verificare se l’operazione crei o rafforzi una dominant position,\u00a0comme vedremo negli sviluppi successivi.\u00a0In primo luogo, the general interest weighs molto nel controllo nazionale delle fusioni.\u00a0Posto che il Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze \u00e8 favorevole alla concentration del sistema bancario inglese, \u00e8 lecito ritenere che if opporr\u00e0 solo eccezionalmente a tali operazioni in nome della tutela della concorrenza.\u00a0.\u00a0Per quanto riguarda il controllo delle concentration da parte del consiglio della concorrenza, esso \u00e8 solo limitato poich\u00e9 il suo ruolo qui \u00e8 solo consultivo.Questo modello \u00e8 simile al vecchio modello di giustizia conservata, una fase storica della giustizia amministrativa in cui il giudice non poteva decidere lui stesso la controversy, ma si limitava a proporre una decisione del tribunale al governo.\u00a0Questo controllo \u00e8 quindi poco rigoroso.\u00a0In secondo luogo,\u00a0\u00c8 essenziale notare che il controllo europeo delle concentration da parte della Commissione persegue un duplice obiettivo: l’integrazione dei mercati e la tutela della concorrenza.\u00a0Ne deriva una certa ambiguit\u00e0 di controllo, poich\u00e9 la Commissione attributisce il primato all’obiettivo dell’integrazione del mercato.<\/span><\/p>\n18. \u2013 This last element unquestionably reveals that the legal sources of the concentration are supplemented by economic and managerial causes.<\/span><\/p>\nB\/ The economic and managerial causes of the banking concentration process<\/span><\/p>\n19. \u2013 Competition leads to increased competition between credit institutions, which leads to numerous concentrations.\u00a0Thus, for example, competition in the retail banking business tends to reduce margins and leads players to seek to increase the products distributed: savings products, insurance, etc.\u00a0Access to these activities requires a matching strategy.\u00a0Concentrations have therefore been initiated, particularly with insurance companies.\u00a0Moreover, this competition must increasingly also be exercised against non-bank players.\u00a0Let us quote the insurance companies which entered in force in the banking sector, in particular by the repurchase of investment banks.\u00a0In addition, companies in the distribution sector have also entered the banking market.<\/span><\/p>\nFrom an economic point of view, the growth in the size of companies is almost the only answer to the needs of this new competition.\u00a0We are therefore witnessing the globalization of the banking system and a strengthening of power and ownership in the hands of a minority.\u00a0Economic power is concentrated under the guise of creating value.\u00a0This race for size seems inevitable because of the criteria of profitability.<\/span><\/p>\n20. \u2013 Indeed, the concentration is likely to lead to the achievement of synergies and complementarities between the related entities.\u00a0These synergies include both those relating to the businesses and those relating to the distribution system itself.\u00a0The first can come either from the complementarity of customer and\/or product portfolios, or from the pooling of central services, logistical means, but also back-offices or know-how.\u00a0The seconds can, for example, materialize by completing a local network by extension.\u00a0From then on, emphasis was placed on the advantages conferred by large size: easy financing, economies of scale, economies of scope, productivity gains, risky investment opportunities.<\/span><\/p>\n21. \u2013 Tuttavia, questi vantaggi devono essere ridimensionati nel sistema bancario perch\u00e9 non \u00e8 dimostrato che esista una relazione tra la dimensione di un istituto di credito e la sua redditivit\u00e0, se non nel retail banking, soprattutto pi\u00f9 che i costi sono molto diversi da una banca all’altra.\u00a0Cos\u00ec, il confronto della lista delle prime 100 banche mondiali con quella delle 100 pi\u00f9 redditizie, sembra dimostrare l’inesistenza di una relazione tra la dimensione e l’efficienza visto che solo 9 banche della prima lista compaiono sulla seconda.\u00a0Il professor Alain Buzelay riconosce l’esistenza di una correlazione molto debolmente positiva tra le dimensioni delle organizzazioni bancarie e la loro redditivit\u00e0.\u00a0Il lavoro di Alfred Steinherr mostra addirittura una correlazione negativa per le maggiori banche in almeno sei Stati membri.\u00a0La \u201cdimensione ottimale\u201d dipende dal commercio, dalla struttura dei costi e dal potere di mercato che conferisce.\u00a0Alcune professioni sono effettivamente esercitate a livello dipartimentale e regionale.\u00a0Altri sono redditizi solo a livello nazionale, altri infine devono essere schierati a livello internazionale.\u00a0Pertanto, i vantaggi economici di queste strategie sono, ad oggi, ampiamente dibattuti: l’effetto dimensione non ha necessariamente portato maggiori economie di scala o diversificazione del rischio.\u00a0In alcuni casi, lo sviluppo incontrollato dell’attivit\u00e0 ha comportato anche un notevole accumulo di rischi;\u00a0l’importanza dei fondi propri e la loro remunerazione possono aver posto problemi di riutilizzo che possono aver incoraggiato le banche a sviluppare strategie di arbitraggio prudenziale.\u00a0Finalmente,\u00a0Altri sono redditizi solo a livello nazionale, altri infine devono essere schierati a livello internazionale.\u00a0Pertanto, i vantaggi economici di queste strategie sono, ad oggi, ampiamente dibattuti: l’effetto dimensione non ha necessariamente portato maggiori economie di scala o diversificazione del rischio.\u00a0In alcuni casi, lo sviluppo incontrollato dell’attivit\u00e0 ha comportato anche un notevole accumulo di rischi;\u00a0l’importanza dei fondi propri e la loro remunerazione possono aver posto problemi di riutilizzo che possono aver incoraggiato le banche a sviluppare strategie di arbitraggio prudenziale.\u00a0Infine, altri sono redditizi solo a livello nazionale, altri infine devono essere schierati a livello internazionale.\u00a0Pertanto, i vantaggi economici di queste strategie sono, ad oggi, molto dibattuti a livello globale:\u00a0l’effetto dimensionale non ha necessariamente comportato maggiori economie di scala o diversificazione del rischio.\u00a0In alcuni casi, lo sviluppo incontrollato dell’attivit\u00e0 ha comportato anche un notevole accumulo di rischi;\u00a0l’importanza dei fondi propri e la loro remunerazione possono aver posto problemi di riutilizzo che possono aver incoraggiato le banche a sviluppare strategie di arbitraggio prudenziale.\u00a0Infine, lo sviluppo incontrollato dell’attivit\u00e0 ha comportato anche un notevole accumulo di rischi;\u00a0l’importanza dei fondi propri e la loro remunerazione possono aver posto problemi di riutilizzo che possono aver incoraggiato le banche a sviluppare strategie di arbitraggio prudenziale.\u00a0Finalmente,\u00a0lo sviluppo incontrollato dell’attivit\u00e0 ha comportato anche un notevole accumulo di rischi;\u00a0l’importanza dei fondi propri e la loro remunerazione possono aver posto problemi di riutilizzo che possono aver incoraggiato le banche a sviluppare strategie di arbitraggio prudenziale.\u00a0Finalmente,<\/span><\/p>\n22. \u2013 L’accelerazione del processo di concentrazione bancaria in Europa si spiega dunque con la concomitanza di diversi altri fenomeni.<\/span><\/p>\n23. \u2013 In primo luogo, c’\u00e8 la sovraccapacit\u00e0 bancaria, che \u00e8 una delle cause della concentrazione.\u00a0Correlativamente, non sembra esserci pi\u00f9 spazio per una nuova rete bancaria n\u00e9 in Francia n\u00e9 nell’Unione Europea, in particolare a causa dell’altissimo tasso bancario.\u00a0Questo lascia poco spazio ai nuovi arrivati.\u00a0Si tratta, quindi, di acquistare reti di sportelli e banche di una certa dimensione gi\u00e0 insediate sui mercati.\u00a0La spiegazione delle concentrazioni attraverso la ricerca del potere di mercato costituisce quindi un’ipotesi di lavoro molto pi\u00f9 fruttuosa.\u00a0Le banche si concentrano perch\u00e9 vogliono difendere o addirittura ampliare le loro posizioni sul mercato interno contro concorrenti nazionali che si stanno concentrando, ma anche contro potenziali concorrenti esteri.<\/span><\/p>\n24. \u2013 Ensuite, les concentrations apparaissent souvent comme un moyen au service de la mise en \u0153uvre d\u2019une strat\u00e9gie permettant d\u2019atteindre l\u2019objectif \u00e0 la mode.\u00a0En effet, on peut s\u2019interroger sur le caract\u00e8re mim\u00e9tique de certaines de ces op\u00e9rations, dans la mesure o\u00f9 des effets pervers sont apparus par le pass\u00e9 pour contredire, au moins dans un certain nombre de cas, les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices \u00e9conomiques de strat\u00e9gies couramment appliqu\u00e9es \u00e0 la fois par majorit\u00e9 des acteurs du secteur.\u00a0Par exemple, les strat\u00e9gies commerciales des banques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9es, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, par une course \u00e0 la taille des bilans.\u00a0Au cours des ann\u00e9es 1990, le montant des capitaux d\u2019abord, puis leur rendement, sont devenus les nouveaux crit\u00e8res de d\u00e9veloppement.\u00a0Enfin aujourd\u2019hui,<\/p>\n
Le syst\u00e8me bancaire pr\u00e9sente ainsi parfois un fonctionnement concurrentiel consensuel et, dans certains cas, oligopolistique, o\u00f9 les principaux acteurs sont dans l\u2019ensemble assez peu diff\u00e9renci\u00e9s.\u00a0Elle appara\u00eet donc souvent sensible \u00e0 une modification de l\u2019environnement concurrentiel local, qui peut alors \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme une modification des r\u00e8gles du jeu, \u00e0 laquelle il faut r\u00e9pondre soit en s\u2019y conformant, soit en changeant \u00e0 nouveau ces r\u00e8gles soi-m\u00eame.\u00a0.\u00a0Par cons\u00e9quent, de nombreuses op\u00e9rations de consolidation peuvent \u00eatre d\u00e9clench\u00e9es par un effet d\u2019imitation de fusion initi\u00e9 par un concurrent.\u00a0Au niveau europ\u00e9en, le mim\u00e9tisme semble \u00e9galement perceptible.\u00a0En effet, l\u2019europ\u00e9anisation de plusieurs banques est motiv\u00e9e par le fait que leurs principaux concurrents s\u2019installent en Europe.<\/p>\n
25. \u2013 L\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration des op\u00e9rations de consolidation peut aussi r\u00e9sulter d\u2019une r\u00e9action d\u00e9fensive de certains acteurs face aux initiatives des concurrents.\u00a0Ces comportements micro-\u00e9conomiques, appel\u00e9s \u00ab \u00e9quilibre de Nash \u00bb en th\u00e9orie des jeux, conduisent un agent \u00e0 adopter la r\u00e9ponse qu\u2019il juge la plus cr\u00e9dible \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de son concurrent pour maintenir ou pr\u00e9server sa position.\u00a0A cet \u00e9gard, certains rapprochements du syst\u00e8me bancaire r\u00e9alis\u00e9s r\u00e9cemment en Europe semblent avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 initi\u00e9s davantage en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 une modification des \u00e9quilibres existants que dans la perspective d\u2019atteindre un objectif initial fort.<\/p>\n
26. \u2013 Les comportements mim\u00e9tiques, comme les strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9actives, ont leur propre rationalit\u00e9 \u00e9conomique, mais qui n\u2019est pas n\u00e9cessairement fond\u00e9e sur la cr\u00e9ation de valeur : dans le premier cas, la r\u00e9duction des asym\u00e9tries d\u2019information entre concurrents sur le march\u00e9.\u00a0un ensemble assez homog\u00e8ne, comme c\u2019est le cas dans le syst\u00e8me bancaire, peut les inciter \u00e0 des r\u00e9actions de type mim\u00e9tique ;\u00a0dans le second cas, c\u2019est surtout la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9action qui prime.<\/p>\n
27. \u2013 La course \u00e0 la concentration s\u2019explique aussi par la volont\u00e9 des dirigeants des banques d\u2019\u00eatre des \u00ab pr\u00e9dateurs \u00bb plut\u00f4t que de risquer de devenir la cible d\u2019une OPA inamicale.\u00a0De ce point de vue, la taille moyenne des banques fran\u00e7aises r\u00e9v\u00e8le le risque de rachat par de plus grands \u00e9tablissements \u00e9trangers.\u00a0Il faut noter que la recherche de puissance est en elle-m\u00eame un facteur de concentration non n\u00e9gligeable.\u00a0Par exemple, en 1999, la bataille boursi\u00e8re entre la BNP et la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale a d\u00e9montr\u00e9 qu\u2019au-del\u00e0 des raisons \u00e9conomiques, se posaient aussi des questions de pr\u00e9\u00e9minence des individus et de prestige des \u00e9quipes dirigeantes.<\/p>\n
28. \u2013 Par ailleurs, les pressions actionnariales jouent \u00e9galement un r\u00f4le d\u00e9terminant dans les concentrations bancaires.\u00a0Celles-ci apparaissent comme une r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la demande de rendement pour les actionnaires.\u00a0En effet, l\u2019importance croissante des investisseurs institutionnels dans le capital des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit conduit naturellement les dirigeants de ces derniers \u00e0 orienter leurs objectifs de gestion vers la valeur actionnariale.\u00a0Les objectifs de rentabilit\u00e9 demand\u00e9s atteignent le taux de rentabilit\u00e9 des fonds propres de 15%.\u00a0Face \u00e0 cette pression actionnariale exigeante, les banques cherchent d\u2019abord \u00e0 y r\u00e9pondre en s\u2019effor\u00e7ant de d\u00e9velopper leur performance interne et en acc\u00e9l\u00e9rant leur croissance.\u00a0Mais la marge potentielle de croissance interne atteint rapidement ses limites : en effet, les gains de productivit\u00e9 moyens oscillent g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement entre 2 et 5 % par an ;\u00a0quant \u00e0 la croissance globale des activit\u00e9s,\u00a0il est d\u2019environ 3 % par an sur le march\u00e9 int\u00e9rieur.\u00a0Le maintien d\u2019un taux de rendement sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 10 % n\u00e9cessite donc le recours \u00e0 la croissance externe.<\/p>\n
29. \u2013 Par ailleurs, le march\u00e9 unique et l\u2019introduction de l\u2019euro s\u2019av\u00e8rent d\u00e9cisifs dans la m\u00e9tamorphose du secteur.\u00a0Ils ont transform\u00e9 les march\u00e9s nationaux en un march\u00e9 paneurop\u00e9en.\u00a0Ainsi, la Commission europ\u00e9enne a estim\u00e9 que : \u00ab (\u2026) l\u2019euro ferait sans doute sentir ses effets dans un grand nombre de secteurs, notamment les services financiers (\u2026) \u00bb.\u00a0En d\u00e9finitive, l\u2019av\u00e8nement de l\u2019euro a fait office de d\u00e9tonateur avec encore plus de force que ne l\u2019avaient pr\u00e9vu les sp\u00e9cialistes.\u00a0Cela \u00e9limine le risque de taux de change au sein de la zone euro.\u00a0De plus, il assure une monnaie commune pour la gestion d\u2019actifs.\u00a0Enfin, les frais pr\u00e9lev\u00e9s par les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit sont \u00e9galement exprim\u00e9s dans la m\u00eame devise partout en Europe.\u00a0L\u2019homog\u00e9n\u00e9isation des produits et la transparence des prix sont donc encourag\u00e9es.\u00a0Cette concurrence accrue contribue \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9crasement des marges sur certaines activit\u00e9s.\u00a0Cela incite les banques \u00e0 rechercher plus de volume, et donc des parts de march\u00e9 plus \u00e9lev\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
30. \u2013 Par ailleurs, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la croissance des march\u00e9s financiers, des capacit\u00e9s et des opportunit\u00e9s d\u2019acquisition ont \u00e9t\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es.\u00a0La situation internationale s\u2019est am\u00e9lior\u00e9e et a \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9e par une reprise de la croissance et des taux d\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat relativement bas, malgr\u00e9 une hausse r\u00e9cente.\u00a0Cet environnement a profit\u00e9 aux march\u00e9s boursiers, ce qui a pu contribuer \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer le processus de consolidation bancaire \u00e0 plusieurs \u00e9gards :<\/p>\n
\u2013 par la cr\u00e9ation de capacit\u00e9s d\u2019acquisition du fait des fortes hausses de valorisation de certains \u00e9tablissements,<\/p>\n
\u2013 en d\u00e9clenchant des acquisitions pr\u00e9coces de cibles dans le but de minimiser le co\u00fbt de la restructuration en vue d\u2019une revalorisation croissante du syst\u00e8me bancaire, \u2013 par des opportunit\u00e9s d\u2019investissement bon march\u00e9 gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l\u2019abondance des ressources de march\u00e9, voire internes.<\/p>\n
31. \u2013 Finally, mergers are part of a context of increasing globalization of financial markets and technological progress linked to the development of new channels of distance marketing and negotiation. There are indeed high-tech sectors which are globalized from the outset: electronic components, IT, aeronautics. Some more traditional sectors are in the process of globalisation: the automobile industry, the tire industry, as many client companies that the banks must support in their race to global size if they wish not to lose them. As for the financial industry itself, it is becoming global, as activity on the financial markets can only be considered on a global scale. It is certain that globalization constitutes a factor of concentration. Initially, national operators are concentrating. In a second period, they are concentrated at European level. Finally, in a third step, they should focus globally. National rivers should flow into a European river and then into a global banking and financial ocean. However, the current situation seems stuck between the first phase and the second.<\/p>\n
II\/ The contemporary situation of the movement of banking concentration<\/p>\n
32. \u2013 A movement of concentration of the banking systems of all the States of Europe can be noted (A). As regards the movement of cross-border concentration, this is having difficulty developing (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ The movement towards concentration of banking systems in the States of Europe<\/p>\n
33. \u2013 It seems that the concentration process got off to a moderate start in France.<\/p>\n
34. \u2013 D\u2019une part, comme nous l\u2019avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9, il existe encore de nombreuses lois en droit bancaire fran\u00e7ais.\u00a0Cela limite th\u00e9oriquement la concentration des banques mutualistes.\u00a0Ainsi, la r\u00e8gle selon laquelle ils ne peuvent payer en titres, notamment l\u2019acquisition d\u2019autres \u00e9tablissements, continue de s\u2019appliquer.\u00a0Cela p\u00e9nalise le d\u00e9veloppement du secteur mutualiste qui, paradoxalement, a pourtant r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 se concentrer.\u00a0A noter la concentration du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole avec Indosuez ainsi que Sofinco, la concentration entre Banque Populaire et Natexis, ainsi que le rachat du CIC par le Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel.\u00a0Cependant, le risque demeure pour le secteur mutualiste de ne pas r\u00e9ussir \u00e0 acqu\u00e9rir une dimension europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n
35. \u2013 En revanche, les banques fran\u00e7aises, malgr\u00e9 l\u2019am\u00e9lioration de leurs r\u00e9sultats, due en grande partie \u00e0 l\u2019am\u00e9lioration de la situation \u00e9conomique, souffrent toujours de l\u2019insuffisance des b\u00e9n\u00e9fices de leur activit\u00e9 domestique, comme en t\u00e9moigne leur relative faiblesse en termes de rentabilit\u00e9 des fonds propres \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9chelle internationale.\u00a0Cela tient peut-\u00eatre aussi \u00e0 la gestion de la catastrophe du Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais et \u00e0 toute une s\u00e9rie de faillites de banques ou d\u2019entreprises de moindre importance qui ont fait peser une charge tr\u00e8s lourde sur la collectivit\u00e9 publique et les grands groupes priv\u00e9s qui se retrouvent consid\u00e9rablement fragilis\u00e9s.\u00a0Le groupe Suez et la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Paribas, par exemple, ont d\u00fb dig\u00e9rer les abus qu\u2019ils avaient provoqu\u00e9s dans le domaine de l\u2019immobilier.\u00a0Les banques de d\u00e9p\u00f4t traditionnelles, comme la BNP ou la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale,\u00a0ont \u00e9galement d\u00fb faire face aux erreurs qu\u2019ils avaient commises en pr\u00eatant aux petites et moyennes entreprises.\u00a0Cela pla\u00e7ait la France, au regard de la concentration du syst\u00e8me bancaire, dans une position m\u00e9diane par rapport aux autres \u00c9tats membres de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n
36. \u2013 Cependant, entre le 01\/01\/1987 et le 31\/12\/2001, le nombre total d\u2019\u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit implant\u00e9s en France a n\u00e9anmoins sensiblement diminu\u00e9, passant de 2152 en 1987 \u00e0 1837 en 1991, \u00e0 1608 en 1994, \u00e0 1209 en 1998, \u00e0 1085 en 2000, \u00e0 1035 en 2001 et \u00e0 975 en 2002. La baisse a \u00e9t\u00e9 de 5% en 1998 et 2000 et, en quatorze ans, de 51,9%.\u00a0Toutes les cat\u00e9gories d\u2019\u00e9tablissements sont concern\u00e9es par ce changement.\u00a0Ainsi, le nombre de banques AFB est pass\u00e9 de 412 en 1991 \u00e0 386 fin 1997 et 359 fin 1998. Cette \u00ab r\u00e9duction r\u00e9guli\u00e8re, \u00e0 partir de 1988, et qui se poursuit actuellement (\u2026) se traduit notamment (\u2026) groupes d\u2019\u00e9tablissements \u00bb.\u00a0En effet, de 1985 \u00e0 1998, 1277 op\u00e9rations de fusion ont \u00e9t\u00e9 enregistr\u00e9es et plus de 900 rachats par de nouveaux actionnaires.<\/p>\n
37. \u2013 Pour faire face \u00e0 la mont\u00e9e de la concurrence et \u00e0 la baisse des marges, les r\u00e9seaux ont engag\u00e9 des programmes de rationalisation visant \u00e0 cr\u00e9er des entit\u00e9s de taille suffisante.\u00a0Cette recherche d\u2019une masse critique a conduit les groupes mutualistes \u00e0 proc\u00e9der \u00e0 de nombreuses fusions entre entit\u00e9s affili\u00e9es.
L\u2019action la plus notable est celle men\u00e9e par le groupe Caisses d\u2019Epargne et de Pr\u00e9voyance.\u00a0B\u00e9n\u00e9ficiant, avec la Caisse Nationale d\u2019Epargne, du monopole du livret A et \u00e9tant \u00e9troitement sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9es dans les cr\u00e9dits \u00e0 l\u2019habitat et aux collectivit\u00e9s, elles n\u2019avaient pas ressenti le besoin d\u2019adapter leur organisation.\u00a0Encore au nombre de 468 fin 1984, ils n\u2019avaient, pour la plupart, qu\u2019un rayon d\u2019action limit\u00e9 \u00e0 une ville et quelques communes voisines.\u00a0Ils adoptent alors un plan de regroupement qui, par \u00e9tapes successives, r\u00e9duit leur nombre \u00e0 186 en 1990, \u00e0 35 en 1993 puis \u00e0 34 en 2000.<\/p>\n
Les autres r\u00e9seaux ont men\u00e9 une action similaire, mais de mani\u00e8re plus progressive.\u00a0Par exemple, le groupe Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, qui comptait encore 95 caisses r\u00e9gionales en 1987, a r\u00e9duit leur nombre, par fusions successives, \u00e0 90 en 1990, puis \u00e0 74 en 1993, \u00e0 59 en 1996, \u00e0 54 en 1999, 51 en 2001 et 43 en 2003.<\/p>\n
De m\u00eame, le groupe Banques Populaires, qui comptait en 1984 42 Banques Populaires, a r\u00e9duit leur nombre \u00e0 32 en 1992 puis \u00e0 25 en 2002.<\/p>\n
De m\u00eame, le Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel a r\u00e9duit le nombre de ses agences de 40 \u00e0 26. Enfin, le groupe des Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s anonymes de cr\u00e9dit immobilier a entrepris durant cette p\u00e9riode une rationalisation de ses structures, r\u00e9duisant ses effectifs de 171 en 1984 \u00e0 103 en 1999, 87 en 2001 et 59 en 2004.<\/p>\n
38. \u2013 Parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 ces op\u00e9rations de fusion au sein des groupes bancaires, des op\u00e9rations de concentration de grande ampleur ont eu lieu.\u00a0Un big bang s\u2019est produit, mais il n\u2019est pas encore complet car le mouvement de concentration est en cours.\u00a0Les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques deviennent de plus en plus puissants et cela a pour cons\u00e9quence que chacun doit se renforcer, n\u2019ayant d\u2019autre choix que de b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier de l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 des armes.\u00a0On peut citer la fusion Indosuez\/Cr\u00e9dit Agricole en 1996 ;\u00a0en 1997, les op\u00e9rations Cr\u00e9dit du Nord\/Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale et Natexis\/Banques Populaires ;\u00a0la reprise du CIC par le Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel et de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit par le CCF en 1998. En 1999, la plus importante offre bancaire publique en France donne naissance \u00e0 BNP-Paribas.\u00a0Par ailleurs, la Caisse Nationale du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole a acquis 70% du sp\u00e9cialiste du cr\u00e9dit \u00e0 la consommation Sofinco.\u00a0Le Groupe Caisses d\u2019Epargne a rachet\u00e9 le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France et l\u2019actionnariat de DEXIA a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9organis\u00e9 sous l\u2019\u00e9gide de la holding belge du groupe.\u00a0En 2000, le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs se concentre avec la Banque La H\u00e9nin.\u00a0En 2001, la Banque Hervet est rachet\u00e9e par le CCF, tandis que la Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations et Ecureuil apportent l\u2019essentiel de leurs activit\u00e9s \u00e0 la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 financi\u00e8re Eulia, afin de cr\u00e9er la troisi\u00e8me place bancaire fran\u00e7aise.\u00a0Cela a sans doute renforc\u00e9 la concentration du syst\u00e8me bancaire fran\u00e7ais.\u00a0En 2002, Axa Banque rach\u00e8te Banque Directe, le groupe Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif est int\u00e9gr\u00e9 au groupe Banques Populaires, Cetelem rach\u00e8te Facet et le Cr\u00e9dit Agricole gagne Finaref.\u00a0En 2003, le Cr\u00e9dit Agricole prend le contr\u00f4le du Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais.\u00a0Enfin, en 2004, le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France acquiert Entenial,<\/p>\n
39. \u2013 Mais alors que le mouvement de concentration s\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e8re dans de nombreux pays europ\u00e9ens, les Fran\u00e7ais commencent \u00e0 prendre conscience de leur retard.\u00a0Les pouvoirs financiers nationaux sont devenus d\u00e9risoires.\u00a0L\u2019exemple de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, grande banque fran\u00e7aise, est r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur.\u00a0Il d\u00e9tient 7 % du march\u00e9 fran\u00e7ais de la banque de d\u00e9tail.\u00a0Or, compte tenu du fait que la France p\u00e8se 17 \u00e0 20 % du march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en, cela signifie qu\u2019elle repr\u00e9sente environ 1,3 \u00e0 1,4 % de ce march\u00e9.\u00a0Il s\u2019agit probablement d\u2019une partie insuffisante qui ne peut garantir son existence \u00e0 long terme.\u00a0De plus, le nouveau groupe, n\u00e9 de la concentration entre BNP et Paribas, devenu le \u00ab champion national \u00bb, n\u2019est pas un groupe optimal.<\/p>\n
Les banques fran\u00e7aises doivent donc cro\u00eetre pour concurrencer la concurrence europ\u00e9enne, faute de quoi elles seront rachet\u00e9es par des \u00e9tablissements \u00e9trangers comme le CCF, pass\u00e9 sous pavillon anglais, suite \u00e0 une offre publique lanc\u00e9e par le groupe HSBC le 04\/01\/2000.\u00a0En effet, les banques britanniques sont bien plus puissantes que les fran\u00e7aises, notamment gr\u00e2ce aux nombreuses fusions qui ont eu lieu ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es.\u00a0Il s\u2019agit notamment des op\u00e9rations Lloyds TSB\/Scottish Widdows, Natwest\/Legal and General, Barclays\/Woolwich et Bank of Scotland\/Halifax.\u00a0La plus spectaculaire est certainement l\u2019offre publique de Royal Bank of Scotland sur Natwest.\u00a0Une bataille \u00e9pique contre la Bank of Scotland a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e pour le contr\u00f4le.\u00a0C\u2019est finalement Royal Bank of\u00a0Scotland\u00a0qui l\u2019a emport\u00e9 gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l\u2019aide de son premier actionnaire :<\/p>\n
En Espagne, un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de concentration en cascade s\u2019est \u00e9galement produit.\u00a0Ce sont d\u2019abord Banco de Bilbao et Banco Vizcaya qui ont fusionn\u00e9 en 1988 pour cr\u00e9er BBV.\u00a0Puis en 1991, Banco Hispano Americano a \u00e9t\u00e9 absorb\u00e9e par Banco Central.\u00a0Peu de temps apr\u00e8s, Banco Santander a rachet\u00e9 le Banesto en difficult\u00e9.\u00a0De m\u00eame, cinq \u00e9tablissements publics ont fusionn\u00e9 pour former la Banque Argentaria.\u00a0Enfin, plus r\u00e9cemment, Banco Santander et Banco Central Hispano se sont rapproch\u00e9s.\u00a0Depuis, BSCH a fortement consolid\u00e9 sa position de premier groupe bancaire ib\u00e9rique.\u00a0Sa capitalisation boursi\u00e8re a augment\u00e9 de 55% \u00e0 40 milliards d\u2019euros et son total de bilan, de 240,5 milliards d\u2019euros, repr\u00e9sente plus de 23% des actifs bancaires du pays.\u00a0Enfin, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya et Argentaria ont fusionn\u00e9 pour donner naissance \u00e0 BBVA le 01\/01\/2000.\u00a0Ce processus s\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e8re \u00e9galement au Portugal.\u00a0En 2000,\u00a0Banco Commercial Portugues est pass\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019offensive en fusionnant avec Banco Mello et Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor.\u00a0De m\u00eame, Banco Espirito Santo et Banco Portugues di Investimento se sont concentr\u00e9es.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration a ainsi marqu\u00e9 la naissance du premier groupe bancaire portugais avec 40,484 milliards d\u2019euros d\u2019actifs.<\/p>\n
Anche in Italia il sistema bancario sta vivendo da diversi anni un periodo di accelerata ristrutturazione, che gli ha permesso di rafforzarsi.\u00a0Cos\u00ec, nel 1998, la banca Abrovenento acquisisce Cariplo, costituendo la banca Intesa e, nel 1999, Intesa rileva Comit.\u00a0Inoltre, le fusioni San Paolo\/IMI, ma anche Credito Italiano\/Unicredito, San Paolo\/Cardine, Banca Popolare di Verona\/Banca Popolare di Novara, Banca Popolare Bergamo\/Cr\u00e9dito Varesino\/Banca Popolare Commercio Industria e infine Capitalia\/Bipope Carire potrebbero essere citato.\u00a0La performance finanziaria delle banche italiane \u00e8 nettamente migliorata e cominciano ad emergere veri campioni nazionali, capaci di svolgere un ruolo attivo nel concerto delle banche europee.<\/span><\/p>\nIn Belgio si sono susseguite le acquisizioni di Banque Indosuez Belgique da parte di CERA e Banque Paribas Belgique da parte di Bacob.\u00a0Pi\u00f9 fondamentalmente, possiamo notare in particolare l’integrazione di G\u00e9n\u00e9rale de Banque nel gruppo Fortis.\u00a0Questa operazione \u00e8 accompagnata da un riavvicinamento con il CGER che assume il controllo dello SNCI.<\/span><\/p>\nPer quanto riguarda la ridistribuzione bancaria nei Paesi Bassi, ha dato vita a tre giganti ABN AMRO, Rabobank e ING, dall’inizio degli anni 90. Questi primi tre istituti di credito detengono il 90% del mercato bancario olandese.\u00a0Questa forte quota di mercato nazionale e questi dieci anni di anticipo hanno consentito ai gruppi olandesi di assumere posizioni significative a livello internazionale.\u00a0Dopo l’acquisizione nell’agosto 1999 della banca tedesca BHF, ING ha una presenza significativa in cinque paesi europei.\u00a0Anche lui desiderava il CCF, ma fu un fallimento.\u00a0Nel dicembre 1999 \u00e8 stata lanciata un’offerta pubblica di acquisto a 137,5 euro per azione, ma subito ritirata.\u00a0Alcuni avevano affermato che la rottura era definitivamente consumata,\u00a0ma un saggio osservatore ci aveva confermato che i colloqui tra le due banche non si erano definitivamente interrotti.\u00a0Patrick Dupray ha anche stimato che ING dovrebbe “tornare alla carica nei prossimi mesi”.\u00a0Gli eventi gli hanno dato ragione, poich\u00e9 il 16\/03\/2000 si \u00e8 verificato un nuovo colpo di scena.\u00a0Il presidente di ING ha approfittato della presentazione dei risultati annuali per lanciare un ultimatum a Charles de Croisset.\u00a0Tuttavia, il 04\/01\/2000, in base ad accordi rapidi e segreti, HSBC si \u00e8 rivelato offrire agli azionisti di CCF un prezzo superiore del 9% a quello di ING, che \u00e8 stata costretta a cedere.\u00a0Il presidente di ING ha approfittato della presentazione dei risultati annuali per lanciare un ultimatum a Charles de Croisset.\u00a0Tuttavia, in data 01\/04\/2000, in base ad accordi rapidi e segreti,\u00a0Si \u00e8 scoperto che HSBC offriva agli azionisti di CCF un prezzo superiore del 9% rispetto a ING, che \u00e8 stata costretta a inchinarsi.\u00a0Il presidente di ING ha approfittato della presentazione dei risultati annuali per lanciare un ultimatum a Charles de Croisset.\u00a0Tuttavia, il 04\/01\/2000, in base ad accordi rapidi e segreti, HSBC si \u00e8 rivelato offrire agli azionisti di CCF un prezzo superiore del 9% a quello di ING, che \u00e8 stata costretta a cedere.<\/span><\/p>\nDe plus, les banques allemandes, \u00e0 la tra\u00eene dans la course \u00e0 la concentration, semblent d\u00e9termin\u00e9es \u00e0 rattraper leur retard.\u00a0On peut citer les fusions entre Hypo Bank et Vereinsbank et entre Bankgesellchaft Berlin et Nordeutsche\/LB.\u00a0Les trois principales banques publiques r\u00e9gionales du Bade-Wurtemberg ont fusionn\u00e9 pour cr\u00e9er la Landesbank Baden W\u00fcrttemberg.\u00a0En outre, il convient de se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 l\u2019annonce du projet de fusion entre Deutsche Bank et Dresdner Bank le 08\/03\/2000.\u00a0Ce regroupement aurait donn\u00e9 naissance \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re banque mondiale avec 1 200 milliards d\u2019euros d\u2019actifs sous gestion.\u00a0Cependant, suite \u00e0 de nombreux diff\u00e9rends, notamment concernant l\u2019int\u00e9gration dans la Deutsche Bank de Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, la banque d\u2019investissement de Dresdner, la fusion a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e.\u00a0C\u2019est finalement Allianz qui rach\u00e8te la Dresdner Bank en 2001 et donne naissance \u00e0 un empire financier.\u00a0Enfin, il faut mentionner la fusion DGBank et GZ-Bank ainsi que la fusion d\u2019Eurohypo, DeutscheHyp et Rheinhyp.<\/p>\n
Enfin, le Danemark a connu une vague de fusions \u00e0 la fin des ann\u00e9es 1980 avec les fusions de Copenhagen Handelsbank\/ Den Danske Bank\/ Provinsbanken, Privatbanken\/ Sparekassen SDS\/ Andelsbanken et Sydbank\/ Sparekassen Sydiylland.<\/p>\n
40. \u2013 Les concentrations bancaires nationales se sont donc ind\u00e9niablement multipli\u00e9es ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es.\u00a0En ce qui concerne les concentrations transfrontali\u00e8res, le tableau est plus nuanc\u00e9.<\/p>\n
B\/ Le mouvement relatif de concentration bancaire transfrontali\u00e8re<\/p>\n
41. \u2013 Les regroupements se sont, jusqu\u2019\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, principalement op\u00e9r\u00e9s au sein des march\u00e9s nationaux dans le but de consolider les positions et de constituer de vastes p\u00f4les nationaux dans les zones consid\u00e9r\u00e9es par les int\u00e9ress\u00e9s comme les plus r\u00e9mun\u00e9ratrices en fonction des sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s locales.\u00a0Ainsi, bien que le mouvement de concentration soit \u00e9vident, les fusions bancaires transfrontali\u00e8res, contrairement \u00e0 ce qui est observable dans le secteur, sont assez rares.<\/p>\n
Parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 la constitution de grands groupes nationaux, seules quelques op\u00e9rations transfrontali\u00e8res ont eu lieu.\u00a0Les transactions sortant du cadre national concernaient principalement les pays voisins comme Merita\/ Nordbanken en Finlande et en Su\u00e8de, Merita Nordbanken\/ Unidanmark entre la Finlande, la Su\u00e8de et le Danemark, Merita Nordbanken\/ Christiana en Finlande, en Su\u00e8de et en Norv\u00e8ge.\u00a0Citons \u00e9galement les op\u00e9rations Hypo Vereinsbank\/ Bank Austria entre l\u2019Allemagne et l\u2019Autriche, Cera\/ Kredietbank et ING\/ BBL aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique, ING\/ BHF Bank, ABN Amro\/ Delbr\u00fcck, ING\/ Entrium et ABN Amro \/ BethmannMaffei aux Pays-Bas et Allemagne, Cr\u00e9dit local de France\/ Cr\u00e9dit communal de Belgique pour former Dexia.\u00a0Ce dernier s\u2019est ensuite concentr\u00e9, en 2001, avec le belge Art\u00e9sia Banking Corp et le n\u00e9erlandais Kempen.\u00a0Il faut \u00e9galement citer les fusions entre BSCH et une partie du groupe Champalimaud en Espagne et au Portugal, et enfin les op\u00e9rations franco-britanniques HSBC\/CCF et Egg\/Zebank.\u00a0A noter enfin qu\u2019en 2004, l\u2019Espagnol Santander rach\u00e8te le britannique Abbey National.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration constitue une v\u00e9ritable concentration d\u2019\u00e9chelle paneurop\u00e9enne dans la banque de d\u00e9tail.\u00a0Le mouvement transfrontalier de ces acteurs s\u2019explique notamment par l\u2019absence de cibles domestiques alternatives.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration constitue une v\u00e9ritable concentration d\u2019\u00e9chelle paneurop\u00e9enne dans la banque de d\u00e9tail.\u00a0Le mouvement transfrontalier de ces acteurs s\u2019explique notamment par l\u2019absence de cibles domestiques alternatives.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration constitue une v\u00e9ritable concentration d\u2019\u00e9chelle paneurop\u00e9enne dans la banque de d\u00e9tail.<\/p>\n
42. \u2013 Les diff\u00e9rences de culture, d\u2019\u00e9loignement g\u00e9ographique, de langue rendent plus difficile la mutualisation des ressources et notamment des back-offices.\u00a0Les synergies \u00e9mergent moins facilement sur le plan commercial, notamment en raison de la difficult\u00e9 suppl\u00e9mentaire d\u2019homog\u00e9n\u00e9iser des marques g\u00e9ographiquement dissoci\u00e9es.\u00a0Mais selon nous, la difficult\u00e9 fondamentale r\u00e9side dans les disparit\u00e9s des r\u00e9glementations ainsi que dans les protections dont b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient les activit\u00e9s des banques, comme l\u2019ont soulign\u00e9 des exemples r\u00e9cents.\u00a0En effet, les autorit\u00e9s norv\u00e9giennes, par exemple, ont longtemps refus\u00e9 l\u2019offre de Merita-Nordbanken sur Christiania avant de donner leur accord.\u00a0Les autorit\u00e9s portugaises se sont \u00e9galement oppos\u00e9es au rachat du groupe BPSM-MC par BSCH et l\u2019intervention de la Commission europ\u00e9enne a \u00e9t\u00e9 n\u00e9cessaire pour permettre un d\u00e9blocage partiel.\u00a0Ce dernier cas est exemplaire.\u00a0En soutenant cette op\u00e9ration,<\/p>\n
43. \u2013 En principe, il est donc d\u00e9sormais impossible de s\u2019opposer aux concentrations bancaires initi\u00e9es par les op\u00e9rateurs europ\u00e9ens.\u00a0Cela serait contraire aux principes du march\u00e9 bancaire unique et au droit communautaire de la concurrence.\u00a0Mais il est pertinent de noter que la protection du droit \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re, par Bruxelles, n\u2019est pas suffisante pour rendre ce droit effectif.\u00a0En effet, il existe de nombreux autres obstacles qui proviennent du manque d\u2019harmonisation europ\u00e9enne des lois, de la fiscalit\u00e9 et de la comptabilit\u00e9.\u00a0On sera donc amen\u00e9 \u00e0 s\u2019interroger sur une \u00e9ventuelle harmonisation europ\u00e9enne.\u00a0Une directive sur les aspects juridiques des fusions entre soci\u00e9t\u00e9s d\u2019Etats membres diff\u00e9rents est toujours en pr\u00e9paration, tandis que la directive CEE du 23\/07\/1990, relative au r\u00e9gime fiscal de ces m\u00eames fusions, a \u00e9t\u00e9 transpos\u00e9e en droit fran\u00e7ais.\u00a0Cette absence de r\u00e9gulation justifie en partie la pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence pour les op\u00e9rations nationales, outre le fait que les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques privil\u00e9gient d\u2019abord le renforcement de leur territoire national avant d\u2019avoir une politique de croissance internationale.\u00a0La tendance \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re ne peut s\u2019\u00e9panouir que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la r\u00e9glementation applicable \u00e0 ces concentrations est parfaitement connue.\u00a0outre le fait que les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques privil\u00e9gient d\u2019abord leur renforcement sur leur territoire national avant d\u2019avoir une politique de croissance internationale.\u00a0La tendance \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re ne peut s\u2019\u00e9panouir que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la r\u00e9glementation applicable \u00e0 ces concentrations est parfaitement connue.\u00a0outre le fait que les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques privil\u00e9gient d\u2019abord leur renforcement sur leur territoire national avant d\u2019avoir une politique de croissance internationale.\u00a0La tendance \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re ne peut s\u2019\u00e9panouir que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la r\u00e9glementation applicable \u00e0 ces concentrations est parfaitement connue.<\/p>\n
44. \u2013 European banks will have to merge and the legal system will have to offer them the means to do so, \u201cit is a question of rationality\u201d. Consequently, the consolidation of national banking systems, the harmonization of rules of law and the control of concentrations should constitute a prerequisite for profound transformations at European level.<\/p>\n
45. \u2013 Selon la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration bancaire europ\u00e9enne, 2 955 banques commerciales sont pr\u00e9sentes en Europe occidentale avec un total d\u2019actifs de 9 144 milliards d\u2019euros, op\u00e9rant \u00e0 travers 99 456 agences et succursales et employant 1,84 million d\u2019employ\u00e9s.\u00a0En France, le poids \u00e9conomique du syst\u00e8me bancaire est \u00e9galement consid\u00e9rable et d\u00e9cisif.\u00a0Elle emploie 423 798 personnes, traite 3,4 milliards d\u2019euros de paiements par ch\u00e8ques, cartes ou virements et g\u00e8re l\u2019essentiel des cr\u00e9dits \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9conomie, soit 1 176,7 milliards d\u2019euros.\u00a0L\u2019\u00e9quilibre de cet \u00e9difice et sa stabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 moyen terme seront n\u00e9cessairement boulevers\u00e9s avec \u00e0 la clef une redistribution des parts de march\u00e9 et une recomposition des forces en pr\u00e9sence qui se traduira par un nombre beaucoup plus r\u00e9duit d\u2019entit\u00e9s en Europe.\u00a0Les chiffres sont r\u00e9v\u00e9lateurs.\u00a0Il y avait 12 500 \u00e9tablissements bancaires en Europe en 1990. Il n\u2019en restait plus que 8 000 en 2000.\u00a0En 1998 et 1999, 188 op\u00e9rations en capital ont concern\u00e9 des banques europ\u00e9ennes.\u00a0Le montant des actifs qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9chang\u00e9s fonde la th\u00e8se que ces op\u00e9rations sont de plus en plus colossales.\u00a0Ainsi, le nombre de fusions et acquisitions de plus de 500 millions de francs, concernant des banques europ\u00e9ennes, est pass\u00e9 de 54 en 1994 \u00e0 98 en 1998. En 1994, 109 milliards de francs ont fait l\u2019objet d\u2019\u00e9changes contre 710 milliards de francs en 1998 et 923 milliards de francs en 1999. Cette course \u00e0 la taille et aux parts de march\u00e9 menace de d\u00e9stabiliser le syst\u00e8me bancaire et financier.\u00a0De plus, cette \u00e9volution augmentera consid\u00e9rablement les risques de monopolisation et de cartellisation.\u00a0Le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne appelle en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 un renforcement du syst\u00e8me assurant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire et financier,\u00a0mais aussi une accentuation du contr\u00f4le des autorit\u00e9s charg\u00e9es de surveiller la concurrence sur le march\u00e9.\u00a0Il faut donc rechercher la m\u00e9thode pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9e pour tenter de proposer une r\u00e9gulation de ce mouvement.<\/p>\n
III\/ M\u00e9thodologie pour une nouvelle approche des concentrations bancaires<\/p>\n
46. \u200b\u200b\u2013 L\u2019approche adopt\u00e9e doit \u00eatre juridique (A), mais il convient d\u2019aller au-del\u00e0 de cette vision monodisciplinaire gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une analyse interdisciplinaire (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ Comprendre le processus de concentration bancaire par la loi<\/p>\n
47. \u2013 L\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel des concentrations bancaires r\u00e9side dans leur particularit\u00e9.\u00a0La principale raison de cette situation tient au fait que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est sp\u00e9cifique car il est d\u00e9positaire de fonds appartenant \u00e0 autrui, notamment sous forme de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts \u00e0 restituer ult\u00e9rieurement.\u00a0C\u2019est le principal d\u00e9tenteur de liquidit\u00e9s mais aussi le principal fournisseur de services de paiement d\u2019o\u00f9 proviennent la quasi-totalit\u00e9 des transactions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dans l\u2019\u00e9conomie.\u00a0Enfin, c\u2019est de lui que d\u00e9pendent r\u00e9ellement le bon fonctionnement et l\u2019efficacit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, \u00e0 travers le processus d\u2019interm\u00e9diation financi\u00e8re.\u00a0Ainsi, c\u2019est un \u00e9l\u00e9ment vital de presque toutes les transactions \u00e9conomiques.<\/p>\n
48. \u2013 La loi a donc notamment pour objet de pr\u00e9venir le risque syst\u00e9mique propre au syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Cela g\u00e9n\u00e8re un traitement juridique sp\u00e9cifique des concentrations bancaires.\u00a0Cette sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 se traduit par un contr\u00f4le plus approfondi que celui appliqu\u00e9 aux autres secteurs \u00e9conomiques.\u00a0Ce contr\u00f4le suppl\u00e9mentaire est r\u00e9gi par le droit bancaire.<\/p>\n
49. \u2013 Un r\u00e9gime d\u2019autorisation pr\u00e9alable des concentrations bancaires est organis\u00e9 par l\u2019article L. 611-1 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier.\u00a0Ce dernier habilite le ministre charg\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie \u00e0 fixer les conditions dans lesquelles des participations directes ou indirectes peuvent \u00eatre prises, \u00e9tendues ou transf\u00e9r\u00e9es dans des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit et les conditions permettant \u00e0 ces \u00e9tablissements de prendre des participations.\u00a0Le r\u00e8glement n\u00b0 96-16 du 20\/12\/1996 du Comit\u00e9 de la R\u00e9glementation Bancaire et Financi\u00e8re a ainsi pr\u00e9vu l\u2019autorisation pr\u00e9alable de toute modification majeure dans la composition des apporteurs de capitaux afin d\u2019assurer la solidit\u00e9 financi\u00e8re de l\u2019entreprise.<\/p>\n
50. \u2013 Par ailleurs, la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 de l\u2019appr\u00e9hension juridique des concentrations bancaires est mat\u00e9rialis\u00e9e par la d\u00e9licate coordination, voire les conflits entre, d\u2019une part, le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, le droit boursier et, d\u2019autre part, le droit bancaire.\u00a0Les fusions bancaires ne remettent pas seulement en cause ces trois droits particuliers.\u00a0Elles entra\u00eenent \u00e9galement la rencontre de ces branches avec le droit commun, in\u00e9vitable dans l\u2019ordre juridique fran\u00e7ais o\u00f9 les droits sp\u00e9ciaux ne peuvent totalement chasser le droit priv\u00e9 fondamental.<\/p>\n
51. \u2013 Par exemple, un conflit entre le droit bancaire et le droit des contrats ne peut \u00eatre \u00e9vit\u00e9.\u00a0En effet, sur la base du droit des contrats, les parties sont libres d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir et de vendre leurs parts dans une soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Toutefois, le CECEI soumet l\u2019autorisation de prise de participation dans une banque \u00e0 un accord entre les banques.<\/p>\n
52. \u2013 De m\u00eame, le conflit entre le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s et le droit bancaire est manifeste.\u00a0En effet, le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s d\u00e9finit la notion de contr\u00f4le d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Toutefois, le droit bancaire ne renvoie pas \u00e0 la d\u00e9finition de l\u2019article L. 233-3 du Code de commerce.<\/p>\n
53. \u2013 Enfin, le conflit entre le droit bancaire et le droit boursier est \u00e9vident.\u00a0L\u2019op\u00e9ration est soumise au contr\u00f4le de la loi bancaire, qui assure le bon fonctionnement du syst\u00e8me bancaire et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des clients.\u00a0Il pr\u00e9voit notamment les conditions d\u2019autorisation des prises de participation dans les banques.\u00a0Le droit boursier, quant \u00e0 lui, agit en faveur du bon fonctionnement des march\u00e9s financiers.\u00a0Il pr\u00e9voit les conditions de recevabilit\u00e9 des offres publiques et leur d\u00e9roulement.\u00a0La rencontre de ces deux droits engendre un conflit de droits sp\u00e9ciaux.<\/p>\n
54. \u2013 Ainsi, le probl\u00e8me majeur est celui de l\u2019articulation des diff\u00e9rentes branches du droit.\u00a0En effet, la mise en \u0153uvre du droit bancaire s\u2019oppose \u00e0 de nombreuses r\u00e8gles juridiques issues d\u2019autres branches du droit.\u00a0Le droit applicable aux concentrations bancaires r\u00e9v\u00e8le donc un certain nombre d\u2019incertitudes qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 en partie lev\u00e9es par le l\u00e9gislateur ou qu\u2019il convient de lever.<\/p>\n
55. \u2013 En d\u00e9finitive, la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire implique une adaptation de la loi.\u00a0D\u00e8s lors, il serait pertinent de s\u2019interroger sur l\u2019\u00e9mergence d\u2019un droit de la concentration bancaire.\u00a0Cependant, cet exercice est d\u00e9licat pour deux raisons.\u00a0D\u2019une part, le droit applicable aux concentrations bancaires n\u2019est sp\u00e9cifique qu\u2019occasionnellement.\u00a0Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, il semble que dans certains cas, la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire soit prise en compte dans le droit de la fusion, alors que dans d\u2019autres cas, le droit \u00ab commun \u00bb de la fusion s\u2019applique pleinement.\u00a0D\u2019autre part, les bases de ce syst\u00e8me sont dispers\u00e9es dans plusieurs branches du droit.\u00a0En effet, la concentration bancaire pr\u00e9sente autant d\u2019expressions qu\u2019elle concerne de disciplines.\u00a0Cependant, les disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es sont nombreuses : droit des contrats, droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, droit des privatisations, droit bancaire, droit des march\u00e9s financiers, droit de la concurrence, droit des valeurs mobili\u00e8res et droit du travail.\u00a0La dynamique impos\u00e9e par la concentration bancaire cristallise les orientations constituant l\u2019ossature de ce r\u00e9gime juridique.\u00a0En l\u2019absence d\u2019un r\u00e9gime juridique exhaustif, il puise dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs de son propre r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Cela suppose un ensemble de r\u00e8gles et de contr\u00f4les emprunt\u00e9s aux disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es, mais aussi un mode de r\u00e9solution adapt\u00e9 aux conflits n\u00e9s du choc des multiples dispositions en pr\u00e9sence.\u00a0La dynamique impos\u00e9e par la concentration bancaire cristallise les orientations constituant l\u2019ossature de ce r\u00e9gime juridique.\u00a0En l\u2019absence d\u2019un r\u00e9gime juridique exhaustif, il puise dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs de son propre r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Cela suppose un ensemble de r\u00e8gles et de contr\u00f4les emprunt\u00e9s aux disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es,\u00a0mais aussi un mode de r\u00e9solution adapt\u00e9 aux conflits n\u00e9s du choc des multiples dispositions en pr\u00e9sence.\u00a0La dynamique impos\u00e9e par la concentration bancaire cristallise les orientations constituant l\u2019ossature de ce r\u00e9gime juridique.\u00a0En l\u2019absence d\u2019un r\u00e9gime juridique exhaustif, il puise dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs de son propre r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Cela suppose un ensemble de r\u00e8gles et de contr\u00f4les emprunt\u00e9s aux disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es, mais aussi un mode de r\u00e9solution adapt\u00e9 aux conflits n\u00e9s du choc des multiples dispositions en pr\u00e9sence.\u00a0elle puise dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs de son propre r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Cela suppose un ensemble de r\u00e8gles et de contr\u00f4les emprunt\u00e9s aux disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es, mais aussi un mode de r\u00e9solution adapt\u00e9 aux conflits n\u00e9s du choc des multiples dispositions en pr\u00e9sence.\u00a0elle puise dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs de son propre r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Cela suppose un ensemble de r\u00e8gles et de contr\u00f4les emprunt\u00e9s aux disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es, mais aussi un mode de r\u00e9solution adapt\u00e9 aux conflits n\u00e9s du choc des multiples dispositions en pr\u00e9sence.<\/p>\n
56. \u2013 Atteinte \u00e0 l\u2019autonomie m\u00eame relative des branches du droit, le manque de coordination entre elles, avec le droit bancaire notamment, est \u00e0 l\u2019origine de conflits qui s\u2019av\u00e8rent difficiles \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre.\u00a0Ainsi, la complexit\u00e9 des r\u00e8gles et contr\u00f4les r\u00e9gissant la r\u00e9alisation des concentrations bancaires et leur appartenance \u00e0 des disciplines juridiques distinctes g\u00e9n\u00e8rent des difficult\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
57. \u2013 The solution certainly lies in better interpenetration of the branches of law within the judicial system.\u00a0This would, in our opinion, reduce the divergences between the different branches of law which have unifying objectives.\u00a0Banking concentration would constitute a legal concept bridging several legal disciplines, bringing them together and going beyond their autonomy.\u00a0This would allow it to be subject to a unitary legal regime.\u00a0This argument militates for an interdisciplinarity internal to the law but also external.<\/span><\/p>\nB\/ Interdisciplinary understanding of the banking concentration process<\/span><\/p>\n58. \u2013 The multidimensional nature of the phenomenon of banking concentration does not seem to lend itself to an analysis based on a single discipline. Thus, a legal approach to the movement implies a certain openness. It is therefore preferable to try to adopt an interdisciplinary method. This will be all the more reliable if its field of action is concretely defined.<\/p>\n
Multidisciplinarity is topical in legal sciences. Mr. Claude Champaud affirms that \u201cunless we persevere in a purely normative, immanent and quasi-biblical conception of law, we must consider the legal rule as the result of economic, social, political and cultural forces which are exercised at a given moment\u201d .<\/p>\n
Mr. G\u00e9rard Farjat, another precursor of economic law, also strongly called for reasoning based on the confrontation of several disciplines. He recommended in particular for the specialist in economic law, in addition to legal and economic approaches, the use of comparative methods. According to this author, developments in economic law are often underpinned by comparisons between formal and substantive legal structures. However, G\u00e9rard Farjat was led to point out one of the unavoidable limits of the generalist approach, the risk of knowing only superficially each notion studied without completely dominating the area covered. To avoid this pitfall, the author recommends teamwork with specialists in each discipline.<\/p>\n
Quiconque m\u00e8ne une \u00e9tude individuelle ne peut envisager cette possibilit\u00e9.\u00a0Cependant, s\u2019il est convaincu de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019une analyse liant les probl\u00e8mes juridiques aux ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes sociaux et \u00e9conomiques sans pour autant poss\u00e9der les connaissances approfondies indispensables \u00e0 une v\u00e9ritable pluridisciplinarit\u00e9, le chercheur peut alors tenter de s\u2019engager dans la voie de l\u2019interdisciplinarit\u00e9.\u00a0Dans ce cas, il s\u2019agit d\u2019\u00e9tablir un dialogue avec diff\u00e9rentes sciences humaines d\u2019un domaine pr\u00e9cis \u2013 celui du droit \u2013 en soumettant l\u2019objet \u00e9tudi\u00e9 aux \u00e9clairages d\u2019autres disciplines.<\/p>\n
Il est donc \u00e9minemment n\u00e9cessaire d\u2019adopter un discours fait d\u2019une dialectique permanente entre droit, \u00e9conomie, gestion et politique.\u00a0C\u2019est dans cet esprit que cette th\u00e8se sur les fusions-acquisitions bancaires sera abord\u00e9e.<\/p>\n
59. \u2013 Concr\u00e8tement, il s\u2019agira d\u2019abord de recourir \u00e0 une approche interdisciplinaire interne au droit.\u00a0En effet, la liste des notions ou m\u00e9canismes juridiques auxquels renvoie la seule r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 la concentration bancaire est tr\u00e8s longue.\u00a0Ainsi, cette \u00e9tude n\u00e9cessite de puiser dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs d\u2019un r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Toute tentative de syst\u00e9matisation de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne suppose un mode d\u2019appr\u00e9hension complexe n\u00e9cessitant une lecture crois\u00e9e des diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
Il en r\u00e9sultera une tentative de d\u00e9passement de la distinction entre droit public et droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0La remise en cause de cette division du droit semble f\u00e9conde dans un examen du mouvement de concentration bancaire.\u00a0A cette occasion, la logique \u00ab publiciste \u00bb ainsi que la logique \u00ab privatiste \u00bb doivent \u00eatre prises en compte simultan\u00e9ment.\u00a0Rappelons que le professeur G\u00e9rard Farjat assimile la loi de la concentration \u00e0 la loi de la \u00ab collectivisation des biens de production et de l\u2019organisation de l\u2019\u00e9conomie par les pouvoirs publics ou priv\u00e9s \u00bb.<\/p>\n
Cela conduit \u00e0 une alt\u00e9ration de la distinction entre droit public et droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0Traditionnellement, le droit public est le droit de l\u2019\u00c9tat dans ses relations avec les citoyens.\u00a0Ce qui caract\u00e9rise la norme publique, c\u2019est l\u2019acte unilat\u00e9ral symbole d\u2019autorit\u00e9, de commandement.\u00a0En revanche, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile est fond\u00e9e sur le contrat librement n\u00e9goci\u00e9.\u00a0Cependant, force est de constater qu\u2019il existe des sources de droit priv\u00e9es et mixtes qui concurrencent les sources publiques de droit.<\/p>\n
Par exemple, les accords d\u2019entreprise sont une source de droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0Dans de nombreuses concentrations, les banques trouvent des solutions par le biais d\u2019accords sociaux sur l\u2019emploi.\u00a0Ces derniers mettent en \u00e9vidence une d\u00e9centralisation du droit.\u00a0Ils font de l\u2019entreprise le lieu privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 de la production du droit.\u00a0Ils permettent une adaptation, une cr\u00e9ation de r\u00e8gles correspondant aux besoins sp\u00e9cifiques de la banque lors de sa concentration.\u00a0Par ailleurs, les pratiques et r\u00e8gles \u00e9tablies dans les entreprises et formalis\u00e9es dans les accords ont pour effet soit d\u2019\u00eatre prises en compte et ent\u00e9rin\u00e9es par la loi, soit de rendre certaines normes \u00ab inefficaces \u00bb.<\/p>\n
Les sources mixtes du droit remettent \u00e9galement en cause la distinction traditionnelle entre droit public et droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0On parle ici d\u2019autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes.\u00a0Ils sont \u00e0 l\u2019intersection des pouvoirs publics et priv\u00e9s.\u00a0Leur cr\u00e9ation permet de d\u00e9passer une contradiction entre la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019une intervention \u00e9conomique de l\u2019\u00c9tat li\u00e9e \u00e0 la concentration et le principe de s\u00e9paration du pouvoir politique et du pouvoir \u00e9conomique.\u00a0La cr\u00e9ation d\u2019autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes permet de mener une politique publique qui ne d\u00e9pend pas d\u2019un d\u00e9partement minist\u00e9riel.\u00a0Ils sont le r\u00e9sultat de l\u2019action de l\u2019\u00c9tat et des forces du march\u00e9.\u00a0Ils permettent ainsi de concilier politiques publiques et politiques de march\u00e9.<\/p>\n
60. \u2013 It will then be necessary to apply external interdisciplinarity. The task is then delicate because the lawyer must integrate extra-legal data into his reasoning. It is a question of appealing to notions of economy, finance, management and politics.<\/p>\n
61. \u2013 Ultimately, it will be a matter of determining whether there is a need for the law to take into consideration the economic specificity of banking activities. In other words, should banking concentrations be subject to specific legal treatment? More precisely, in which hypothesis is the law of concentration forced to take into account the banking specificity?<\/p>\n
62. \u2013 It is therefore essential to seek the principle which justifies the intervention of provisions specific to the banking system. These constitute a source of vigor by inspiring confidence in the clientele. However, excessive or inappropriate regulation is harmful because it constitutes an obstacle to restructuring. Thus, it is important to find a compromise between the prudential rules which favor the sector by protecting the stability of its structure and the excessive provisions which are harmful to it.<\/p>\n
63. \u2013 Our hypothesis is to demonstrate that the existence of banking specificities is only consistent when it comes to protecting the banking and financial system. Logically, when the protection of the latter is no longer concerned, the \u201ccommon\u201d merger law should fully apply. A legal consecration of banking specificity will therefore be demonstrated in the context of the protection of the banking and financial system (1st part). In line with this reasoning, a gradual decline in banking specificity may be observed in the absence of any need to protect the system (2nd part).<\/p>\n
First part: The legal consecration of banking and financial specificity<\/p>\n
64. \u2013 Les fusions bancaires pr\u00e9sentent des similitudes avec les fusions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dans d\u2019autres secteurs de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, mais les obstacles \u00e0 la r\u00e9alisation de telles op\u00e9rations sont beaucoup plus nombreux et complexes.\u00a0En effet, elles posent des probl\u00e8mes sp\u00e9cifiques li\u00e9s \u00e0 leurs conditions institutionnelles, leurs interactions avec les enjeux de politique mon\u00e9taire et les exigences prudentielles li\u00e9es notamment \u00e0 l\u2019existence d\u2019un risque syst\u00e9mique.\u00a0Ainsi, la grande originalit\u00e9 des concentrations bancaires r\u00e9side dans l\u2019existence d\u2019autorit\u00e9s charg\u00e9es du contr\u00f4le des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit, ce qui fait que le principe dans le secteur bancaire n\u2019est pas la libert\u00e9 totale de restructuration mais la libert\u00e9 contr\u00f4l\u00e9e.\u00a0L\u2019objectif principal est de contr\u00f4ler la nouvelle composition de l\u2019actionnariat,<\/p>\n
65. \u2013 Successivamente, alcune disposizioni della legge bancaria del 24\/01\/1984 determinano una concentrazione in deroga al diritto societario.\u00a0Infatti, nel caso in cui un istituto di credito pregiudichi la sicurezza dei depositanti, la Commission Bancaire ha la facolt\u00e0 di \u201cportare la questione al Tribunal de Grande Instance affinch\u00e9 (\u2026) la vendita delle azioni detenute da uno o pi\u00f9 de jure o azionisti di fatto.\u00a0Il tribunale pu\u00f2 anche ordinare il trasferimento di tutte le quote dello stabilimento.\u00a0La vendita forzata \u00e8 quindi qui uno strumento di concentrazione con l’obiettivo di tutelare l’intero sistema bancario.\u00a0Certo, la possibilit\u00e0 di una vendita forzata di azioni pu\u00f2 richiamare quella dell’articolo L. 621-59 del codice di commercio,\u00a0che il tribunale commerciale pu\u00f2 ordinare tale esproprio quando la sopravvivenza della societ\u00e0 lo richiede.\u00a0Ma ai sensi della legge bancaria, il trasferimento in questione pu\u00f2 essere prescritto anche al di fuori del procedimento collettivo.\u00a0Per motivi di simmetria, gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando la situazione finanziaria degli stabilimenti interessati lo giustifichi, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di questi stabilimenti affiliati nonch\u00e9 l’intero o il trasferimento di la loro propriet\u00e0 commerciale. .\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0il trasferimento in questione pu\u00f2 essere prescritto anche al di fuori del procedimento collettivo.\u00a0Per amore della simmetria,\u00a0gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando lo giustifichi la situazione patrimoniale degli enti interessati, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di tali enti convenzionati nonch\u00e9 il trasferimento totale o parziale del loro patrimonio aziendale.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0il trasferimento in questione pu\u00f2 essere prescritto anche al di fuori del procedimento collettivo.\u00a0Per motivi di simmetria, gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando la situazione finanziaria degli stabilimenti interessati lo giustifichi, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di questi stabilimenti affiliati nonch\u00e9 l’intero o il trasferimento di la loro propriet\u00e0 commerciale. .\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0il trasferimento in questione pu\u00f2 essere prescritto anche al di fuori del procedimento collettivo.\u00a0Per motivi di simmetria, gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando la situazione finanziaria degli stabilimenti interessati lo giustifichi, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di questi stabilimenti affiliati nonch\u00e9 l’intero o il trasferimento di la loro propriet\u00e0 commerciale. .\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0il trasferimento in questione pu\u00f2 essere prescritto anche al di fuori del procedimento collettivo.\u00a0Per motivi di simmetria, gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando la situazione finanziaria degli stabilimenti interessati lo giustifichi, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di questi stabilimenti affiliati nonch\u00e9 l’intero o il trasferimento di la loro propriet\u00e0 commerciale. .\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando lo giustifichi la situazione patrimoniale degli enti interessati, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di tali enti convenzionati nonch\u00e9 il trasferimento totale o parziale del loro patrimonio aziendale.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0gli organi centrali delle reti mutualistiche e cooperative hanno anche la possibilit\u00e0, quando lo giustifichi la situazione patrimoniale degli enti interessati, di decidere la fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di tali enti convenzionati nonch\u00e9 il trasferimento totale o parziale del loro patrimonio aziendale.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0decidere in merito alla fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di tali stabilimenti affiliati nonch\u00e9 al trasferimento totale o parziale del loro patrimonio aziendale.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.\u00a0decidere in merito alla fusione di due o pi\u00f9 di tali stabilimenti affiliati nonch\u00e9 al trasferimento totale o parziale del loro patrimonio aziendale.\u00a0Si tratta di fare strage di diritto societario, escludendo qualsiasi decisione dell’assemblea dei soci.<\/span><\/p>\n66. \u2013 La specificit\u00e0 bancaria e finanziaria \u00e8 quindi presa in considerazione nei meccanismi di concentrazione (Titolo 1) e correlativamente gli stessi controlli appaiono specifici con l’obiettivo di tutelare il sistema bancario e finanziario (Titolo 2).<\/span><\/p>\nTitolo 1: Considerazione della specificit\u00e0 bancaria e finanziaria nei meccanismi di concentrazione<\/span><\/p>\n67. \u2013 \u00ab Il faudrait avoir en droit une science des m\u00e9canismes juridiques (\u2026) Nous d\u00e9cririons et classerions les m\u00e9canismes utilis\u00e9s pour les cr\u00e9ations et les transferts de propri\u00e9t\u00e9, de droits et d\u2019obligations (\u2026).\u00a0Ce m\u00e9canisme juridique ne serait pas sans int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00bb.\u00a0Ainsi, Dean Ripert a soulign\u00e9 l\u2019importance des m\u00e9canismes juridiques.\u00a0Or, dans son esprit, ce terme renvoyait \u00e0 des techniques aussi disparates que les lettres de change, les op\u00e9rations boursi\u00e8res ou les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s par actions.\u00a0Le sens utilis\u00e9 dans cette \u00e9tude est n\u00e9cessairement plus restrictif.\u00a0En effet, seules les techniques juridiques permettant la r\u00e9alisation de la concentration sont envisag\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
68. \u2013 Les autorit\u00e9s bancaires restent neutres quant au dispositif juridique permettant de r\u00e9aliser la concentration.\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, il convient de noter qu\u2019elles proc\u00e8dent \u00e0 des contr\u00f4les rigoureux afin de garantir la bonne gestion des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Par exemple, contrairement \u00e0 d\u2019autres secteurs de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, les initiateurs d\u2019une reprise doivent pr\u00e9senter des garanties suffisantes ;\u00a0dans le cas contraire, les autorit\u00e9s bancaires ont le pouvoir d\u2019interdire l\u2019op\u00e9ration.\u00a0En outre, ce dernier peut s\u2019opposer \u00e0 une fusion bancaire, notamment si l\u2019absorption fait courir un risque excessif \u00e0 l\u2019entit\u00e9 absorbante en raison d\u2019une concentration importante des risques.<\/p>\n
69. \u2013 Finally, the protectionist attitude of certain countries is particularly acute in the context of banking concentrations, as recent examples show. Some States prohibit or limit the establishment of foreign credit institutions on their territory by providing for very heavy legal constraints. Obviously, this complicates and slows down banking concentrations. Thus, the Norwegian authorities have long refused the offer of Merita-Nordbanken on Christiania before giving their approval. The Portuguese authorities opposed the takeover of the BPSM-MC group by BSCH and the intervention of the European Commission was necessary to allow a partial unblocking.<\/p>\n
70. \u2013 We will therefore demonstrate that account is taken of the specific nature of banking and finance in concentration mechanisms in domestic law (chapter 1) as well as in Community law (chapter 2).<\/p>\n
Chapter 1: Concentration mechanisms in domestic law<\/p>\n
71. \u2013 It should be noted that financiers and economists too often refer to the term \u201cmergers\u201d as operations which, from a legal point of view, only result in acquisitions of shares of companies without merger between the entities concerned which remain legally distinct. The rigor of the jurist is not satisfied with this. This is the reason why it is necessary to make an essential distinction.
The merger and the takeover are thus distinguished by the nature of the object of the obligations of the parties. With regard to the merger, the obligation of the absorbed or combined bank is to make the contributions while for the beneficiary company, it is a question of settling the net assets contributed by means of social rights. With regard to the takeover, the beneficiary bank\u2019s obligation will simply be to pay the acquisition price for the shares of the target. There is therefore a fundamental distinction in the mode of settlement of the concentration. Indeed, within the framework of the merger, a settlement by means of social rights distributed among the partners of the company or companies absorbed or combined must take place. This requirement highlights that the holders of the capital of the absorbed or combined companies remain \u201cstakeholders\u201d in the new unit resulting from the merger. This criterion therefore makes it possible to distinguish the merger (section 2) from other concentration operations such as the acquisition of control (section 1).<\/p>\n
Section 1: Acquisitions of control<\/p>\n
72. \u2013 As P. Coupaye points out: \u201cthe constitution of banking groups which occupy a dominant position on the market was carried out (\u2026) through numerous equity investments. This concentration has generally taken place through takeovers of existing companies. During this period, we sometimes witnessed large-scale stock market maneuvers to ensure control of the coveted establishment or establishments\u201d. The author alludes to the famous battle between the Suez and Paribas groups, with regard to CIC: given the 1966 legislation, the investment banks expressed the desire to widen their room for maneuver, by taking an interest in the banks depository with a sufficiently extensive network of counters. In this context, the banks Paribas and Suez engaged in a severe financial confrontation in 1968 to take control of CIC. After many stock market adventures, the Suez group took control of CIC, but sold 80% of the capital of the Banque de l\u2019Union Parisienne to Paribas in 1971. The Cr\u00e9dit Commercial de France banking group was essentially formed by taking control of existing units. In a first phase, it strengthened its geographical presence by taking stakes in local or regional banks as well as in specialized establishments. In 1965, the CCF took stakes in the Regional Bank of Artois, in Finindus, in the Pierre Brun et fils bank, in 1966 in the Kolb bank and in the Borgeaud bank, in 1967 in two rediscount houses Morrhange et Cie , as well as Union d\u2019Escompte, in 1968 in Banque Rivaud, in 1971 in Banque de Savoie, in 1972 in Banque Derobert. These concentration operations are interesting because they show that the beginnings of the concentration movement go back several decades. However, it should be noted that these concentration operations are small in scale compared to recent takeovers. Since 1996, the concentration movement has truly taken shape. Most of the major French banking groups have experienced numerous operations that have resulted in the takeover of very significant establishments. It can be cited, in 1996, the takeover of Indosuez by Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, in 1997, that of Cr\u00e9dit du Nord by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, in 1998, that of Natexis by the Banques Populaires group and that of CIC by Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel. In 1999, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France was acquired by Caisses d\u2019Epargne, while BNP took control of Paribas. Finally, in 2003, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole succeeded in its public offer for Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais and, in 2004, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France acquired Entenial.<\/p>\n
73. \u2013 These concentrations lead to the creation of complex groups. Indeed, financial links can be established in various ways:
\u2013 a company takes exclusive control of a bank which becomes its subsidiary;
\u2013 several companies can together create a bank which will be their joint subsidiary;
\u2013 several companies may jointly take control of another bank.
We will therefore study the acquisition of exclusive control (\u00a7 1) but also the joint takeover (\u00a7 2) by demonstrating that the banking and financial specificity is taken into account in these modes of concentration.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1: Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of exclusive control<\/p>\n
74. \u2013 In France, the legal acceptance of the notion of control dates from the mid-1980s. This period corresponds to an amplification of the phenomenon of mergers and inaugurates a real legal recognition of the power of control. This legislative consecration is imperfect. Many difficulties are related to the qualification of control (A). The banking object of the operations increases the complexity. This results in a number of issues that are related to the configuration of takeover (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ Difficulties related to the qualification of control<\/p>\n
75. \u2013 These difficulties arise from the development of divergent definitions between the different branches of law (1). Undoubtedly, the fundamental problem lies in the determination of the threshold of the takeover (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Divergent definitions<\/p>\n
76. \u2013 The concept of control is presented as a functional concept whose usefulness has precisely consisted in allowing the legislator and the case law to draw the consequences of the phenomenon of concentration. It is therefore defined punctually according to its use. Thus, a difficulty lies in the fact that there is not one but several acceptations of control whose meaning varies with use. There is undeniably a feeling of heterogeneity.<\/p>\n
77. \u2013 In company law, this notion is considered complex, even fleeting, because of its dynamism and relativity. There is not one but several legal notions of control. If exclusive control is normally acquired by law when a company acquires a majority of the voting rights of a company, it can also be acquired with a \u201cqualified minority\u201d, which can be established by any element of fact or law. . The difficulty arises from the fact that control cannot, in general, result from the mere existence of a capital link between the structures in question. The legislator has therefore attempted, when developing definitions of control, to capture the diversity of control situations.<\/p>\n
Two types of control are envisaged by article L. 233-3 of the Commercial Code. Legal control exists as soon as a company \u201cholds, directly or indirectly, a fraction of the capital giving it the majority of voting rights in general meetings\u201d. De facto control is characterized by the power that the company has, thanks to the voting rights held, to determine decisions at general meetings. This power is presumed when the latter \u201chas, directly or indirectly, a fraction of the voting rights greater than 40% and no other partner or shareholder directly or indirectly holds a fraction greater than his own\u201d.<\/p>\n
78. \u2013 Concerning the consolidated financial statements, article L. 233-16 of the Commercial Code contains a definition of de jure control and de facto control essentially similar to that of article L. 233-3 of the Code of business. Indeed, this article defines de jure control by the holding of the majority of voting rights and de facto control by \u201cthe appointment, for two successive financial years, of the majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervision\u201d with an identical presumption linked to the threshold of holding 40% of the voting rights. Admittedly, it does not expressly refer, like Article L. 233-3 of the Commercial Code, to the power to determine the decisions of general meetings. But it is undeniable that a company having the ability to appoint the majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of another company, holds such power. Ultimately, the only difference between these provisions stems from the fact that Article L. 233-16-II 3\u00b0 of the French Commercial Code also provides that control arises \u201cfrom the right to exercise a dominant influence over a company by virtue of a contract or statutory clauses\u201d. This criterion of control is found in competition law. that control arises \u201cfrom the right to exercise a dominant influence over a company by virtue of a contract or statutory clauses\u201d. This criterion of control is found in competition law. that control arises \u201cfrom the right to exercise a dominant influence over a company by virtue of a contract or statutory clauses\u201d. This criterion of control is found in competition law.<\/p>\n
79. \u2013 Pour le droit de la concurrence, la prise de contr\u00f4le, caract\u00e9ristique n\u00e9cessaire de toute op\u00e9ration de concentration, conf\u00e8re la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019exercer une influence d\u00e9terminante sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 d\u2019une entreprise.\u00a0C\u2019est une notion reprise notamment par le droit fran\u00e7ais, mais aussi par le droit communautaire des concentrations.\u00a0Les articles L. 430-1 du Code de commerce et 3 \u00a7 2 du r\u00e8glement CE n\u00b0.\u00a0qui conf\u00e8rent, seuls ou conjointement et compte tenu des circonstances de fait ou de droit, la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019exercer une influence d\u00e9terminante sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00bb.<\/p>\n
80. \u2013 Les dispositions du droit de la repr\u00e9sentation collective relatives \u00e0 la constitution du comit\u00e9 de groupe visent les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s contr\u00f4l\u00e9es dans les conditions d\u00e9finies aux articles L. 233-1, L. 233-3 et L. 233-16 du code de commerce, mais aussi par influence dominante.\u00a0Cette derni\u00e8re existe toujours lorsque la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 dominante d\u00e9tient une participation d\u2019au moins 10 % du capital de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 domin\u00e9e et que \u00ab la permanence et l\u2019importance des relations de ces soci\u00e9t\u00e9s \u00e9tablissent l\u2019appartenance de l\u2019une et de l\u2019autre \u00e0 une m\u00eame entit\u00e9 \u00e9conomique \u00bb. \u201d.<\/p>\n
81. \u2013 Enfin, le droit bancaire et notamment le droit comptable bancaire retiennent des d\u00e9finitions diff\u00e9rentes de la notion de contr\u00f4le.\u00a0Selon le r\u00e8glement n\u00b0 85-12 du Comit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9glementation bancaire \u00ab une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme contr\u00f4l\u00e9e de mani\u00e8re exclusive lorsque la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e8re d\u00e9tient, directement ou indirectement, une participation au capital et soit la majorit\u00e9 des droits de vote, soit le pouvoir de nommer le majorit\u00e9 des membres des organes d\u2019administration, de direction ou de surveillance.\u00a0Dans les deux cas suivants, l\u2019existence d\u2019un contr\u00f4le exclusif est \u00e9galement pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e :
\u2013 lorsqu\u2019il n\u2019existe pas d\u2019autres actionnaires ou associ\u00e9s d\u00e9tenant ensemble une participation sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle du groupe et d\u00e9tenant chacun plus de 5 % du capital ;\u00a0\u2013 lorsque, notamment, en vertu d\u2019un contrat de gestion ou de clauses statutaires, une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 du groupe y exerce une influence dominante \u00bb.<\/p>\n
82. \u2013 Il semble imprudent d\u2019adopter des d\u00e9finitions diff\u00e9rentes du contr\u00f4le dans les diff\u00e9rentes branches du droit qui visent \u00e0 appr\u00e9hender le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de concentration.\u00a0Un auteur souligne que si \u00ab le pluralisme doctrinal peut \u00eatre source de progr\u00e8s par les r\u00e9flexions et les propositions qu\u2019il implique, en revanche, la diversit\u00e9 juridique engendre la confusion et le doute quant \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d\u2019une notion ;\u00a0il sera difficile d\u2019instituer une r\u00e9glementation coh\u00e9rente (\u2026) si l\u2019on n\u2019arrive pas, au pr\u00e9alable, \u00e0 unifier la notion de contr\u00f4le sur laquelle repose tout l\u2019\u00e9difice \u00bb.\u00a0D\u00e8s lors, certains souhaiteraient que le l\u00e9gislateur intervienne pour donner une d\u00e9finition unitaire du contr\u00f4le.\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, une partie de la doctrine stigmatise les obstacles qui s\u2019opposent \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition unitaire.<\/p>\n
2\/ Les obstacles \u00e0 la fixation d\u2019un seuil unitaire
83. \u2013 En remontant aux cat\u00e9gories juridiques, on peut dire que le contr\u00f4le est le droit de disposer de l\u2019entreprise en tant que propri\u00e9taire.\u00a0La substance du droit de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 classique est le \u00ab jus abutendi \u00bb, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire le droit de disposer.\u00a0En pratique, c\u2019est la possibilit\u00e9 de choisir le mode d\u2019exploitation du bien.\u00a0Ainsi, dans la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 classique, le lien d\u2019appartenance implique la capacit\u00e9 de contr\u00f4ler la propri\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Les aspects d\u2019appartenance et de ma\u00eetrise sont indissociables.<\/p>\n
84. \u2013 Or, c\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment cette relation qui aujourd\u2019hui est souvent rompue.\u00a0Certains actionnaires ne sont que des \u00ab pr\u00eateurs \u00bb, tandis que d\u2019autres contr\u00f4lent des actifs qui ne leur appartiennent pas.<\/p>\n
85. \u2013 The major problem is to know the threshold which will make it possible to qualify the control and consequently the existence of a substantial property right. According to Article L. 233-3-I of the Commercial Code, when a company holds more than 50% of the share capital of another company, we are in the presence of a parent company and its subsidiary in the legal sense. of the term.<\/p>\n
86. \u2013 However, as we have already shown, there is no need to hold more than 50% of the capital of a company to exercise control. In reality, control of a credit institution is very often monopolized by minorities. Indeed, the majority principle combined with the wide dispersion of shares in the public allows certain minority shareholders to exercise power.
Paradoxically, the controlling shareholders are frequently in the minority, whereas the majority in number have no power over social management. It is therefore necessary to dissociate belonging and control. Unquestionably, we can affirm that the ownership of a certain number of shares will allow shareholders to extend their control well beyond what their membership should give them insofar as they will be able to control the totality of the economic activity of the company.<\/p>\n
87. \u2013 It is therefore certain that the level of participation in the capital of a firm does not mean by itself that the bank is controlling. \u201cLarge packages of shares held by a bank can have a neutral meaning from this point of view. Moreover, the intensity of a control is not automatically proportional to the weight of the participation in the capital of a company. With 10%, total control is possible (\u2026)\u201d. Consequently, part of the doctrine proposes to carry out a case-by-case analysis. It would be necessary to know the distribution of the capital, to compare the rate of participation of the various shareholders, the respective weight of their representatives within the board of directors, to take account of the degree of absenteeism.<\/p>\n
88. \u2013 This assertion is not called into question by taking into account the specificity of banking. However, the latter leads to increased complexity. There is an autonomy of the banking texts in the determination of the threshold of the takeover (a). The banking regulator\u2019s interpretation also seems specific (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ The autonomy of banking texts in determining the threshold for taking control<\/p>\n
89. \u2013 Company law, when it defines the notion of control, provides a certain number of thresholds.<\/p>\n
90. \u2013 Banking law, in Article 2 of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996, refers to the acquisition of the effective power of control without defining this notion. This criterion is foreign to the legal qualifications traditionally retained by company law. Thus, the notion of effective control, used on several occasions by banking regulations, is not defined in relation to Article L. 233-3 of the Commercial Code. This is due to the concern to assess on a case-by-case basis the reality of the control exercised, including moreover in establishments whose corporate form is not that of a commercial company. Given that this text does not specify the threshold for holding an effective power of control, it is necessary to try to find other provisions of banking law which could provide some indications.<\/p>\n
91. \u2013 Bank accounting law has attempted to give a very realistic definition of the notion of exclusive control. This is much more precise than that given by company law. Indeed, relatively precise indications are provided as to the determination of the takeover. A company is presumed to be exclusively controlled when there are no other shareholders or partners holding together a stake greater than that of the group and each possessing more than 5% of the company\u2019s capital.<\/p>\n
92. \u2013 In our opinion, this definition is very interesting because it gives a number of indications for setting the threshold for a takeover. However, it is not widely recognized. The banking regulatory authority does not retain this definition either to set the threshold for the takeover.<\/p>\n
b\/ The specificity of the interpretation of the banking regulatory authority in determining the threshold for taking control<\/p>\n
93. \u2013 A major difficulty is therefore to know from what threshold a bank obtains control of its target. This problem was highlighted in the BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas affair. In a decision of 08\/28\/1999, the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee decided that BNP had not obtained \u201ceffective power of control\u201d over Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale with 31.8% of the rights of voting.<\/p>\n
94. \u2013 Thus, if it appears obvious that it is not enough to refer to the rates of the simple majority of 50% of the capital, it is commendable to seek what is the threshold for the acquisition of control of an establishment of credit for the CECEI. This is essential in the banking system because, if the CECEI finds that an initiating company has not succeeded in taking control of its target, it can prohibit it from keeping its stake. This was the case in the BNP\/Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale\/Paribas case. The CECEI found that BNP did not clearly have the effective power to control Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. The Committee considered that, in a non-concerted framework and taking into account the shareholding structure of this establishment, the holding by BNP of such a stake was likely to disrupt the management of Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. However, because of its place within the French banking system, the risk of disruption of its management was likely to thwart the overall functioning of the banking system. The Committee therefore decided not to authorize BNP to hold its stake in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. It can therefore be seen that the CECEI does not want to leave credit institutions in ambiguous situations concerning their control. However, he failed to demonstrate precise thresholds of control. the Committee decided not to authorize BNP to hold its stake in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. It can therefore be seen that the CECEI does not want to leave credit institutions in ambiguous situations concerning their control. However, he failed to demonstrate precise thresholds of control. the Committee decided not to authorize BNP to hold its stake in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. It can therefore be seen that the CECEI does not want to leave credit institutions in ambiguous situations concerning their control. However, he failed to demonstrate precise thresholds of control.<\/p>\n
95. \u2013 First of all, it seems that it can be said that he did not refer to the takeover threshold set by Articles L. 233-3-II and L. 233-16 -II of the Commercial Code. Indeed, an impression of autonomy emerges from the notion of manifest possession of the effective power of control vis-\u00e0-vis that of presumed control. It should nevertheless be specified that the level of participation obtained by BNP in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale prevents any definite conclusion from being drawn on this point.<\/p>\n
96. \u2013 Inoltre, il silenzio della CECEI sui criteri da essa utilizzati rende impossibile avere anche certezza circa l’utilizzo delle nozioni di \u201ccontrollo di fatto\u201d o di \u201cinfluenza determinante\u201d utilizzate dalle autorit\u00e0 interne e comunitarie della concorrenza.\u00a0Da un lato, il controllo de facto richiede una visione retrospettiva della distribuzione dei poteri nella societ\u00e0.\u00a0Si svolge, per definizione, in vista dell’andamento delle assemblee, quindi, nel tempo.\u00a0Nel caso BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas, la CECEI non ha effettuato tale verifica per il contesto e per l’urgenza di risolverlo.\u00a0Sembra che la tutela del sistema bancario e finanziario imponga di non lasciare gli istituti di credito in situazioni di incertezza circa il loro controllo.\u00a0\u00c8 del resto per questo che l’autorizzazione della CECEI interviene a priori prima di ogni adunanza.\u00a0Una tale revisione nel tempo \u00e8 quindi difficile da attuare.\u00a0Per quanto riguarda invece l’utilizzo del concetto di influenza determinante, anche in questo caso si pu\u00f2 stimare che sia stata l’autonomia a prevalere rispetto al 31,8% dei diritti di voto acquisiti dalla BNP.\u00a0Quest’ultimo, infatti, avrebbe potuto esercitare un’influenza determinante a causa della dispersione del resto del capitale e dei diritti di voto.<\/span><\/p>\n97. \u2013 Infine, \u00e8 certo che non \u00e8 stata mantenuta la soglia di subentro fissata dai testi di contabilit\u00e0 bancaria.\u00a0Infatti, come abbiamo gi\u00e0 precisato, vi si presume il controllo quando non vi sono altri soci o soci che detengano insieme una quota superiore a quella del gruppo e possiedano ciascuno pi\u00f9 del 5% del capitale.\u00a0Il BNP ha rispettato questo scenario.\u00a0\u00c8 certo, dunque, che la CECEI ha qui adottato una specifica interpretazione della nozione di controllo.<\/span><\/p>\n98. \u2013 Abbiamo appena evidenziato la complessit\u00e0 della definizione della soglia per l’assunzione del controllo.\u00a0La difficolt\u00e0 \u00e8 ulteriormente aumentata in alcune ipotesi a causa della configurazione dell’acquisizione del controllo.<\/span><\/p>\nB\/ Difficolt\u00e0 legate alla configurazione dell’acquisizione del controllo<\/span><\/p>\n99. \u2013 Nell’acquisizione del controllo di soggetti privati \u200b\u200b(1), pubblici (2) e mutualistici (3) si tiene conto della specificit\u00e0 bancaria e finanziaria.<\/span><\/p>\n1\/ Tenendo conto della specificit\u00e0 bancaria e finanziaria nell’acquisizione del controllo di una banca privata<\/span><\/p>\n100. \u2013 Schematicamente, si possono distinguere due situazioni in cui appare essenziale la tutela del sistema bancario e finanziario.\u00a0La specificit\u00e0 bancaria e finanziaria viene quindi presa in considerazione quando una banca fallisce (a) e quando \u00e8 quotata in borsa (b).<\/span><\/p>\na\/ Tenere conto della specificit\u00e0 bancaria e finanziaria nell’acquisizione del controllo di una banca in dissesto<\/span><\/p>\n101. \u2013 Le procedure concorsuali in una societ\u00e0 sono un fenomeno normale, inevitabile e persino auspicabile quando sono la conseguenza e la punizione per la cattiva amministrazione.<\/span><\/p>\n102. \u2013 Tale ragionamento, a nostro avviso, non \u00e8 trasponibile al sistema bancario.\u00a0Quest’ultimo, infatti, \u00e8 ancora attualmente strettamente associato alla produzione e alla gestione del denaro.\u00a0Certo, questa moneta \u00e8 sempre pi\u00f9 difficile da definire e identificare, in quanto dematerializzata, ma rimane fondamentalmente legata all’idea di fiducia.\u00a0Poich\u00e9 il denaro trasmette fiducia, il fallimento di una banca ha una risonanza molto maggiore rispetto alla procedura concorsuale di un’impresa industriale o commerciale di dimensioni equivalenti.\u00a0Pertanto, le banche in fallimento sono state spesso salvate sotto l’egida dello Stato (\u03b1).\u00a0Se in alcuni casi \u00e8 stato proprio quest’ultimo il vero artefice del salvataggio, ora \u00e8 l’intervento dell’Autorit\u00e0 di vigilanza bancaria ad essere consacrato (\u03b2).<\/span><\/p>\n\u03b1\/ Il salvataggio delle banche sotto l’egida dello Stato<\/span><\/p>\n103. \u2013 The crisis of the 1990s put a large number of French banks in difficulty. The State, not wanting to liquidate them, has frequently launched rescue plans which have resulted in the failing banks being backed by more powerful groups.<\/p>\n
104.\u2013 Let\u2019s take the example of the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs. It is a public limited company under private law to which the State has entrusted a mission of general interest in the construction of housing, which allows it to distribute subsidized loans under various formulas. Since the end of the 1980s, it has been deprived of the distribution of loans assisted with access to property, now reserved solely for Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France.<\/p>\n
Thus, on 02\/17 and 19\/1993, the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs was no longer able to renew certificates of deposit with Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale SICAVs. The latter is in a state of cessation of payments and, technically, in a situation of insolvency.<\/p>\n
With many difficulties, the State manages to set up a rescue of the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs. This is, in his view, the only solution to prevent panic on the interbank market and on the bond market where the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs is a major issuer. The plan has three components:<\/p>\n
\u2013 a capital increase of 800 million francs accompanied by the issue of subordinated debt securities in the amount of 200 million francs. AGF increased their stake to almost 30% and Cr\u00e9dit Foncier entered the capital with 10%;<\/p>\n
\u2013 une ligne de cr\u00e9dit de 6 milliards de francs est accord\u00e9e par les principales banques de Paris au nom de la solidarit\u00e9 de la place, \u00e0 l\u2019initiative du gouverneur de la Banque de France, qui active la proc\u00e9dure de l\u2019article 52 de la loi bancaire du 24\/01\/1984\u00a0;<\/p>\n
\u2013 enfin, la Caisse des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts accorde une avance de tr\u00e9sorerie de 1,6 milliard de francs sur cautions apport\u00e9es par le Comptoir des entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n
Malgr\u00e9 ce plan de sauvetage, la cession de plus de 3 milliards de francs de cr\u00e9ances et l\u2019\u00e9mission, avec la garantie de l\u2019Etat, de 5,5 milliards de francs d\u2019obligations, le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs se retrouve, un an plus tard, au bord du gouffre.<\/p>\n
En 1994, un dispositif de cession de cr\u00e9ances est mis en place, permettant de sortir les principaux risques immobiliers du bilan du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n
Le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs accumule encore des pertes de 1024 millions de francs et il faut mettre en place, en 1995, une deuxi\u00e8me op\u00e9ration de d\u00e9sendettement du bilan pour un montant de 7 milliards de francs.\u00a0L\u2019Etat intervient en garantie \u00e0 hauteur de 4,5 milliards.\u00a0AGF contribue ensuite \u00e0 hauteur de 450 millions \u00e0 la souscription de titres de cr\u00e9ances subordonn\u00e9s \u00e9mis par le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.\u00a0Le solde, soit 2,1 milliards, est constitu\u00e9 de dette senior obtenue par conversion de pr\u00eats accord\u00e9s par les AGF et la Caisse des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts.\u00a0Enfin, une recapitalisation d\u2019environ 1,2 milliard est pr\u00e9vue sur deux ans.\u00a0Deux op\u00e9rations intervenues en 1996 pour 700 et 550 millions de francs ont amen\u00e9 le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs sous le contr\u00f4le des AGF avec une participation directe de 52,\u00a043% et la contribution de leur filiale Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d\u2019Investissement Bancaire et Immobili\u00e8re \u00e0 hauteur de 22,46%.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration confirme l\u2019adossement du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs aux AGF.<\/p>\n
Le bilan du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs est all\u00e9g\u00e9 suite aux deux op\u00e9rations de d\u00e9faisance et assaini.\u00a0Cependant, sa solvabilit\u00e9 n\u2019est pas r\u00e9tablie puisque son ratio de fonds propres ne d\u00e9passe pas 5 %.\u00a0C\u2019est pourquoi les AGF font porter les titres de leur participation au capital du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs par une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 holding afin que la Commission Bancaire, plut\u00f4t que de contr\u00f4ler le ratio de solvabilit\u00e9 de chaque composante du groupe, se contente d\u2019une appr\u00e9ciation globale.<\/p>\n
105. \u2013 Cette op\u00e9ration de sauvetage par l\u2019\u00c9tat n\u2019\u00e9tait pas la seule ;\u00a0on peut aussi citer le cas du Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France.<\/p>\n
Cette derni\u00e8re est une institution financi\u00e8re priv\u00e9e sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e.\u00a0Bien qu\u2019\u00e9tant une entreprise priv\u00e9e, elle est en fait d\u00e9pendante de l\u2019\u00c9tat.\u00a0Les deux tiers du capital sont entre les mains de particuliers et d\u2019investisseurs institutionnels.\u00a0La part de la Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et des assurances publiques ne d\u00e9passe pas 15 %.\u00a0Cependant, c\u2019est l\u2019\u00c9tat qui nomme le gouverneur et les principaux dirigeants.<\/p>\n
Depuis 1977, le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France partage le monopole de la distribution des pr\u00eats aid\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019accession \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 avec les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s de cr\u00e9dit immobilier et le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.\u00a0A partir du 01\/10\/1995, ces derniers sont supprim\u00e9s notamment parce que la baisse des taux d\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat du march\u00e9 rend les pr\u00eats hypoth\u00e9caires classiques moins chers que les pr\u00eats aid\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019accession \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9.<\/p>\n
En 1995, la crise immobili\u00e8re entra\u00eenant une baisse de la valeur des actifs et de la demande de cr\u00e9dits, le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France subit une perte de 10,7 milliards de francs et ne parvient pas \u00e0 faire face \u00e0 ses obligations prudentielles.\u00a0Celle-ci est particuli\u00e8rement d\u00e9faillante au regard des provisions qu\u2019elle aurait d\u00fb constituer sur ses risques immobiliers.<\/p>\n
L\u2019\u00c9tat, ne pouvant faire appel \u00e0 aucun actionnaire de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence, a organis\u00e9 lui-m\u00eame le sauvetage du Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France, dans la mesure o\u00f9 une simple liquidation aurait pu entra\u00eener l\u2019effondrement de l\u2019ensemble du march\u00e9 du cr\u00e9dit immobilier et obligataire.<\/p>\n
At the start of 1996, after lengthy negotiations, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France obtained a line of credit allowing it to refinance itself for an amount of 20 billion francs at market conditions. Undoubtedly, the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations acts as a lender of last resort in place of the Banque de France, which does not wish to create a precedent by intervening itself in an overly conspicuous way. Then a few months later, the State itself guarantees the bond debt of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France which is, with an outstanding amount of 270 billion francs, the second issuer after the Treasury. Consequently, the State is actively seeking to back Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France with a more solid institution which would take over the net liabilities. It took more than three years for a solution to be found to this crisis.<\/p>\n
In a press release dated 03\/13\/1997, Minister Arthuis, whose services are advised by Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, launched a call for applications to recapitalize Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France, which had been without capital for more than two years. A year later, this not very transparent procedure ends up releasing a potential buyer. A consortium formed by GMAC, the Texan investor Bass, the Caisses d\u2019Epargne and the CCF, is continuing the discussions, after the abandonment of GE Capital, the Post Office and the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations. Despite the interest of American groups for the prospects offered by the securitization of mortgage loans, the negotiations were finally broken off in 09\/1998, in the face of the derisory price offered and guarantee requirements deemed exorbitant.<\/p>\n
Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn then announced a completely different plan. The first stage is that of a financial restructuring of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France to restore its solvency. The second stage is that of an \u201copen, transparent and non-discriminatory\u201d backing procedure. It led to a new Cr\u00e9dit Foncier, the main player in the obligations fonci\u00e8res market, which restored all of its attractiveness to the establishment in the eyes of potential buyers.<\/p>\n
Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France\u2019s articles of association have been simplified and brought into line with company law, which excludes the appointment of managers by the State. Finally, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France is recapitalized with the approval of the European Commission. The operation is led by the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations, as a shareholder advance, for an amount of 1.85 billion francs. This makes it possible, after reduction of the share capital, to bring the institution\u2019s own funds to a level that complies with prudential regulations.<\/p>\n
Finally, the buyer of 90.6% of the capital of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France is the Caisses d\u2019Epargne group. Given that shortly before the final choice, the law of 25\/06\/1999 modified the status of the Caisses d\u2019Epargne by making them cooperative companies and by providing the network with a central body, namely the Caisse Caisses d\u2019Epargne, which becomes the real buyer of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France. It should be noted that the general interest mission of financing social housing falling within the remit of the Caisses d\u2019Epargne, the attachment of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France is entirely justified.<\/p>\n
106. \u2013 Unquestionably, these operations to rescue French banks were carried out under the aegis of the State. Yet, gradually, political intervention gave way to legal regulation. Indeed, from now on, the treatment of failing banks is carried out through the intermediary of the banking regulatory authority.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ The consecration of the intervention of the banking regulatory authority<\/p>\n
107. \u2013 This consecration of the intervention of the banking regulatory authority gradually took hold. This could be seen during the default of Banque Majorel. The latter was declared insolvent at the beginning of 1992. Indeed, a provisional administrator had been appointed by the Banking Commission after the failure of negotiations with a possible buyer, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole de l\u2019Aveyron. He had noted a very serious lack of provisions, since the outstanding amount had to be provisioned at more than 50%. However, the provisions recognized did not reach 10%. Consequently, the declaration of cessation of payments was made less than a month after the appointment of the provisional administrator. The Commercial Court of Rodez approved a transfer plan proposed by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Bordelaise de CIC. The counters closed only a few days without serious problems vis-\u00e0-vis the customers. However, the disposal plan included aid from the AFB solidarity mechanism of 120 million francs supported by all the AFB banks.<\/p>\n
108. \u2013 The Court of Cassation, in a judgment of 26\/04\/1994, upheld the power of the Commission Bancaire to decide on the compulsory resignation of the manager of the bank. The Commercial Chamber therefore confirmed that the managers were deprived of all powers with regard to the credit institution. The power conferred on the Banking Commission was therefore very significant.<\/p>\n
109. \u2013 But a decision of principle of the Court of Cassation is not the law and it is with remarkable speed that the legislator, from law n\u00b0 94-679 of 08\/08\/1994, drew the first consequences of the Majorel judgment. This specified that the provisional administrator appointed by the Commission Bancaire was transferred \u201call the powers of administration, management and representation of the legal person\u201d. The law of 08\/08\/1994 at the same time adjusted the powers of the Banking Commission by opening up greater ease of decision-making but by making it subject to an adversarial obligation. The legislator thus sanctioned the possibility of a very rapid appointment of a provisional administrator.<\/p>\n
110. \u2013 The ultimate strengthening of the powers of the Banking Commission was found in the law relating to savings and financial security. The latter enshrined the specificity of judicial reorganization and liquidation, applicable to credit institutions and investment companies. This reform completed the derogations already adopted in favor of financial companies. More specifically, it recognized the specificity of financial enterprises, while keeping them within the ambit of common law. Indeed, the amended law of 25\/01\/1985 is still applicable to these companies, but the derogation measures are becoming more and more numerous.<\/p>\n
Thus, the law of 06\/25\/1999 introduced a number of provisions aimed at modernizing the financial sector and strengthening the security of the system as a whole. To this end, it significantly strengthened the powers of the Banking Commission, giving it specific powers, in particular the prohibition on distributing dividends and the obligation to sell shares or shares. Similarly, the law organized the pre-eminence of the Banking Commission over the Commercial Court by obliging company directors to notify the Banking Commission beforehand of their intention to declare the cessation of payments by their establishment. In addition, it improved the transparency of credit institutions belonging to a group, by making their authorization conditional on the transparency of the group\u2019s structures. Finally,<\/p>\n
111. \u2013 The decree of 26\/12\/2000, in turn inaugurated this new approach by organizing a better distribution of powers between the different bodies that may intervene in the procedure: provisional administrator, judicial administrator, liquidator appointed by the Banking Commission and liquidator judicial. The competence of the banking and judicial authorities now gives way to the predominance of the banking commission, whose powers have been strengthened. Currently, the opening of reorganization or liquidation proceedings against a credit institution or an investment firm is subject to the prior opinion of the Banking Commission. The redefinition, by the law of 25\/06\/1999, of the notion of cessation of payments applicable to credit institutions required, in fact, a reorganization of the competent bodies to note this state and to open a collective procedure against these establishments. The \u201cfinancialization\u201d of the notion of cessation of payments, now perceived as the moment when the credit institution is no longer able to ensure its payments, immediately or in the near term, can only be assessed by a financial authority. . In this respect, the Banking Commission is henceforth the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. The \u201cfinancialization\u201d of the notion of cessation of payments, now perceived as the moment when the credit institution is no longer able to ensure its payments, immediately or in the near term, can only be assessed by a financial authority. . In this respect, the Banking Commission is henceforth the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. The \u201cfinancialization\u201d of the notion of cessation of payments, now perceived as the moment when the credit institution is no longer able to ensure its payments, immediately or in the near term, can only be assessed by a financial authority. . In this respect, the Banking Commission is henceforth the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings.<\/p>\n
112. \u2013 Thus, a certain number of specific rules apply to credit institutions and investment firms in dealing with their default. These are part of a financial logic consisting in strengthening the prevention of difficulties that may affect them.<\/p>\n
113. \u2013 However, it is certain that the new applicable rules are not infallible and that bank failures remain possible. In this case, it is a question of avoiding a high systemic risk. The takeover of a failing bank by a healthy financial institution is one of the solutions favored by the banking regulatory authorities. Indeed, this operation will lead to an increase in concentration which is likely to strengthen the structure of the banking system. The sale of a failing bank must then comply with the specific rules applicable to insolvency proceedings by credit institutions.<\/p>\n
114. \u2013 Having demonstrated that banking and financial specificity are taken into account in the ordinary rules for the restructuring of defaulting capital, it should be verified that this same phenomenon is present in the takeover of a listed bank.<\/p>\n
b\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of control of a listed bank<\/p>\n
115. \u2013 Banks are generally large in size. They are therefore frequently listed on the stock exchange. Only small entities and certain subsidiaries of large groups remain unlisted. However, these are less and less numerous because of the amplification of the phenomenon of concentration.<\/p>\n
116. \u2013 The conditions for taking control of a listed bank are much stricter compared to other economic sectors. Indeed, the banking object of the takeover entails the application of banking law. The latter is more restrictive than stock market law. The distributive application of these two rights therefore generates obstacles to the gradual acquisition of control of a bank by picking up on the stock exchange. There are only two usable techniques left. These are the acquisition of a control block (\u03b1) and the public offering (\u03b2).<\/p>\n
\u03b1\/ Acquisition of a block of control<\/p>\n
117. \u2013 The negotiation of a block of control is the operation by which the shareholder of a company which holds a sufficient number of shares allowing him to exercise in the organs of the company directly or indirectly, a preponderant influence, sells them to a person wishing to acquire them.<\/p>\n
118. \u2013 Originally, the law of 02\/08\/1989 amended by the law of 31\/12\/1993 was applicable. This was taken up, with little modification, by article 33 of the law of 02\/07\/1996 incorporated into article L. 433-1 II of the Monetary and Financial Code. The latter instructs the financial regulatory authority to provide in its General Regulations, regulations in this area: \u201cin order to ensure the equality of shareholders and the transparency of the markets\u2026\u201d.<\/p>\n
119. \u2013 The General Regulations therefore provide in Book II, Title I, for a Chapter V concerning the price guarantee procedure. These are the rules relating to the conditions under which the proposed acquisition of a block of securities conferring the majority of the capital or voting rights of a company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market obliges the the purchasers to buy the securities which are then presented to them at the price or at the price at which the transfer of the block is carried out. The purchaser of the block undertakes to acquire on the market, at the price of the block, the securities presented for at least ten trading days.<\/p>\n
120. \u2013 The Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers focuses its attention mainly on the price offered and possibly authorizes a derogation from equal pricing. The filing is published by the Autorit\u00e9 des march\u00e9s financiers and its approval gives rise to the publication of a notice. The buyer of the block must also send a draft press release, the content of which is close to an information note. When this project is approved, it is published. As soon as the press release is published, the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers declares the opening of the procedure. At the end of it, it pronounces its closure.<\/p>\n
121. \u2013 This procedure was used in the banking sector, in particular, during the Banco espirito Santo\/ Via Banque and Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France\/ Entenial transactions.<\/p>\n
122. \u2013 Stock market rules must apply alongside banking rules. In fact, the acquisition of a control block entails the application of the Regulation of the Banking and Financial Regulation Committee No. 96-16 of 12\/20\/1996. The latter provides for the authorization of the takeover by the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee. It should be specified that it is up to the person who acquires the control block to request the authorization thus provided for. This clarification is important because previously it was the establishment whose distribution of capital experienced a significant change that had to submit this request. In the event of non-compliance with the provisions applicable to shareholders of credit institutions, the law of 07\/16\/1992 provides for a specific sanction:<\/p>\n
123. \u2013 This highlights the fundamental link between banking law and securities law. These two rights should therefore be coordinated, which is not obvious, particularly in terms of public offers.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ Public offering<\/p>\n
124. \u2013 Public offerings of securities are the instrument par excellence for takeovers, particularly in the banking sector. The primary mechanisms of concentration are the public purchase or exchange offer. These consist, on the part of a company, in publicly proposing to the shareholders of another company to acquire their shares at a determined price, generally higher than the market price. When the price is settled in cash, it is a tender offer. When it is settled by the delivery of shares or bonds, it is a public exchange offer.<\/p>\n
125. \u2013 The operation has many interests. It ensures equal treatment for all sellers and represents one of the techniques for protecting minority shareholders in banking groups. It constitutes an effective means of bringing about a grouping, which is particularly useful in view of the creation of the European financial market.<\/p>\n
126. \u2013 For civil lawyers, the offer is \u201cthe proposal that it will suffice for the solicited party to accept for the contract to be concluded\u201d. Thus, it is a proposal to contract, which can be made to a named person or to any other person, ie to the public, and this, whatever its meaning and its object: to acquire or to transfer; tangible or intangible property. Its author may therefore propose to acquire or sell securities held, as the case may be, by the public or by him. Recipients of the solicitation may or may not accept it. Also, the public offer is only one offer among others. It also presents the essential characteristic of any offer. She must be firm. It is for this reason that it constitutes an irrevocable commitment.<\/p>\n
127. \u2013 If this contractual aspect is taken into consideration by stock market law, at the same time, it gives the public offer a procedural aspect. Indeed, it defines the public offer as the procedure which allows a natural or legal person to make known publicly that it proposes to acquire or sell all or part of the securities of a company listed on the first market. or at the coast of the secondary market. In the same vein, it indicates that the rules enacted set the general process for conducting a public offering with a view to the orderly conduct of operations in the best interests of investors and the market. This process is characterized by the filing of a draft offer, the decision on the admissibility of the offer,<\/p>\n
128. \u2013 Thus, the public offer is subject to procedural rules of stock market law. However, these rules are not exclusive because of the interference of banking rules.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Rules of stock market law<\/p>\n
129. \u2013 Several procedures coexist: the so-called normal procedure and the so-called simplified procedure must be distinguished. The latter is of an exceptional nature and can only be implemented in the cases expressly specified. We will not devote any development to it because it does not aim to allow the takeover of a company. It is then necessary to differentiate between the normal procedure and the compulsory procedure. Within the framework of the first procedure, the offer can be freely launched by any person. In the context of the second procedure, a public offer must be filed when a shareholder exceeds the threshold of one third of the capital or voting rights as well as in the event that he rapidly increases his participation. The most innovative point concerns the temporary regularization of immigrants \u2013 those who entered Italy before December 31, 2011 \u2013 who will denounce the boss or the company exploiting or even mistreating them. Those who lodge a complaint and undertake to cooperate in the criminal proceedings brought against their employer will thus be issued a humanitarian residence permit for a period of six months, renewable for a period of at least one year.<\/p>\n
130. \u2013 Various reforms have taken place, some of them without the support of a legal text, which is debatable. The stock market regulatory authority is authorized to make regulations concerning the operation of the markets placed under its control \u201cfor the execution of its mission\u201d. It is for this reason that Regulation No. 89-03 was adopted. This was repealed by Regulation No. 2002-04, the provisions of which were taken over by the General Regulation of the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers. These apply to public takeover bids relating to financial instruments traded on a regulated market. The text sets strict criteria for \u201cany offer made publicly to holders of financial instruments traded on a regulated market (\u2026) with a view to acquiring all or part of said financial instruments\u201d. An ambitious triple objective is set: respect for the free play of bids and their higher bids, equal treatment and information for the holders of securities of the companies concerned, transparency, market integrity and fairness in transactions and competition. Consequently, the Regulation increases the level of information disseminated to the market and to the public. Thus, a draft information memorandum must be filed by the initiator of the public offer. This project, drawn up by the initiator and the target company, alone or jointly, must be the subject of a press release at the latest when it is filed. Likewise, any data likely to supplement this information note must be transmitted to the public. This is the case for any clause in the agreement concluded by the companies concerned or their shareholders likely to have an impact on the assessment of the public offer. This arrangement is clearly inspired by the BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas concentration. In this case, an agreement between Axa and Paribas had been revealed late when it provided for a device requiring the first to obtain the agreement of the second before bringing its shares to the offer. In addition, the initiator of the offer must specify its intentions in terms of volume and structure of the workforce, the orientations in terms of employment, as well as its objectives regarding the maintenance of the securities of the target company on the market for \u201d the next twelve months. The document must also set out \u201cthe financing conditions of the operation and their impact on the assets, activity and results of the companies concerned\u201d. The target company is required to file a draft offer document. It states the reasoned opinion of the board of directors or the supervisory board deciding on \u201cthe interest of the offer or its consequences for the target company, its shareholders and its employees\u201d. Finally, during the takeover bid, the companies concerned, the members of their administrative or management bodies, the presenting establishments and the consulting establishments, the persons or entities holding at least 5% of the capital or voting rights have the obligation to declare, each day,<\/p>\n
131. \u2013 The regulation cannot add to the law as recalled by the Court of Cassation. However, the implementation of a legal support was late. This is welcome since stock market regulations clearly include constraints that can only come from legislative authorization. Indeed, article 34 of the Constitution provides that: \u201cthe law determines the fundamental principles of the system of ownership of real rights and civil and commercial obligations\u201d.<\/p>\n
132. \u2013 The law of 02\/08\/1989 inserted into the law of 22\/01\/1988 an article 6 bis in order to regulate public offers. This provision, which is at the origin of mandatory public offers, was modified by the law of 31\/12\/1993. It was taken up, with little modification, by article 33 of the law of 02\/07\/1996, which instructs the financial regulatory authority to provide in its General Regulations, regulations in this area. According to this text: \u201cin order to ensure the equality of shareholders and the transparency of the markets, the General Regulations of the Financial Markets Council lays down the rules relating to public offers relating to financial instruments traded on a regulated market (\u2026)\u201d. It is specified that any person who comes to hold a fraction of the capital or voting rights of a company, must immediately inform the financial regulatory authority and file a public offer for the securities concerned. This threshold has been set at one third of a company\u2019s capital or voting rights.<\/p>\n
133. \u2013 Following the law of 02\/08\/1989, the General Regulations of the Stock Exchange Council, which could not derogate from the obligations laid down by law, dealt with public offers.<\/p>\n
134. \u2013 This system was maintained by the law of 02\/07\/1996. This provided that the General Regulations of the Stock Exchange Council remain applicable, while indicating that they may be amended or repealed.<\/p>\n
135. \u2013 It was amended by decrees of 03\/27\/1997, 07\/09\/1997 and 08\/11\/1997, then repealed and replaced, by the new Title V of the General Regulations of the Financial Markets Council. This was approved by a decree of 05\/11\/1998. This title defines the rules applicable to takeover bids. It should be noted that these General Regulations of the Financial Markets Council were amended by the decrees of 18\/12\/2000 and 15\/11\/2002. These texts approved new provisions in terms of public offers. Indeed, the old version had shown its weaknesses, in particular, during the great banking and stock market battle of 1999 between BNP, Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale and Paribas. It has been clarified that the initiator of a takeover bid or a public offer may specify a condition for obtaining below which this offer will not be followed up positively, which constitutes a derogation from the principle of irrevocability of the offer. . In the case of two simultaneous offers, he can waive the conditionality clause and reopen his offer if he holds more than two-thirds of the capital and voting rights. The threshold required for this reopening is reduced to the majority of the capital and voting rights if several offers are present. Finally, the option is introduced for an initiator to condition its public offer on the approval of the competition authorities. These provisions have been included in the General Regulations of the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers.<\/p>\n
136. \u2013 These reforms are indicative of the consideration given to specific cases by the financial regulatory authority when drafting general rules. This phenomenon should also be highlighted with regard to the consideration of banking specificity in the regulation of public offers.<\/p>\n
\u2013 The taking into account of banking specificity in the regulation of public offers<\/p>\n
137. \u2013 Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996 of the Banking and Financial Regulation Committee provides for an additional formality for credit institutions. It submits to the prior authorization of the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee any transaction involving the acquisition, extension or sale of direct or indirect holdings, when this transaction has the effect of allowing a person or a group of persons acting together to acquire the effective power of control over the management of the company or to acquire one-third, one-fifth or one-tenth of the voting rights.<\/p>\n
138. \u2013 Tale previsione, a nostro avviso, rischia di complicare le offerte jolly nel sistema bancario.\u00a0Infatti, la necessit\u00e0 di ottenere il preventivo assenso della CECEI per assumere il controllo di un istituto di credito costituisce un ostacolo.\u00a0Quest’ultima \u00e8 tanto pi\u00f9 importante in quanto il Comitato si \u00e8 dichiarato contrario alle offerte pubbliche di acquisto ostili da parte delle banche.\u00a0Tuttavia, questa non \u00e8 una difesa anti-acquisizione assoluta perch\u00e9 l’azienda bersaglio ha solo una tregua dal processo di pre-autorizzazione.\u00a0Questa tregua pu\u00f2 tuttavia essere abbastanza lunga da consentire alla banca target di organizzare la propria difesa perch\u00e9 il CECEI ha la possibilit\u00e0 di sospendere il prezzo delle offerte pubbliche.\u00a0Questo potrebbe essere visto nel caso BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas.\u00a0In primo luogo,\u00a0il Comitato ha bloccato il rilancio su Paribas rinviandone la decisione perch\u00e9 il progetto poneva interrogativi soprattutto dal punto di vista prudenziale.\u00a0L’autorizzazione e quindi la prosecuzione del normale svolgimento delle offerte, \u00e8 intervenuta solo dieci giorni dopo.\u00a0Il Comitato ha invece ritardato la comunicazione dei risultati definitivi delle offerte note dal 14\/08\/1999 al 30\/08\/1999 senza giustificazione pubblica, salvo l’annuncio dell’audizione dei presidenti dei due istituti di credito cedenti.\u00a0In questo caso si trattava di modificare il prezzo delle offerte pubbliche forzando la negoziazione.\u00a0il Comitato ha ritardato l’annuncio dei risultati definitivi delle offerte note dal 14\/08\/1999 al 30\/08\/1999 senza giustificazione pubblica,\u00a0a parte l’annuncio dell’audizione dei presidenti dei due istituti di credito promotori.\u00a0In questo caso si trattava di modificare il prezzo delle offerte pubbliche forzando la negoziazione.\u00a0il Comitato ha ritardato la comunicazione dei risultati definitivi delle offerte note dal 14\/08\/1999 al 30\/08\/1999 senza pubblica giustificazione, salvo l’annuncio dell’audizione dei presidenti dei due istituti di credito promotori.\u00a0In questo caso si trattava di modificare il prezzo delle offerte pubbliche forzando la negoziazione.\u00a0a parte l’annuncio dell’audizione dei presidenti dei due istituti di credito promotori.\u00a0In questo caso si trattava di modificare il prezzo delle offerte pubbliche forzando la negoziazione.\u00a0a parte l’annuncio dell’audizione dei presidenti dei due istituti di credito promotori.\u00a0In questo caso si trattava di modificare il prezzo delle offerte pubbliche forzando la negoziazione.<\/span><\/p>\n139. \u2013 Peraltro, \u00e8 indispensabile rilevare che i titoli detenuti oltre la soglia stabilita sono privati \u200b\u200bdel diritto di voto.\u00a0Questa sanzione \u00e8 interessante, perch\u00e9 va oltre il quadro delle sanzioni legali tradizionali.\u00a0In effetti, c’\u00e8 un’inadeguatezza delle sanzioni tradizionali.\u00a0Per la loro rigidit\u00e0, la nullit\u00e0, la rescissione o l’attribuzione del risarcimento mancano di efficacia.\u00a0Appare, ad esempio, ovvio che se la sanzione per l’inosservanza della normativa bancaria fosse la nullit\u00e0 o la risoluzione dell’operazione, ci\u00f2 avrebbe un impatto sull’acquirente dei titoli ma anche sull’esistenza della societ\u00e0 che potrebbe essere messa in al pericolo.\u00a0La privazione del diritto di voto \u00e8 efficace perch\u00e9 l’acquirente dei titoli non \u00e8 esautorato dalla sua appartenenza, il che limita inoltre la violazione del suo diritto,<\/span><\/p>\n140. \u2013 Infine, l’articolo 9 della legge 15.05.2001 relativa alle nuove regole economiche ha integrato l’articolo L. 511-10 del Codice monetario e finanziario.\u00a0Si precisa che chiunque intenda presentare una bozza di offerta pubblica finalizzata all’acquisizione di un determinato quantitativo di titoli da un istituto di credito autorizzato in Francia, \u00e8 tenuto a informare il Governatore della Banque de France, Presidente della CECEI, otto giorni lavorativi prima del deposito di questa bozza di offerta o del suo annuncio pubblico se precedente.\u00a0Questo provvedimento ha lo scopo di evitare che si ripeta quanto accaduto durante le offerte pubbliche BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas del 1999, quando le autorit\u00e0 bancarie si trovarono di fronte al fatto compiuto.\u00a0Le autorit\u00e0 di vigilanza, infatti, avevano appreso di alcune offerte dai giornali del mattino.<\/span><\/p>\nOvviamente, questo provvedimento si limita alla semplice informazione, di carattere riservato, del Governatore della Banque de France.\u00a0Pertanto, quest’ultimo non ha alcuna decisione da prendere.\u00a0Nessuna sanzione legale \u00e8 applicabile in assenza di informazioni o in caso di informazioni tardive.\u00a0Va comunque sottolineato che il Governatore della Banque de France \u00e8 il Presidente della CECEI.\u00a0Tuttavia, i poteri di tale Comitato sono notevoli in quanto ad esso spetta il rilascio dei singoli nulla osta nonch\u00e9 delle autorizzazioni al controllo.\u00a0Ci\u00f2 costituisce un forte incentivo a rispettare tale obbligo di informazione.<\/span><\/p>\n141. \u2013 Conseguentemente, organizzando una migliore informazione nell’ambito delle offerte pubbliche bancarie, tale legge mira a tutelare meglio il sistema bancario e finanziario.\u00a0Consente al Governatore della Banque de France \u201cdi rendere nota la sua valutazione, o anche di esercitare un ruolo di buoni uffici prima che il deposito renda irrevocabile l’offerta\u201d.\u00a0Introduce quindi nel diritto borsistico una forma di interventismo statale specifica per le offerte bancarie pubbliche.\u00a0\u00c8 indiscutibile qui che la specificit\u00e0 bancaria viene presa in considerazione nel meccanismo delle offerte pubbliche.<\/span><\/p>\n142. \u2013 In definitiva, se questa presa in considerazione della specificit\u00e0 bancaria avviene nell’acquisizione del controllo di banche private, lo stesso fenomeno pu\u00f2 evidenziarsi nell’assunzione del controllo di banche pubbliche.<\/span><\/p>\n2\/ Tenere conto delle specificit\u00e0 bancarie e finanziarie nell’acquisizione del controllo di una banca pubblica<\/span><\/p>\n143. \u2013 Takeovers of public banks took place within the framework of privatization procedures.\u00a0Privatization is the transfer from the public sector to the private sector of the majority stakes held by the State in certain companies.\u00a0If the operation is complex, privatization is the basis of a transfer of ownership of the securities forming the capital of a State company to persons governed by private law.<\/span><\/p>\n144. \u2013 The decision can belong only to the legislator.\u00a0The solution is expressed by article 34 of the 1958 Constitution: \u201cThe law establishes the rules concerning (\u2026) the transfer of ownership of enterprises from the public sector to the private sector\u201d.\u00a0The principle has been reiterated by the Council of State on several occasions.\u00a0A law was therefore needed, or at the very least a standard of equivalent value, such as an ordinance.<\/span><\/p>\n145. \u2013 Le gouvernement a choisi la voie des ordonnances.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, une loi du 02\/07\/1986 l\u2019a habilit\u00e9 \u00e0 proc\u00e9der, par ordonnance, \u00e0 la privatisation d\u2019une s\u00e9rie de soci\u00e9t\u00e9s qu\u2019il a cot\u00e9es.\u00a0Le premier secteur concern\u00e9 \u00e9tait pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le secteur bancaire.\u00a0L\u2019ordonnance pr\u00e9par\u00e9e n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 sign\u00e9e par le pr\u00e9sident de la R\u00e9publique, ce qui a oblig\u00e9 le gouvernement \u00e0 modifier sa proc\u00e9dure.<\/p>\n
146. \u2013 Un projet de loi a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 soumis au parlement.\u00a0Elle aboutit au vote de la loi du 06\/08\/1986 \u00ab relative aux modalit\u00e9s d\u2019application des privatisations d\u00e9cid\u00e9es par la loi du 02\/07\/1986 \u00bb.\u00a0Le r\u00e9gime juridique des privatisations est ainsi tiraill\u00e9 entre la loi du 02\/07\/1986 qui pose le principe et celle du 06\/08\/1986 qui d\u00e9crit les modalit\u00e9s et qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9e par la loi du 19\/07\/1993.<\/p>\n
147. \u2013 La privatisation est mise en place par la Direction du Tr\u00e9sor.\u00a0L\u2019op\u00e9ration n\u00e9cessite \u00e9galement l\u2019intervention de la Commission de privatisation, charg\u00e9e d\u2019\u00e9valuer la banque.\u00a0La Commission d\u00e9cide sur la base des rapports d\u2019\u00e9valuation \u00e9tablis par les banques du Conseil du Tr\u00e9sor.\u00a0Il d\u00e9termine la valeur minimale des entreprises \u00e0 privatiser, avec l\u2019aide d\u2019expertises externes.\u00a0Ces \u00e9valuations sont r\u00e9alis\u00e9es en tenant compte, selon une pond\u00e9ration appropri\u00e9e \u00e0 chaque cas, de la valeur de march\u00e9 du titre, de la valeur des actifs, des b\u00e9n\u00e9fices r\u00e9alis\u00e9s, de l\u2019existence de filiales et des perspectives d\u2019avenir.\u00a0Une approche \u00ab multicrit\u00e8res \u00bb est donc consacr\u00e9e.\u00a0Le prix d\u2019offre ou de vente est fix\u00e9 par le ministre charg\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, qui ne doit pas \u00eatre inf\u00e9rieur \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9valuation donn\u00e9e par la commission.\u00a0Enfin,<\/p>\n
148. \u2013 However, the intervention of the banking authorities appeared uncertain (a).\u00a0Nevertheless, the taking into account of the banking and financial specificity in the privatization procedures is indisputable (b).<\/span><\/p>\na\/ The uncertain intervention of the banking authorities in privatizations<\/span><\/p>\n149. \u2013 It should be specified that the competences of the Commission and of the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee may come into conflict during bank privatizations.\u00a0Indeed, they both aim to maintain the proper functioning and security of the banking and financial system.\u00a0The Commission is thus competent to assess the bank, intervene when the status of the public bank changes and choose the acquirers.\u00a0The Committee is competent to authorize equity investments.\u00a0On this occasion, its control is concentrated on the shareholders.\u00a0Consequently, the two authorities intervene to decide on the change of shareholders.<\/span><\/p>\nThis distribution of roles did not make it possible to overcome a certain number of difficulties and shortcomings linked to the interference of banking specificity in this restructuring mechanism.\u00a0Indeed, the authorities in charge of banking definition and supervision have not seen their role specified in the context of these operations.\u00a0Thus, it may seem, at first glance, relatively secondary.<\/span><\/p>\nThe choice of the members of the groups of associated shareholders does not fall within the competence of the CECEI, which is solely responsible for the approval, the control of the bank shareholding and the authorization to cross the threshold fixed for the vote.\u00a0However, within the framework of the authorization to take control or to cross thresholds, the latter could have made these authorizations conditional on a certain number of measures aimed at effectively protecting the banking system.\u00a0This was not the case.\u00a0First of all, it should be noted that the Director of the Treasury is a member of the CECEI.\u00a0However, he is at the origin of the assembly of the operation.\u00a0In addition, the Chairman of the Committee is the Governor of the Banque de France.<\/span><\/p>\n150. \u2013 Furthermore, the Banking Commission should have intervened in order to protect the banking system.\u00a0Indeed, in a number of cases, the losses of public banks were accumulating.\u00a0There were delays in provisioning, insufficient capital and non-compliance with prudential ratios.\u00a0However, the Commission Bancaire has not ruled on the advisability of withdrawing the authorization of failing institutions, in particular the subsidiaries of banking companies and first-rate public financial companies.\u00a0This could have allowed him to put pressure on the choice of the Treasury and the government in the privatization procedure.<\/span><\/p>\nb\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificities in privatization procedures<\/span><\/p>\n151. \u2013 The taking into account of the banking and financial specificity was carried out within the framework of privatization procedures on the financial markets (a) as well as in the context of off-market privatization procedures (b).<\/span><\/p>\n\u03b1\/ Privatization procedures on the financial markets<\/span><\/p>\n152. \u2013 These procedures are subject to specific rules.\u00a0Banking regulation only appears in these hypotheses in a very incidental way.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 Rules specific to privatizations on the financial markets<\/span><\/p>\n153. \u2013 This method consists of the State offering the shares of the privatized company to the financial market. The operation is in a way a reverse takeover bid, ie a public sale offer. It is the direct result of the public offering procedure provided for by the general regulations of the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers. A notice is published. It indicates the number of titles offered for sale as well as the price. Interested persons have a deadline to respond to this offer, indicating the number of securities they wish to purchase.<\/p>\n
154. \u2013 It should be specified that Article 4-1 of Law No. 86-912 of 06\/08\/1986 provides that transfers made by the State \u201cmay be subject to payment in installments\u2026\u201d However, the implementing decree for this text was delayed since it was only published in 1997. Its scope is limited since it only concerns privatization operations which result in a transfer of control according to the procedures of the financial market.<\/p>\n
155. \u2013 Without going into the details of the decree, it is however appropriate to dwell on the conditions of implementation of the right granted to the State in the event of default of payment by a shareholder. With regard to payment defaults, the procedure provides that \u201cwhatever the cause of the default, the registration in the account of the bearer of the shares whose due date has not been honored is automatically canceled. The new account entry is made in the name of the State by the issuing legal entity or the authorized financial intermediary without the bearer having been given prior formal notice to have to settle his debt\u201d. The solution is as brutal as it is effective.<\/p>\n
156. \u2013 It seems to us that such a legal retention of title could have been dangerous for the stability of the banking system. The State could again have shares in credit institutions in the event of non-payment. He would then have been able to sell them again. The banking authorities would certainly have had to intervene with the aim of protecting the banking system. This incursion would have highlighted the consideration of banking regulation.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Consideration of banking regulation<\/p>\n
157. \u2013 The privatization of a bank must in principle be subject to the prior authorization of the CECEI.\u00a0Indeed, according to Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996, any transaction involving the transfer of holdings in a credit institution, when this transaction has the effect of allowing a person or a group of persons to acquire the effective power to control the management of the company or to acquire one-third, one-fifth or one-tenth of the voting rights, must be authorized.\u00a0Thus, it is indisputable that the privatization of a bank must be authorized by the CECEI.\u00a0Banking specificity therefore interferes in the privatization procedure.<\/span><\/p>\n158. \u2013 However, it should be specified that under the terms of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996, only transfers allowing a person or a group of persons to acquire at least 10% of the rights of vote, are subject to the prior authorization of the CECEI. Thus, in certain bank privatization operations, the acquirers have not reached the threshold of a 10% stake. The Committee was therefore not informed by the Treasury. In reality, the privatization operations that gave rise to referral to the CECEI are those that were partially carried out on the financial markets.<\/p>\n
159. \u2013 Correlatively, the disposals that took place within the framework of off-market privatization procedures involved the CECEI.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ Off-market privatization procedures<\/p>\n
160. \u2013 Control of an off-market public bank can be transferred. In certain cases, this single procedure has been used with a view to forming a group known as \u201cstable shareholders\u201d. A consideration of banking and financial specificity in the rules applicable to privatization can be demonstrated. In addition, a particularity of the various off-market banking privatizations can be highlighted.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Taking into account the banking and financial specificity in the rules applicable to privatization<\/p>\n
161. \u2013 Under the terms of article 4 of law n\u00b0 86-912 of 06\/08\/1986, in its wording resulting from law n\u00b0 93-923 of 19\/07\/1993, the transfer or exchange of securities, sales of preferential rights or waivers of such rights are carried out according to financial market procedures.\u00a0However, the Minister in charge of the Economy may decide to appeal to off-market buyers.\u00a0The choice of the purchaser(s) and the terms of sale are determined by the Minister for the Economy, with the assent of the Privatization Commission, which has become the Participations and Transfers Commission.\u00a0This also provides the valuation of the company.\u00a0A Council of State decree sets in particular the publicity rules to which these decisions are subject and the cases in which a call for tenders is used.\u00a0Furthermore, article l of decree n\u00b0 93-1041 of 03\/09\/1993,\u00a0modified by decree n\u00b0 95-947 of 25\/08\/1995 specifies that, for the application of the provisions of the second paragraph of n article 4 of the law of 06\/08\/1986, private sector holdings in the capital of public companies are subject to certain rules.\u00a0The decision to sell or exchange over-the-counter securities or rights of public companies is publicized by publication in the Official Journal.\u00a0When specifications governing the operation are established, this insertion informs potential buyers so that they send their offer accompanied by their financial references.\u00a0The drafting of the specifications in bank privatizations is the subject of specificities.\u00a0It is recalled that the economic role of the bank to be privatized must be preserved in the country’s banking organization so as not to undermine the stability and security of the financial system.\u00a0It is specified that prospective acquirers must explain how they intend to develop the bank while respecting the requirements of the specifications.\u00a0In other words, they must commit to an industrial project and not just seek capital gains on a transitional equity investment.\u00a0These specific provisions aim to protect the banking and financial system.\u00a0When no specifications are provided, the Minister for the Economy appoints an independent personality whose name is made public.\u00a0This establishes a report on the conditions and progress of the operation.\u00a0This report is submitted to the Minister and to the Privatization Commission.\u00a0Potential buyers must send their offer accompanied by their financial references.<\/span><\/p>\n162. \u2013 We have demonstrated the interference of banking and financial specificity in the rules applicable to privatization. Correlatively, in practice, the various off-market banking privatizations have been specific compared to other economic sectors.<\/p>\n
\u2013 The specific nature of the various off-market banking privatizations<\/p>\n
163. \u2013 Concerning the privatization of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, law no. Provision has been made for the purchase of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole by the regional banks for 90% of the capital and by the group\u2019s employees for 10% of the capital.<\/p>\n
164. \u2013 Article 4 of this law provided that the valuation of the fund should be carried out according to the procedure provided for by law no. 86-912 of 06\/08\/1986. After the vote of the law of 18\/01\/1988, the Privatization Commission therefore issued an opinion on 19\/02\/1988. The complexity of the relationship between the regional banks and the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole has been taken into account, as well as the specific nature of the risks weighing on the whole. It is for this reason that the Commission has set the minimum value of the Caisse Nationale at 7 billion francs.<\/p>\n
165. \u2013 This valuation gave rise to controversy because it could have been higher. In fact, the Commission relied on the net assets of the Fund which it evaluated at 8.1 billion francs at 31\/12\/1986. This amount was obtained by adding the State allocation, the consolidated results and the 1986 result. this savings was not assimilated to equity. However, this provision is considered by the Banking Commission as capital for the calculation of prudential ratios, in particular the risk coverage ratio and the reserve requirement ratio. The provision for home savings was also recorded in equity in an information note made available to the public during a financial operation set up by Unicredit, a subsidiary of the Caisse Nationale. This document, endorsed by the Stock Exchange Commission and drafted by the National Fund, specified that these equity capital amounted to 14.12 billion francs. Furthermore, a particular point relating to the nature of the guarantee fund was not the subject of any comment in the Privatization Commission\u2019s estimate. This fund, amounting to 2.4 billion at the end of 1986, made up of contributions from regional mutuals, guarantees deposits in the event of failure of a local or regional mutual. The law provided for its absorption by the National Fund but its amount was not added to that of equity. Conversely, this decision therefore contradicted the specific provisions of the Rural Code applicable to Cr\u00e9dit Agricole. Indeed, it is provided that \u201cin the event of dissolution, the surplus assets [of the common guarantee fund] are allocated to the Cr\u00e9dit Agricole endowment\u201d.<\/p>\n
166. \u2013 Without taking this controversy into account, on 25\/02\/1988 the Ministers of Economy and Agriculture issued the decree provided for in article 5 of the law of 18\/01\/1988. This notably provided for the sale price of Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole shares to employees as well as to the regional mutuals. The price retained is the minimum value proposed by the Privatization Commission. In our opinion, it is the fear of a financial weakening of the regional funds that guided this measure. The substantial objective is to protect the solvency of the regional banks as well as the structure of the banking system as a whole. This appears indisputably because it is provided that the latter do not have to mobilize all of their own funds. Moreover, part of the financing can be achieved through a public call for savings through investment certificates, equity securities or bonds. Finally, a last specific provision, aiming at the same objective, has been organized. With regard to the regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, at least 50% of the shares had to be paid in cash, the payment of the balance being scheduled for a later date. Thus, the decree therefore granted time limits to the funds that so wished when their risk coverage ratio was less than 5.5% on 30\/06\/1987. These were authorized to settle 33.3% of the shares at maturity of one year, 33.3% of the shares at maturity of two years and 33.4% of the shares at maturity of three years, on the anniversary dates of the cash payment. In practice,<\/p>\n
167. \u2013 This privatization therefore led to the takeover of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole by the regional banks. The Caisse Nationale was transformed into a public limited company governed by the law of 07\/24\/1966. Incidentally, the transformation of the status of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole raised the question of the compatibility of that of the regional banks which are the new owners. Can the latter remain civil companies with variable capital and engage in commercial activities and equity investments that generate profits? In our opinion, these questions remain fundamentally undetermined, but article 625 of the Rural Code, which exempts the Cr\u00e9dit Agricole funds from registration in the trade and companies register, seems sufficient to avoid a more in-depth debate.
Thus, we have demonstrated that the privatization of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole was special.<\/p>\n
168. \u2013 This was also the case with the privatization of BFCE. The decree of 12\/12\/1995 authorized the transfer to the private sector of BFCE, in which the State only indirectly holds a majority stake. The operation was carried out by private sale without specifications, with an expert\u2019s report and the opinion of the Privatization Commission. By an opinion of the Minister of Economy and Finance published in the Official Journal of 13\/12\/1995, Mrs Hagelsteen, State Councillor, was instructed to draw up a report on the conditions and progress of this operation of privatization. The Privatization Commission issued a favorable opinion on Cr\u00e9dit National\u2019s offer.<\/p>\n
169. \u2013 The Credit Institutions Committee has been seized of the file. It gave its authorization on 12\/21\/1995 on the condition, however, that Cr\u00e9dit National obtains a solvency ratio of 9.2% after the acquisition. This condition set by the banking regulatory authority was intended to preserve Cr\u00e9dit National\u2019s sound financial situation. The primary objective was indeed the protection of the banking system.<\/p>\n
170. \u2013 By order of 01\/23\/1996, on the assent of the Privatization Commission, the Minister authorized the transfer of BFCE to the private sector, thus allowing Cr\u00e9dit National to take control.<\/p>\n
171. \u2013 Cr\u00e9dit National still had to supplement its own funds to meet the requirements of the CECEI and it had to increase them from 8.85% to 9.2%. To fill this gap, an issue of 500 million perpetual subordinated securities, eligible as quasi-equity in the solvency ratio, was organised. The AGF subscribed to it for 340 million francs. The balance of 140 million francs was covered by the CDC. Ultimately, Cr\u00e9dit National\u2019s Cooke ratio was indeed increased to 9.2%, but its core capital ratio fell from 8.7% to 6.2%. This value was considered insufficient given the range and type of the group\u2019s activities and given its dependence on the cost of refinancing on the market. Cr\u00e9dit national-BFCE\u2019s rating was downgraded by the Standard and Poor\u2019s agencies,<\/p>\n
172. \u2013 The privatization of SMC did not lead to such a deterioration in the ratings of the buyer because the State carried out several recapitalizations before the sale to the private sector.<\/p>\n
173. \u2013 The government decided by decree of 26\/10\/1995 to transfer the State\u2019s stake in the SMC to the private sector through a procedure of transfer by mutual agreement without specifications. At the end of 1996, the Minister appointed Mr. Maugars, Inspector General of Finance, as an independent figure to investigate the privatization file. Several times suspended and resumed, the privatization operation encountered many difficulties, in particular when the Korean group Daewoo proposed to buy out SMC for the symbolic sum of 1 franc.<\/p>\n
174. \u2013 A government notice dated 04\/21\/1998 relaunched the procedure for the transfer of SMC by sale by mutual agreement, without specifications but with the obligation for the purchaser to present an industrial recovery project. the bank. The overriding objective was to secure the future of the bank in order to avoid further difficulties. More broadly, the purpose was to protect the structure of the banking system. After competition between four candidates for the takeover of SMC, BNP, Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Caisse d\u2019\u00e9pargne Provence-Alpes-Corse and Banque Chaix, a subsidiary of CCF, the latter alone submitted a final offer to \u2018purchase. On 12\/06\/1998, she signed a contract to take over SMC shares.<\/p>\n
175. \u2013 Following the assent of the Participations and Transfers Commission and the prior authorization of the CECEI, the government decided by decree of 22\/10\/1998 to transfer ownership of the SMC to the private sector. This transfer took place by sale of the entire capital to Banque Chaix following the last recapitalization of SMC by the State in the amount of 2.9 billion francs. The amount of the transaction, symbolic given the sad state of the bank, was 10 million francs.<\/p>\n
176. \u2013 It should be noted that while these privatization operations were carried out without specifications, other operations were organized within the framework of calls for tenders on the basis of specifications. Thus, the transfer procedure and the specific obligations to be respected have been specified. These obligations may have varied depending on the objectives sought. It could, in particular, be a temporary inalienability of the securities acquired and a right of pre-emption. Finally, the Minister chose the purchaser(s) based on the offers and guarantees provided, with the assent of the Commission.<\/p>\n
177. \u2013 This procedure was the source of significant litigation initiated by potential buyers not chosen by the minister. Thus, it is this procedure which was the basis of the appeal brought before the Council of State by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, BNP and CCF during the privatization of CIC.<\/p>\n
178. \u2013 Let us first recall the facts. CIC was privatized in 1998 under an off-market procedure. By decree n\u00b0 96-681 of 07\/30\/1996, the Prime Minister decided to transfer from the public sector to the private sector the majority stake held by the State, in the financial company of CIC and the European Union . The Minister of Economy and Finance then chose to carry out this transfer through a tender procedure, governed by specifications. Seven candidates were declared admissible, by the Minister, to submit an offer. Five of these candidates have actually filed a purchase offer. By a decision made public on 23\/03\/1998 the Minister authorized Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, ABN-Amro and the Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, to the exclusion of BNP and CCF, to continue the selection procedure. In a decision made public on 04\/14\/1998, the minister appointed the Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel as the buyer. By an order of 24\/04\/1998, it then set the terms of the transfer from the public sector to the private sector.<\/p>\n
179. \u2013 It is the terms of this transfer which have been the subject of an appeal by certain unsuccessful applicants. Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, BNP and CCF jointly requested, on 12\/06\/1998, the annulment for abuse of power of various administrative decisions: the decision of the minister declaring admissible the offer of the Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, that of 03\/12\/1998 of the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee authorizing a possible takeover of Compagnie Financi\u00e8re du CIC et de l\u2019Union Europ\u00e9enne by Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, the decisions of the Minister for 23 \/03 and 14\/04\/1998, the decree of 24\/04\/1998 and the opinions issued by the Privatization Commission during the privatization procedure. In summary, the first challenge related to the illegality of the procedure. The second objection was based on the fact that, according to the applicants, the buyer being a mutual bank, its status prohibited it from taking over an AFB bank. Finally, the third argument maintained that the procedure for transfer to the private sector should be based, with regard to the principle of equality, solely on the content of the offers. Thus, the applicants considered first of all that the provisions allowing a transfer according to the off-market procedure had not entered into force. Indeed, the decree of application concerning the cases of implementation of a call for tenders had not been published. However,<\/p>\n
Next, the applicants also complained about the takeover by a mutual institution of a bank known as \u201cAFB\u201d. To challenge this choice, they based their argument on a specificity of the banking system. They considered on the one hand, that the provisions of the banking law would have opposed the takeover of a bank affiliated to the AFB by a mutual bank. They also asserted that the provisions governing the operation of Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, and more particularly those of Article 2 of Ordinance No. 58-966 of 16\/10\/1958 under the terms of which \u201cthe Caisses de Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel exclusively for the purpose of mutual credit\u201d, would have obstructed the takeover by these funds of a credit institution not affiliated to the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network. The Council of State refutes the argument. It \u201cappears from the documents in the file that BFCM, the candidate selected by the Minister to acquire the State\u2019s stake in the Compagnie financi\u00e8re du CIC et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9en, is itself affiliated to the AFB and not to the network of Credit Mutuel\u201d. The solution provided by the Council of State is, moreover, very interesting. In fact, by rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument because BFCM was itself affiliated with AFB, the latter suggests that if the economic entity had been affiliated with the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network, the takeover could have been contested. The solution provided by the Council of State is, moreover, very interesting. In fact, by rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument because BFCM was itself affiliated with AFB, the latter suggests that if the economic entity had been affiliated with the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network, the takeover could have been contested. The solution provided by the Council of State is, moreover, very interesting. In fact, by rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument because BFCM was itself affiliated with AFB, the latter suggests that if the economic entity had been affiliated with the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network, the takeover could have been contested.<\/p>\n
Finally, concerning the terms of transfer to the private sector by way of a call for tenders for a State participation in a public company, the applicants maintained that the choice between the candidates could not be legally justified, with regard to the principle of equality, only on the content of their offers. The applicant banks maintained that the specifications did not respect the principle of equality between candidates. Firstly, it did not define with sufficient precision the concepts of \u2018firm offer\u2019 and \u2018definitive offer\u2019. The same applied to the conditions and limits under which the candidates could modify, when formulating their \u201cfinal offer\u201d, the content of their \u201cfirm offer\u201d. On the other hand, it restricted access to certain information only to candidates admitted to make a \u201cfinal offer\u201d. The key to reading these expressions is in the specifications. Thus, under the terms of article 5-3 of these specifications, \u201cthe firm offer will constitute an irrevocable commitment to acquire the stake sold for a period of six months, subject, where applicable, to any amendments contained in the offer. final\u201d. Similarly, under the terms of article 7-3 of the same specifications \u201cthe final offer must include the elements of the firm offer, as well as the draft sales contract. In the event that amendments are proposed to the firm offer or to the draft sales contract, all the necessary justifications must be attached to the final offer\u201d. The Council of State observes that it results from the preceding provisions and, in particular, from the need to justify any amendment made to the firm offer, that each candidate must, as soon as his firm offer is formulated, set out the conditions under which he undertakes irrevocably to acquire, if selected, the transferred interest. It thus clarifies the meaning to be given to the expressions \u201cfirm offer\u201d and \u201cdefinitive offer\u201d. According to the High Court, the applicant is only authorized to adjust his final offer in relation to his firm offer to the strict extent of new elements brought to his attention after the filing of the firm offer within the framework of the organized procedure. by the specifications. Consequently, \u201cthe provisions of the specifications,<\/p>\n
Other means, linked to the Livret bleu, were also invoked. These included the exclusive distribution of this Livret bleu. In addition, reference was made to the existence of a procedure initiated by the European Commission which would not have been brought to the attention of the Privatization Commission. Both were rejected on the grounds that they had no influence on the regularity of the privatization procedure.<\/p>\n
180. \u2013 Ultimately, this appeal made before the High Administrative Court by the ousted establishments was an opportunity for the case law to clarify certain points of the procedure for the transfer to the private sector of shares held by the State when this this takes the form of an off-market sale.<\/p>\n
181. \u2013 These clarifications certainly facilitated the privatization of Banque Hervet. This is the last French bank to have been privatised. The procedure was launched on 11\/07\/2000 after several previous failed attempts. The government first decided to sell its holdings through a public offering. Finally in November 2000, the latter preferred to opt for a private sale procedure similar to the privatization of CIC.<\/p>\n
182. \u2013 The State shareholder sold the bank to CCF for 530 million euros. The Ministry of Economy and Finance was therefore not arrested by the majority shareholder of CCF, who is nevertheless British. The State has therefore shown impartiality in the choice of the buyers of Banque Hervet without interfering with nationalist criteria. This seems to mark a pledge of goodwill on the part of the French authorities in the creation of a true single banking market. They chose the proposal that best met the four criteria of the specifications in order to efficiently protect the banking system. This takeover by CCF was a strategic move for HSBC. First, the takeover of CCF in July 2000 enabled it to acquire a banking platform in France. Secondly, the takeover of Banque Hervet strengthened it in France, in particular thanks to geographical complementarity. The CCF was in fact totally absent from the four favorite departments of Banque Hervet.<\/p>\n
183. \u2013 Having demonstrated the taking into account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of control of public banks, we will attempt to highlight the same phenomenon during the acquisition of control by a mutual or cooperative bank.<\/p>\n
3\/ The taking into account of the banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of control by a mutual or cooperative bank<\/p>\n
184. \u2013 The cooperative or mutual banks could be considered as having a significant handicap in the acquisition of a European size or even global. Originally, the overriding problem was that they could not carry out cross-shareholdings or pay in shares for their takeovers. Thus, when cash is the only possible method of payment for external growth operations, the equity ratios of the buying mutual banks can only suffer.<\/p>\n
185. \u2013 However, it should be noted that takeover operations were nevertheless carried out. The external growth of mutual or cooperative banks has even taken on an unexpected scale. Indeed, these have succeeded in acquiring vehicles listed on the stock exchange allowing them to benefit from market capitalizations. For example, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole was able to launch a public offer on Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais shares thanks to the stock market listing of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole SA.<\/p>\n
186. \u2013 It is therefore appropriate to highlight the consideration of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of hybrid control (a) as well as in external growth between mutual banks (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of hybrid control<\/p>\n
187. \u2013 The definition of hybrid takeover should be clarified. This is a concentration between a mutual bank and a bank of another status. This operation involves taking account of the banking specificity because it concerns two banks belonging to different statutes and being subject to different legal rules. In addition, the takeover is financial because it concerns a mutual bank, with a theoretically disinterested vocation, which binds itself financially to a capitalist company with the aim of growing and reaching a critical size. This specificity has consequences.<\/p>\n
188. \u2013 Indeed, in joint-stock companies, there is a category of agents specialized in the function of owner: the shareholders. They also have a function of providing capital.<\/p>\n
189. \u2013 Mutual banks are consumer cooperatives. The property rights are devolved to the members, the members of the mutual, who are contributors of equity, but who in all cases are also part of the clientele. This confusion between members and customers is likely to modify the objective of the company. It is no longer necessary to optimize the situation of the owner of the shares, therefore to maximize the financial profitability, since the latter is also the client. The cooperative is thus, in theory, more oriented towards satisfying the needs of the customers, which can modify the commercial relationship.<\/p>\n
190. \u2013 I diritti patrimoniali dei soci delle banche popolari sono limitati rispetto a quelli dei soci.\u00a0Nelle mutue e nelle cooperative i possessori di quote non possono permutarle.\u00a0Inoltre, le decisioni vengono prese in assemblea generale democraticamente, il che implica che \u201cun uomo corrisponde a un voto\u201d.\u00a0Pertanto, i diritti di controllo dei membri sui dirigenti sono molto pi\u00f9 diluiti che nelle societ\u00e0 per azioni, perch\u00e9 \u00e8 impossibile per un individuo o un gruppo di individui accumulare azioni sufficienti per avere un’influenza significativa sulle decisioni.\u00a0Nelle banche popolari francesi, tuttavia, questa regola non \u00e8 sempre applicata alla lettera, ma i diritti di voto di un membro, anche istituzionale, sono limitati.\u00a0Questa limitazione dei diritti dei soci si manifesta anche con la limitazione del rendimento del capitale.\u00a0Questa non assume la forma di dividendi distribuiti o quella di un aumento del valore della quota, ma quella di interessi pagati.\u00a0\u00c8 l’assemblea generale che decide annualmente il tasso di remunerazione delle azioni, su proposta del consiglio di amministrazione.\u00a0Rispetto alle societ\u00e0 per azioni, la remunerazione dei titolari del capitale appare quindi inferiore.<\/span><\/p>\n191. \u2013 Di conseguenza, vi \u00e8 una differenza importante tra la natura giuridica del socio e quella del socio.<\/span><\/p>\n192. \u2013 Queste acquisizioni ibride portano ad una parziale apertura della struttura mutualistica grazie ai legami finanziari.\u00a0Gli azionisti entrano nella struttura mutualistica e potenzialmente hanno un diritto alla remunerazione maggiore rispetto ai soci.\u00a0Logicamente, l’ingresso dei soci in questi gruppi pone il problema del riconoscimento dei soci.\u00a0In effetti, non hanno mai ricavato alcun valore dalle loro azioni.\u00a0Inoltre, tali operazioni comportano l’utilizzo di fondi raccolti dalle banche dai loro membri.\u00a0Cos\u00ec, quando il Cr\u00e9dit Agricole ha preso il controllo del Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, \u00e8 stato denunciato questo uso massiccio del denaro raccolto dai membri, attraverso le banche regionali.<\/span><\/p>\n193. \u2013 In definitiva, si pu\u00f2 ritenere che il Credito Cooperativo perda la sua anima aprendosi al capitalismo.\u00a0In effetti, si allontana spesso dalle sue missioni originali.\u00a0Correlativamente, sarebbe logico che i membri non appoggino pi\u00f9 la politica del gruppo, che abbandona i valori che hanno preceduto la sua costituzione.<\/span><\/p>\n194. \u2013 Alcuni hanno considerato queste acquisizioni ibride come l’inizio di un processo di demutualizzazione strisciante.\u00a0In altre parole, il mutualismo bancario sarebbe autodistruttivo.<\/span><\/p>\n195. \u2013 Tuttavia, sembra che i gruppi mutualistici siano riusciti a conciliare strutture mutualistiche e capitalistiche.<\/span><\/p>\n196. \u2013 Il Cr\u00e9dit Agricole ha assunto in particolare il controllo di Indosuez nel 1996. Questa operazione \u00e8 stata un’opportunit\u00e0 per la banca verde, fino ad allora incentrata in Francia sulle sue attivit\u00e0 tradizionali di finanziamento dell’agricoltura, delle PMI e dei privati, per stabilirsi in mestieri e mercati completamente nuovi per Esso.\u00a0Cos\u00ec, \u00e8 intervenuto con la clientela di grandi aziende internazionali, nell’attivit\u00e0 di investment banking all’estero o anche nel finanziamento di beni e progetti, terreno di caccia tradizionale delle banche di investimento.\u00a0Per raggiungere i suoi obiettivi, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole ha sfruttato la presenza internazionale di Indosuez.\u00a0Infatti, se il gruppo conta oggi molti stabilimenti diretti nel mondo tramite filiali o filiali, ci\u00f2 \u00e8 in gran parte merito del contributo di Indosuez.\u00a0Di conseguenza, da un lato, esisteva una banca generalista locale,\u00a0con una cultura mutualistica e una struttura molto decentrata.\u00a0Dall’altro, una banca d’affari orientata alle grandi imprese e alle grandi operazioni finanziarie.\u00a0La sua cultura era orientata al profitto.\u00a0Tuttavia, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole \u00e8 riuscito a combinare la sua struttura mutualistica con una struttura capitalista, evitando grandi conflitti.<\/span><\/p>\n197. \u2013 In 1997, the Banques Populaires group took control of Natexis while retaining a free float allowing the bank to be listed on the stock exchange. Natexis-Banques Populaires has become the cooperative group\u2019s wholesale bank. The banking group is therefore made up of three levels: the regional banks, the Banques Populaires federal bank and the capital structure that is Natexis-Banques Populaires. More specifically, the Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires owns more than half of Natexis-Banques Populaires. The regional banks, Casden Banque Populaire and Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif hold 98% of the Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires. In addition, the regional banks have a 25% stake in Natexis-Banques Populaires. In total, 77% of the capital of Natexis-Banques Populaires is held by the Banques Populaires group. The latter succeeded in reconciling a mutualist and capitalist structure. The chairman of the group also insists on the possibility given to members to also become shareholders of the structure to which they are already attached. Shareholders and members are therefore now part of the life of the group.<\/p>\n
198. \u2013 Finally, Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel acquired CIC in 1998. The latter is an AFB bank listed on the stock exchange. However, Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel has not demutualized from the inside insofar as the control it holds allows it to ensure that the cooperative logic prevails over the subsidiary logic. According to Mr. Etienne Pfimlin, President of the National Confederation of Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, it does not seem healthy to erect \u201cChinese walls\u201d which would prevent cooperative banks from equipping themselves with the tools necessary to adapt to a competitive environment. According to him, the prosperity of the subsidiaries has no other justification than to reinforce that of the parent companies to enable them to continue to provide the best services to the members.<\/p>\n
199. \u2013 We have just highlighted the consideration of the banking and financial specificity in the acquisitions of hybrid control. The same phenomenon can be observed in the external growth of mutual banks.<\/p>\n
b\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the external growth of mutual banks<\/p>\n
200. \u2013 The concentration of mutual banking groups is specific. To make them grow, it is enough that another group adheres to them. This is how the Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif group was integrated into the Banques Populaires group in 2002.<\/p>\n
201. \u2013 Thus, the merger of the two groups was based on the implementation of the potential of their cooperative status coupled with the provisions of the banking law applicable to mutualist networks.<\/p>\n
202. \u2013 Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif therefore adopted the legal form of a Banque Populaire limited cooperative company and was affiliated as the parent company. It is therefore associated with the destiny of the group through a stake in the capital and the deliberative bodies of the Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires. The Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires replaced the Caisse centrale de Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif as the central body of the Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif group for all of its affiliates.<\/p>\n
203. \u2013 Toutefois, aux termes de l\u2019article L. 512-11 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier, la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires est charg\u00e9e :<\/p>\n
1\/ d\u00e9finir la politique et les orientations strat\u00e9giques du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire ;
2\/ n\u00e9gocier et conclure des conventions nationales et internationales pour le compte du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire ;
3\/ agr\u00e9er les dirigeants des Banques Populaires et d\u00e9finir les conditions de cet agr\u00e9ment ;
4\/ approuver les statuts des Banques Populaires et leurs modifications ;
5\/ assurer la centralisation des exc\u00e9dents de tr\u00e9sorerie des Banques Populaires et leur refinancement ;
6\/ prendre toute mesure utile \u00e0 l\u2019organisation, au bon fonctionnement et au d\u00e9veloppement du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire et appeler les contributions n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019accomplissement de ses missions d\u2019organe central.<\/p>\n
204. \u2013 Enfin, aux termes de l\u2019article L. 512-12 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier, la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires doit prendre toutes les mesures n\u00e9cessaires pour garantir la liquidit\u00e9 et la solvabilit\u00e9 du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire en d\u00e9finissant et mettant en \u0153uvre les m\u00e9canismes internes de solidarit\u00e9 financi\u00e8re n\u00e9cessaires.\u00a0Ces dispositions concernant les Banques Populaires visent plus largement \u00e0 prot\u00e9ger la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.<\/p>\n
205. \u2013 Par cons\u00e9quent, cet organe central unique a une mission politique et une mission financi\u00e8re.\u00a0Cette structure est la synth\u00e8se entre une organisation politique, dans laquelle les dirigeants sont les repr\u00e9sentants des soci\u00e9taires, et la direction, puisque le conseil d\u2019administration de la Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rale est compos\u00e9 des pr\u00e9sidents et directeurs g\u00e9n\u00e9raux des Banques Populaires.<\/p>\n
206. \u2013 Compte tenu des pr\u00e9rogatives \u00e9tendues de la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires, celle-ci exerce incontestablement ce que l\u2019on peut qualifier de contr\u00f4le sui generis sur le Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif.\u00a0Notre argumentation est confirm\u00e9e par le ministre de l\u2019Economie.\u00a0Selon ce dernier, \u00ab cette op\u00e9ration, en ce qu\u2019elle entra\u00eene le transfert du contr\u00f4le du groupe Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif au profit de la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires, constitue une concentration au sens de l\u2019article L. 430-1 du Code de commerce. \u201d .<\/p>\n
207. \u2013 Il est clair que les reprises que nous venons d\u2019\u00e9tudier sont exclusives.\u00a0Certaines reprises peuvent \u00eatre r\u00e9alis\u00e9es conjointement par deux \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 2 : Prise en compte des sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s bancaires et financi\u00e8res dans l\u2019acquisition du contr\u00f4le conjoint<\/p>\n
208. \u2013 Les OPA sont des formes privil\u00e9gi\u00e9es de concentration entre banques.\u00a0L\u2019objectif est d\u2019atteindre la \u00ab taille critique \u00bb qui permet de mieux r\u00e9sister \u00e0 la concurrence en s\u2019unissant.\u00a0Elles correspondent \u00e0 des situations o\u00f9 aucun des partenaires ne souhaite se retirer du march\u00e9, ou dans lesquelles aucun des deux n\u2019a les moyens d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir la part de l\u2019autre.<\/p>\n
209. \u2013 Ces m\u00e9canismes permettent de limiter les risques d\u2019investissement des banques, alors que leurs ressources en capital sont rares et ch\u00e8res.<\/p>\n
210. \u2013 La prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re se v\u00e9rifie \u00e0 travers les notions permettant la qualification d\u2019OPA (A) ainsi que dans la r\u00e9alisation de l\u2019OPA (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ La prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re dans les concepts permettant la qualification de prise de contr\u00f4le en commun<\/p>\n
211. \u2013 Concerted action constitutes an element of the definition of joint control (1) making it possible to highlight the takeover control (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Action in concert, an element of the definition of joint control<\/p>\n
212. \u2013 Action in concert is subject to a definition in company law (a). The definition of banking law seems different, which reflects the consideration of banking specificity (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ The definition of company law<\/p>\n
213. \u2013 Since the adoption of the law on new economic regulations, concerted action constitutes an element of the definition of joint control.<\/p>\n
214. \u2013 The control exercised by a concert results from a double presumption. Indeed, article L. 233-10 of the Commercial Code, modified by the law of 11\/12\/2001, is used to presume the existence of an action in concert. Persons who have entered into an agreement with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights or with a view to exercising voting rights, in order to implement a policy vis-\u00e0-vis the Company \u201c. Such an agreement is presumed to exist: between a company, the chairman of its board of directors and its managing directors or the members of its management board or its managers; between a company and the companies it controls within the meaning of Article L. 233-3; between companies controlled by the same person or persons; between the partners of a simplified joint-stock company with regard to the companies that it controls. Persons acting in concert are jointly and severally bound by the obligations imposed on them by law and regulations.<\/p>\n
b\/ The interference of banking specificity<\/p>\n
215. \u2013 The notion of concerted action is also defined by banking law in Article 4 of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996. The latter provides that \u201cpersons who have entered into an agreement with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights or with a view to exercising rights to implement a common policy vis-\u00e0-vis the subject undertaking\u201d.<\/p>\n
216. \u2013 At first sight, the wording of this article seems to be close to that given in company law. However, by rigorously analyzing this provision, the differences appear significant and highlight a specificity of banking law.<\/p>\n
217. \u2013 First of all, the law of 11\/12\/2001 on urgent economic and financial reform measures modified the definition of concerted action in company law. A fundamental comma has been added after the words \u201cfor the purpose of exercising voting rights\u201d. This reform clarified the wording of Article L. 233-10 of the Commercial Code. It is therefore now certain that company law places the incident relating to the common policy as a common factor of the two objects of the agreement. Thus, it is distinguished, among the agreements with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights, those whose purpose is to implement a common policy and those which do not have this purpose.<\/p>\n
218. \u2013 However, banking law has not undergone the same modification. There is therefore a difficulty of interpretation concerning the purpose of the linking of the words \u201cto implement a common policy\u201d. The text refers to two types of agreements, one with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights, the other with a view to exercising rights. In the presence of this distinction, it is possible to consider that the incidental \u201cto implement a common policy\u201d relates exclusively to agreements with a view to exercising rights. From this, it may follow that all agreements to acquire or dispose of constitute actions in concert, without there being any reason to ask whether their purpose is to implement a common policy.<\/p>\n
219. \u2013 Admittedly, it may seem excessive to take advantage of such a formal observation. However, it confirms an analysis authorized by Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996. The latter, considering action in concert, specifies \u201cin order to exercise rights\u2026\u201d. However, company law refers to the exercise of voting rights. The difference is essential. Once again, it seems that banking law retains an extensive definition of the agreements concerned. It is not just about agreements to exercise voting rights to implement a common policy. It could be contracts made between people allowing them to benefit from certain rights within the bank concerned.<\/p>\n
220. \u2013 The interference of banking specificity is therefore evident in the definition of legal concepts. In addition, the specific definition of banking law logically entails a broad application of Article 2 of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996. Indeed, it provides that any person or group of persons acting together must obtain authorization from the CECEI when a stake greater than one-tenth of the voting rights is acquired or sold. Its authorization is fundamental because if the CECEI opposes the operation, the project will have to be abandoned. This authorization is intended to protect the banking system. The CECEI verifies that there is consultation between the parties in order to avoid conflicts between shareholders and guarantee the stability of the entity. So, it makes its authorization subject to the conclusion of a formal agreement guaranteeing the cohesion of the block of shareholders. Finally, he ensures the existence of a clear and viable industrial project, always with the aim of avoiding disruption of the banking system. Indeed, acting in concert can result in a joint takeover.<\/p>\n
2\/ Qualification of joint control resulting from concerted action<\/p>\n
221. \u2013 Not every concert can constitute control. Article L. 233-3 paragraph 3 of the Commercial Code resulting from the law relating to new economic regulations and modified by the law of 11\/12\/2001 allows the exercise of joint control to be presumed. This provides that \u201ctwo or more persons acting in concert are considered to jointly control another when they in fact determine the decisions taken at the general meeting\u201d. The objective of the legislator was thus to introduce a provision aimed at recognizing the existence of control held in concert. The law therefore adjusts to the realities of power within societies.<\/p>\n
222. \u2013 In banking law, there is no provision defining joint control. However, the persons considered to be acting together are not apprehended in the same way in banking law and company law. This lack of banking law is a source of questioning.<\/p>\n
223. \u2013 A fundamental question therefore arises in the context of joint banking subsidiaries. To what extent can joint control be qualified?<\/p>\n
224. \u2013 In general, on this issue, no fundamental divergence has emerged between company law, banking law, securities law and competition law. We can therefore highlight the criteria of joint control without having to distinguish between these different rights.<\/p>\n
225. \u2013 There is a joint takeover when the controlling companies must agree on the major decisions concerning the controlled company.<\/p>\n
Thus, there is joint control, when two partners each own half of the capital of a joint venture, each control half of the voting rights in meetings and therefore have the right to appoint half of the members of the management bodies. In such a situation, the partners are obliged to come to an agreement in order to avoid reciprocal blocking during votes on decisions concerning the activity of the joint venture. However, joint control is likely to exist, even in situations where the distribution of capital is not egalitarian, when a sufficiently significant common interest emerges from the analysis of all the factual and legal circumstances. .<\/p>\n
Such reasoning, which takes into account all the legal and factual circumstances for the purpose of recognizing a minority partner\u2019s participation in joint control, must be generalized to joint ventures under the influence of more than two partners. In its Communication on concentration and cooperation operations, the European Commission thus indicates that a joint venture may be controlled by a multiplicity of undertakings when the latter are able to bring together a majority of the capital, seats or votes in the joint undertaking\u2019s decision-making bodies. However, joint control can only be presumed if the factual or legal circumstances, in particular a convergence of economic interests, tend to demonstrate the existence of a deliberate common policy of the parent undertakings with regard to the joint undertaking. In practice, this is deduced from the existence of veto rights obliging each of the companies to agree on the management of the joint venture.<\/p>\n
226. \u2013 On the other hand, it should be specified that a company would not be considered to exercise joint control if it benefited from prerogatives aimed solely at protecting its financial interests. It is clear that in practice such a distinction is not without posing delicate problems of appreciation. Indeed, the question of the existence or not of joint control does not always call for an obvious answer in practice, given the complexity of certain factual and legal situations.<\/p>\n
227. \u2013 The above developments show that this process is halfway between financial links and cooperation agreements. Indeed, banks that control joint subsidiaries are not necessarily financially linked. However, financial links still exist, but only between the parent bank and the subsidiary. We are therefore faced with a funnel-shaped diagram and not the classic pyramid-shaped diagram with a bank having several subsidiaries. This assertion will appear very clearly in the study of the realization of the joint takeover.<\/p>\n
B\/ The taking into account of banking and financial specificity in the realization of the joint takeover<\/p>\n
228. \u2013 It is necessary to demonstrate the taking into account of the banking and financial specificity in the negotiations of joint takeover of control (1) as well as than the heterogeneity of situations in the banking system (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Taking account of the banking and financial specificity in the negotiations for the joint takeover<\/p>\n
229. \u2013 The Governor of the Banque de France intervened on several occasions to force negotiations so that banking law would be respected.<\/p>\n
230. \u2013 For example, in the 1990s, Banque Pallas found itself in great difficulty because of the real estate crisis. An audit was carried out in 1991. The Salustro report revealed that out of the 4.9 billion francs in assets whose pledges were appraised, the potential risk of loss was 882 million francs.<\/p>\n
The bank being in a catastrophic situation, a meeting was organized in disaster at the Governor of the Banque de France with the main shareholders of Pallas Holding, \u201cto deal with the most urgent and lend money to the bank\u201d. The Governor of the Banque de France demanded that the solvency ratios, provided for by banking law, be respected by the bank. He put pressure on the latter to find a solution quickly.<\/p>\n
Pallas therefore undertook to get closer to Bred by creating a joint subsidiary. The operation was carried out quickly without the union chamber of the Banques Populaires, the supervisory body of Bred, being informed. This body acts as the central body of the Banques Populaires. As such, it should be remembered that it guarantees the security of the system, of the deposits made in the various establishments that are members of the network and performs inspection functions. The Credit Institutions Committee gave its agreement to the merger without seeking the agreement of the Chambre Syndicale. Indeed, at that time, he did not need the formal, legal agreement of a third party to decide. It is customary for its members to ensure that the establishment concerned informs its supervisory body. The Committee did ask Bred to talk about its project to the president of the trade union chamber, but the latter did so very late. When the president was made aware, there was nothing more he could do. He was presented with a fait accompli. The flexibility of the regulations has helped the Banque de France, which has acted to ensure that this operation is carried out. Indeed, it wanted to avoid the failure of a bank linked to the real estate crisis.<\/p>\n
Thus, on 01\/20\/1992, a protocol was signed between the two banks. This provided for the creation of a joint subsidiary: Bred-Pallas Financement Immobilier. Bred held 51% via Cofibred, Banque Pallas France 49%.<\/p>\n
231. \u2013 This example raises a question. To which group should the entity whose joint control is negotiated belong? This question cannot be given a definitive answer. It should be demonstrated that behind the appearance of unity of this notion hides a heterogeneity of situations.<\/p>\n
2\/ The heterogeneity of joint control situations in the banking system<\/p>\n
232. \u2013 The operations allowing the implementation of joint control are heterogeneous.\u00a0Banks can decide to establish an equal or unequal control.\u00a0Thus, Mr. Dupuy suggests examining the representation of mothers on the board of directors of the subsidiary, in other words to observe interpersonal relations.<\/span><\/p>\n233. \u2013 However, for Mr. Dupuy, interpersonal relations must be treated with caution.\u00a0Indeed, while there is no doubt that they indicate the presence of influence in the broad sense, their ability to reveal command relationships is more doubtful.\u00a0Unquestionably, everything depends on the attitude adopted by the participants in the board of directors and supervisors.\u00a0However, this attitude obviously depends on the objectives pursued by the companies or organizations represented.<\/span><\/p>\n234. \u2013 According to Mr. Parent, we would be in the presence of a kind of super group where the links are solid but leave a lot of freedom. Indeed, the parent banks must work together to make a subsidiary work together, the activity and strategy of which they will jointly determine. It could therefore be considered that the entity formed by the partner banks and their joint subsidiary constitutes a single group.<\/p>\n
235. \u2013 Some authors do not agree with this opinion, in particular Mr. Ruffini. The latter writes that there is no question of confusing the joint subsidiary of several banks with the concept of a group.<\/p>\n
236. \u2013 For our part, we believe that the theories set out above are correct. However, to have an accurate view, it is necessary to take into consideration the heterogeneity of joint takeover operations.<\/p>\n
237. \u2013 Indeed, some of them are intended to allow the development of banking activities that are still non-existent or even not very widespread. In this case, the joint venture constitutes, without any hesitation, the joint subsidiary of several groups. In banking, this very flexible mode of development has been very successful. Groupama and Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale signed an agreement in 2001 creating a common multi-channel bank. The 8 million members and customers of Groupama and the individual customers of Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale thus have access to the products offered by the two groups. The creation of this joint bank therefore enabled Groupama to develop its banking activities after it had just failed to take over Banque Hervet.<\/p>\n
238. \u2013 The joint venture may also combine the majority of the activities of two or more groups. It seems that the operation then leads to the creation of a super group. This is probably often a common core relating to certain activities, while other activities are carried out by the participating groups themselves. However, the common core is generally of considerable importance and the turnover of the joint subsidiary often exceeds that of the activities of its members. This type of joint venture has been successful at the national level.<\/p>\n
239. \u2013 Let us mention the creation of the joint venture called Compagnie financi\u00e8re Eulia. The latter groups together the majority of the assets of the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations as well as of l\u2019Ecureuil. During his hearing by the Finance Committee of the National Assembly on 06\/27\/2001, the managing director of the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations insisted on the scope of the merger between his institution and the Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The objective is \u201cto reach critical mass on a global scale in the sectors of banking, finance, insurance and markets, marked by fierce competition. While the trend is towards concentration, it was appropriate to bring together the activities, assets and teams of the two groups in the competitive banking sector, in order to pursue European development from a very strong domestic base\u201d. The new entity therefore constitutes a powerful French public and semi-public banking center.<\/p>\n
240. \u2013 The implementation of the operation required the establishment of three major working groups. The first group worked on finalizing the transaction. He drew up the contribution agreements and prepared the files for the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee, the specific body for controlling the structure of the banking system. The second group worked on setting up the common company, in particular its organization, its services and its operation. This team had to reflect on the mode of governance of the holding company vis-\u00e0-vis its subsidiaries. Finally, the third group piloted the strategic project. He had to establish a two-year business plan providing for many synergies on existing businesses.<\/p>\n
241. \u2013 The two groups only pooled their competitive activities. The company is 50.1% owned by Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations and 49.9% by Ecureuil. This group, staffed by 48,000 people, controls a perimeter of 17.7 billion euros in equity. The joint venture provides strategic management of the financial businesses of the two former groups and holds the interests they have in common in four markets: retail banking, investment and corporate banking, insurance and real estate. . For retail banking, the groups contributed all the stakes held in the specialized subsidiaries and the cooperative investment certificates issued by the Caisses d\u2019Epargne network. The investment and corporate banking division was supplied by 53% of CDC Ixis, subsidiary of the CDC, through interests of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne in CDC Ixis Capital Market and in CDC Ixis Asset Management as well as through the financial division of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The capital markets businesses have been grouped together in a single CDC Ixis division. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. through investments of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne in CDC Ixis Capital Market and in CDC Ixis Asset Management as well as by the financial division of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The capital markets businesses have been grouped together in a single CDC Ixis division. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. through investments of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne in CDC Ixis Capital Market and in CDC Ixis Asset Management as well as by the financial division of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The capital markets businesses have been grouped together in a single CDC Ixis division. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners.<\/p>\n
242. \u2013 This concentration operation enabled the new entity to offer very diversified products. The latter was thus able to offer a full range of financial services: from consumer credit to home loans, including personal loans, life insurance, mutual funds and traditional personal insurance products. The lack of integration, optimization and strategy from which the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignation and l\u2019Ecureuil undeniably suffered in the face of integrated financial entities such as BNP-Paribas or Dresdner-Allianz has therefore been able to be resolved. In addition, the creation of this joint venture made it possible to significantly increase the concentration of the French banking system. Finally, this association has opened the door to new concentrations. These have, in particular,<\/p>\n
Section 2: Merger operations<\/p>\n
243. \u2013 Ces op\u00e9rations d\u00e9coulent de la pratique, puis sont reconnues par la jurisprudence.\u00a0Une premi\u00e8re d\u00e9finition de la fusion est issue d\u2019un arr\u00eat de la chambre commerciale de la Cour de cassation du 28\/01\/1946.\u00a0Ensuite, la loi du 24\/07\/1966 sur les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s commerciales a consacr\u00e9 quelques articles aux fusions et scissions, mais uniquement pour les SARL et les SA.\u00a0Ces dispositions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9es et compl\u00e9t\u00e9es par les lois du 04\/01\/1978 et 05\/01\/1988 qui ont \u00e9tendu la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019utiliser ces op\u00e9rations \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
244. \u2013 L\u2019ensemble de ces textes permet de d\u00e9finir un ensemble coh\u00e9rent de r\u00e8gles permettant le traitement juridique des op\u00e9rations de fusion.\u00a0Ainsi, les op\u00e9rations de fusion sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement d\u00e9finies par l\u2019article 1844-4 du Code civil, qui a vocation \u00e0 s\u2019appliquer \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
245. \u2013 A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la fusion, il y a la scission.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration consiste en un apport d\u2019actifs \u00e0 deux ou plusieurs soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 scind\u00e9e disparaissant.<\/p>\n
246. \u2013 A ces op\u00e9rations s\u2019ajoute l\u2019apport partiel d\u2019actifs soumis au r\u00e9gime de la scission, sur option.\u00a0Cette derni\u00e8re permet \u00e0 une entreprise d\u2019apporter une partie de son patrimoine \u00e0 une autre, \u00e0 condition que cette derni\u00e8re constitue une branche d\u2019activit\u00e9 ind\u00e9pendante.\u00a0S\u2019op\u00e8re alors une transmission universelle des droits, biens et obligations qui s\u2019attachent \u00e0 cette branche d\u2019activit\u00e9.\u00a0Mais il reste une diff\u00e9rence essentielle par rapport \u00e0 une scission : la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 qui r\u00e9alise cette op\u00e9ration ne dispara\u00eet pas.\u00a0Toutefois, cette op\u00e9ration peut \u00eatre soumise \u00e0 la proc\u00e9dure de scission.\u00a0Cependant, le r\u00e9gime de la scission est tr\u00e8s proche de la fusion, les techniques de transmission des actifs \u00e9tant similaires.\u00a0Nous n\u2019\u00e9tudierons donc pas sp\u00e9cifiquement ces deux derni\u00e8res techniques.<\/p>\n
247. \u2013 Enfin, les op\u00e9rations de dissolution par fusion de biens permettent \u00e0 l\u2019associ\u00e9 unique de recevoir la totalit\u00e9 de l\u2019actif de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 dont il d\u00e9tient la totalit\u00e9 des actions sur simple d\u00e9claration faite au greffe du tribunal de commerce.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration permet de r\u00e9aliser une transmission universelle de patrimoine avec un formalisme simplifi\u00e9 par rapport aux fusions dites simplifi\u00e9es.\u00a0L\u2019absorption d\u2019une filiale d\u00e9tenue \u00e0 100 % b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie ainsi d\u2019un r\u00e9gime simplifi\u00e9 pr\u00e9vu \u00e0 l\u2019article L. 236-11 du Code de commerce.\u00a0La dissolution par regroupement d\u2019actifs permet la disparition des filiales d\u00e9tenues \u00e0 100 % sans qu\u2019il soit n\u00e9cessaire de convoquer une assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale extraordinaire de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorbante, sans l\u2019intervention d\u2019un commissaire aux apports et sans accord de fusion, \u00e0 la diff\u00e9rence d\u2019une fusion simplifi\u00e9e.\u00a0Lorsqu\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est devenue actionnaire unique d\u2019une de ses filiales, le recours \u00e0 la consolidation de patrimoine lui permet d\u2019appr\u00e9hender, au moyen d\u2019un formalisme simplifi\u00e9, l\u2019ensemble du patrimoine de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 dissoute sans sa liquidation.\u00a0Nous ne d\u00e9velopperons pas ce mode de restructuration car ses effets sont \u00e9quivalents \u00e0 ceux d\u2019une fusion.\u00a0De m\u00eame, nous n\u2019aborderons pas les \u00ab fusions \u00e0 l\u2019anglaise \u00bb qui ne sont qu\u2019un mode d\u2019apport de parts sociales soumis \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime particulier en mati\u00e8re de droits d\u2019enregistrement.\u00a0Nous ne d\u00e9velopperons pas ce mode de restructuration car ses effets sont \u00e9quivalents \u00e0 ceux d\u2019une fusion.\u00a0De m\u00eame, nous n\u2019aborderons pas les \u00ab fusions \u00e0 l\u2019anglaise \u00bb qui ne sont qu\u2019un mode d\u2019apport de parts sociales soumis \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime particulier en mati\u00e8re de droits d\u2019enregistrement.\u00a0Nous ne d\u00e9velopperons pas ce mode de restructuration car ses effets sont \u00e9quivalents \u00e0 ceux d\u2019une fusion.\u00a0De m\u00eame, nous n\u2019aborderons pas les \u00ab fusions \u00e0 l\u2019anglaise \u00bb qui ne sont qu\u2019un mode d\u2019apport de parts sociales soumis \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime particulier en mati\u00e8re de droits d\u2019enregistrement.<\/p>\n
248. \u2013 Ainsi, seul le cadre juridique de la fusion nous retiendra.\u00a0Celui-ci comporte trois syst\u00e8mes occupant en quelque sorte trois cercles concentriques.\u00a0Le r\u00e9gime \u00ab rudimentaire \u00bb est repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par l\u2019article 1844-4 du Code civil.\u00a0Le r\u00e9gime de droit commun est applicable \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s commerciales d\u00e9finies par les articles L. 236-1 \u00e0 L. 236-6 du Code de commerce.\u00a0Enfin, le r\u00e9gime \u00ab d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 \u00bb est applicable aux fusions entre soci\u00e9t\u00e9s anonymes pr\u00e9vues par les articles L. 236-8 \u00e0 L. 236-22 du code de commerce.\u00a0Le cadre juridique des fusions a longtemps \u00e9t\u00e9 diff\u00e9rent selon qu\u2019il s\u2019agissait d\u2019une fusion entre banques AFB ou d\u2019une fusion entre banques coop\u00e9ratives.\u00a0Les premi\u00e8res \u00e9taient soumises \u00e0 la loi du 24\/07\/1966, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire au r\u00e9gime de droit commun mais surtout, compte tenu de l\u2019importance de ces banques, au r\u00e9gime \u00ab d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 \u00bb.\u00a0Ces derniers \u00e9taient soumis au r\u00e9gime \u00ab rudimentaire \u00bb que repr\u00e9sente l\u2019article 1844-4 du Code civil, notamment pour les Caisses r\u00e9gionales de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole.\u00a0Cette disposition l\u00e9gislative a lourdement pes\u00e9 sur les op\u00e9rations de fusion des caisses r\u00e9gionales.\u00a0Elle a permis de souligner, une fois de plus, la prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire dans ces instruments de concentration.<\/p>\n
249. \u2013 In fact, before 1984, there were more than thirty different statuses of credit institutions, often giving their beneficiaries a monopoly on the exercise of certain activities, frequently accompanied by tax and financial advantages. This banking specificity has been the subject of a reform. The banking law of 01\/24\/1984 partially unified banking statutes and recognized the universal vocation of credit institutions. This measure favored the process of concentration by limiting the number of existing statutes. This relative trivialization of statutes was of paramount importance for the organization of the profession. Indeed, once they are no longer subject to a special legal regime,<\/p>\n
250. \u2013 However, despite this unification of banking statutes, this law does not have a totally universal vocation. It is a compromise law that respects the various interests involved. Thus, if a unique legal framework has been established, this does not mean that the statutory specificities of cooperative or mutual banks have disappeared. This therefore necessarily has an impact on banking concentrations.<\/p>\n
251. \u2013 Since credit institutions cannot freely choose their status without depending on a parliamentary or administrative decision, mergers of banks belonging to different legal statuses are problematic. Nevertheless, such operations remain possible but their implementation is so complex that they are generally carried out between credit institutions of the same statutory nature.<\/p>\n
252. \u2013 Logically, this coexistence of different statuses within credit institutions leads to a distinction between mergers of commercial banks (\u00a7 1) and mergers of mutual or cooperative banks (\u00a7 2).<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1: Mergers of commercial banks<\/p>\n
253. \u2013 The legal regime applicable to these mergers was modified by the law of 05\/01\/1988. This development was justified by the desire to harmonize French legislation with the provisions contained in European directives.<\/p>\n
254. \u2013 This law certainly favored the process of concentration in the banking system. We give as proof of this the large number of bank mergers after 1988, whereas this number was much lower previously.<\/p>\n
Thus, Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de CIC merged with Banque de l\u2019Union Europ\u00e9enne in 1990. Sogebanque was absorbed by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale in 1991. Banque Gravereau was also absorbed by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale in 1992. BFCE and the Cr\u00e9dit National gave birth to Natexis in 1995. Compagnie Bancaire, Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de Paribas and Banque Paribas merged in 1998. Finally, BNP and Paribas merged in 2000.<\/p>\n
255. \u2013 Compared to previous provisions, the 1988 law has the merit first of all of providing a definition of merger. This is now defined as the transmission by one or more companies of their assets to an existing company or to a new company that they constitute.<\/p>\n
256. \u2013 La fusion entre deux ou plusieurs soci\u00e9t\u00e9s emporte transmission universelle de l\u2019actif de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorb\u00e9e au profit de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorbante ou de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle cr\u00e9\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de la fusion.<\/p>\n
257. \u2013 En outre, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorb\u00e9e est syst\u00e9matiquement dissoute, sans qu\u2019il soit n\u00e9cessaire de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 la liquidation de cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Cependant, il convient de noter qu\u2019il existe ici un conflit entre le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s et le droit bancaire.\u00a0En effet, cette derni\u00e8re pr\u00e9voit qu\u2019en cas de fusion, l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit voit son agr\u00e9ment retir\u00e9 et entre en liquidation.\u00a0La loi du 02\/07\/1996 n\u2019a pas r\u00e9solu ce probl\u00e8me.\u00a0Elle indique seulement, \u00e0 ce sujet, que l\u2019\u00e9tablissement ne peut effectuer que les op\u00e9rations bancaires et de placement strictement n\u00e9cessaires au r\u00e8glement de sa situation.\u00a0Ce dernier texte reste donc impr\u00e9cis et peut impliquer que cette op\u00e9ration entra\u00eene la liquidation de l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Il y a donc ici conflit de lois internes.\u00a0Selon nous,<\/p>\n
258. \u2013 Di conseguenza, l’applicazione distributiva del diritto societario e del diritto bancario \u00e8 delicata.\u00a0Tuttavia, \u00e8 necessario riuscire a tenere conto della specificit\u00e0 bancaria durante il processo di riconciliazione degli asset, sia che riguardi il periodo precedente alla fusione (A) sia la decisione di fusione stessa (B).<\/span><\/p>\nA\/ Il periodo precedente la fusione<\/span><\/p>\n259. \u2013 Il periodo precedente la fusione si articola in due fasi distinte.\u00a0Una prima fase, di durata variabile, non \u00e8 altro che una fase di riconciliazione (1).\u00a0La seconda fase \u00e8 un modo per le aziende di materializzare il loro desiderio di fondersi.\u00a0Questa fase \u00e8 l’occasione per redigere e sottoscrivere il progetto di fusione (2).<\/span><\/p>\n1\/ Fusioni aziendali<\/span><\/p>\n260. \u2013 La fase delle societ\u00e0 richiedenti la fusione varia notevolmente da una fusione all’altra.\u00a0Inoltre, varia sia nella sua durata che nel suo contenuto.<\/span><\/p>\n261. \u2013 Cosa c’\u00e8 in comune, infatti, tra la fusione di due societ\u00e0 che non si conoscono e la fusione di due controllate nell’ambito della ristrutturazione di gruppo imposta dalla capogruppo.\u00a0Nel primo caso \u00e8 praticamente necessario prendere contatto e fare conoscenza.\u00a0Nel secondo caso, invece, si pu\u00f2 arrivare molto rapidamente alla firma del progetto di fusione, come avvenne durante la ristrutturazione del gruppo bancario Lazard.<\/span><\/p>\n262. \u2013 Questa fase di fusione presenta due aspetti: da un lato le trattative intersocietarie (a) e, dall’altro, i frequenti interventi delle autorit\u00e0 pubbliche che costituiscono una specificit\u00e0 bancaria (b).<\/span><\/p>\na\/ Trattative interaziendali<\/span><\/p>\n263. \u2013 Le fusioni aziendali sono operazioni a geometria variabile.\u00a0Le societ\u00e0 che partecipano a una fusione possono essere estremamente numerose o possono essercene solo due.\u00a0Allo stesso modo possono avvenire fusioni tra societ\u00e0 di diversa dimensione, struttura, redditivit\u00e0 o attivit\u00e0.<\/span><\/p>\n264. \u2013 Giuridicamente la fusione pu\u00f2 avvenire tra societ\u00e0 di diversa forma.\u00a0Inoltre, una societ\u00e0 in liquidazione pu\u00f2 partecipare ad un’operazione di fusione a condizione, per\u00f2, che la ripartizione del patrimonio di tale societ\u00e0 tra i soci non sia stata oggetto di un avvio di esecuzione.<\/span><\/p>\n265. \u2013 Quali che siano le differenze tra le societ\u00e0 che si uniscono, la fase negoziale non \u00e8 soggetta ad alcun preciso formalismo giuridico.\u00a0Le societ\u00e0 organizzano quindi liberamente i termini della loro fusione.<\/span><\/p>\n266. \u2013 Questa fase di riavvicinamento \u00e8 spesso segreta, almeno inizialmente.\u00a0La segretezza \u00e8 pienamente giustificata nel sistema bancario.\u00a0In effetti, le banche sono generalmente quotate in borsa.\u00a0Nella maggior parte delle riconciliazioni bancarie, questa fase \u00e8 quindi rimasta segreta per non provocare perturbazioni nei mercati finanziari.<\/span><\/p>\n267. \u2013 Il contenuto di questa fase di fusione \u00e8 estremamente variabile da una fusione all’altra.\u00a0In alcuni casi, questa fase d\u00e0 luogo allo svolgimento di studi volti a comprendere meglio le aziende coinvolte: diagnosi commerciale, valutazione degli attivi bancari, audit sociale, analisi finanziaria, ecc. Questa diagnosi dovrebbe consentire alle aziende di determinare se stanno perseguendo o non la fusione avviata e, in tal caso, decidere quale sar\u00e0 il miglior supporto legale.<\/span><\/p>\n268. \u2013 The lawyer must make the most judicious choice and for this he must carry out an interdisciplinary analysis. Correlatively, it must take into account the specificity of the banking activity, as it is obvious that the efficient choice of the instrument of concentration will be different from that which could have been selected in another economic sector. For example, in the context of the takeover of a structure with a human component, specialized in mergers and acquisitions, the merger may not be a good decision. Indeed, imposing a culture on this type of structure would lead to destroying it in favor of a homogeneity that would have no meaning. The bank\u2019s essential human resources would be forced to resign. Gold, it is essential to note that the conservation of human heritage is fundamental in the banking sector. Thus, it seems more interesting, in the case presented, to adopt another strategy in order to avoid endangering the entity concerned.<\/p>\n
269. \u2013 It is therefore generally at this stage that the decision is made whether or not to move towards a merger. If this is the case, the representatives of the banks continue the negotiation phase by endeavoring to establish the essential conditions of the operation. This supposes the evaluation of the banks in presence (\u03b1) and the determination of the parity (\u03b2).<\/p>\n
\u03b1\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the evaluation of the entities involved<\/p>\n
270. \u2013 The evaluation of the entities involved is certainly one of the most difficult problems to resolve in terms of mergers. Indeed, it is necessary to determine the respective weight of each company. It is therefore necessary to proceed with the evaluation of the companies involved, seeking to get as close as possible to the value representative of their economic reality. To do so, it is necessary to take into consideration the specificity of banks compared to traditional companies.<\/p>\n
271. \u2013 There are many methods for valuing banks, in particular:
\u2013 valuation at book value;
\u2013 valuation at market value;
\u2013 valuation at net asset value;
\u2013 valuation using the earnings capitalization method;
\u2013 valuation based on cash flows;
\u2013 evaluation based on forecasts of activity or results;
\u2013 evaluation based on the mathematical value;
\u2013 valuation at value in use;
\u2013 valuation at insurance value;
\u2013 the valuation based on the corrected net assets\u2026<\/p>\n
272. \u2013 In matters of mergers, there are no rigid methods to be followed in order to assess companies. It is advisable to retain several evaluation criteria without their number being excessive. The criteria retained must be selected in such a way as not to duplicate each other. The valuation methods must be applied in the same way to the different companies involved. The criteria selected must be significant. The forecast results can only be used as a valuation method under certain technical conditions guaranteeing the reasonable nature of the valuations. Similarly, the use of discounts, fixed allowances or weighting coefficients is rejected.<\/p>\n
273. \u2013 The diversity of criteria used to assess companies can be a source of dispute, particularly between majority and minority shareholders. If this evaluation is a source of dispute, it is because it is a delicate exercise. The complexity is all the more marked in the banking system because of the existence of banking specificities. Indeed, some criteria for evaluating banks differ from ordinary companies. Four of them are particularly important: net banking income, the Cooke ratio, the evolution of deposits and the \u201creturn on equity\u201d. The net banking income is the equivalent of the turnover of a traditional company. These are the interest margin, commissions and fees. To judge its evolution and the orientations of the bank, it is necessary to analyze the net banking income of each of the four main business lines: retail banking, financial services, private banking and asset management as well as investment banking. The second important criterion is the Cooke ratio which describes the solvency of the establishment. This is the ratio between equity and outstanding loans. It must be at least 4% for the ratio of \u201chard\u201d equity and weighted assets. It must be 8% for the ratio of total equity and weighted assets. The evolution of deposits indicates, in turn, the commercial success of an institution, particularly in its ability to attract deposits from its customers. However, this does not provide any information on profitability. The latter is assessed with the study of the \u201creturn on equity\u201d, ie the return on equity.<\/p>\n
274. \u2013 The difficulty of evaluation is all the greater for the banks as there is significant diversity in the application of accounting rules. Generally, the most widely used approach today, based on modern financial theory, is that of determining the discounted future net cash flows of each of the entities.<\/p>\n
As far as credit institutions are concerned, a more traditional approach based on ratios is still sometimes used. The data that is used comes from the financial statements and is therefore based on accounting rules. Benchmarking generally does not disregard past performance, examined from balance sheets and income statements. Accounting data is therefore a privileged source of information. For the analyzes and conclusions drawn from them to be relevant, the accounting data must be comparable. This comparability is subject to the use of identical accounting rules or leading to slightly different valuations, if the methods are not strictly similar.<\/p>\n
The accounting regulatory framework imposed on credit institutions in France is set relatively strictly. The rules for valuing and presenting the accounts are defined by the regulations and instructions of the Banking and Financial Regulation Committee, supplemented, where applicable, by interpretations published in the bulletin of the Banking Commission. Since 1999, the regulations drawn up by the banking section of the National Accounting Council have been applied.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it might seem, a priori, that French credit institutions apply identical rules and methods that allow their accounts to be compared without restatements and without significant risk of error. Experience leads, on the contrary, to highlight many and varied sources of differences.<\/p>\n
275. \u2013 The origins of the distortions existing in the evaluation of the accounts of credit institutions can be grouped by type.<\/p>\n
276. \u2013 First of all, there are discrepancies arising from the different application of the rules. Generally accepted accounting principles require fixed assets to be depreciated and provisions to be made for asset depreciation and\/or provisions under the conditions set by law. However, there is a specificity in the banking system because the policies for provisioning real estate risks from one institution to another are not identical. The very definition of real estate assets requiring an evaluation and, if necessary, an impairment is not common to all.<\/p>\n
The same observation can be made for country risks. The definition of the bases to be subject to a provision sometimes turns out to be different from one institution to another. However, each bases its analysis on precise written provisions transmitted annually by the Banking Commission. The differences concern whether or not all or part of short-term transactions are taken into account, and whether certain guarantees are taken into account. Even before the harmonization of the depreciation rates, it is therefore more fundamental to question the comparison of the definition of the risk base.<\/p>\n
With regard to doubtful debts, beyond the classic causes of differences, it was noted, for example, in 1996 that certain establishments decided to initiate an accounting provisioning of the credit risk as soon as a loan was granted . This \u201cearly\u201d taking into account of the risk necessarily has significant consequences on the comparability of the performance of the establishment which practices it in relation to those which, more traditionally, only provision for risks arising.<\/p>\n
277. \u2013 Secondly, there are discrepancies stemming from the options offered by the texts or the rules themselves.<\/p>\n
The accounting rules in force sometimes leave institutions the choice between several possible methods or offer them the possibility of certain accounting practices. Of course, the fund for general banking risks should be mentioned. This is a real provision of a reserve nature, constituted or reversed by the income statement and which should, of course, be restated in the perspective of a valid comparison between several establishments. The hybrid nature of this position has raised a number of questions about its treatment. The new methodology for banks\u2019 consolidated accounts seems to resolve these difficulties by specifying that it is not an identifiable liability:<\/p>\n
Les provisions pour pensions qui, en France, peuvent \u00eatre constitu\u00e9es ou non, totalement ou partiellement, sont \u00e9galement une source notoire et valable de distorsions.\u00a0Les frais d\u2019\u00e9mission d\u2019emprunt peuvent, sur option, \u00eatre amortis sur la dur\u00e9e de vie de l\u2019emprunt, ce qui est le cas le plus courant, mais de nombreux \u00e9tablissements comptabilisent imm\u00e9diatement ces frais en charges.<\/p>\n
278. \u2013 Troisi\u00e8mement, il existe des divergences li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019absence de dispositions pr\u00e9cises dans les textes.<\/p>\n
Une analyse plus d\u00e9taill\u00e9e des pratiques comptables des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit et plus particuli\u00e8rement des op\u00e9rations bancaires met en \u00e9vidence, dans certains cas, des diff\u00e9rences de traitement dont l\u2019impact sur les r\u00e9sultats et les capitaux propres n\u2019est pas n\u00e9gligeable.\u00a0Ils n\u00e9cessitent donc des retraitements d\u2019harmonisation pour r\u00e9aliser une analyse comparative pertinente et fiable.\u00a0Le fait g\u00e9n\u00e9rateur de la prise en compte du r\u00e9sultat d\u2019exploitation est d\u00e9terminant.\u00a0Sa d\u00e9termination peut entra\u00eener des d\u00e9calages dans le temps dans la comptabilisation des produits ou des charges.<\/p>\n
De nombreux services bancaires sont r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9s sous forme de commissions, qui peuvent \u00eatre pay\u00e9es d\u2019avance, in fine ou en plusieurs fois.\u00a0D\u2019un point de vue comptable, la prise en compte du r\u00e9sultat des commissions doit \u00eatre li\u00e9e \u00e0 la nature des prestations fournies et aux obligations qui en d\u00e9coulent.\u00a0Ainsi, la r\u00e9glementation pr\u00e9voit que les commissions assimil\u00e9es \u00e0 des int\u00e9r\u00eats sont assimil\u00e9es \u00e0 ces derniers.\u00a0Mais il existe un certain nombre d\u2019autres commissions qui ne sont pas comparables \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat.<\/p>\n
Certains \u00e9tablissements n\u2019enregistrent les commissions qu\u2019\u00e0 la date de r\u00e9ception ;\u00a0d\u2019autres, au contraire, attendent syst\u00e9matiquement la fin des prestations ;\u00a0d\u2019autres, enfin, r\u00e9partissent tout ou partie des commissions dans le temps sur la dur\u00e9e de la prestation.\u00a0Les commissions, qui constituent une part croissante du produit net bancaire et des r\u00e9sultats bancaires, doivent donc faire l\u2019objet d\u2019un examen approfondi, afin d\u2019harmoniser les faits donnant lieu \u00e0 leur prise en compte, selon leur sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9.<\/p>\n
En ce qui concerne les titres, si les r\u00e8gles d\u2019\u00e9valuation sont strictement d\u00e9finies en fonction du type de portefeuille auquel elles se rattachent, l\u00e0 encore il existe des sources de distorsions.\u00a0Par exemple, les modalit\u00e9s d\u2019amortissement des d\u00e9cotes\/primes relatives aux titres \u00e0 revenu fixe peuvent varier.\u00a0Elles sont parfois pratiqu\u00e9es sur la dur\u00e9e restant \u00e0 courir jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9ch\u00e9ance du titre, tandis que certains \u00e9tablissements utilisent une m\u00e9thode de calcul actuariel, selon la nature du titre.\u00a0Enfin, d\u2019autres proc\u00e8dent \u00e0 un \u00e9pandage lin\u00e9aire syst\u00e9matique.<\/p>\n
Par ailleurs, les modalit\u00e9s de d\u00e9termination des r\u00e9sultats de cession des titres du portefeuille d\u2019investissement ne sont pas toujours identiques d\u2019un \u00e9tablissement \u00e0 l\u2019autre.\u00a0Certains utilisent la m\u00e9thode FIFO, d\u2019autres celle du prix moyen pond\u00e9r\u00e9, d\u2019autres encore proc\u00e8dent \u00e0 une \u00ab s\u00e9lection \u00bb des gammes commercialis\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
Les remboursements anticip\u00e9s d\u2019emprunts donnent g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement lieu, sur une base contractuelle, au versement d\u2019indemnit\u00e9s financi\u00e8res compensatoires par les clients ou les \u00e9tablissements.\u00a0Les pratiques adopt\u00e9es consistent soit \u00e0 prendre en compte imm\u00e9diatement ces indemnit\u00e9s, soit \u00e0 les \u00e9taler sur la dur\u00e9e restant \u00e0 courir de l\u2019ancien pr\u00eat voire sur la dur\u00e9e du financement de remplacement, lorsqu\u2019il existe.<\/p>\n
Dans le domaine des produits d\u00e9riv\u00e9s, une certaine diversit\u00e9 des pratiques peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre soulign\u00e9e.\u00a0Par exemple, l\u2019\u00e9valuation \u00e0 la valeur de march\u00e9 ou \u00e0 la \u00ab juste valeur \u00bb des instruments financiers auxquels cette m\u00e9thode s\u2019applique peut \u00eatre prise en compte.\u00a0Les modalit\u00e9s de calcul des frais de gestion futurs des swaps et autres instruments valoris\u00e9s \u00e0 la valeur de march\u00e9 prennent en compte une part plus ou moins importante des frais indirects.\u00a0De plus, la d\u00e9finition des co\u00fbts directs eux-m\u00eames peut varier.\u00a0Enfin, la notion m\u00eame de couverture ne peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme d\u00e9finie de mani\u00e8re uniforme.\u00a0Les difficult\u00e9s li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019application de la notion de couverture conduisent \u00e9galement certains normalisateurs comptables \u00e0 ne plus reconna\u00eetre la comptabilit\u00e9 de couverture.<\/p>\n
279. \u2013 It is obvious that the differences in accounting methods result in non-homogeneous valuations and influence the results. This diversity of methods in the context of an establishment merger has consequences. Only a detailed analysis or audit work can make it possible, on the one hand, to identify the differences between two or more establishments, and on the other hand, to measure the possible impact of these divergences. Furthermore, when performance is analyzed over certain previous years, it is necessary to measure this impact for each of the periods examined.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ The determination of the parity<\/p>\n
280. \u2013 The determination of the parity therefore implies the concretization of the balance of power which exists between the banks. The parity is the exchange ratio of the shares decided most often, but not exclusively, from the evaluations of the banks. The determination of parity calls for a few remarks.<\/p>\n
281. \u2013 Firstly, the reference made to the valuation of companies, although it is frequent in practice, does not have the effect of freezing the determination of the exchange ratio. Indeed, the parties involved can introduce other parameters intended to achieve the most equitable balance of power.<\/p>\n
282. \u2013 Secondly, the parity will set the terms according to which the partners of the acquired company will become partners of the acquiring or new company. However, it is possible that, taking into account the parity adopted, the shareholders or partners are not entitled to receive a whole number of shares of the acquiring or new company. Consequently, in practice, companies will have to resort to the so-called fractional trading procedure.<\/p>\n
283. \u2013 However, in order not to burden the merger operation with such negotiations, which may prove to be lengthy in the event of dilution of the capital, companies may use palliatives, including the possibility of payment of a balance in species.\u00a0This technique, which received legal sanction with the law of 05\/01\/1988, no longer has the effect of causing the operation to lose its nature of amalgamation, on the condition, however, that this balancing payment does not represent more than 10% of the nominal value of the shares or shares remunerating the contributions.<\/span><\/p>\n284. \u2013 Companies also have the option of making an exceptional distribution of dividends. It makes it possible to rebalance the parities and to make the absorption of a company less costly. Indeed, by paying such a dividend, the future absorbed reduces its net assets proportionally, thus allowing the absorbing company to limit the number of securities to be issued to remunerate its acquisition. Therefore, exceptional dividend distributions are regularly used.<\/p>\n
285. \u2013 Negotiations between the companies applying for the merger are therefore an essential element. However, in the banking system, government intervention is also very important.<\/p>\n
b\/ Taking banking specificity into account in negotiations: intervention by the public authorities<\/p>\n
286. \u2013 Taking account of banking specificity materializes both through the intervention of political power (\u03b1) and the banking authorities (\u03b2).<\/span><\/p>\n\u03b1\/ The intervention of political power<\/span><\/p>\n287. \u2013 There is a specificity to reconciliation negotiations in the banking system.\u00a0Indeed, these take place between the economic actors, but the public authorities also frequently intervene in the negotiation.<\/span><\/p>\n288. \u2013 Take the example of the merger between the Banque Nationale du Commerce et de l\u2019Industrie and the Comptoir National d\u2019Escompte de Paris. The government stepped in to lead the merger negotiations. Michel Debr\u00e9 makes this very clear \u201c(\u2026) global economic competition and economic influence, but also France\u2019s policy demanded that it have instruments of action and of an international dimension. I created the BNP to serve the economic and national influence of our country\u201d. However abrupt and directed it may be, the State\u2019s decision to associate the BNCI and the CNEP in 1966 aims to stimulate the banking sector and set up a genuine \u201cfinancial strike force, the BNP\u201d. In effect,<\/p>\n
During the negotiation of this merger, the public authorities were really very present.\u00a0They mobilized all their energy to push the BNCI to accept the principle of merger.\u00a0They thus highlighted the complementarity of the goodwill of the CNEP, active with large companies, and the BNCI, very present with small and medium-sized companies.\u00a0They also indirectly highlighted the interest of creating a new major bank, alongside Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais and Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale.<\/span><\/p>\nAs soon as the choice was made, the government quickly decided on the principles to be applied in order to carry out the operation, in order to ensure maximum efficiency and to avoid any rumors or possible pressure.<\/span><\/p>\nOn 05\/04\/1966, the merger between the BNCI and the CNEP was publicly announced: \u201cThe Council of Ministers today approved the merger of the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l\u2019Industrie and the Comptoir National d\u2019Escompte of Paris into an establishment which will take the name of Banque Nationale de Paris\u201d.<\/p>\n
289. \u2013 After this operation, the State took part in many other mergers which, moreover, did not necessarily constitute mergers stricto sensu. For example, in 1999, during BNP\u2019s public exchange offer for Paribas and Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, which resulted after the merger of BNP and Paribas, the public authorities intervened on several occasions. This interference took place in a confidential and public manner. It should be verified that this same phenomenon characterizes the intervention of the banking authorities.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ The intervention of the banking authorities<\/p>\n
290. \u2013 The intervention of the banking authorities was carried out in order to promote the merger of banks in difficulty with the aim of protecting the banking system. Indeed, the failure of a bank can generate a systemic risk. The merger of a failing bank with a healthy credit institution is one of the solutions favored by the banking regulatory authorities.<\/p>\n
291. \u2013 In the case of Banque Pallas, the Governor of the Banque de France intervened. Given that the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 des Banques Suisses was asking for authorization to create a new subsidiary in France, he strongly encouraged the directors of the SBS to hold talks with the directors of Pallas. \u201cThe governor\u2019s encouragements are received five out of five. The Swiss allow their arm to be twisted and run\u201d. Negotiations between companies are therefore influenced by the Banque de France. The agreement providing for the merger of Comipar and Pallas Holding, as well as that of Banque Pallas with Banque Stern was signed at the end of March 1992.<\/p>\n
292. \u2013 Consequently, in a classic merger, the preparatory phase is essentially a matter of negotiations between the representatives of the companies involved. However, in the banking system, this phase frequently involves the public authorities. It is clear that once the decision has been taken to resort to merger, the managers must adopt the measures made necessary by the development of the merger project. To do this, the companies must essentially convene and meet the bodies responsible for drafting the project. Regularly convened, the directors will be able to proceed with the development of the merger project.<\/p>\n
2\/ The merger project<\/p>\n
293. \u2013 There is no doubt that this act goes beyond the talks. These are completed when the merger project is completed. Moreover, in the event, frequent in practice, where the shareholders\u2019 meetings decide in favor, this project will become the agreement itself. This is why it is possible to affirm that this act already constitutes the agreement, specifying however that its effectiveness is suspended on one condition: the approval of the shareholders\u2019 meetings. This analysis undoubtedly has the merit of clarity. However, it has a major drawback. Until the agreement is approved, it has no legal effect. This means that in case of refusal, it would be necessary to consider that there was no agreement. This conclusion clashes with reality. The draft agreement not only concretizes an agreement in principle between the parties but even confirms this agreement on the details of the operation. Therefore, another analysis of the merger project is preferable. This can be viewed as an agreement which binds neither the partners nor the companies but only the managers of these companies as such. They are now required to make every effort to ensure that the partners of their company accept the merger under the conditions determined by the project. It goes without saying that this obligation is only an obligation of means. This can be viewed as an agreement which binds neither the partners nor the companies but only the managers of these companies as such. They are now required to make every effort to ensure that the partners of their company accept the merger under the conditions determined by the project. It goes without saying that this obligation is only an obligation of means. This can be viewed as an agreement which binds neither the partners nor the companies but only the managers of these companies as such. They are now required to make every effort to ensure that the partners of their company accept the merger under the conditions determined by the project. It goes without saying that this obligation is only an obligation of means.<\/p>\n
294. \u2013 Thus, the draft merger is indeed the \u201cofficial\u201d starting point for the operations which should result in the merger of two or more companies. Centerpiece in the merger, it is necessary to study the adoption of the merger project (a) and the repercussion of the merger project (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Adoption of the draft merger<\/p>\n
295. \u2013 The draft merger is a document made compulsory by the law of 05\/01\/1988 and the content of which was clarified by the decree of 22\/04\/1988.<\/p>\n
296. \u2013 When the managers of the companies involved have decided on the final terms of the merger project, they must, if necessary, grant a delegation to the legal representative of the company, or to any person authorized for this purpose to proceed with the signing of the project. .<\/p>\n
297. \u2013 The draft is established in a number of copies which varies from one merger to another. In principle, the recipients of the project are each of the companies participating in the operation, the merger auditors, the registry of the Commercial Court, the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers and the CECEI. The communication of the merger project to the latter constitutes a banking specificity. Indeed, the merger concerning credit institutions generates the intervention of the banking regulatory authority. It is therefore essential that the latter be informed of the operations that it must control.<\/p>\n
298. \u2013 In addition, the merger plan must be circulated within the bank. The draft must, in particular, be made available to shareholders with a view to holding extraordinary meetings to decide on the merger operation. It must also be made available to the works council. Employers must provide reasoned answers to questions asked by members of the works council, in particular with regard to the repercussions of the proposed merger.<\/p>\n
b\/ The repercussions of the merger plan<\/p>\n
299. \u2013 Once the merger plan has been signed by the representatives of the different companies, the merger operation must be approved by the meetings of the partners of each of the companies. However, for the partners, or shareholders, to be able to decide with full knowledge of the facts, it is necessary to submit the conditions of the operation beforehand to the control of external and independent experts. This need requires the intervention of merger auditors.<\/p>\n
300. \u2013 The merger commissioner, which appeared with the law of 05\/01\/1988, is appointed by order of the president of the Commercial Court. This ordinance is taken at the request of the managers of the various banks which are merging without limitation of time.<\/p>\n
301. \u2013 The intervention of the merger auditor is required only in joint-stock companies and in limited liability companies. The strict application of the texts, and particularly of Articles L. 236-1 and L. 236-2 of the Commercial Code, leads to the conclusion that only transactions between public limited companies and\/or SARLs are concerned by the appointment of a merger commissioner. This designation is not required in the context of an operation involving a company of another legal form.<\/p>\n
302. \u2013 It should be specified that the merger of banks incorporated in the form of LLCs is impossible. Although the banking law does not specify that LLCs are excluded from the banking profession, this is the case in practice. Indeed, under the terms of Article L. 511-10 paragraph 2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, the CECEI \u201cverifies the adequacy of the legal form of the company to the activity of the credit institution\u201d. Thus, the CECEI has always refused to approve a bank incorporated in this corporate form. However, a distinction should be made between banks and finance companies. Indeed, the CECEI agrees to approve financial companies incorporated in the form of limited liability companies. Mergers between them are therefore possible.<\/p>\n
303. \u2013 Furthermore, the mission of the merger auditor is defined by Article L. 236-10 of the Commercial Code. It is invested with a double mission. It must issue an opinion on the determination of the values \u200b\u200battributed to the shares or units of the companies participating in the operation and on the fairness of the exchange ratio. It must also formulate an opinion on the value of contributions in kind and special benefits.<\/p>\n
304. \u2013 At the end of this assignment, the merger auditor is required to write a report.<\/p>\n
305. \u2013 Finally, to carry out the merger operation, the companies involved must move on to the stage of final completion of the operation.<\/p>\n
B\/ The merger decision<\/p>\n
306. \u2013 This last step concerns the approval of the operation. The approval of the merger by the assemblies obeys different rules depending on whether it is a merger-absorption operation (1) or a merger by creation of a new company (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Approval in the case of a merger-absorption<\/p>\n
307. \u2013 Approval of the merger by the shareholders of the companies presupposes the calling of the meeting.<\/p>\n
308. \u2013 The decision approving the merger must be taken under the conditions provided for the amendment of the articles of association. It follows that in the SA, the decision is within the competence of the extraordinary general meeting. The rules for calling this meeting must be respected. Without going into the details of these rules, it should be remembered that the notice of meeting is generally preceded by a notice of meeting, published in the Bulletin of mandatory legal notices with regard to bank mergers. Indeed, as commercial banks generally make public calls for savings, this constitutes an obligation towards them.<\/p>\n
309. \u2013 The convocation is carried out by applying the provisions contained in the statutes. Notwithstanding these provisions, the company must respect the obligation to insert the notice of meeting with mention of the agenda in a journal of legal announcements. In addition, the notice must be sent to the company\u2019s auditors.<\/p>\n
310. \u2013 In order to be able to make an informed decision, shareholders must have specific information. Thus, during the 30 days preceding the general meeting called to rule on the merger operation, the shareholders must be able to consult at the registered office or obtain a certain number of documents on simple request.<\/p>\n
311. \u2013 Finally, the partners of the absorbed company rule on the merger project under the conditions provided for the modification of the articles of association, ie by a majority of 2\/3 in the SA. However, if the merger has the effect of increasing shareholders\u2019 commitments, the decision to approve the operation must be taken unanimously. Depending on the prospects of the operation, the majority in the assembly is more or less large. For example, during the merger between BNP and Paribas on 05\/23\/2000, the shareholders approved the merger by 99.72%.<\/p>\n
312. \u2013 Au-del\u00e0 de ces r\u00e8gles g\u00e9n\u00e9rales de fonctionnement de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e en cas de fusion, la d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e appelle un commentaire.\u00a0Les associ\u00e9s ne sont pas tenus de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 l\u2019approbation ou au rejet pur et simple du projet de fusion qui leur est soumis.\u00a0Ils ont la possibilit\u00e9 de modifier les termes de ce projet.\u00a0Toutefois, si tel est le cas, la modification doit \u00eatre \u00e9tendue \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s participant \u00e0 la fusion, dans la mesure o\u00f9 les assembl\u00e9es qui statuent sur l\u2019op\u00e9ration doivent adopter le m\u00eame texte.<\/p>\n
313. \u2013 Par ailleurs, la loi bancaire doit \u00eatre appliqu\u00e9e.\u00a0L\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit absorbant doit modifier son agr\u00e9ment en raison, par exemple, de l\u2019extension de ses activit\u00e9s.\u00a0Parall\u00e8lement, l\u2019\u00e9tablissement absorb\u00e9 doit demander son retrait d\u2019agr\u00e9ment au CECEI.\u00a0Le retrait d\u2019agr\u00e9ment prend effet \u00e0 la date de r\u00e9alisation de l\u2019absorption.\u00a0Enfin, en cas de fusion par cr\u00e9ation de soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle, une demande d\u2019agr\u00e9ment doit \u00eatre introduite aupr\u00e8s du CECEI.<\/p>\n
2\/ Agr\u00e9ment en cas de fusion avec cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle<\/p>\n
314. \u2013 Cet agr\u00e9ment est r\u00e9gi par les r\u00e8gles bancaires (a) ainsi que par les r\u00e8gles du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Encadrement par les r\u00e8gles bancaires<\/p>\n
315. \u2013 Ce type de fusion entra\u00eene la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une nouvelle entit\u00e9 juridique.\u00a0Ainsi, les \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s doivent solliciter, aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019autorit\u00e9 de r\u00e9gulation bancaire, simultan\u00e9ment le retrait de leur agr\u00e9ment ainsi qu\u2019un agr\u00e9ment pour la nouvelle entit\u00e9.<\/p>\n
316. \u2013 Les associ\u00e9s doivent approuver les \u00e9l\u00e9ments constitutifs de la nouvelle banque.\u00a0L\u2019ing\u00e9rence des r\u00e8gles bancaires entra\u00eene une atteinte au libre choix de la forme sociale par les associ\u00e9s.\u00a0En effet, comme nous l\u2019avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9, la constitution d\u2019une banque sous forme de SARL est impossible car cette forme sociale n\u2019est pas en ad\u00e9quation avec les besoins du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Les banques devant disposer de fonds propres importants, le recours aux SARL est exclu.<\/p>\n
317. \u2013 Inoltre, la normativa bancaria deroga alle disposizioni del diritto societario relative al capitale minimo delle societ\u00e0 di capitali.\u00a0Infatti, secondo il diritto societario, \u201cdeve essere almeno di 225.000 euro se l’azienda effettua un bando pubblico di risparmio e di almeno 37.000 euro altrimenti\u201d.\u00a0Tuttavia, la legge bancaria prevede che il capitale minimo che gli istituti di credito devono avere sia preciso.\u00a0Pertanto,<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 le banche, le banche popolari o cooperative, le cooperative di credito di grande rilievo e le istituzioni finanziarie specializzate devono avere un capitale di almeno 5 milioni di euro;<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 le societ\u00e0 finanziarie, salvo poche eccezioni, devono avere un capitale di almeno 2,2 milioni di euro;<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 le cooperative di credito che limitano la loro attivit\u00e0 a garanzie corporali per prestiti e le societ\u00e0 finanziarie la cui autorizzazione \u00e8 limitata all’esercizio di operazioni di fideiussione devono avere un capitale almeno pari a 1,1 milioni di euro.<\/span><\/p>\n318. \u2013 Finally, the absence of a constituent meeting has the effect of transferring to the general meetings of the banks that are merging the obligation to choose the first directors and auditors.\u00a0Concerning the appointment of auditors, the Monetary and Financial Code took into consideration the specificity of the banking system.\u00a0Thus, he imposed the appointment of two commissioners.\u00a0This is done \u201cafter consulting the Banking Commission\u201d which can also \u201cappoint an additional auditor when the situation justifies it\u201d.\u00a0The credit institution must notify the Commission Bancaire of the names of the statutory auditors it proposes to appoint.\u00a0The latter has a period of two months to make known its opinion on the proposal to appoint the auditor.\u00a0If he deems it necessary, he may request additional information.\u00a0When its opinion is unfavorable or subject to reservations, it must be reasoned.\u00a0It can only be taken after the proposed auditor has been invited to make his observations known.<\/span><\/p>\n319. \u2013 Moreover, this designation can only be made within the framework of the new company’s articles of association, which must be approved by the extraordinary general meetings of the companies taking part in the operation.\u00a0This last rule demonstrates the fundamental connection that should be made between the rules of banking law and company law.<\/span><\/p>\nb\/ Rules of company law<\/span><\/p>\n320. \u2013 In theory, the merger entailing the creation of a new bank, it would be advisable to respect all the rules and formalities related to the constitution of a company, whatever the form of the company.\u00a0news thus created.<\/span><\/p>\n321. \u2013 However, in order to facilitate the carrying out of merger operations, the legislator has introduced various simplification measures.\u00a0These provisions essentially apply when the new company is formed without any contributions other than those of the merging companies.<\/span><\/p>\n322. \u2013 If the new company is an SA, Article L. 236-12 of the Commercial Code provides that this company may be incorporated without any contributions other than those made by the merging companies.\u00a0In this case, the statutes of the future company are approved by each of the general meetings of the companies which disappear on the occasion of the merger.\u00a0Similarly, it is not necessary to proceed with the meeting of the constituent assembly of the new company.\u00a0The abolition of this meeting essentially results in concentrating the carrying out of merger operations within the framework of the extraordinary general meetings of the merging companies.\u00a0Most of the other incorporation formalities are however maintained, but their fulfillment is largely transferred to the level of the companies that are disappearing.<\/span><\/p>\n