Adem\u00e1s, la Directiva CEE N\u00b0 93\/22 adoptada el 10\/05\/1993 facilit\u00f3 la libre prestaci\u00f3n de servicios y la libertad de establecimiento en los mercados financieros de la Uni\u00f3n Europea para cualquier proveedor de servicios de inversi\u00f3n que tenga su domicilio social o su direcci\u00f3n efectiva en uno de los Estados miembros.\u00a0Con este fin, se ha introducido el llamado sistema de \u201cpasaporte europeo\u201d.\u00a0Esto no implica una armonizaci\u00f3n completa de las normas relativas a las condiciones de acceso a la actividad de proveedor de servicios de inversi\u00f3n.\u00a0Se basa en el principio de reconocimiento de las homologaciones concedidas por las autoridades del Estado miembro de origen.The directive sets out a few minimum harmonization conditions relating to the granting of the European passport, but the Member State of origin remains free to enact stricter rules.<\/span><\/p>\nConsequently, the law of 1984 was modified by law n\u00b0 92-665 of 16\/07\/1992 transposing the EEC directive of 15\/12\/1989. This laid down the principle of freedom of establishment, the provision of services in the Member States of the community, the mutual recognition of approvals issued by the latter and the principle of monitoring by the country of origin. The most significant novelty thus resides in the single license system: the approval granted by the State of the head office is valid once and for all throughout the Community. This creation of a single banking market was obviously the primary cause of concentration since credit institutions were able to compete freely throughout Europe.<\/p>\n
Finally, EEC directive n\u00b0 93\/22 of 05\/10\/1993 was transposed into French law by law n\u00b0 96-597 of 07\/02\/1996. The latter adopts a new legal structure based on trades and no longer on markets. It consecrates the unity of the financial market while maintaining the specificity of financial intermediation in relation to credit businesses.<\/p>\n
14. \u2013 Ultimately, the banking law as well as the texts drawn up subsequently allowed deregulation, harmonization of prudential rules and logically an activation of competition between credit institutions. This constituted a factor of concentration in the banking system. In particular, Community law has been at the origin of a large number of developments resulting in the acceleration of mergers.<\/p>\n
15. \u2013 Dans ce contexte, l\u2019\u00c9tat a d\u00fb privatiser les banques.\u00a0Ce processus a \u00e9galement contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 accro\u00eetre la concentration du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En effet, revenus au secteur priv\u00e9, les principaux \u00e9tablissements ont retrouv\u00e9 leur libert\u00e9 d\u2019initiative et ont pu s\u2019engager dans des concentrations que leur appartenance au secteur public avait longtemps entrav\u00e9es.\u00a0Le transfert des banques du secteur public au secteur priv\u00e9 s\u2019est d\u00e9roul\u00e9 principalement en trois \u00e9tapes.\u00a0Les privatisations de 1986 \u00e0 1988 ont concern\u00e9 73 banques, principalement la Banque du B\u00e2timent et des Travaux Publics, la Banque Industrielle et Immobili\u00e8re Priv\u00e9e, la Caisse Nationale du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, la Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de Paribas, la Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de Suez, la Compagnie Financi\u00e8re Cr\u00e9dit Commercial de France et Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale.\u00a0Apr\u00e8s une interruption de cinq ans,\u00a0correspondant \u00e0 la p\u00e9riode \u00ab ni-ni \u00bb, le programme de privatisation reprend en 1993. Les privatisations de 1993 et \u200b\u200b1994 concernent notamment la BNP et la Banque Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0De nouveaux transferts du secteur public vers le secteur priv\u00e9 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 op\u00e9r\u00e9s depuis : en 1995 ils concernaient la BFCE et le Cr\u00e9dit Local de France, en 1996 deux banques du groupe Renault et trois filiales du Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, en 1997 une filiale du groupe GAN, en 1998 les autres filiales du GAN, notamment le groupe CIC ainsi que la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit et ses filiales, en 1999 le Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais et enfin en 2001 la banque Hervet.\u00a0Les privatisations de 1993 et \u200b\u200b1994 ont notamment concern\u00e9 la BNP et la Banque Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0De nouveaux transferts du secteur public vers le secteur priv\u00e9 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 op\u00e9r\u00e9s depuis : en 1995 ils concernaient la BFCE et le Cr\u00e9dit Local de France,\u00a0en 1996 deux banques du groupe Renault et trois filiales du Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, en 1997 une filiale du groupe GAN, en 1998 les autres filiales du GAN, notamment le groupe CIC ainsi que la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit et ses filiales, en 1999 le Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais et enfin en 2001 la banque Hervet.\u00a0Les privatisations de 1993 et \u200b\u200b1994 ont notamment concern\u00e9 la BNP et la Banque Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0De nouveaux transferts du secteur public vers le secteur priv\u00e9 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 op\u00e9r\u00e9s depuis : en 1995 ils concernaient la BFCE et le Cr\u00e9dit Local de France, en 1996 deux banques du groupe Renault et trois filiales du Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, en 1997 une filiale du groupe GAN, en 1998 les autres filiales du GAN, notamment le groupe CIC ainsi que la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit et ses filiales,<\/p>\n
16. \u2013 Face \u00e0 ces mutations du march\u00e9 bancaire, les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit fondent d\u00e9sormais leur strat\u00e9gie sur la rentabilit\u00e9.\u00a0Le transfert du syst\u00e8me bancaire de la sph\u00e8re institutionnelle, voire administrative, \u00e0 la sph\u00e8re commerciale, en fait d\u00e9sormais une activit\u00e9 concurrentielle.\u00a0Or, il est incontestable que la concurrence est \u00e0 l\u2019origine du processus de concentration.<\/p>\n
17. \u2013 Par ailleurs, dans le domaine des contr\u00f4les l\u00e9gaux, il convient de noter que les banques privil\u00e9gient la concentration par rapport \u00e0 d\u2019autres strat\u00e9gies susceptibles de g\u00e9n\u00e9rer des \u00e9conomies, car les autorit\u00e9s de la concurrence les appr\u00e9hendent avec bienveillance.\u00a0.\u00a0En effet, la coop\u00e9ration peut \u00eatre condamn\u00e9e sur la base de l\u2019accord lorsqu\u2019elle a pour objet d\u2019emp\u00eacher, de restreindre ou de fausser la concurrence sur un march\u00e9.\u00a0Les autorit\u00e9s de concurrence nationales et communautaires contr\u00f4lent rigoureusement les pratiques anticoncurrentielles.\u00a0Ainsi, les banques contournent la difficult\u00e9 en se concentrant.\u00a0Ce qui est interdit est remplac\u00e9 par ce qui est encourag\u00e9.\u00a0Ces concentrations font l\u2019objet d\u2019un contr\u00f4le plus ambigu qui vise notamment \u00e0 examiner si l\u2019op\u00e9ration cr\u00e9e ou renforce une position dominante, comme nous le verrons dans les d\u00e9veloppements suivants.\u00a0Premi\u00e8rement,\u00a0l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral p\u00e8se lourd dans le contr\u00f4le national des concentrations.\u00a0Etant donn\u00e9 que le minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Economie et des Finances est favorable \u00e0 la concentration du syst\u00e8me bancaire fran\u00e7ais, il est l\u00e9gitime de consid\u00e9rer qu\u2019il ne s\u2019opposera qu\u2019exceptionnellement \u00e0 ces op\u00e9rations au nom de la protection de la concurrence.\u00a0.\u00a0Quant au contr\u00f4le des concentrations par le Conseil de la concurrence, il n\u2019est que limit\u00e9 puisque son r\u00f4le n\u2019est ici que consultatif.\u00a0Ce mod\u00e8le s\u2019apparente \u00e0 l\u2019ancien mod\u00e8le de justice retenue, \u00e9tape historique de la justice administrative o\u00f9 le juge ne pouvait trancher lui-m\u00eame le litige mais se bornait \u00e0 proposer une d\u00e9cision de justice au Gouvernement.\u00a0Ce contr\u00f4le est donc peu rigoureux.\u00a0Deuxi\u00e8mement, il est essentiel de noter que le contr\u00f4le europ\u00e9en des concentrations par la Commission poursuit un double objectif :\u00a0l\u2019int\u00e9gration des march\u00e9s et la protection de la concurrence.\u00a0Il en r\u00e9sulte une certaine ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 du contr\u00f4le puisque la Commission donne la primaut\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019objectif d\u2019int\u00e9gration des march\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
18. \u2013 Ce dernier \u00e9l\u00e9ment r\u00e9v\u00e8le incontestablement que les sources juridiques de la concentration sont compl\u00e9t\u00e9es par des causes \u00e9conomiques et manag\u00e9riales.<\/p>\n
B\/ Les causes \u00e9conomiques et manag\u00e9riales du processus de concentration bancaire<\/p>\n
19. \u2013 La concurrence entra\u00eene une concurrence accrue entre les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit, ce qui conduit \u00e0 de nombreuses concentrations.\u00a0Ainsi, par exemple, la concurrence dans le m\u00e9tier de banque de d\u00e9tail tend \u00e0 r\u00e9duire les marges et conduit les acteurs \u00e0 chercher \u00e0 augmenter les produits distribu\u00e9s : produits d\u2019\u00e9pargne, d\u2019assurance, etc. L\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 ces activit\u00e9s passe par une strat\u00e9gie de rapprochement.\u00a0Des concentrations ont donc \u00e9t\u00e9 initi\u00e9es, notamment avec les compagnies d\u2019assurance.\u00a0De plus, cette concurrence doit de plus en plus s\u2019exercer \u00e9galement contre des acteurs non bancaires.\u00a0Citons les compagnies d\u2019assurances qui sont entr\u00e9es en force dans le secteur bancaire, notamment par le rachat de banques d\u2019investissement.\u00a0Par ailleurs, des entreprises du secteur de la distribution sont \u00e9galement entr\u00e9es sur le march\u00e9 bancaire.<\/p>\n
D\u2019un point de vue \u00e9conomique, la croissance de la taille des entreprises est quasiment la seule r\u00e9ponse aux besoins de cette nouvelle concurrence.\u00a0On assiste donc \u00e0 la globalisation du syst\u00e8me bancaire et \u00e0 un renforcement du pouvoir et de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 entre les mains d\u2019une minorit\u00e9.\u00a0Le pouvoir \u00e9conomique est concentr\u00e9 sous pr\u00e9texte de cr\u00e9er de la valeur.\u00a0Cette course \u00e0 la taille semble in\u00e9luctable en raison des crit\u00e8res de rentabilit\u00e9.<\/p>\n
20. \u2013 En effet, la concentration est susceptible de conduire \u00e0 la r\u00e9alisation de synergies et de compl\u00e9mentarit\u00e9s entre les entit\u00e9s li\u00e9es.\u00a0Ces synergies comprennent \u00e0 la fois celles qui concernent les m\u00e9tiers et celles qui concernent le syst\u00e8me de distribution lui-m\u00eame.\u00a0Le premier peut provenir soit de la compl\u00e9mentarit\u00e9 des portefeuilles clients et\/ou produits, soit de la mutualisation de services centraux, de moyens logistiques, mais aussi de back-offices ou encore de savoir-faire.\u00a0Les secondes peuvent, par exemple, se concr\u00e9tiser en compl\u00e9tant un r\u00e9seau de proximit\u00e9 par extension.\u00a0D\u00e8s lors, l\u2019accent a \u00e9t\u00e9 mis sur les avantages conf\u00e9r\u00e9s par la grande taille : facilit\u00e9s de financement, \u00e9conomies d\u2019\u00e9chelle, \u00e9conomies de gamme, gains de productivit\u00e9, opportunit\u00e9s d\u2019investissements risqu\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
21. \u2013 Cependant, ces avantages doivent \u00eatre relativis\u00e9s dans le syst\u00e8me bancaire car il n\u2019est pas prouv\u00e9 qu\u2019il existe une relation entre la taille d\u2019un \u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit et sa rentabilit\u00e9, sauf dans la banque de d\u00e9tail, d\u2019autant plus que les co\u00fbts sont tr\u00e8s disparates d\u2019une banque \u00e0 l\u2019autre.\u00a0Ainsi, la comparaison de la liste des 100 premi\u00e8res banques mondiales avec celle des 100 plus rentables, semble prouver l\u2019inexistence d\u2019une relation entre la taille et l\u2019efficacit\u00e9 puisque seules 9 banques de la premi\u00e8re liste figurent sur la seconde.\u00a0Le professeur Alain Buzelay reconna\u00eet l\u2019existence d\u2019une corr\u00e9lation tr\u00e8s faiblement positive entre la taille des organismes bancaires et leur rentabilit\u00e9.\u00a0Les travaux d\u2019Alfred Steinherr montrent m\u00eame une corr\u00e9lation n\u00e9gative pour les plus grandes banques dans au moins six \u00c9tats membres.\u00a0La \u00ab\u00a0taille optimale\u00a0\u00bb d\u00e9pend du m\u00e9tier,\u00a0la structure des co\u00fbts et le pouvoir de march\u00e9 qu\u2019elle conf\u00e8re.\u00a0Certaines professions sont effectivement exerc\u00e9es au niveau d\u00e9partemental et r\u00e9gional.\u00a0D\u2019autres ne sont rentables qu\u2019au niveau national, d\u2019autres ont enfin besoin de se d\u00e9ployer au niveau international.\u00a0Ainsi, les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices \u00e9conomiques de ces strat\u00e9gies sont, \u00e0 ce jour, globalement tr\u00e8s d\u00e9battus : l\u2019effet taille n\u2019a pas forc\u00e9ment apport\u00e9 plus d\u2019\u00e9conomies d\u2019\u00e9chelle ni de diversification des risques.\u00a0Dans certains cas, le d\u00e9veloppement incontr\u00f4l\u00e9 de l\u2019activit\u00e9 a m\u00eame conduit \u00e0 une accumulation consid\u00e9rable de risques ;\u00a0l\u2019importance des fonds propres et leur rendement ont pu poser des probl\u00e8mes de r\u00e9utilisation qui ont pu inciter les banques \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper des strat\u00e9gies d\u2019arbitrage prudentiel.\u00a0Enfin,\u00a0D\u2019autres ne sont rentables qu\u2019au niveau national, d\u2019autres ont enfin besoin de se d\u00e9ployer au niveau international.\u00a0Ainsi, les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices \u00e9conomiques de ces strat\u00e9gies sont, \u00e0 ce jour, globalement tr\u00e8s d\u00e9battus : l\u2019effet taille n\u2019a pas forc\u00e9ment apport\u00e9 plus d\u2019\u00e9conomies d\u2019\u00e9chelle ni de diversification des risques.\u00a0Dans certains cas, le d\u00e9veloppement incontr\u00f4l\u00e9 de l\u2019activit\u00e9 a m\u00eame conduit \u00e0 une accumulation consid\u00e9rable de risques ;\u00a0l\u2019importance des fonds propres et leur rendement ont pu poser des probl\u00e8mes de r\u00e9utilisation qui ont pu inciter les banques \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper des strat\u00e9gies d\u2019arbitrage prudentiel.\u00a0Enfin,\u00a0D\u2019autres ne sont rentables qu\u2019au niveau national, d\u2019autres ont enfin besoin de se d\u00e9ployer au niveau international.\u00a0Ainsi, les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices \u00e9conomiques de ces strat\u00e9gies sont, \u00e0 ce jour, globalement tr\u00e8s d\u00e9battus : l\u2019effet taille n\u2019a pas forc\u00e9ment apport\u00e9 plus d\u2019\u00e9conomies d\u2019\u00e9chelle ni de diversification des risques.\u00a0Dans certains cas, le d\u00e9veloppement incontr\u00f4l\u00e9 de l\u2019activit\u00e9 a m\u00eame conduit \u00e0 une accumulation consid\u00e9rable de risques ;\u00a0l\u2019importance des fonds propres et leur rendement ont pu poser des probl\u00e8mes de r\u00e9utilisation qui ont pu inciter les banques \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper des strat\u00e9gies d\u2019arbitrage prudentiel.\u00a0Enfin,\u00a0le d\u00e9veloppement incontr\u00f4l\u00e9 de l\u2019activit\u00e9 a m\u00eame conduit \u00e0 une accumulation consid\u00e9rable de risques ;\u00a0l\u2019importance des fonds propres et leur rendement ont pu poser des probl\u00e8mes de r\u00e9utilisation qui ont pu inciter les banques \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper des strat\u00e9gies d\u2019arbitrage prudentiel.\u00a0Enfin,\u00a0le d\u00e9veloppement incontr\u00f4l\u00e9 de l\u2019activit\u00e9 a m\u00eame conduit \u00e0 une accumulation consid\u00e9rable de risques ;\u00a0l\u2019importance des fonds propres et leur rendement ont pu poser des probl\u00e8mes de r\u00e9utilisation qui ont pu inciter les banques \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper des strat\u00e9gies d\u2019arbitrage prudentiel.\u00a0Enfin,<\/p>\n
22. \u2013 L\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du processus de concentration bancaire en Europe s\u2019explique donc par la conjonction de plusieurs autres ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes.<\/p>\n
23. \u2013 Tout d\u2019abord, il y a la surcapacit\u00e9 bancaire qui est une des causes de la concentration.\u00a0Corr\u00e9lativement, il ne semble plus y avoir de place pour un nouveau r\u00e9seau bancaire ni en France ni dans l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, notamment en raison du taux de bancarisation tr\u00e8s \u00e9lev\u00e9.\u00a0Cela laisse tr\u00e8s peu de place aux nouveaux venus.\u00a0Ainsi, il s\u2019agit d\u2019acheter des r\u00e9seaux de guichets et de banques d\u2019une certaine taille d\u00e9j\u00e0 implant\u00e9s sur les march\u00e9s.\u00a0L\u2019explication des concentrations par la recherche de pouvoir de march\u00e9 constitue donc une hypoth\u00e8se de travail beaucoup plus f\u00e9conde.\u00a0Les banques se concentrent parce qu\u2019elles veulent d\u00e9fendre voire \u00e9tendre leurs positions sur leur march\u00e9 domestique face \u00e0 des concurrents nationaux qui se concentrent, mais aussi face \u00e0 des concurrents \u00e9trangers potentiels.<\/p>\n
24. \u2013 Ensuite, les concentrations apparaissent souvent comme un moyen au service de la mise en \u0153uvre d\u2019une strat\u00e9gie permettant d\u2019atteindre l\u2019objectif \u00e0 la mode.\u00a0En effet, on peut s\u2019interroger sur le caract\u00e8re mim\u00e9tique de certaines de ces op\u00e9rations, dans la mesure o\u00f9 des effets pervers sont apparus par le pass\u00e9 pour contredire, au moins dans un certain nombre de cas, les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices \u00e9conomiques de strat\u00e9gies couramment appliqu\u00e9es \u00e0 la fois par majorit\u00e9 des acteurs du secteur.\u00a0Par exemple, les strat\u00e9gies commerciales des banques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9es, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, par une course \u00e0 la taille des bilans.\u00a0Au cours des ann\u00e9es 1990, le montant des capitaux d\u2019abord, puis leur rendement, sont devenus les nouveaux crit\u00e8res de d\u00e9veloppement.\u00a0Enfin aujourd\u2019hui,<\/p>\n
Le syst\u00e8me bancaire pr\u00e9sente ainsi parfois un fonctionnement concurrentiel consensuel et, dans certains cas, oligopolistique, o\u00f9 les principaux acteurs sont dans l\u2019ensemble assez peu diff\u00e9renci\u00e9s.\u00a0Elle appara\u00eet donc souvent sensible \u00e0 une modification de l\u2019environnement concurrentiel local, qui peut alors \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme une modification des r\u00e8gles du jeu, \u00e0 laquelle il faut r\u00e9pondre soit en s\u2019y conformant, soit en changeant \u00e0 nouveau ces r\u00e8gles soi-m\u00eame.\u00a0.\u00a0Par cons\u00e9quent, de nombreuses op\u00e9rations de consolidation peuvent \u00eatre d\u00e9clench\u00e9es par un effet d\u2019imitation de fusion initi\u00e9 par un concurrent.\u00a0Au niveau europ\u00e9en, le mim\u00e9tisme semble \u00e9galement perceptible.\u00a0En effet, l\u2019europ\u00e9anisation de plusieurs banques est motiv\u00e9e par le fait que leurs principaux concurrents s\u2019installent en Europe.<\/p>\n
25. \u2013 L\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration des op\u00e9rations de consolidation peut aussi r\u00e9sulter d\u2019une r\u00e9action d\u00e9fensive de certains acteurs face aux initiatives des concurrents.\u00a0Ces comportements micro-\u00e9conomiques, appel\u00e9s \u00ab \u00e9quilibre de Nash \u00bb en th\u00e9orie des jeux, conduisent un agent \u00e0 adopter la r\u00e9ponse qu\u2019il juge la plus cr\u00e9dible \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de son concurrent pour maintenir ou pr\u00e9server sa position.\u00a0A cet \u00e9gard, certains rapprochements du syst\u00e8me bancaire r\u00e9alis\u00e9s r\u00e9cemment en Europe semblent avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 initi\u00e9s davantage en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 une modification des \u00e9quilibres existants que dans la perspective d\u2019atteindre un objectif initial fort.<\/p>\n
26. \u2013 Les comportements mim\u00e9tiques, comme les strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9actives, ont leur propre rationalit\u00e9 \u00e9conomique, mais qui n\u2019est pas n\u00e9cessairement fond\u00e9e sur la cr\u00e9ation de valeur : dans le premier cas, la r\u00e9duction des asym\u00e9tries d\u2019information entre concurrents sur le march\u00e9.\u00a0un ensemble assez homog\u00e8ne, comme c\u2019est le cas dans le syst\u00e8me bancaire, peut les inciter \u00e0 des r\u00e9actions de type mim\u00e9tique ;\u00a0dans le second cas, c\u2019est surtout la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9action qui prime.<\/p>\n
27. \u2013 La course \u00e0 la concentration s\u2019explique aussi par la volont\u00e9 des dirigeants des banques d\u2019\u00eatre des \u00ab pr\u00e9dateurs \u00bb plut\u00f4t que de risquer de devenir la cible d\u2019une OPA inamicale.\u00a0De ce point de vue, la taille moyenne des banques fran\u00e7aises r\u00e9v\u00e8le le risque de rachat par de plus grands \u00e9tablissements \u00e9trangers.\u00a0Il faut noter que la recherche de puissance est en elle-m\u00eame un facteur de concentration non n\u00e9gligeable.\u00a0Par exemple, en 1999, la bataille boursi\u00e8re entre la BNP et la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale a d\u00e9montr\u00e9 qu\u2019au-del\u00e0 des raisons \u00e9conomiques, se posaient aussi des questions de pr\u00e9\u00e9minence des individus et de prestige des \u00e9quipes dirigeantes.<\/p>\n
28. \u2013 Par ailleurs, les pressions actionnariales jouent \u00e9galement un r\u00f4le d\u00e9terminant dans les concentrations bancaires.\u00a0Celles-ci apparaissent comme une r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la demande de rendement pour les actionnaires.\u00a0En effet, l\u2019importance croissante des investisseurs institutionnels dans le capital des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit conduit naturellement les dirigeants de ces derniers \u00e0 orienter leurs objectifs de gestion vers la valeur actionnariale.\u00a0Les objectifs de rentabilit\u00e9 demand\u00e9s atteignent le taux de rentabilit\u00e9 des fonds propres de 15%.\u00a0Face \u00e0 cette pression actionnariale exigeante, les banques cherchent d\u2019abord \u00e0 y r\u00e9pondre en s\u2019effor\u00e7ant de d\u00e9velopper leur performance interne et en acc\u00e9l\u00e9rant leur croissance.\u00a0Mais la marge potentielle de croissance interne atteint rapidement ses limites : en effet, les gains de productivit\u00e9 moyens oscillent g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement entre 2 et 5 % par an ;\u00a0quant \u00e0 la croissance globale des activit\u00e9s,\u00a0il est d\u2019environ 3 % par an sur le march\u00e9 int\u00e9rieur.\u00a0Le maintien d\u2019un taux de rendement sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 10 % n\u00e9cessite donc le recours \u00e0 la croissance externe.<\/p>\n
29. \u2013 Par ailleurs, le march\u00e9 unique et l\u2019introduction de l\u2019euro s\u2019av\u00e8rent d\u00e9cisifs dans la m\u00e9tamorphose du secteur.\u00a0Ils ont transform\u00e9 les march\u00e9s nationaux en un march\u00e9 paneurop\u00e9en.\u00a0Ainsi, la Commission europ\u00e9enne a estim\u00e9 que : \u00ab (\u2026) l\u2019euro ferait sans doute sentir ses effets dans un grand nombre de secteurs, notamment les services financiers (\u2026) \u00bb.\u00a0En d\u00e9finitive, l\u2019av\u00e8nement de l\u2019euro a fait office de d\u00e9tonateur avec encore plus de force que ne l\u2019avaient pr\u00e9vu les sp\u00e9cialistes.\u00a0Cela \u00e9limine le risque de taux de change au sein de la zone euro.\u00a0De plus, il assure une monnaie commune pour la gestion d\u2019actifs.\u00a0Enfin, les frais pr\u00e9lev\u00e9s par les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit sont \u00e9galement exprim\u00e9s dans la m\u00eame devise partout en Europe.\u00a0L\u2019homog\u00e9n\u00e9isation des produits et la transparence des prix sont donc encourag\u00e9es.\u00a0Cette concurrence accrue contribue \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9crasement des marges sur certaines activit\u00e9s.\u00a0Cela incite les banques \u00e0 rechercher plus de volume, et donc des parts de march\u00e9 plus \u00e9lev\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
30. \u2013 Par ailleurs, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la croissance des march\u00e9s financiers, des capacit\u00e9s et des opportunit\u00e9s d\u2019acquisition ont \u00e9t\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es.\u00a0La situation internationale s\u2019est am\u00e9lior\u00e9e et a \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9e par une reprise de la croissance et des taux d\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat relativement bas, malgr\u00e9 une hausse r\u00e9cente.\u00a0Cet environnement a profit\u00e9 aux march\u00e9s boursiers, ce qui a pu contribuer \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer le processus de consolidation bancaire \u00e0 plusieurs \u00e9gards :<\/p>\n
\u2013 par la cr\u00e9ation de capacit\u00e9s d\u2019acquisition du fait des fortes hausses de valorisation de certains \u00e9tablissements,<\/p>\n
\u2013 en d\u00e9clenchant des acquisitions pr\u00e9coces de cibles dans le but de minimiser le co\u00fbt de la restructuration en vue d\u2019une revalorisation croissante du syst\u00e8me bancaire, \u2013 par des opportunit\u00e9s d\u2019investissement bon march\u00e9 gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l\u2019abondance des ressources de march\u00e9, voire internes.<\/p>\n
31. \u2013 Finally, mergers are part of a context of increasing globalization of financial markets and technological progress linked to the development of new channels of distance marketing and negotiation. There are indeed high-tech sectors which are globalized from the outset: electronic components, IT, aeronautics. Some more traditional sectors are in the process of globalisation: the automobile industry, the tire industry, as many client companies that the banks must support in their race to global size if they wish not to lose them. As for the financial industry itself, it is becoming global, as activity on the financial markets can only be considered on a global scale. It is certain that globalization constitutes a factor of concentration. Initially, national operators are concentrating. In a second period, they are concentrated at European level. Finally, in a third step, they should focus globally. National rivers should flow into a European river and then into a global banking and financial ocean. However, the current situation seems stuck between the first phase and the second.<\/p>\n
II\/ The contemporary situation of the movement of banking concentration<\/p>\n
32. \u2013 A movement of concentration of the banking systems of all the States of Europe can be noted (A). As regards the movement of cross-border concentration, this is having difficulty developing (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ The movement towards concentration of banking systems in the States of Europe<\/p>\n
33. \u2013 It seems that the concentration process got off to a moderate start in France.<\/p>\n
34. \u2013 D\u2019une part, comme nous l\u2019avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9, il existe encore de nombreuses lois en droit bancaire fran\u00e7ais.\u00a0Cela limite th\u00e9oriquement la concentration des banques mutualistes.\u00a0Ainsi, la r\u00e8gle selon laquelle ils ne peuvent payer en titres, notamment l\u2019acquisition d\u2019autres \u00e9tablissements, continue de s\u2019appliquer.\u00a0Cela p\u00e9nalise le d\u00e9veloppement du secteur mutualiste qui, paradoxalement, a pourtant r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 se concentrer.\u00a0A noter la concentration du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole avec Indosuez ainsi que Sofinco, la concentration entre Banque Populaire et Natexis, ainsi que le rachat du CIC par le Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel.\u00a0Cependant, le risque demeure pour le secteur mutualiste de ne pas r\u00e9ussir \u00e0 acqu\u00e9rir une dimension europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n
35. \u2013 En revanche, les banques fran\u00e7aises, malgr\u00e9 l\u2019am\u00e9lioration de leurs r\u00e9sultats, due en grande partie \u00e0 l\u2019am\u00e9lioration de la situation \u00e9conomique, souffrent toujours de l\u2019insuffisance des b\u00e9n\u00e9fices de leur activit\u00e9 domestique, comme en t\u00e9moigne leur relative faiblesse en termes de rentabilit\u00e9 des fonds propres \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9chelle internationale.\u00a0Cela tient peut-\u00eatre aussi \u00e0 la gestion de la catastrophe du Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais et \u00e0 toute une s\u00e9rie de faillites de banques ou d\u2019entreprises de moindre importance qui ont fait peser une charge tr\u00e8s lourde sur la collectivit\u00e9 publique et les grands groupes priv\u00e9s qui se retrouvent consid\u00e9rablement fragilis\u00e9s.\u00a0Le groupe Suez et la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Paribas, par exemple, ont d\u00fb dig\u00e9rer les abus qu\u2019ils avaient provoqu\u00e9s dans le domaine de l\u2019immobilier.\u00a0Les banques de d\u00e9p\u00f4t traditionnelles, comme la BNP ou la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale,\u00a0ont \u00e9galement d\u00fb faire face aux erreurs qu\u2019ils avaient commises en pr\u00eatant aux petites et moyennes entreprises.\u00a0Cela pla\u00e7ait la France, au regard de la concentration du syst\u00e8me bancaire, dans une position m\u00e9diane par rapport aux autres \u00c9tats membres de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n
36. \u2013 Cependant, entre le 01\/01\/1987 et le 31\/12\/2001, le nombre total d\u2019\u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit implant\u00e9s en France a n\u00e9anmoins sensiblement diminu\u00e9, passant de 2152 en 1987 \u00e0 1837 en 1991, \u00e0 1608 en 1994, \u00e0 1209 en 1998, \u00e0 1085 en 2000, \u00e0 1035 en 2001 et \u00e0 975 en 2002. La baisse a \u00e9t\u00e9 de 5% en 1998 et 2000 et, en quatorze ans, de 51,9%.\u00a0Toutes les cat\u00e9gories d\u2019\u00e9tablissements sont concern\u00e9es par ce changement.\u00a0Ainsi, le nombre de banques AFB est pass\u00e9 de 412 en 1991 \u00e0 386 fin 1997 et 359 fin 1998. Cette \u00ab r\u00e9duction r\u00e9guli\u00e8re, \u00e0 partir de 1988, et qui se poursuit actuellement (\u2026) se traduit notamment (\u2026) groupes d\u2019\u00e9tablissements \u00bb.\u00a0En effet, de 1985 \u00e0 1998, 1277 op\u00e9rations de fusion ont \u00e9t\u00e9 enregistr\u00e9es et plus de 900 rachats par de nouveaux actionnaires.<\/p>\n
37.- Para hacer frente al aumento de la competencia y la ca\u00edda de los m\u00e1rgenes, las redes han emprendido programas de racionalizaci\u00f3n destinados a crear entidades de tama\u00f1o suficiente.\u00a0Esta b\u00fasqueda de masa cr\u00edtica ha llevado a los grupos mutualistas a realizar numerosas fusiones entre entidades afiliadas.<\/span>
La acci\u00f3n m\u00e1s destacada es la llevada a cabo por el grupo Caisses d’Epargne et de Pr\u00e9voyance.\u00a0Benefici\u00e1ndose, con la Caisse Nationale d’Epargne, del monopolio del livret A y estando estrechamente especializados en vivienda y pr\u00e9stamos comunitarios, no hab\u00edan sentido la necesidad de adaptar su organizaci\u00f3n.\u00a0A\u00fan siendo 468 a fines de 1984, ten\u00edan, en su mayor parte, solo un radio de acci\u00f3n limitado a una ciudad y algunas ciudades vecinas.\u00a0Luego adoptaron un plan de reagrupamiento que, en etapas sucesivas, redujo su n\u00famero a 186 en 1990, a 35 en 1993 y luego a 34 en 2000.<\/span><\/p>\nLas otras redes han llevado a cabo una acci\u00f3n similar, pero de forma m\u00e1s progresiva.\u00a0Por ejemplo, el grupo Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, que todav\u00eda contaba con 95 bancos regionales en 1987, redujo su n\u00famero, mediante fusiones sucesivas, a 90 en 1990, luego a 74 en 1993, a 59 en 1996, a 54 en 1999, a 51 en 2001 y 43 en 2003.<\/span><\/p>\nDe manera similar, el grupo Banques Populaires, que ten\u00eda 42 Banques Populaires en 1984, redujo su n\u00famero a 32 en 1992 y luego a 25 en 2002.<\/span><\/p>\nAsimismo, Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel redujo el n\u00famero de sus sucursales de 40 a 26. Finalmente, el grupo de Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s anonymes de credit immobilier emprendi\u00f3 durante este per\u00edodo una racionalizaci\u00f3n de sus estructuras, reduciendo su plantilla de 171 en 1984 a 103 en 1999, 87 en 2001 y 59 en 2004.<\/span><\/p>\n38.- Paralelamente a estas operaciones de fusi\u00f3n dentro de los grupos bancarios, se produjeron operaciones de concentraci\u00f3n de gran envergadura.\u00a0Ha ocurrido un big bang, pero a\u00fan no est\u00e1 completo porque el movimiento de concentraci\u00f3n est\u00e1 en marcha.\u00a0Los operadores econ\u00f3micos son cada vez m\u00e1s poderosos y esto tiene como consecuencia que todos deben fortalecerse, no teniendo m\u00e1s remedio que beneficiarse de la igualdad de armas.\u00a0Los ejemplos incluyen la fusi\u00f3n Indosuez\/Cr\u00e9dit Agricole en 1996;\u00a0en 1997, las operaciones de Cr\u00e9dit du Nord\/Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale y Natexis\/Banques Populaires;\u00a0la adquisici\u00f3n de CIC por Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel y de Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Marseillaise de Cr\u00e9dit por CCF en 1998. En 1999, la mayor oferta bancaria p\u00fablica en Francia dio lugar a BNP-Paribas.\u00a0Por otro lado,\u00a0la Caisse Nationale du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole ha adquirido el 70% del especialista en cr\u00e9dito al consumo Sofinco.\u00a0Groupe Caisses d’Epargne compr\u00f3 Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France y se reorganiz\u00f3 el accionariado de DEXIA bajo los auspicios del holding belga del grupo.\u00a0En 2000, el Comptoir des Entrepreneurs se concentr\u00f3 en Banque La H\u00e9nin.\u00a0En 2001, Banque Hervet pas\u00f3 a manos de CCF, mientras que Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations y Ecureuil transfirieron la mayor parte de sus actividades a la sociedad financiera Eulia, con el fin de crear el tercer centro bancario m\u00e1s grande de Francia.\u00a0Esto, sin duda, reforz\u00f3 la concentraci\u00f3n del sistema bancario franc\u00e9s.\u00a0En 2002, Axa Banque compr\u00f3 Banque Directe, el grupo Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif se integr\u00f3 en el grupo Banques Populaires, Cetelem compr\u00f3 Facet y Cr\u00e9dit Agricole gan\u00f3 Finaref.\u00a0En 2003,\u00a0Cr\u00e9dit Agricole toma el control de Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais.\u00a0Finalmente, en 2004, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France adquiri\u00f3 Entenial,<\/span><\/p>\n39. \u2013 Mais alors que le mouvement de concentration s\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e8re dans de nombreux pays europ\u00e9ens, les Fran\u00e7ais commencent \u00e0 prendre conscience de leur retard.\u00a0Les pouvoirs financiers nationaux sont devenus d\u00e9risoires.\u00a0L\u2019exemple de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, grande banque fran\u00e7aise, est r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur.\u00a0Il d\u00e9tient 7 % du march\u00e9 fran\u00e7ais de la banque de d\u00e9tail.\u00a0Or, compte tenu du fait que la France p\u00e8se 17 \u00e0 20 % du march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en, cela signifie qu\u2019elle repr\u00e9sente environ 1,3 \u00e0 1,4 % de ce march\u00e9.\u00a0Il s\u2019agit probablement d\u2019une partie insuffisante qui ne peut garantir son existence \u00e0 long terme.\u00a0De plus, le nouveau groupe, n\u00e9 de la concentration entre BNP et Paribas, devenu le \u00ab champion national \u00bb, n\u2019est pas un groupe optimal.<\/p>\n
Les banques fran\u00e7aises doivent donc cro\u00eetre pour concurrencer la concurrence europ\u00e9enne, faute de quoi elles seront rachet\u00e9es par des \u00e9tablissements \u00e9trangers comme le CCF, pass\u00e9 sous pavillon anglais, suite \u00e0 une offre publique lanc\u00e9e par le groupe HSBC le 04\/01\/2000.\u00a0En effet, les banques britanniques sont bien plus puissantes que les fran\u00e7aises, notamment gr\u00e2ce aux nombreuses fusions qui ont eu lieu ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es.\u00a0Il s\u2019agit notamment des op\u00e9rations Lloyds TSB\/Scottish Widdows, Natwest\/Legal and General, Barclays\/Woolwich et Bank of Scotland\/Halifax.\u00a0La plus spectaculaire est certainement l\u2019offre publique de Royal Bank of Scotland sur Natwest.\u00a0Une bataille \u00e9pique contre la Bank of Scotland a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e pour le contr\u00f4le.\u00a0C\u2019est finalement Royal Bank of\u00a0Scotland\u00a0qui l\u2019a emport\u00e9 gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 l\u2019aide de son premier actionnaire :<\/p>\n
En Espagne, un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de concentration en cascade s\u2019est \u00e9galement produit.\u00a0Ce sont d\u2019abord Banco de Bilbao et Banco Vizcaya qui ont fusionn\u00e9 en 1988 pour cr\u00e9er BBV.\u00a0Puis en 1991, Banco Hispano Americano a \u00e9t\u00e9 absorb\u00e9e par Banco Central.\u00a0Peu de temps apr\u00e8s, Banco Santander a rachet\u00e9 le Banesto en difficult\u00e9.\u00a0De m\u00eame, cinq \u00e9tablissements publics ont fusionn\u00e9 pour former la Banque Argentaria.\u00a0Enfin, plus r\u00e9cemment, Banco Santander et Banco Central Hispano se sont rapproch\u00e9s.\u00a0Depuis, BSCH a fortement consolid\u00e9 sa position de premier groupe bancaire ib\u00e9rique.\u00a0Sa capitalisation boursi\u00e8re a augment\u00e9 de 55% \u00e0 40 milliards d\u2019euros et son total de bilan, de 240,5 milliards d\u2019euros, repr\u00e9sente plus de 23% des actifs bancaires du pays.\u00a0Enfin, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya et Argentaria ont fusionn\u00e9 pour donner naissance \u00e0 BBVA le 01\/01\/2000.\u00a0Ce processus s\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e8re \u00e9galement au Portugal.\u00a0En 2000,\u00a0Banco Commercial Portugues est pass\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019offensive en fusionnant avec Banco Mello et Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor.\u00a0De m\u00eame, Banco Espirito Santo et Banco Portugues di Investimento se sont concentr\u00e9es.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration a ainsi marqu\u00e9 la naissance du premier groupe bancaire portugais avec 40,484 milliards d\u2019euros d\u2019actifs.<\/p>\n
En Italie, le syst\u00e8me bancaire conna\u00eet \u00e9galement depuis plusieurs ann\u00e9es une p\u00e9riode de restructuration acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e qui lui a permis de se renforcer.\u00a0Ainsi, en 1998, la banque Abrovenento rach\u00e8te Cariplo, pour former la banca Intesa et, en 1999, Intesa reprend Comit.\u00a0Par ailleurs, les fusions San Paolo\/IMI, mais aussi Credito Italiano\/ Unicredito, San Paolo\/ Cardine, Banca Popolare di Verona\/ Banca Popolare di Novara, Banca Popolare Bergamo\/ Cr\u00e9dito Varesino\/ Banca Popolare Commercio Industria et enfin Capitalia \/ Bipope Carire peuvent \u00eatre cit\u00e9.\u00a0Les performances financi\u00e8res des banques italiennes se sont nettement am\u00e9lior\u00e9es et de v\u00e9ritables champions nationaux, capables de jouer un r\u00f4le actif dans le concert des banques europ\u00e9ennes, commencent \u00e0 \u00e9merger.<\/p>\n
En Belgique, les reprises de Banque Indosuez Belgique par CERA et de Banque Paribas Belgique par Bacob se sont succ\u00e9d\u00e9es.\u00a0Plus fondamentalement, on peut notamment relever l\u2019int\u00e9gration de G\u00e9n\u00e9rale de Banque au groupe Fortis.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration s\u2019accompagne d\u2019un rapprochement avec la CGER qui prend le contr\u00f4le de la SNCI.<\/p>\n
Quant au red\u00e9ploiement bancaire aux Pays-Bas, il a donn\u00e9 naissance \u00e0 trois g\u00e9ants ABN AMRO, Rabobank et ING, d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990.\u00a0Ces trois premiers \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit d\u00e9tiennent 90 % du march\u00e9 bancaire n\u00e9erlandais.\u00a0Cette forte part de march\u00e9 domestique et ces dix ann\u00e9es d\u2019avance, ont permis aux groupes n\u00e9erlandais de prendre des positions significatives au niveau international.\u00a0Apr\u00e8s le rachat en ao\u00fbt 1999 de la banque allemande BHF, ING a une pr\u00e9sence significative dans cinq pays europ\u00e9ens.\u00a0Lui aussi convoitait le CCF, mais ce fut un \u00e9chec.\u00a0Une offre publique d\u2019achat \u00e0 137,5 euros par action est lanc\u00e9e en d\u00e9cembre 1999, mais elle est imm\u00e9diatement retir\u00e9e.\u00a0Certains avaient affirm\u00e9 que la rupture \u00e9tait d\u00e9finitivement consomm\u00e9e, mais un observateur avis\u00e9 nous avait confirm\u00e9 que les pourparlers entre les deux banques n\u2019\u00e9taient pas d\u00e9finitivement rompus.\u00a0Patrick Dupray a \u00e9galement estim\u00e9 qu\u2019ING devrait \u00ab\u00a0revenir \u00e0 la charge dans les mois \u00e0 venir\u00a0\u00bb.\u00a0Les \u00e9v\u00e9nements lui donn\u00e8rent raison, puisque le 16\/03\/2000, un nouveau rebondissement se produisit.\u00a0Le pr\u00e9sident d\u2019ING a profit\u00e9 de la pr\u00e9sentation des r\u00e9sultats annuels pour lancer un ultimatum \u00e0 Charles de Croisset.\u00a0Or, le 01\/04\/2000, aux termes d\u2019accords rapides et secrets, HSBC s\u2019est r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 offrir aux actionnaires du CCF un prix sup\u00e9rieur de 9% \u00e0 celui d\u2019ING, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 oblig\u00e9 de s\u2019incliner.\u00a0Le pr\u00e9sident d\u2019ING a profit\u00e9 de la pr\u00e9sentation des r\u00e9sultats annuels pour lancer un ultimatum \u00e0 Charles de Croisset.\u00a0Or, le 01\/04\/2000, aux termes d\u2019accords rapides et secrets, HSBC s\u2019est r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 offrir aux actionnaires du CCF un prix sup\u00e9rieur de 9% \u00e0 celui d\u2019ING, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 oblig\u00e9 de s\u2019incliner.\u00a0Le pr\u00e9sident d\u2019ING a profit\u00e9 de la pr\u00e9sentation des r\u00e9sultats annuels pour lancer un ultimatum \u00e0 Charles de Croisset.\u00a0Or, le 01\/04\/2000, aux termes d\u2019accords rapides et secrets, HSBC s\u2019est r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 offrir aux actionnaires du CCF un prix sup\u00e9rieur de 9% \u00e0 celui d\u2019ING, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 oblig\u00e9 de s\u2019incliner.<\/p>\n
De plus, les banques allemandes, \u00e0 la tra\u00eene dans la course \u00e0 la concentration, semblent d\u00e9termin\u00e9es \u00e0 rattraper leur retard.\u00a0On peut citer les fusions entre Hypo Bank et Vereinsbank et entre Bankgesellchaft Berlin et Nordeutsche\/LB.\u00a0Les trois principales banques publiques r\u00e9gionales du Bade-Wurtemberg ont fusionn\u00e9 pour cr\u00e9er la Landesbank Baden W\u00fcrttemberg.\u00a0En outre, il convient de se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 l\u2019annonce du projet de fusion entre Deutsche Bank et Dresdner Bank le 08\/03\/2000.\u00a0Ce regroupement aurait donn\u00e9 naissance \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re banque mondiale avec 1 200 milliards d\u2019euros d\u2019actifs sous gestion.\u00a0Cependant, suite \u00e0 de nombreux diff\u00e9rends, notamment concernant l\u2019int\u00e9gration dans la Deutsche Bank de Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, la banque d\u2019investissement de Dresdner, la fusion a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9e.\u00a0C\u2019est finalement Allianz qui rach\u00e8te la Dresdner Bank en 2001 et donne naissance \u00e0 un empire financier.\u00a0Enfin, il faut mentionner la fusion DGBank et GZ-Bank ainsi que la fusion d\u2019Eurohypo, DeutscheHyp et Rheinhyp.<\/p>\n
Enfin, le Danemark a connu une vague de fusions \u00e0 la fin des ann\u00e9es 1980 avec les fusions de Copenhagen Handelsbank\/ Den Danske Bank\/ Provinsbanken, Privatbanken\/ Sparekassen SDS\/ Andelsbanken et Sydbank\/ Sparekassen Sydiylland.<\/p>\n
40. \u2013 Les concentrations bancaires nationales se sont donc ind\u00e9niablement multipli\u00e9es ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es.\u00a0En ce qui concerne les concentrations transfrontali\u00e8res, le tableau est plus nuanc\u00e9.<\/p>\n
B\/ Le mouvement relatif de concentration bancaire transfrontali\u00e8re<\/p>\n
41. \u2013 Les regroupements se sont, jusqu\u2019\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, principalement op\u00e9r\u00e9s au sein des march\u00e9s nationaux dans le but de consolider les positions et de constituer de vastes p\u00f4les nationaux dans les zones consid\u00e9r\u00e9es par les int\u00e9ress\u00e9s comme les plus r\u00e9mun\u00e9ratrices en fonction des sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s locales.\u00a0Ainsi, bien que le mouvement de concentration soit \u00e9vident, les fusions bancaires transfrontali\u00e8res, contrairement \u00e0 ce qui est observable dans le secteur, sont assez rares.<\/p>\n
Parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 la constitution de grands groupes nationaux, seules quelques op\u00e9rations transfrontali\u00e8res ont eu lieu.\u00a0Les transactions sortant du cadre national concernaient principalement les pays voisins comme Merita\/ Nordbanken en Finlande et en Su\u00e8de, Merita Nordbanken\/ Unidanmark entre la Finlande, la Su\u00e8de et le Danemark, Merita Nordbanken\/ Christiana en Finlande, en Su\u00e8de et en Norv\u00e8ge.\u00a0Citons \u00e9galement les op\u00e9rations Hypo Vereinsbank\/ Bank Austria entre l\u2019Allemagne et l\u2019Autriche, Cera\/ Kredietbank et ING\/ BBL aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique, ING\/ BHF Bank, ABN Amro\/ Delbr\u00fcck, ING\/ Entrium et ABN Amro \/ BethmannMaffei aux Pays-Bas et Allemagne, Cr\u00e9dit local de France\/ Cr\u00e9dit communal de Belgique pour former Dexia.\u00a0Ce dernier s\u2019est ensuite concentr\u00e9, en 2001, avec le belge Art\u00e9sia Banking Corp et le n\u00e9erlandais Kempen.\u00a0Il faut \u00e9galement citer les fusions entre BSCH et une partie du groupe Champalimaud en Espagne et au Portugal, et enfin les op\u00e9rations franco-britanniques HSBC\/CCF et Egg\/Zebank.\u00a0A noter enfin qu\u2019en 2004, l\u2019Espagnol Santander rach\u00e8te le britannique Abbey National.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration constitue une v\u00e9ritable concentration d\u2019\u00e9chelle paneurop\u00e9enne dans la banque de d\u00e9tail.\u00a0Le mouvement transfrontalier de ces acteurs s\u2019explique notamment par l\u2019absence de cibles domestiques alternatives.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration constitue une v\u00e9ritable concentration d\u2019\u00e9chelle paneurop\u00e9enne dans la banque de d\u00e9tail.\u00a0Le mouvement transfrontalier de ces acteurs s\u2019explique notamment par l\u2019absence de cibles domestiques alternatives.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration constitue une v\u00e9ritable concentration d\u2019\u00e9chelle paneurop\u00e9enne dans la banque de d\u00e9tail.<\/p>\n
42. \u2013 Les diff\u00e9rences de culture, d\u2019\u00e9loignement g\u00e9ographique, de langue rendent plus difficile la mutualisation des ressources et notamment des back-offices.\u00a0Les synergies \u00e9mergent moins facilement sur le plan commercial, notamment en raison de la difficult\u00e9 suppl\u00e9mentaire d\u2019homog\u00e9n\u00e9iser des marques g\u00e9ographiquement dissoci\u00e9es.\u00a0Mais selon nous, la difficult\u00e9 fondamentale r\u00e9side dans les disparit\u00e9s des r\u00e9glementations ainsi que dans les protections dont b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient les activit\u00e9s des banques, comme l\u2019ont soulign\u00e9 des exemples r\u00e9cents.\u00a0En effet, les autorit\u00e9s norv\u00e9giennes, par exemple, ont longtemps refus\u00e9 l\u2019offre de Merita-Nordbanken sur Christiania avant de donner leur accord.\u00a0Les autorit\u00e9s portugaises se sont \u00e9galement oppos\u00e9es au rachat du groupe BPSM-MC par BSCH et l\u2019intervention de la Commission europ\u00e9enne a \u00e9t\u00e9 n\u00e9cessaire pour permettre un d\u00e9blocage partiel.\u00a0Ce dernier cas est exemplaire.\u00a0En soutenant cette op\u00e9ration,<\/p>\n
43. \u2013 En principe, il est donc d\u00e9sormais impossible de s\u2019opposer aux concentrations bancaires initi\u00e9es par les op\u00e9rateurs europ\u00e9ens.\u00a0Cela serait contraire aux principes du march\u00e9 bancaire unique et au droit communautaire de la concurrence.\u00a0Mais il est pertinent de noter que la protection du droit \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re, par Bruxelles, n\u2019est pas suffisante pour rendre ce droit effectif.\u00a0En effet, il existe de nombreux autres obstacles qui proviennent du manque d\u2019harmonisation europ\u00e9enne des lois, de la fiscalit\u00e9 et de la comptabilit\u00e9.\u00a0On sera donc amen\u00e9 \u00e0 s\u2019interroger sur une \u00e9ventuelle harmonisation europ\u00e9enne.\u00a0Une directive sur les aspects juridiques des fusions entre soci\u00e9t\u00e9s d\u2019Etats membres diff\u00e9rents est toujours en pr\u00e9paration, tandis que la directive CEE du 23\/07\/1990, relative au r\u00e9gime fiscal de ces m\u00eames fusions, a \u00e9t\u00e9 transpos\u00e9e en droit fran\u00e7ais.\u00a0Cette absence de r\u00e9gulation justifie en partie la pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence pour les op\u00e9rations nationales, outre le fait que les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques privil\u00e9gient d\u2019abord le renforcement de leur territoire national avant d\u2019avoir une politique de croissance internationale.\u00a0La tendance \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re ne peut s\u2019\u00e9panouir que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la r\u00e9glementation applicable \u00e0 ces concentrations est parfaitement connue.\u00a0outre le fait que les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques privil\u00e9gient d\u2019abord leur renforcement sur leur territoire national avant d\u2019avoir une politique de croissance internationale.\u00a0La tendance \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re ne peut s\u2019\u00e9panouir que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la r\u00e9glementation applicable \u00e0 ces concentrations est parfaitement connue.\u00a0outre le fait que les op\u00e9rateurs \u00e9conomiques privil\u00e9gient d\u2019abord leur renforcement sur leur territoire national avant d\u2019avoir une politique de croissance internationale.\u00a0La tendance \u00e0 la concentration transfrontali\u00e8re ne peut s\u2019\u00e9panouir que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la r\u00e9glementation applicable \u00e0 ces concentrations est parfaitement connue.<\/p>\n
44. \u2013 European banks will have to merge and the legal system will have to offer them the means to do so, \u201cit is a question of rationality\u201d. Consequently, the consolidation of national banking systems, the harmonization of rules of law and the control of concentrations should constitute a prerequisite for profound transformations at European level.<\/p>\n
45. \u2013 Selon la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration bancaire europ\u00e9enne, 2 955 banques commerciales sont pr\u00e9sentes en Europe occidentale avec un total d\u2019actifs de 9 144 milliards d\u2019euros, op\u00e9rant \u00e0 travers 99 456 agences et succursales et employant 1,84 million d\u2019employ\u00e9s.\u00a0En France, le poids \u00e9conomique du syst\u00e8me bancaire est \u00e9galement consid\u00e9rable et d\u00e9cisif.\u00a0Elle emploie 423 798 personnes, traite 3,4 milliards d\u2019euros de paiements par ch\u00e8ques, cartes ou virements et g\u00e8re l\u2019essentiel des cr\u00e9dits \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9conomie, soit 1 176,7 milliards d\u2019euros.\u00a0L\u2019\u00e9quilibre de cet \u00e9difice et sa stabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 moyen terme seront n\u00e9cessairement boulevers\u00e9s avec \u00e0 la clef une redistribution des parts de march\u00e9 et une recomposition des forces en pr\u00e9sence qui se traduira par un nombre beaucoup plus r\u00e9duit d\u2019entit\u00e9s en Europe.\u00a0Les chiffres sont r\u00e9v\u00e9lateurs.\u00a0Il y avait 12 500 \u00e9tablissements bancaires en Europe en 1990. Il n\u2019en restait plus que 8 000 en 2000.\u00a0En 1998 et 1999, 188 op\u00e9rations en capital ont concern\u00e9 des banques europ\u00e9ennes.\u00a0Le montant des actifs qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9chang\u00e9s fonde la th\u00e8se que ces op\u00e9rations sont de plus en plus colossales.\u00a0Ainsi, le nombre de fusions et acquisitions de plus de 500 millions de francs, concernant des banques europ\u00e9ennes, est pass\u00e9 de 54 en 1994 \u00e0 98 en 1998. En 1994, 109 milliards de francs ont fait l\u2019objet d\u2019\u00e9changes contre 710 milliards de francs en 1998 et 923 milliards de francs en 1999. Cette course \u00e0 la taille et aux parts de march\u00e9 menace de d\u00e9stabiliser le syst\u00e8me bancaire et financier.\u00a0De plus, cette \u00e9volution augmentera consid\u00e9rablement les risques de monopolisation et de cartellisation.\u00a0Le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne appelle en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 un renforcement du syst\u00e8me assurant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire et financier,\u00a0mais aussi une accentuation du contr\u00f4le des autorit\u00e9s charg\u00e9es de surveiller la concurrence sur le march\u00e9.\u00a0Il faut donc rechercher la m\u00e9thode pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9e pour tenter de proposer une r\u00e9gulation de ce mouvement.<\/p>\n
III\/ M\u00e9thodologie pour une nouvelle approche des concentrations bancaires<\/p>\n
46. \u200b\u200b\u2013 L\u2019approche adopt\u00e9e doit \u00eatre juridique (A), mais il convient d\u2019aller au-del\u00e0 de cette vision monodisciplinaire gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une analyse interdisciplinaire (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ Comprendre le processus de concentration bancaire par la loi<\/p>\n
47. \u2013 L\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel des concentrations bancaires r\u00e9side dans leur particularit\u00e9.\u00a0La principale raison de cette situation tient au fait que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est sp\u00e9cifique car il est d\u00e9positaire de fonds appartenant \u00e0 autrui, notamment sous forme de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts \u00e0 restituer ult\u00e9rieurement.\u00a0C\u2019est le principal d\u00e9tenteur de liquidit\u00e9s mais aussi le principal fournisseur de services de paiement d\u2019o\u00f9 proviennent la quasi-totalit\u00e9 des transactions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dans l\u2019\u00e9conomie.\u00a0Enfin, c\u2019est de lui que d\u00e9pendent r\u00e9ellement le bon fonctionnement et l\u2019efficacit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, \u00e0 travers le processus d\u2019interm\u00e9diation financi\u00e8re.\u00a0Ainsi, c\u2019est un \u00e9l\u00e9ment vital de presque toutes les transactions \u00e9conomiques.<\/p>\n
48. \u2013 La loi a donc notamment pour objet de pr\u00e9venir le risque syst\u00e9mique propre au syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Cela g\u00e9n\u00e8re un traitement juridique sp\u00e9cifique des concentrations bancaires.\u00a0Cette sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 se traduit par un contr\u00f4le plus approfondi que celui appliqu\u00e9 aux autres secteurs \u00e9conomiques.\u00a0Ce contr\u00f4le suppl\u00e9mentaire est r\u00e9gi par le droit bancaire.<\/p>\n
49. \u2013 Un r\u00e9gime d\u2019autorisation pr\u00e9alable des concentrations bancaires est organis\u00e9 par l\u2019article L. 611-1 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier.\u00a0Ce dernier habilite le ministre charg\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie \u00e0 fixer les conditions dans lesquelles des participations directes ou indirectes peuvent \u00eatre prises, \u00e9tendues ou transf\u00e9r\u00e9es dans des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit et les conditions permettant \u00e0 ces \u00e9tablissements de prendre des participations.\u00a0Le r\u00e8glement n\u00b0 96-16 du 20\/12\/1996 du Comit\u00e9 de la R\u00e9glementation Bancaire et Financi\u00e8re a ainsi pr\u00e9vu l\u2019autorisation pr\u00e9alable de toute modification majeure dans la composition des apporteurs de capitaux afin d\u2019assurer la solidit\u00e9 financi\u00e8re de l\u2019entreprise.<\/p>\n
50. \u2013 Par ailleurs, la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 de l\u2019appr\u00e9hension juridique des concentrations bancaires est mat\u00e9rialis\u00e9e par la d\u00e9licate coordination, voire les conflits entre, d\u2019une part, le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, le droit boursier et, d\u2019autre part, le droit bancaire.\u00a0Les fusions bancaires ne remettent pas seulement en cause ces trois droits particuliers.\u00a0Elles entra\u00eenent \u00e9galement la rencontre de ces branches avec le droit commun, in\u00e9vitable dans l\u2019ordre juridique fran\u00e7ais o\u00f9 les droits sp\u00e9ciaux ne peuvent totalement chasser le droit priv\u00e9 fondamental.<\/p>\n
51. \u2013 Par exemple, un conflit entre le droit bancaire et le droit des contrats ne peut \u00eatre \u00e9vit\u00e9.\u00a0En effet, sur la base du droit des contrats, les parties sont libres d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir et de vendre leurs parts dans une soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Toutefois, le CECEI soumet l\u2019autorisation de prise de participation dans une banque \u00e0 un accord entre les banques.<\/p>\n
52. \u2013 De m\u00eame, le conflit entre le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s et le droit bancaire est manifeste.\u00a0En effet, le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s d\u00e9finit la notion de contr\u00f4le d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Toutefois, le droit bancaire ne renvoie pas \u00e0 la d\u00e9finition de l\u2019article L. 233-3 du Code de commerce.<\/p>\n
53. \u2013 Enfin, le conflit entre le droit bancaire et le droit boursier est \u00e9vident.\u00a0L\u2019op\u00e9ration est soumise au contr\u00f4le de la loi bancaire, qui assure le bon fonctionnement du syst\u00e8me bancaire et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des clients.\u00a0Il pr\u00e9voit notamment les conditions d\u2019autorisation des prises de participation dans les banques.\u00a0Le droit boursier, quant \u00e0 lui, agit en faveur du bon fonctionnement des march\u00e9s financiers.\u00a0Il pr\u00e9voit les conditions de recevabilit\u00e9 des offres publiques et leur d\u00e9roulement.\u00a0La rencontre de ces deux droits engendre un conflit de droits sp\u00e9ciaux.<\/p>\n
54. \u2013 Ainsi, le probl\u00e8me majeur est celui de l\u2019articulation des diff\u00e9rentes branches du droit.\u00a0En effet, la mise en \u0153uvre du droit bancaire s\u2019oppose \u00e0 de nombreuses r\u00e8gles juridiques issues d\u2019autres branches du droit.\u00a0Le droit applicable aux concentrations bancaires r\u00e9v\u00e8le donc un certain nombre d\u2019incertitudes qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 en partie lev\u00e9es par le l\u00e9gislateur ou qu\u2019il convient de lever.<\/p>\n
55. \u2013 En definitiva, la especificidad bancaria implica una adecuaci\u00f3n de la ley.\u00a0Por lo tanto, ser\u00eda relevante cuestionar el surgimiento de una ley de concentraci\u00f3n bancaria.\u00a0Sin embargo, este ejercicio es complicado por dos razones.\u00a0Por un lado, la ley aplicable a las concentraciones bancarias es solo ocasionalmente espec\u00edfica.\u00a0M\u00e1s precisamente, parece que en ciertos casos, la especificidad bancaria se tiene en cuenta en la ley de fusiones, mientras que en otros casos, se aplica plenamente la ley \u201ccom\u00fan\u201d de fusiones.\u00a0Por otra parte, las bases de este sistema se encuentran dispersas en varias ramas del derecho.\u00a0En efecto, la concentraci\u00f3n bancaria presenta tantas expresiones como disciplinas.\u00a0Sin embargo, las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n son numerosas: derecho contractual, derecho de sociedades,\u00a0derecho de privatizaci\u00f3n, derecho bancario, derecho del mercado financiero, derecho de la competencia, derecho burs\u00e1til y derecho laboral.\u00a0La din\u00e1mica impuesta por la concentraci\u00f3n bancaria cristaliza las orientaciones que constituyen el marco de este ordenamiento jur\u00eddico.\u00a0A falta de un r\u00e9gimen jur\u00eddico exhaustivo, extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundacionales de su propio r\u00e9gimen.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.\u00a0La din\u00e1mica impuesta por la concentraci\u00f3n bancaria cristaliza las orientaciones que constituyen el marco de este ordenamiento jur\u00eddico.\u00a0A falta de un r\u00e9gimen jur\u00eddico completo,\u00a0extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundacionales de su propio r\u00e9gimen.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.\u00a0La din\u00e1mica impuesta por la concentraci\u00f3n bancaria cristaliza las orientaciones que constituyen el marco de este r\u00e9gimen jur\u00eddico.\u00a0A falta de un r\u00e9gimen jur\u00eddico exhaustivo, extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundacionales de su propio r\u00e9gimen.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.\u00a0extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundamentales de su propio sistema.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.\u00a0extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundamentales de su propio sistema.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.\u00a0extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundamentales de su propio sistema.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.\u00a0extrae de diferentes disciplinas jur\u00eddicas los principios fundamentales de su propio sistema.\u00a0Esto presupone un conjunto de reglas y controles tomados de las disciplinas jur\u00eddicas en cuesti\u00f3n, pero tambi\u00e9n un modo de resoluci\u00f3n adaptado a los conflictos derivados del choque de las m\u00faltiples disposiciones presentes.<\/span><\/p>\n56.- El ataque a la propia autonom\u00eda relativa de las ramas del derecho, la falta de coordinaci\u00f3n entre ellas, en particular con el derecho bancario, est\u00e1 en el origen de conflictos que resultan de dif\u00edcil soluci\u00f3n.\u00a0As\u00ed, la complejidad de las normas y controles que rigen la realizaci\u00f3n de concentraciones bancarias y su pertenencia a distintas disciplinas jur\u00eddicas generan dificultades.<\/span><\/p>\n57. \u2013 The solution certainly lies in better interpenetration of the branches of law within the judicial system.\u00a0This would, in our opinion, reduce the divergences between the different branches of law which have unifying objectives.\u00a0Banking concentration would constitute a legal concept bridging several legal disciplines, bringing them together and going beyond their autonomy.\u00a0This would allow it to be subject to a unitary legal regime.\u00a0This argument militates for an interdisciplinarity internal to the law but also external.<\/span><\/p>\nB\/ Interdisciplinary understanding of the banking concentration process<\/span><\/p>\n58. \u2013 El car\u00e1cter multidimensional del fen\u00f3meno de la concentraci\u00f3n bancaria no parece prestarse a un an\u00e1lisis basado en una sola disciplina.\u00a0As\u00ed, un enfoque legal del movimiento implica una cierta apertura.\u00a0Por lo tanto, es preferible tratar de adoptar un m\u00e9todo interdisciplinario.\u00a0Esta ser\u00e1 tanto m\u00e1s fiable cuanto m\u00e1s concretamente se defina su campo de acci\u00f3n.<\/span><\/p>\nLa multidisciplinariedad es de actualidad en las ciencias jur\u00eddicas.\u00a0El Sr. Claude Champaud afirma que \u201csalvo que perseveremos en una concepci\u00f3n puramente normativa, inmanente y cuasi b\u00edblica del derecho, debemos considerar la regla jur\u00eddica como el resultado de fuerzas econ\u00f3micas, sociales, pol\u00edticas y culturales que se ejercen en un momento dado\u201d .<\/span><\/p>\nEl Sr. G\u00e9rard Farjat, otro precursor del derecho econ\u00f3mico, tambi\u00e9n apel\u00f3 fuertemente a un razonamiento basado en la confrontaci\u00f3n de varias disciplinas.\u00a0Recomend\u00f3 en particular para el especialista en derecho econ\u00f3mico, adem\u00e1s de los enfoques jur\u00eddico y econ\u00f3mico, el uso de m\u00e9todos comparativos.\u00a0Seg\u00fan este autor, los desarrollos en el derecho econ\u00f3mico a menudo se sustentan en comparaciones entre estructuras legales formales y sustantivas.\u00a0Sin embargo, G\u00e9rard Farjat se vio llevado a se\u00f1alar uno de los l\u00edmites ineludibles del enfoque generalista, el riesgo de conocer s\u00f3lo superficialmente cada noci\u00f3n estudiada sin dominar por completo el \u00e1rea cubierta.\u00a0Para evitar este escollo, el autor recomienda trabajar en equipo con especialistas en cada disciplina.<\/span><\/p>\nQuiconque m\u00e8ne une \u00e9tude individuelle ne peut envisager cette possibilit\u00e9.\u00a0Cependant, s\u2019il est convaincu de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019une analyse liant les probl\u00e8mes juridiques aux ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes sociaux et \u00e9conomiques sans pour autant poss\u00e9der les connaissances approfondies indispensables \u00e0 une v\u00e9ritable pluridisciplinarit\u00e9, le chercheur peut alors tenter de s\u2019engager dans la voie de l\u2019interdisciplinarit\u00e9.\u00a0Dans ce cas, il s\u2019agit d\u2019\u00e9tablir un dialogue avec diff\u00e9rentes sciences humaines d\u2019un domaine pr\u00e9cis \u2013 celui du droit \u2013 en soumettant l\u2019objet \u00e9tudi\u00e9 aux \u00e9clairages d\u2019autres disciplines.<\/p>\n
Il est donc \u00e9minemment n\u00e9cessaire d\u2019adopter un discours fait d\u2019une dialectique permanente entre droit, \u00e9conomie, gestion et politique.\u00a0C\u2019est dans cet esprit que cette th\u00e8se sur les fusions-acquisitions bancaires sera abord\u00e9e.<\/p>\n
59. \u2013 Concr\u00e8tement, il s\u2019agira d\u2019abord de recourir \u00e0 une approche interdisciplinaire interne au droit.\u00a0En effet, la liste des notions ou m\u00e9canismes juridiques auxquels renvoie la seule r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 la concentration bancaire est tr\u00e8s longue.\u00a0Ainsi, cette \u00e9tude n\u00e9cessite de puiser dans diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques les principes fondateurs d\u2019un r\u00e9gime.\u00a0Toute tentative de syst\u00e9matisation de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne suppose un mode d\u2019appr\u00e9hension complexe n\u00e9cessitant une lecture crois\u00e9e des diff\u00e9rentes disciplines juridiques concern\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
Il en r\u00e9sultera une tentative de d\u00e9passement de la distinction entre droit public et droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0La remise en cause de cette division du droit semble f\u00e9conde dans un examen du mouvement de concentration bancaire.\u00a0A cette occasion, la logique \u00ab publiciste \u00bb ainsi que la logique \u00ab privatiste \u00bb doivent \u00eatre prises en compte simultan\u00e9ment.\u00a0Rappelons que le professeur G\u00e9rard Farjat assimile la loi de la concentration \u00e0 la loi de la \u00ab collectivisation des biens de production et de l\u2019organisation de l\u2019\u00e9conomie par les pouvoirs publics ou priv\u00e9s \u00bb.<\/p>\n
Cela conduit \u00e0 une alt\u00e9ration de la distinction entre droit public et droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0Traditionnellement, le droit public est le droit de l\u2019\u00c9tat dans ses relations avec les citoyens.\u00a0Ce qui caract\u00e9rise la norme publique, c\u2019est l\u2019acte unilat\u00e9ral symbole d\u2019autorit\u00e9, de commandement.\u00a0En revanche, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile est fond\u00e9e sur le contrat librement n\u00e9goci\u00e9.\u00a0Cependant, force est de constater qu\u2019il existe des sources de droit priv\u00e9es et mixtes qui concurrencent les sources publiques de droit.<\/p>\n
Par exemple, les accords d\u2019entreprise sont une source de droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0Dans de nombreuses concentrations, les banques trouvent des solutions par le biais d\u2019accords sociaux sur l\u2019emploi.\u00a0Ces derniers mettent en \u00e9vidence une d\u00e9centralisation du droit.\u00a0Ils font de l\u2019entreprise le lieu privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 de la production du droit.\u00a0Ils permettent une adaptation, une cr\u00e9ation de r\u00e8gles correspondant aux besoins sp\u00e9cifiques de la banque lors de sa concentration.\u00a0Par ailleurs, les pratiques et r\u00e8gles \u00e9tablies dans les entreprises et formalis\u00e9es dans les accords ont pour effet soit d\u2019\u00eatre prises en compte et ent\u00e9rin\u00e9es par la loi, soit de rendre certaines normes \u00ab inefficaces \u00bb.<\/p>\n
Les sources mixtes du droit remettent \u00e9galement en cause la distinction traditionnelle entre droit public et droit priv\u00e9.\u00a0On parle ici d\u2019autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes.\u00a0Ils sont \u00e0 l\u2019intersection des pouvoirs publics et priv\u00e9s.\u00a0Leur cr\u00e9ation permet de d\u00e9passer une contradiction entre la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019une intervention \u00e9conomique de l\u2019\u00c9tat li\u00e9e \u00e0 la concentration et le principe de s\u00e9paration du pouvoir politique et du pouvoir \u00e9conomique.\u00a0La cr\u00e9ation d\u2019autorit\u00e9s administratives ind\u00e9pendantes permet de mener une politique publique qui ne d\u00e9pend pas d\u2019un d\u00e9partement minist\u00e9riel.\u00a0Ils sont le r\u00e9sultat de l\u2019action de l\u2019\u00c9tat et des forces du march\u00e9.\u00a0Ils permettent ainsi de concilier politiques publiques et politiques de march\u00e9.<\/p>\n
60. \u2013 It will then be necessary to apply external interdisciplinarity. The task is then delicate because the lawyer must integrate extra-legal data into his reasoning. It is a question of appealing to notions of economy, finance, management and politics.<\/p>\n
61. \u2013 Ultimately, it will be a matter of determining whether there is a need for the law to take into consideration the economic specificity of banking activities. In other words, should banking concentrations be subject to specific legal treatment? More precisely, in which hypothesis is the law of concentration forced to take into account the banking specificity?<\/p>\n
62. \u2013 It is therefore essential to seek the principle which justifies the intervention of provisions specific to the banking system. These constitute a source of vigor by inspiring confidence in the clientele. However, excessive or inappropriate regulation is harmful because it constitutes an obstacle to restructuring. Thus, it is important to find a compromise between the prudential rules which favor the sector by protecting the stability of its structure and the excessive provisions which are harmful to it.<\/p>\n
63. \u2013 Our hypothesis is to demonstrate that the existence of banking specificities is only consistent when it comes to protecting the banking and financial system. Logically, when the protection of the latter is no longer concerned, the \u201ccommon\u201d merger law should fully apply. A legal consecration of banking specificity will therefore be demonstrated in the context of the protection of the banking and financial system (1st part). In line with this reasoning, a gradual decline in banking specificity may be observed in the absence of any need to protect the system (2nd part).<\/p>\n
First part: The legal consecration of banking and financial specificity<\/p>\n
64. \u2013 Les fusions bancaires pr\u00e9sentent des similitudes avec les fusions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dans d\u2019autres secteurs de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, mais les obstacles \u00e0 la r\u00e9alisation de telles op\u00e9rations sont beaucoup plus nombreux et complexes.\u00a0En effet, elles posent des probl\u00e8mes sp\u00e9cifiques li\u00e9s \u00e0 leurs conditions institutionnelles, leurs interactions avec les enjeux de politique mon\u00e9taire et les exigences prudentielles li\u00e9es notamment \u00e0 l\u2019existence d\u2019un risque syst\u00e9mique.\u00a0Ainsi, la grande originalit\u00e9 des concentrations bancaires r\u00e9side dans l\u2019existence d\u2019autorit\u00e9s charg\u00e9es du contr\u00f4le des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit, ce qui fait que le principe dans le secteur bancaire n\u2019est pas la libert\u00e9 totale de restructuration mais la libert\u00e9 contr\u00f4l\u00e9e.\u00a0L\u2019objectif principal est de contr\u00f4ler la nouvelle composition de l\u2019actionnariat,<\/p>\n
65. \u2013 Par la suite, certaines dispositions de la loi bancaire du 24\/01\/1984 conduisent \u00e0 une concentration d\u00e9rogatoire au droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s.\u00a0En effet, dans le cas o\u00f9 un \u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit porterait atteinte \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des d\u00e9posants, la Commission bancaire a la facult\u00e9 de \u00ab saisir le Tribunal de Grande Instance afin que (\u2026) la cession des actions d\u00e9tenues par un ou plusieurs de droit ou de fait actionnaires.\u00a0Le tribunal peut \u00e9galement ordonner le transfert de toutes les parts de l\u2019\u00e9tablissement.\u00a0La vente forc\u00e9e est donc ici un instrument de concentration ayant pour objectif de prot\u00e9ger l\u2019ensemble du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Certes, la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019une vente forc\u00e9e d\u2019actions peut rappeler celle de l\u2019article L. 621-59 du Code de commerce, selon laquelle le Tribunal de commerce peut ordonner une telle expropriation lorsque la survie de l\u2019entreprise l\u2019exige.\u00a0Mais aux termes de la loi bancaire,\u00a0le transfert en question peut \u00eatre prescrit m\u00eame en dehors du cadre d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure collective.\u00a0Par souci de sym\u00e9trie, les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la facult\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie, de d\u00e9cider de fusionner deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que l\u2019ensemble ou transfert de leur propri\u00e9t\u00e9 commerciale.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0la cession en question peut \u00eatre prescrite m\u00eame en dehors du cadre d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure collective.\u00a0Par souci de sym\u00e9trie, les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la possibilit\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie,\u00a0de d\u00e9cider la fusion de deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que la cession totale ou partielle de leur Fonds commercial.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0la cession en question peut \u00eatre prescrite m\u00eame en dehors du cadre d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure collective.\u00a0Par souci de sym\u00e9trie, les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la facult\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie, de d\u00e9cider de fusionner deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que l\u2019ensemble ou transfert de leur propri\u00e9t\u00e9 commerciale.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0la cession en question peut \u00eatre prescrite m\u00eame en dehors du cadre d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure collective.\u00a0Par souci de sym\u00e9trie, les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la facult\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie, de d\u00e9cider de fusionner deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que l\u2019ensemble ou transfert de leur propri\u00e9t\u00e9 commerciale.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0la cession en question peut \u00eatre prescrite m\u00eame en dehors du cadre d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure collective.\u00a0Par souci de sym\u00e9trie, les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la facult\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie, de d\u00e9cider de fusionner deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que l\u2019ensemble ou transfert de leur propri\u00e9t\u00e9 commerciale.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la possibilit\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie, de d\u00e9cider la fusion de deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que la cession totale ou partielle de leur Fonds commercial.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.\u00a0les organes centraux des r\u00e9seaux mutualistes et coop\u00e9ratifs ont \u00e9galement la possibilit\u00e9, lorsque la situation financi\u00e8re des \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s le justifie, de d\u00e9cider la fusion de deux ou plusieurs de ces \u00e9tablissements affili\u00e9s ainsi que la cession totale ou partielle de leur Fonds commercial.\u00a0Il est de faire liti\u00e8re du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, en excluant toute d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e des associ\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
66. \u2013 La sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re est donc prise en compte dans les m\u00e9canismes de concentration (Titre 1) et corr\u00e9lativement les contr\u00f4les eux-m\u00eames apparaissent sp\u00e9cifiques dans le but de prot\u00e9ger le syst\u00e8me bancaire et financier (Titre 2).<\/p>\n
Titre 1 : Prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re dans les m\u00e9canismes de concentration<\/p>\n
67. \u2013 \u00ab Il faudrait avoir en droit une science des m\u00e9canismes juridiques (\u2026) Nous d\u00e9cririons et classerions les m\u00e9canismes utilis\u00e9s pour les cr\u00e9ations et les transferts de propri\u00e9t\u00e9, de droits et d\u2019obligations (\u2026).\u00a0Ce m\u00e9canisme juridique ne serait pas sans int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00bb.\u00a0Ainsi, Dean Ripert a soulign\u00e9 l\u2019importance des m\u00e9canismes juridiques.\u00a0Or, dans son esprit, ce terme renvoyait \u00e0 des techniques aussi disparates que les lettres de change, les op\u00e9rations boursi\u00e8res ou les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s par actions.\u00a0Le sens utilis\u00e9 dans cette \u00e9tude est n\u00e9cessairement plus restrictif.\u00a0En effet, seules les techniques juridiques permettant la r\u00e9alisation de la concentration sont envisag\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
68. \u2013 Les autorit\u00e9s bancaires restent neutres quant au dispositif juridique permettant de r\u00e9aliser la concentration.\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, il convient de noter qu\u2019elles proc\u00e8dent \u00e0 des contr\u00f4les rigoureux afin de garantir la bonne gestion des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Par exemple, contrairement \u00e0 d\u2019autres secteurs de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, les initiateurs d\u2019une reprise doivent pr\u00e9senter des garanties suffisantes ;\u00a0dans le cas contraire, les autorit\u00e9s bancaires ont le pouvoir d\u2019interdire l\u2019op\u00e9ration.\u00a0En outre, ce dernier peut s\u2019opposer \u00e0 une fusion bancaire, notamment si l\u2019absorption fait courir un risque excessif \u00e0 l\u2019entit\u00e9 absorbante en raison d\u2019une concentration importante des risques.<\/p>\n
69. \u2013 Finally, the protectionist attitude of certain countries is particularly acute in the context of banking concentrations, as recent examples show. Some States prohibit or limit the establishment of foreign credit institutions on their territory by providing for very heavy legal constraints. Obviously, this complicates and slows down banking concentrations. Thus, the Norwegian authorities have long refused the offer of Merita-Nordbanken on Christiania before giving their approval. The Portuguese authorities opposed the takeover of the BPSM-MC group by BSCH and the intervention of the European Commission was necessary to allow a partial unblocking.<\/p>\n
70. \u2013 We will therefore demonstrate that account is taken of the specific nature of banking and finance in concentration mechanisms in domestic law (chapter 1) as well as in Community law (chapter 2).<\/p>\n
Chapter 1: Concentration mechanisms in domestic law<\/p>\n
71. \u2013 It should be noted that financiers and economists too often refer to the term \u201cmergers\u201d as operations which, from a legal point of view, only result in acquisitions of shares of companies without merger between the entities concerned which remain legally distinct. The rigor of the jurist is not satisfied with this. This is the reason why it is necessary to make an essential distinction.
The merger and the takeover are thus distinguished by the nature of the object of the obligations of the parties. With regard to the merger, the obligation of the absorbed or combined bank is to make the contributions while for the beneficiary company, it is a question of settling the net assets contributed by means of social rights. With regard to the takeover, the beneficiary bank\u2019s obligation will simply be to pay the acquisition price for the shares of the target. There is therefore a fundamental distinction in the mode of settlement of the concentration. Indeed, within the framework of the merger, a settlement by means of social rights distributed among the partners of the company or companies absorbed or combined must take place. This requirement highlights that the holders of the capital of the absorbed or combined companies remain \u201cstakeholders\u201d in the new unit resulting from the merger. This criterion therefore makes it possible to distinguish the merger (section 2) from other concentration operations such as the acquisition of control (section 1).<\/p>\n
Section 1: Acquisitions of control<\/p>\n
72. \u2013 As P. Coupaye points out: \u201cthe constitution of banking groups which occupy a dominant position on the market was carried out (\u2026) through numerous equity investments. This concentration has generally taken place through takeovers of existing companies. During this period, we sometimes witnessed large-scale stock market maneuvers to ensure control of the coveted establishment or establishments\u201d. The author alludes to the famous battle between the Suez and Paribas groups, with regard to CIC: given the 1966 legislation, the investment banks expressed the desire to widen their room for maneuver, by taking an interest in the banks depository with a sufficiently extensive network of counters. In this context, the banks Paribas and Suez engaged in a severe financial confrontation in 1968 to take control of CIC. After many stock market adventures, the Suez group took control of CIC, but sold 80% of the capital of the Banque de l\u2019Union Parisienne to Paribas in 1971. The Cr\u00e9dit Commercial de France banking group was essentially formed by taking control of existing units. In a first phase, it strengthened its geographical presence by taking stakes in local or regional banks as well as in specialized establishments. In 1965, the CCF took stakes in the Regional Bank of Artois, in Finindus, in the Pierre Brun et fils bank, in 1966 in the Kolb bank and in the Borgeaud bank, in 1967 in two rediscount houses Morrhange et Cie , as well as Union d\u2019Escompte, in 1968 in Banque Rivaud, in 1971 in Banque de Savoie, in 1972 in Banque Derobert. These concentration operations are interesting because they show that the beginnings of the concentration movement go back several decades. However, it should be noted that these concentration operations are small in scale compared to recent takeovers. Since 1996, the concentration movement has truly taken shape. Most of the major French banking groups have experienced numerous operations that have resulted in the takeover of very significant establishments. It can be cited, in 1996, the takeover of Indosuez by Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, in 1997, that of Cr\u00e9dit du Nord by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, in 1998, that of Natexis by the Banques Populaires group and that of CIC by Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel. In 1999, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France was acquired by Caisses d\u2019Epargne, while BNP took control of Paribas. Finally, in 2003, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole succeeded in its public offer for Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais and, in 2004, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France acquired Entenial.<\/p>\n
73. \u2013 These concentrations lead to the creation of complex groups. Indeed, financial links can be established in various ways:
\u2013 a company takes exclusive control of a bank which becomes its subsidiary;
\u2013 several companies can together create a bank which will be their joint subsidiary;
\u2013 several companies may jointly take control of another bank.
We will therefore study the acquisition of exclusive control (\u00a7 1) but also the joint takeover (\u00a7 2) by demonstrating that the banking and financial specificity is taken into account in these modes of concentration.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1: Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of exclusive control<\/p>\n
74. \u2013 En Francia, la aceptaci\u00f3n legal de la noci\u00f3n de control data de mediados de la d\u00e9cada de 1980.\u00a0Este per\u00edodo corresponde a una ampliaci\u00f3n del fen\u00f3meno de las fusiones e inaugura un verdadero reconocimiento legal del poder de control.\u00a0Esta consagraci\u00f3n legislativa es imperfecta.\u00a0Muchas dificultades est\u00e1n relacionadas con la calificaci\u00f3n del control (A).\u00a0El objeto bancario de las operaciones aumenta la complejidad.\u00a0Esto da como resultado una serie de problemas que est\u00e1n relacionados con la configuraci\u00f3n de la toma de control (B).<\/span><\/p>\nA\/ Dificultades relacionadas con la calificaci\u00f3n del control<\/span><\/p>\n75.- Estas dificultades surgen del desarrollo de definiciones divergentes entre las diferentes ramas del derecho (1).\u00a0Sin duda, el problema fundamental radica en la determinaci\u00f3n del umbral de la opa (2).<\/span><\/p>\n1\/ Definiciones divergentes<\/span><\/p>\n76. \u2013 El concepto de control se presenta como un concepto funcional cuya utilidad ha consistido precisamente en permitir al legislador ya la jurisprudencia extraer las consecuencias del fen\u00f3meno de la concentraci\u00f3n.\u00a0Por lo tanto, se define puntualmente seg\u00fan su uso.\u00a0As\u00ed, una dificultad radica en el hecho de que no hay una sino varias acepciones de control cuyo significado var\u00eda con el uso.\u00a0Es innegable que hay un sentimiento de heterogeneidad.<\/span><\/p>\n77. \u2013 En el derecho de sociedades, esta noci\u00f3n se considera compleja, incluso fugaz, por su dinamismo y relatividad.\u00a0No existe una sino varias nociones jur\u00eddicas de control.\u00a0Si el control exclusivo normalmente se adquiere por ley cuando una empresa adquiere la mayor\u00eda de los derechos de voto de una empresa, tambi\u00e9n puede adquirirse con una \u201cminor\u00eda cualificada\u201d, que puede establecerse por cualquier elemento de hecho o de derecho.\u00a0.\u00a0La dificultad surge del hecho de que el control no puede, en general, resultar de la mera existencia de un v\u00ednculo de capital entre las estructuras en cuesti\u00f3n.\u00a0Por lo tanto, el legislador ha intentado, al desarrollar definiciones de control, capturar la diversidad de situaciones de control.<\/span><\/p>\nEl art\u00edculo L. 233-3 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio prev\u00e9 dos tipos de control.\u00a0El control legal existe tan pronto como una empresa \u201cposee, directa o indirectamente, una fracci\u00f3n del capital que le otorga la mayor\u00eda de los derechos de voto en las juntas generales\u201d.\u00a0El control de facto se caracteriza por el poder que tiene la sociedad, gracias a los derechos de voto que posee, para determinar las decisiones de las asambleas generales.\u00a0Esta facultad se presume cuando \u00e9ste \u201cposee, directa o indirectamente, una fracci\u00f3n de los derechos de voto superior al 40% y ning\u00fan otro socio o accionista posee directa o indirectamente una fracci\u00f3n superior a la suya\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n78. \u2013 En cuanto a los estados financieros consolidados, el art\u00edculo L. 233-16 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio contiene una definici\u00f3n de control de jure y control de facto esencialmente similar a la del art\u00edculo L. 233-3 del C\u00f3digo de comercio.\u00a0En efecto, este art\u00edculo define el control de jure por la posesi\u00f3n de la mayor\u00eda de los derechos de voto y el control de facto por \u201cel nombramiento, por dos ejercicios econ\u00f3micos sucesivos, de la mayor\u00eda de los miembros de los \u00f3rganos de administraci\u00f3n, direcci\u00f3n o supervisi\u00f3n\u201d con id\u00e9ntica presunci\u00f3n vinculado al umbral de poseer el 40% de los derechos de voto.\u00a0Es cierto que no se refiere expresamente, como el art\u00edculo L. 233-3 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio, a la facultad de determinar las decisiones de las juntas generales.\u00a0Pero es innegable que una empresa que tenga la facultad de designar a la mayor\u00eda de los miembros del \u00f3rgano de administraci\u00f3n,\u00a0\u00f3rganos de direcci\u00f3n o de supervisi\u00f3n de otra sociedad, ostente tal facultad.\u00a0En \u00faltima instancia, la \u00fanica diferencia entre estas disposiciones se deriva del hecho de que el art\u00edculo L. 233-16-II 3\u00b0 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio franc\u00e9s tambi\u00e9n establece que el control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0la \u00fanica diferencia entre estas disposiciones se deriva del hecho de que el art\u00edculo L. 233-16-II 3\u00b0 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio franc\u00e9s tambi\u00e9n establece que el control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o estatuto cl\u00e1usulas\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0la \u00fanica diferencia entre estas disposiciones se deriva del hecho de que el art\u00edculo L. 233-16-II 3\u00b0 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio franc\u00e9s tambi\u00e9n establece que el control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o estatuto cl\u00e1usulas\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0233-16-II 3\u00b0 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio franc\u00e9s tambi\u00e9n establece que el control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o de cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0233-16-II 3\u00b0 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio franc\u00e9s tambi\u00e9n establece que el control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o de cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.\u00a0ese control surge \u201cdel derecho a ejercer una influencia dominante sobre una empresa en virtud de un contrato o cl\u00e1usulas estatutarias\u201d.\u00a0Este criterio de control se encuentra en la ley de competencia.<\/span><\/p>\n79. \u2013 Pour le droit de la concurrence, la prise de contr\u00f4le, caract\u00e9ristique n\u00e9cessaire de toute op\u00e9ration de concentration, conf\u00e8re la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019exercer une influence d\u00e9terminante sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 d\u2019une entreprise.\u00a0C\u2019est une notion reprise notamment par le droit fran\u00e7ais, mais aussi par le droit communautaire des concentrations.\u00a0Les articles L. 430-1 du Code de commerce et 3 \u00a7 2 du r\u00e8glement CE n\u00b0.\u00a0qui conf\u00e8rent, seuls ou conjointement et compte tenu des circonstances de fait ou de droit, la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019exercer une influence d\u00e9terminante sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00bb.<\/p>\n
80. \u2013 Les dispositions du droit de la repr\u00e9sentation collective relatives \u00e0 la constitution du comit\u00e9 de groupe visent les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s contr\u00f4l\u00e9es dans les conditions d\u00e9finies aux articles L. 233-1, L. 233-3 et L. 233-16 du code de commerce, mais aussi par influence dominante.\u00a0Cette derni\u00e8re existe toujours lorsque la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 dominante d\u00e9tient une participation d\u2019au moins 10 % du capital de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 domin\u00e9e et que \u00ab la permanence et l\u2019importance des relations de ces soci\u00e9t\u00e9s \u00e9tablissent l\u2019appartenance de l\u2019une et de l\u2019autre \u00e0 une m\u00eame entit\u00e9 \u00e9conomique \u00bb. \u201d.<\/p>\n
81. \u2013 Enfin, le droit bancaire et notamment le droit comptable bancaire retiennent des d\u00e9finitions diff\u00e9rentes de la notion de contr\u00f4le.\u00a0Selon le r\u00e8glement n\u00b0 85-12 du Comit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9glementation bancaire \u00ab une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme contr\u00f4l\u00e9e de mani\u00e8re exclusive lorsque la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e8re d\u00e9tient, directement ou indirectement, une participation au capital et soit la majorit\u00e9 des droits de vote, soit le pouvoir de nommer le majorit\u00e9 des membres des organes d\u2019administration, de direction ou de surveillance.\u00a0Dans les deux cas suivants, l\u2019existence d\u2019un contr\u00f4le exclusif est \u00e9galement pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e :
\u2013 lorsqu\u2019il n\u2019existe pas d\u2019autres actionnaires ou associ\u00e9s d\u00e9tenant ensemble une participation sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle du groupe et d\u00e9tenant chacun plus de 5 % du capital ;\u00a0\u2013 lorsque, notamment, en vertu d\u2019un contrat de gestion ou de clauses statutaires, une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 du groupe y exerce une influence dominante \u00bb.<\/p>\n
82. \u2013 Il semble imprudent d\u2019adopter des d\u00e9finitions diff\u00e9rentes du contr\u00f4le dans les diff\u00e9rentes branches du droit qui visent \u00e0 appr\u00e9hender le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de concentration.\u00a0Un auteur souligne que si \u00ab le pluralisme doctrinal peut \u00eatre source de progr\u00e8s par les r\u00e9flexions et les propositions qu\u2019il implique, en revanche, la diversit\u00e9 juridique engendre la confusion et le doute quant \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d\u2019une notion ;\u00a0il sera difficile d\u2019instituer une r\u00e9glementation coh\u00e9rente (\u2026) si l\u2019on n\u2019arrive pas, au pr\u00e9alable, \u00e0 unifier la notion de contr\u00f4le sur laquelle repose tout l\u2019\u00e9difice \u00bb.\u00a0D\u00e8s lors, certains souhaiteraient que le l\u00e9gislateur intervienne pour donner une d\u00e9finition unitaire du contr\u00f4le.\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, une partie de la doctrine stigmatise les obstacles qui s\u2019opposent \u00e0 une d\u00e9finition unitaire.<\/p>\n
2\/ Les obstacles \u00e0 la fixation d\u2019un seuil unitaire
83. \u2013 En remontant aux cat\u00e9gories juridiques, on peut dire que le contr\u00f4le est le droit de disposer de l\u2019entreprise en tant que propri\u00e9taire.\u00a0La substance du droit de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 classique est le \u00ab jus abutendi \u00bb, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire le droit de disposer.\u00a0En pratique, c\u2019est la possibilit\u00e9 de choisir le mode d\u2019exploitation du bien.\u00a0Ainsi, dans la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 classique, le lien d\u2019appartenance implique la capacit\u00e9 de contr\u00f4ler la propri\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Les aspects d\u2019appartenance et de ma\u00eetrise sont indissociables.<\/p>\n
84. \u2013 Or, c\u2019est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment cette relation qui aujourd\u2019hui est souvent rompue.\u00a0Certains actionnaires ne sont que des \u00ab pr\u00eateurs \u00bb, tandis que d\u2019autres contr\u00f4lent des actifs qui ne leur appartiennent pas.<\/p>\n
85. \u2013 The major problem is to know the threshold which will make it possible to qualify the control and consequently the existence of a substantial property right. According to Article L. 233-3-I of the Commercial Code, when a company holds more than 50% of the share capital of another company, we are in the presence of a parent company and its subsidiary in the legal sense. of the term.<\/p>\n
86. \u2013 However, as we have already shown, there is no need to hold more than 50% of the capital of a company to exercise control. In reality, control of a credit institution is very often monopolized by minorities. Indeed, the majority principle combined with the wide dispersion of shares in the public allows certain minority shareholders to exercise power.
Paradoxically, the controlling shareholders are frequently in the minority, whereas the majority in number have no power over social management. It is therefore necessary to dissociate belonging and control. Unquestionably, we can affirm that the ownership of a certain number of shares will allow shareholders to extend their control well beyond what their membership should give them insofar as they will be able to control the totality of the economic activity of the company.<\/p>\n
87. \u2013 It is therefore certain that the level of participation in the capital of a firm does not mean by itself that the bank is controlling. \u201cLarge packages of shares held by a bank can have a neutral meaning from this point of view. Moreover, the intensity of a control is not automatically proportional to the weight of the participation in the capital of a company. With 10%, total control is possible (\u2026)\u201d. Consequently, part of the doctrine proposes to carry out a case-by-case analysis. It would be necessary to know the distribution of the capital, to compare the rate of participation of the various shareholders, the respective weight of their representatives within the board of directors, to take account of the degree of absenteeism.<\/p>\n
88. \u2013 This assertion is not called into question by taking into account the specificity of banking. However, the latter leads to increased complexity. There is an autonomy of the banking texts in the determination of the threshold of the takeover (a). The banking regulator\u2019s interpretation also seems specific (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ The autonomy of banking texts in determining the threshold for taking control<\/p>\n
89. \u2013 Company law, when it defines the notion of control, provides a certain number of thresholds.<\/p>\n
90. \u2013 Banking law, in Article 2 of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996, refers to the acquisition of the effective power of control without defining this notion. This criterion is foreign to the legal qualifications traditionally retained by company law. Thus, the notion of effective control, used on several occasions by banking regulations, is not defined in relation to Article L. 233-3 of the Commercial Code. This is due to the concern to assess on a case-by-case basis the reality of the control exercised, including moreover in establishments whose corporate form is not that of a commercial company. Given that this text does not specify the threshold for holding an effective power of control, it is necessary to try to find other provisions of banking law which could provide some indications.<\/p>\n
91. \u2013 Bank accounting law has attempted to give a very realistic definition of the notion of exclusive control. This is much more precise than that given by company law. Indeed, relatively precise indications are provided as to the determination of the takeover. A company is presumed to be exclusively controlled when there are no other shareholders or partners holding together a stake greater than that of the group and each possessing more than 5% of the company\u2019s capital.<\/p>\n
92. \u2013 In our opinion, this definition is very interesting because it gives a number of indications for setting the threshold for a takeover. However, it is not widely recognized. The banking regulatory authority does not retain this definition either to set the threshold for the takeover.<\/p>\n
b\/ The specificity of the interpretation of the banking regulatory authority in determining the threshold for taking control<\/p>\n
93. \u2013 A major difficulty is therefore to know from what threshold a bank obtains control of its target. This problem was highlighted in the BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas affair. In a decision of 08\/28\/1999, the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee decided that BNP had not obtained \u201ceffective power of control\u201d over Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale with 31.8% of the rights of voting.<\/p>\n
94. \u2013 Thus, if it appears obvious that it is not enough to refer to the rates of the simple majority of 50% of the capital, it is commendable to seek what is the threshold for the acquisition of control of an establishment of credit for the CECEI. This is essential in the banking system because, if the CECEI finds that an initiating company has not succeeded in taking control of its target, it can prohibit it from keeping its stake. This was the case in the BNP\/Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale\/Paribas case. The CECEI found that BNP did not clearly have the effective power to control Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. The Committee considered that, in a non-concerted framework and taking into account the shareholding structure of this establishment, the holding by BNP of such a stake was likely to disrupt the management of Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. However, because of its place within the French banking system, the risk of disruption of its management was likely to thwart the overall functioning of the banking system. The Committee therefore decided not to authorize BNP to hold its stake in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. It can therefore be seen that the CECEI does not want to leave credit institutions in ambiguous situations concerning their control. However, he failed to demonstrate precise thresholds of control. the Committee decided not to authorize BNP to hold its stake in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. It can therefore be seen that the CECEI does not want to leave credit institutions in ambiguous situations concerning their control. However, he failed to demonstrate precise thresholds of control. the Committee decided not to authorize BNP to hold its stake in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale. It can therefore be seen that the CECEI does not want to leave credit institutions in ambiguous situations concerning their control. However, he failed to demonstrate precise thresholds of control.<\/p>\n
95. \u2013 First of all, it seems that it can be said that he did not refer to the takeover threshold set by Articles L. 233-3-II and L. 233-16 -II of the Commercial Code. Indeed, an impression of autonomy emerges from the notion of manifest possession of the effective power of control vis-\u00e0-vis that of presumed control. It should nevertheless be specified that the level of participation obtained by BNP in Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale prevents any definite conclusion from being drawn on this point.<\/p>\n
96. \u2013 Next, the silence of the CECEI on the criteria it uses also makes it impossible to have any certainty as to the use of the notions of \u201ccontrol in fact\u201d or \u201cdecisive influence\u201d used by the internal and Community authorities of the competition. On the one hand, de facto control requires a retrospective vision of the distribution of powers in society. It is carried out, by definition, in view of the progress of the general meetings, therefore, over time. In the BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas case, the CECEI did not carry out such a check due to the context and the urgency of resolving it. It appears that the protection of the banking and financial system requires not leaving credit institutions in situations of uncertainty concerning their control. It is moreover for this reason that the authorization of the CECEI intervenes a priori before any meeting. Such a review over time is therefore difficult to implement. On the other hand, concerning the use of the concept of decisive influence, here again, we can estimate that it was autonomy that prevailed with regard to the 31.8% of the voting rights acquired by the BNP. Indeed, the latter was likely to exercise a decisive influence because of the dispersal of the rest of the capital and voting rights.<\/p>\n
97. \u2013 Finally, it is certain that the takeover threshold set by the texts of banking accounting law was not retained. Indeed, as we have already specified, control is presumed there when there are no other shareholders or partners holding together a stake greater than that of the group and each possessing more than 5% of the capital. The BNP respected this scenario. Therefore, it is certain that the CECEI here adopted a specific interpretation of the notion of control.<\/p>\n
98. \u2013 We have just highlighted the complexity of defining the threshold for taking control. The difficulty is further increased in certain hypotheses because of the configuration of the acquisition of control.<\/p>\n
B\/ Difficulties related to the configuration of the acquisition of control<\/p>\n
99.- Se tiene en cuenta la especificidad bancaria y financiera en la adquisici\u00f3n del control de entidades privadas (1), p\u00fablicas (2) y mutualistas (3).<\/span><\/p>\n1\/ Teniendo en cuenta la especificidad bancaria y financiera en la adquisici\u00f3n del control de un banco privado<\/span><\/p>\n100. \u2013 Esquem\u00e1ticamente, se pueden distinguir dos situaciones en las que la protecci\u00f3n del sistema bancario y financiero parece imprescindible.\u00a0Por lo tanto, la especificidad bancaria y financiera se tiene en cuenta cuando un banco est\u00e1 en quiebra (a) y cuando cotiza en bolsa (b).<\/span><\/p>\na\/ Tener en cuenta la especificidad bancaria y financiera en la adquisici\u00f3n del control de un banco en quiebra<\/span><\/p>\n101.- Los procedimientos de insolvencia en una empresa son un fen\u00f3meno normal, inevitable y hasta deseable cuando son la consecuencia y el castigo de una mala administraci\u00f3n.<\/span><\/p>\n102. \u2013 En nuestra opini\u00f3n, este razonamiento no puede trasladarse al sistema bancario.\u00a0De hecho, este \u00faltimo todav\u00eda est\u00e1 estrechamente asociado en la actualidad con la producci\u00f3n y gesti\u00f3n del dinero.\u00a0Es cierto que esta moneda es cada vez m\u00e1s dif\u00edcil de definir e identificar, ya que se desmaterializa, pero sigue estando fundamentalmente vinculada a la idea de confianza.\u00a0Dado que el dinero transmite confianza, la quiebra de un banco tiene una resonancia mucho mayor que los procedimientos de insolvencia de una empresa industrial o comercial de tama\u00f1o equivalente.\u00a0As\u00ed, los bancos en quiebra fueron frecuentemente rescatados bajo la \u00e9gida del estado (\u03b1).\u00a0Si en algunos casos este \u00faltimo fue el verdadero art\u00edfice del rescate, ahora es la intervenci\u00f3n de la autoridad reguladora bancaria la que se consagra (\u03b2).<\/span><\/p>\n\u03b1\/ El rescate de los bancos bajo la \u00e9gida del Estado<\/span><\/p>\n103. \u2013 La crisis de los a\u00f1os 90 puso en dificultades a un gran n\u00famero de bancos franceses.\u00a0El Estado, al no querer liquidarlos, ha lanzado con frecuencia planes de rescate que han resultado en que los bancos en quiebra sean respaldados por grupos m\u00e1s poderosos.<\/span><\/p>\n104.\u2013 Tomemos el ejemplo del Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.\u00a0Es una sociedad an\u00f3nima de derecho privado a la que el Estado ha encomendado una misi\u00f3n de inter\u00e9s general en la construcci\u00f3n de viviendas, lo que le permite distribuir pr\u00e9stamos subvencionados bajo diversas f\u00f3rmulas.\u00a0Desde finales de la d\u00e9cada de 1980, se ha privado de la distribuci\u00f3n de pr\u00e9stamos asistidos con acceso a la propiedad, ahora reservados \u00fanicamente para Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France.<\/span><\/p>\nAs\u00ed, el 17\/02 y el 19\/1993, el Comptoir des Entrepreneurs ya no pudo renovar certificados de dep\u00f3sito con Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale SICAV.\u00a0Este \u00faltimo se encuentra en estado de cesaci\u00f3n de pagos y, t\u00e9cnicamente, en situaci\u00f3n de insolvencia.<\/span><\/p>\nCon muchas dificultades, el Estado logra establecer un rescate del Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.\u00a0Esta es, en su opini\u00f3n, la \u00fanica soluci\u00f3n para evitar el p\u00e1nico en el mercado interbancario y en el mercado de bonos donde el Comptoir des Entrepreneurs es un emisor importante.\u00a0El plan tiene tres componentes:<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 un aumento de capital de 800 millones de francos acompa\u00f1ado de la emisi\u00f3n de t\u00edtulos de deuda subordinada por un importe de 200 millones de francos.\u00a0AGF aumenta su participaci\u00f3n hasta casi el 30% y Cr\u00e9dit Foncier entra en el capital con un 10%;<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 une ligne de cr\u00e9dit de 6 milliards de francs est accord\u00e9e par les principales banques de Paris au nom de la solidarit\u00e9 de la place, \u00e0 l\u2019initiative du gouverneur de la Banque de France, qui active la proc\u00e9dure de l\u2019article 52 de la loi bancaire du 24\/01\/1984\u00a0;<\/p>\n
\u2013 enfin, la Caisse des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts accorde une avance de tr\u00e9sorerie de 1,6 milliard de francs sur cautions apport\u00e9es par le Comptoir des entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n
Malgr\u00e9 ce plan de sauvetage, la cession de plus de 3 milliards de francs de cr\u00e9ances et l\u2019\u00e9mission, avec la garantie de l\u2019Etat, de 5,5 milliards de francs d\u2019obligations, le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs se retrouve, un an plus tard, au bord du gouffre.<\/p>\n
En 1994, un dispositif de cession de cr\u00e9ances est mis en place, permettant de sortir les principaux risques immobiliers du bilan du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n
Le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs accumule encore des pertes de 1024 millions de francs et il faut mettre en place, en 1995, une deuxi\u00e8me op\u00e9ration de d\u00e9sendettement du bilan pour un montant de 7 milliards de francs.\u00a0L\u2019Etat intervient en garantie \u00e0 hauteur de 4,5 milliards.\u00a0AGF contribue ensuite \u00e0 hauteur de 450 millions \u00e0 la souscription de titres de cr\u00e9ances subordonn\u00e9s \u00e9mis par le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.\u00a0Le solde, soit 2,1 milliards, est constitu\u00e9 de dette senior obtenue par conversion de pr\u00eats accord\u00e9s par les AGF et la Caisse des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts.\u00a0Enfin, une recapitalisation d\u2019environ 1,2 milliard est pr\u00e9vue sur deux ans.\u00a0Deux op\u00e9rations intervenues en 1996 pour 700 et 550 millions de francs ont amen\u00e9 le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs sous le contr\u00f4le des AGF avec une participation directe de 52,\u00a043% et la contribution de leur filiale Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d\u2019Investissement Bancaire et Immobili\u00e8re \u00e0 hauteur de 22,46%.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration confirme l\u2019adossement du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs aux AGF.<\/p>\n
Le bilan du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs est all\u00e9g\u00e9 suite aux deux op\u00e9rations de d\u00e9faisance et assaini.\u00a0Cependant, sa solvabilit\u00e9 n\u2019est pas r\u00e9tablie puisque son ratio de fonds propres ne d\u00e9passe pas 5 %.\u00a0C\u2019est pourquoi les AGF font porter les titres de leur participation au capital du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs par une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 holding afin que la Commission Bancaire, plut\u00f4t que de contr\u00f4ler le ratio de solvabilit\u00e9 de chaque composante du groupe, se contente d\u2019une appr\u00e9ciation globale.<\/p>\n
105. \u2013 Cette op\u00e9ration de sauvetage par l\u2019\u00c9tat n\u2019\u00e9tait pas la seule ;\u00a0on peut aussi citer le cas du Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France.<\/p>\n
Cette derni\u00e8re est une institution financi\u00e8re priv\u00e9e sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e.\u00a0Bien qu\u2019\u00e9tant une entreprise priv\u00e9e, elle est en fait d\u00e9pendante de l\u2019\u00c9tat.\u00a0Les deux tiers du capital sont entre les mains de particuliers et d\u2019investisseurs institutionnels.\u00a0La part de la Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et des assurances publiques ne d\u00e9passe pas 15 %.\u00a0Cependant, c\u2019est l\u2019\u00c9tat qui nomme le gouverneur et les principaux dirigeants.<\/p>\n
Depuis 1977, le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France partage le monopole de la distribution des pr\u00eats aid\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019accession \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 avec les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s de cr\u00e9dit immobilier et le Comptoir des Entrepreneurs.\u00a0A partir du 01\/10\/1995, ces derniers sont supprim\u00e9s notamment parce que la baisse des taux d\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat du march\u00e9 rend les pr\u00eats hypoth\u00e9caires classiques moins chers que les pr\u00eats aid\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019accession \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9.<\/p>\n
En 1995, la crise immobili\u00e8re entra\u00eenant une baisse de la valeur des actifs et de la demande de cr\u00e9dits, le Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France subit une perte de 10,7 milliards de francs et ne parvient pas \u00e0 faire face \u00e0 ses obligations prudentielles.\u00a0Celle-ci est particuli\u00e8rement d\u00e9faillante au regard des provisions qu\u2019elle aurait d\u00fb constituer sur ses risques immobiliers.<\/p>\n
L\u2019\u00c9tat, ne pouvant faire appel \u00e0 aucun actionnaire de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence, a organis\u00e9 lui-m\u00eame le sauvetage du Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France, dans la mesure o\u00f9 une simple liquidation aurait pu entra\u00eener l\u2019effondrement de l\u2019ensemble du march\u00e9 du cr\u00e9dit immobilier et obligataire.<\/p>\n
At the start of 1996, after lengthy negotiations, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France obtained a line of credit allowing it to refinance itself for an amount of 20 billion francs at market conditions. Undoubtedly, the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations acts as a lender of last resort in place of the Banque de France, which does not wish to create a precedent by intervening itself in an overly conspicuous way. Then a few months later, the State itself guarantees the bond debt of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France which is, with an outstanding amount of 270 billion francs, the second issuer after the Treasury. Consequently, the State is actively seeking to back Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France with a more solid institution which would take over the net liabilities. It took more than three years for a solution to be found to this crisis.<\/p>\n
In a press release dated 03\/13\/1997, Minister Arthuis, whose services are advised by Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, launched a call for applications to recapitalize Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France, which had been without capital for more than two years. A year later, this not very transparent procedure ends up releasing a potential buyer. A consortium formed by GMAC, the Texan investor Bass, the Caisses d\u2019Epargne and the CCF, is continuing the discussions, after the abandonment of GE Capital, the Post Office and the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations. Despite the interest of American groups for the prospects offered by the securitization of mortgage loans, the negotiations were finally broken off in 09\/1998, in the face of the derisory price offered and guarantee requirements deemed exorbitant.<\/p>\n
Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn then announced a completely different plan. The first stage is that of a financial restructuring of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France to restore its solvency. The second stage is that of an \u201copen, transparent and non-discriminatory\u201d backing procedure. It led to a new Cr\u00e9dit Foncier, the main player in the obligations fonci\u00e8res market, which restored all of its attractiveness to the establishment in the eyes of potential buyers.<\/p>\n
Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France\u2019s articles of association have been simplified and brought into line with company law, which excludes the appointment of managers by the State. Finally, Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France is recapitalized with the approval of the European Commission. The operation is led by the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations, as a shareholder advance, for an amount of 1.85 billion francs. This makes it possible, after reduction of the share capital, to bring the institution\u2019s own funds to a level that complies with prudential regulations.<\/p>\n
Finally, the buyer of 90.6% of the capital of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France is the Caisses d\u2019Epargne group. Given that shortly before the final choice, the law of 25\/06\/1999 modified the status of the Caisses d\u2019Epargne by making them cooperative companies and by providing the network with a central body, namely the Caisse Caisses d\u2019Epargne, which becomes the real buyer of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France. It should be noted that the general interest mission of financing social housing falling within the remit of the Caisses d\u2019Epargne, the attachment of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France is entirely justified.<\/p>\n
106. \u2013 Unquestionably, these operations to rescue French banks were carried out under the aegis of the State. Yet, gradually, political intervention gave way to legal regulation. Indeed, from now on, the treatment of failing banks is carried out through the intermediary of the banking regulatory authority.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ The consecration of the intervention of the banking regulatory authority<\/p>\n
107. \u2013 This consecration of the intervention of the banking regulatory authority gradually took hold. This could be seen during the default of Banque Majorel. The latter was declared insolvent at the beginning of 1992. Indeed, a provisional administrator had been appointed by the Banking Commission after the failure of negotiations with a possible buyer, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole de l\u2019Aveyron. He had noted a very serious lack of provisions, since the outstanding amount had to be provisioned at more than 50%. However, the provisions recognized did not reach 10%. Consequently, the declaration of cessation of payments was made less than a month after the appointment of the provisional administrator. The Commercial Court of Rodez approved a transfer plan proposed by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Bordelaise de CIC. The counters closed only a few days without serious problems vis-\u00e0-vis the customers. However, the disposal plan included aid from the AFB solidarity mechanism of 120 million francs supported by all the AFB banks.<\/p>\n
108. \u2013 The Court of Cassation, in a judgment of 26\/04\/1994, upheld the power of the Commission Bancaire to decide on the compulsory resignation of the manager of the bank. The Commercial Chamber therefore confirmed that the managers were deprived of all powers with regard to the credit institution. The power conferred on the Banking Commission was therefore very significant.<\/p>\n
109. \u2013 But a decision of principle of the Court of Cassation is not the law and it is with remarkable speed that the legislator, from law n\u00b0 94-679 of 08\/08\/1994, drew the first consequences of the Majorel judgment. This specified that the provisional administrator appointed by the Commission Bancaire was transferred \u201call the powers of administration, management and representation of the legal person\u201d. The law of 08\/08\/1994 at the same time adjusted the powers of the Banking Commission by opening up greater ease of decision-making but by making it subject to an adversarial obligation. The legislator thus sanctioned the possibility of a very rapid appointment of a provisional administrator.<\/p>\n
110. \u2013 The ultimate strengthening of the powers of the Banking Commission was found in the law relating to savings and financial security. The latter enshrined the specificity of judicial reorganization and liquidation, applicable to credit institutions and investment companies. This reform completed the derogations already adopted in favor of financial companies. More specifically, it recognized the specificity of financial enterprises, while keeping them within the ambit of common law. Indeed, the amended law of 25\/01\/1985 is still applicable to these companies, but the derogation measures are becoming more and more numerous.<\/p>\n
Thus, the law of 06\/25\/1999 introduced a number of provisions aimed at modernizing the financial sector and strengthening the security of the system as a whole. To this end, it significantly strengthened the powers of the Banking Commission, giving it specific powers, in particular the prohibition on distributing dividends and the obligation to sell shares or shares. Similarly, the law organized the pre-eminence of the Banking Commission over the Commercial Court by obliging company directors to notify the Banking Commission beforehand of their intention to declare the cessation of payments by their establishment. In addition, it improved the transparency of credit institutions belonging to a group, by making their authorization conditional on the transparency of the group\u2019s structures. Finally,<\/p>\n
111. \u2013 The decree of 26\/12\/2000, in turn inaugurated this new approach by organizing a better distribution of powers between the different bodies that may intervene in the procedure: provisional administrator, judicial administrator, liquidator appointed by the Banking Commission and liquidator judicial. The competence of the banking and judicial authorities now gives way to the predominance of the banking commission, whose powers have been strengthened. Currently, the opening of reorganization or liquidation proceedings against a credit institution or an investment firm is subject to the prior opinion of the Banking Commission. The redefinition, by the law of 25\/06\/1999, of the notion of cessation of payments applicable to credit institutions required, in fact, a reorganization of the competent bodies to note this state and to open a collective procedure against these establishments. The \u201cfinancialization\u201d of the notion of cessation of payments, now perceived as the moment when the credit institution is no longer able to ensure its payments, immediately or in the near term, can only be assessed by a financial authority. . In this respect, the Banking Commission is henceforth the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. The \u201cfinancialization\u201d of the notion of cessation of payments, now perceived as the moment when the credit institution is no longer able to ensure its payments, immediately or in the near term, can only be assessed by a financial authority. . In this respect, the Banking Commission is henceforth the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. The \u201cfinancialization\u201d of the notion of cessation of payments, now perceived as the moment when the credit institution is no longer able to ensure its payments, immediately or in the near term, can only be assessed by a financial authority. . In this respect, the Banking Commission is henceforth the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings. the mandatory prerequisite for the opening of any collective proceedings or any amicable settlement. However, this is not an assent and the absence of a response within the time limit cannot prevent the opening of proceedings.<\/p>\n
112. \u2013 Thus, a certain number of specific rules apply to credit institutions and investment firms in dealing with their default. These are part of a financial logic consisting in strengthening the prevention of difficulties that may affect them.<\/p>\n
113. \u2013 However, it is certain that the new applicable rules are not infallible and that bank failures remain possible. In this case, it is a question of avoiding a high systemic risk. The takeover of a failing bank by a healthy financial institution is one of the solutions favored by the banking regulatory authorities. Indeed, this operation will lead to an increase in concentration which is likely to strengthen the structure of the banking system. The sale of a failing bank must then comply with the specific rules applicable to insolvency proceedings by credit institutions.<\/p>\n
114. \u2013 Having demonstrated that banking and financial specificity are taken into account in the ordinary rules for the restructuring of defaulting capital, it should be verified that this same phenomenon is present in the takeover of a listed bank.<\/p>\n
b\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of control of a listed bank<\/p>\n
115. \u2013 Banks are generally large in size. They are therefore frequently listed on the stock exchange. Only small entities and certain subsidiaries of large groups remain unlisted. However, these are less and less numerous because of the amplification of the phenomenon of concentration.<\/p>\n
116. \u2013 The conditions for taking control of a listed bank are much stricter compared to other economic sectors. Indeed, the banking object of the takeover entails the application of banking law. The latter is more restrictive than stock market law. The distributive application of these two rights therefore generates obstacles to the gradual acquisition of control of a bank by picking up on the stock exchange. There are only two usable techniques left. These are the acquisition of a control block (\u03b1) and the public offering (\u03b2).<\/p>\n
\u03b1\/ Acquisition of a block of control<\/p>\n
117. \u2013 The negotiation of a block of control is the operation by which the shareholder of a company which holds a sufficient number of shares allowing him to exercise in the organs of the company directly or indirectly, a preponderant influence, sells them to a person wishing to acquire them.<\/p>\n
118. \u2013 Originally, the law of 02\/08\/1989 amended by the law of 31\/12\/1993 was applicable. This was taken up, with little modification, by article 33 of the law of 02\/07\/1996 incorporated into article L. 433-1 II of the Monetary and Financial Code. The latter instructs the financial regulatory authority to provide in its General Regulations, regulations in this area: \u201cin order to ensure the equality of shareholders and the transparency of the markets\u2026\u201d.<\/p>\n
119. \u2013 The General Regulations therefore provide in Book II, Title I, for a Chapter V concerning the price guarantee procedure. These are the rules relating to the conditions under which the proposed acquisition of a block of securities conferring the majority of the capital or voting rights of a company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market obliges the the purchasers to buy the securities which are then presented to them at the price or at the price at which the transfer of the block is carried out. The purchaser of the block undertakes to acquire on the market, at the price of the block, the securities presented for at least ten trading days.<\/p>\n
120. \u2013 The Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers focuses its attention mainly on the price offered and possibly authorizes a derogation from equal pricing. The filing is published by the Autorit\u00e9 des march\u00e9s financiers and its approval gives rise to the publication of a notice. The buyer of the block must also send a draft press release, the content of which is close to an information note. When this project is approved, it is published. As soon as the press release is published, the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers declares the opening of the procedure. At the end of it, it pronounces its closure.<\/p>\n
121. \u2013 This procedure was used in the banking sector, in particular, during the Banco espirito Santo\/ Via Banque and Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France\/ Entenial transactions.<\/p>\n
122. \u2013 Stock market rules must apply alongside banking rules. In fact, the acquisition of a control block entails the application of the Regulation of the Banking and Financial Regulation Committee No. 96-16 of 12\/20\/1996. The latter provides for the authorization of the takeover by the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee. It should be specified that it is up to the person who acquires the control block to request the authorization thus provided for. This clarification is important because previously it was the establishment whose distribution of capital experienced a significant change that had to submit this request. In the event of non-compliance with the provisions applicable to shareholders of credit institutions, the law of 07\/16\/1992 provides for a specific sanction:<\/p>\n
123. \u2013 This highlights the fundamental link between banking law and securities law. These two rights should therefore be coordinated, which is not obvious, particularly in terms of public offers.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ Public offering<\/p>\n
124. \u2013 Public offerings of securities are the instrument par excellence for takeovers, particularly in the banking sector. The primary mechanisms of concentration are the public purchase or exchange offer. These consist, on the part of a company, in publicly proposing to the shareholders of another company to acquire their shares at a determined price, generally higher than the market price. When the price is settled in cash, it is a tender offer. When it is settled by the delivery of shares or bonds, it is a public exchange offer.<\/p>\n
125. \u2013 The operation has many interests. It ensures equal treatment for all sellers and represents one of the techniques for protecting minority shareholders in banking groups. It constitutes an effective means of bringing about a grouping, which is particularly useful in view of the creation of the European financial market.<\/p>\n
126. \u2013 For civil lawyers, the offer is \u201cthe proposal that it will suffice for the solicited party to accept for the contract to be concluded\u201d. Thus, it is a proposal to contract, which can be made to a named person or to any other person, ie to the public, and this, whatever its meaning and its object: to acquire or to transfer; tangible or intangible property. Its author may therefore propose to acquire or sell securities held, as the case may be, by the public or by him. Recipients of the solicitation may or may not accept it. Also, the public offer is only one offer among others. It also presents the essential characteristic of any offer. She must be firm. It is for this reason that it constitutes an irrevocable commitment.<\/p>\n
127. \u2013 If this contractual aspect is taken into consideration by stock market law, at the same time, it gives the public offer a procedural aspect. Indeed, it defines the public offer as the procedure which allows a natural or legal person to make known publicly that it proposes to acquire or sell all or part of the securities of a company listed on the first market. or at the coast of the secondary market. In the same vein, it indicates that the rules enacted set the general process for conducting a public offering with a view to the orderly conduct of operations in the best interests of investors and the market. This process is characterized by the filing of a draft offer, the decision on the admissibility of the offer,<\/p>\n
128. \u2013 Thus, the public offer is subject to procedural rules of stock market law. However, these rules are not exclusive because of the interference of banking rules.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Rules of stock market law<\/p>\n
129. \u2013 Several procedures coexist: the so-called normal procedure and the so-called simplified procedure must be distinguished. The latter is of an exceptional nature and can only be implemented in the cases expressly specified. We will not devote any development to it because it does not aim to allow the takeover of a company. It is then necessary to differentiate between the normal procedure and the compulsory procedure. Within the framework of the first procedure, the offer can be freely launched by any person. In the context of the second procedure, a public offer must be filed when a shareholder exceeds the threshold of one third of the capital or voting rights as well as in the event that he rapidly increases his participation. The most innovative point concerns the temporary regularization of immigrants \u2013 those who entered Italy before December 31, 2011 \u2013 who will denounce the boss or the company exploiting or even mistreating them. Those who lodge a complaint and undertake to cooperate in the criminal proceedings brought against their employer will thus be issued a humanitarian residence permit for a period of six months, renewable for a period of at least one year.<\/p>\n
130. \u2013 Various reforms have taken place, some of them without the support of a legal text, which is debatable. The stock market regulatory authority is authorized to make regulations concerning the operation of the markets placed under its control \u201cfor the execution of its mission\u201d. It is for this reason that Regulation No. 89-03 was adopted. This was repealed by Regulation No. 2002-04, the provisions of which were taken over by the General Regulation of the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers. These apply to public takeover bids relating to financial instruments traded on a regulated market. The text sets strict criteria for \u201cany offer made publicly to holders of financial instruments traded on a regulated market (\u2026) with a view to acquiring all or part of said financial instruments\u201d. An ambitious triple objective is set: respect for the free play of bids and their higher bids, equal treatment and information for the holders of securities of the companies concerned, transparency, market integrity and fairness in transactions and competition. Consequently, the Regulation increases the level of information disseminated to the market and to the public. Thus, a draft information memorandum must be filed by the initiator of the public offer. This project, drawn up by the initiator and the target company, alone or jointly, must be the subject of a press release at the latest when it is filed. Likewise, any data likely to supplement this information note must be transmitted to the public. This is the case for any clause in the agreement concluded by the companies concerned or their shareholders likely to have an impact on the assessment of the public offer. This arrangement is clearly inspired by the BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas concentration. In this case, an agreement between Axa and Paribas had been revealed late when it provided for a device requiring the first to obtain the agreement of the second before bringing its shares to the offer. In addition, the initiator of the offer must specify its intentions in terms of volume and structure of the workforce, the orientations in terms of employment, as well as its objectives regarding the maintenance of the securities of the target company on the market for \u201d the next twelve months. The document must also set out \u201cthe financing conditions of the operation and their impact on the assets, activity and results of the companies concerned\u201d. The target company is required to file a draft offer document. It states the reasoned opinion of the board of directors or the supervisory board deciding on \u201cthe interest of the offer or its consequences for the target company, its shareholders and its employees\u201d. Finally, during the takeover bid, the companies concerned, the members of their administrative or management bodies, the presenting establishments and the consulting establishments, the persons or entities holding at least 5% of the capital or voting rights have the obligation to declare, each day,<\/p>\n
131. \u2013 The regulation cannot add to the law as recalled by the Court of Cassation. However, the implementation of a legal support was late. This is welcome since stock market regulations clearly include constraints that can only come from legislative authorization. Indeed, article 34 of the Constitution provides that: \u201cthe law determines the fundamental principles of the system of ownership of real rights and civil and commercial obligations\u201d.<\/p>\n
132. \u2013 The law of 02\/08\/1989 inserted into the law of 22\/01\/1988 an article 6 bis in order to regulate public offers. This provision, which is at the origin of mandatory public offers, was modified by the law of 31\/12\/1993. It was taken up, with little modification, by article 33 of the law of 02\/07\/1996, which instructs the financial regulatory authority to provide in its General Regulations, regulations in this area. According to this text: \u201cin order to ensure the equality of shareholders and the transparency of the markets, the General Regulations of the Financial Markets Council lays down the rules relating to public offers relating to financial instruments traded on a regulated market (\u2026)\u201d. It is specified that any person who comes to hold a fraction of the capital or voting rights of a company, must immediately inform the financial regulatory authority and file a public offer for the securities concerned. This threshold has been set at one third of a company\u2019s capital or voting rights.<\/p>\n
133. \u2013 Following the law of 02\/08\/1989, the General Regulations of the Stock Exchange Council, which could not derogate from the obligations laid down by law, dealt with public offers.<\/p>\n
134. \u2013 This system was maintained by the law of 02\/07\/1996. This provided that the General Regulations of the Stock Exchange Council remain applicable, while indicating that they may be amended or repealed.<\/p>\n
135. \u2013 It was amended by decrees of 03\/27\/1997, 07\/09\/1997 and 08\/11\/1997, then repealed and replaced, by the new Title V of the General Regulations of the Financial Markets Council. This was approved by a decree of 05\/11\/1998. This title defines the rules applicable to takeover bids. It should be noted that these General Regulations of the Financial Markets Council were amended by the decrees of 18\/12\/2000 and 15\/11\/2002. These texts approved new provisions in terms of public offers. Indeed, the old version had shown its weaknesses, in particular, during the great banking and stock market battle of 1999 between BNP, Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale and Paribas. It has been clarified that the initiator of a takeover bid or a public offer may specify a condition for obtaining below which this offer will not be followed up positively, which constitutes a derogation from the principle of irrevocability of the offer. . In the case of two simultaneous offers, he can waive the conditionality clause and reopen his offer if he holds more than two-thirds of the capital and voting rights. The threshold required for this reopening is reduced to the majority of the capital and voting rights if several offers are present. Finally, the option is introduced for an initiator to condition its public offer on the approval of the competition authorities. These provisions have been included in the General Regulations of the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers.<\/p>\n
136. \u2013 These reforms are indicative of the consideration given to specific cases by the financial regulatory authority when drafting general rules. This phenomenon should also be highlighted with regard to the consideration of banking specificity in the regulation of public offers.<\/p>\n
\u2013 The taking into account of banking specificity in the regulation of public offers<\/p>\n
137. \u2013 Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996 of the Banking and Financial Regulation Committee provides for an additional formality for credit institutions. It submits to the prior authorization of the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee any transaction involving the acquisition, extension or sale of direct or indirect holdings, when this transaction has the effect of allowing a person or a group of persons acting together to acquire the effective power of control over the management of the company or to acquire one-third, one-fifth or one-tenth of the voting rights.<\/p>\n
138. \u2013 In our view, this provision is likely to complicate wildcard bids in the banking system. Indeed, the need to obtain the prior agreement of the CECEI to take control of a credit institution constitutes an obstacle. The latter is all the more important as the Committee has declared itself opposed to hostile takeover bids by banks. However, this is not an absolute anti-takeover defense because the target company only has a respite from the pre-clearance process. This respite may nevertheless be long enough to allow the target bank to organize its defense because the CECEI has the possibility of suspending the price of public offers. This could be seen in the BNP\/Societe Generale\/Paribas case. Firstly, the Committee blocked the overbidding on Paribas by postponing its decision because the project raised questions in particular from a prudential point of view. The authorization and therefore the continuation of the normal course of the offers, intervened only ten days later. On the other hand, the Committee delayed the announcement of the final results of the offers known from 14\/08\/1999 to 30\/08\/1999 without public justification, except the announcement of the hearing of the presidents of the two originator credit institutions. In this case, it was a question of modifying the price of public offers by forcing negotiation. the Committee delayed the announcement of the final results of the offers known from 14\/08\/1999 to 30\/08\/1999 without public justification, apart from the announcement of the hearing of the presidents of the two initiating credit institutions. In this case, it was a question of modifying the price of public offers by forcing negotiation. the Committee delayed the announcement of the final results of the offers known from 14\/08\/1999 to 30\/08\/1999 without public justification, apart from the announcement of the hearing of the presidents of the two initiating credit institutions. In this case, it was a question of modifying the price of public offers by forcing negotiation.<\/p>\n
139. \u2013 Moreover, it is essential to note that the securities held beyond the established threshold are deprived of the right to vote. This sanction is interesting, because it goes beyond the framework of traditional legal sanctions. Indeed, there is an inadequacy of traditional sanctions. By their rigidity, the nullity, the rescission or the allocation of damages lack efficiency. It seems, for example, obvious that if the penalty for non-compliance with banking law was the nullity or resolution of the operation, this would have an impact on the purchaser of the securities but also on the existence of the company which could be put to danger. The deprivation of voting rights is efficient because the purchaser of the securities is not dispossessed of his membership, which moreover limits the infringement of his right,<\/p>\n
140. \u2013 Por \u00faltimo, el art\u00edculo 9 de la ley de 15\/05\/2001 relativo a las nuevas normas econ\u00f3micas complet\u00f3 el art\u00edculo L. 511-10 del C\u00f3digo Monetario y Financiero.\u00a0Se especifica que cualquier persona que considere presentar un proyecto de oferta p\u00fablica con el fin de adquirir una cantidad espec\u00edfica de valores de una instituci\u00f3n de cr\u00e9dito aprobada en Francia, debe informar al Gobernador de la Banque de France, Presidente de la CECEI, ocho d\u00edas h\u00e1biles. antes de la presentaci\u00f3n de este borrador de oferta o de su anuncio p\u00fablico si es anterior.\u00a0Esta disposici\u00f3n tiene por objeto evitar que se repita lo que sucedi\u00f3 durante las ofertas p\u00fablicas de BNP\/Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale\/Paribas en 1999, cuando se present\u00f3 a las autoridades bancarias un hecho consumado.\u00a0De hecho, las autoridades de control se hab\u00edan enterado de ciertas ofertas de los peri\u00f3dicos de la ma\u00f1ana.<\/span><\/p>\nObviously, this measure is limited to simple information, of a confidential nature, of the Governor of the Banque de France.\u00a0Thus, the latter has no decision to make.\u00a0No legal sanction is applicable in the absence of information or in the event of late information.\u00a0It should however be emphasized that the Governor of the Banque de France is the President of the CECEI.\u00a0However, the powers of this Committee are considerable since it is responsible for issuing individual approvals as well as authorizations to take control.\u00a0This constitutes a powerful incentive to comply with this information obligation.<\/span><\/p>\n141.- En consecuencia, al organizar mejor la informaci\u00f3n en el marco de las ofertas bancarias p\u00fablicas, esta ley pretende proteger mejor el sistema bancario y financiero.\u00a0Permite al Gobernador de la Banque de France \u201cdar a conocer su evaluaci\u00f3n, o incluso ejercer una funci\u00f3n de buenos oficios antes de que el dep\u00f3sito haga irrevocable la oferta\u201d.\u00a0Introduce, por tanto, en la legislaci\u00f3n burs\u00e1til una forma de intervencionismo estatal propia de las ofertas bancarias p\u00fablicas.\u00a0Es indiscutible aqu\u00ed que la especificidad bancaria se tiene en cuenta en el mecanismo de las ofertas p\u00fablicas.<\/span><\/p>\n142. \u2013 En definitiva, si esta consideraci\u00f3n de la especificidad bancaria se produce en la toma de control de los bancos privados, el mismo fen\u00f3meno puede destacarse en la toma de control de los bancos p\u00fablicos.<\/span><\/p>\n2\/ Teniendo en cuenta la especificidad bancaria y financiera en la adquisici\u00f3n del control de un banco p\u00fablico<\/span><\/p>\n143. \u2013 Takeovers of public banks took place within the framework of privatization procedures.\u00a0Privatization is the transfer from the public sector to the private sector of the majority stakes held by the State in certain companies.\u00a0If the operation is complex, privatization is the basis of a transfer of ownership of the securities forming the capital of a State company to persons governed by private law.<\/span><\/p>\n144. \u2013 The decision can belong only to the legislator.\u00a0The solution is expressed by article 34 of the 1958 Constitution: \u201cThe law establishes the rules concerning (\u2026) the transfer of ownership of enterprises from the public sector to the private sector\u201d.\u00a0The principle has been reiterated by the Council of State on several occasions.\u00a0A law was therefore needed, or at the very least a standard of equivalent value, such as an ordinance.<\/span><\/p>\n145. \u2013 Le gouvernement a choisi la voie des ordonnances.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, une loi du 02\/07\/1986 l\u2019a habilit\u00e9 \u00e0 proc\u00e9der, par ordonnance, \u00e0 la privatisation d\u2019une s\u00e9rie de soci\u00e9t\u00e9s qu\u2019il a cot\u00e9es.\u00a0Le premier secteur concern\u00e9 \u00e9tait pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le secteur bancaire.\u00a0L\u2019ordonnance pr\u00e9par\u00e9e n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 sign\u00e9e par le pr\u00e9sident de la R\u00e9publique, ce qui a oblig\u00e9 le gouvernement \u00e0 modifier sa proc\u00e9dure.<\/p>\n
146. \u2013 Un projet de loi a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 soumis au parlement.\u00a0Elle aboutit au vote de la loi du 06\/08\/1986 \u00ab relative aux modalit\u00e9s d\u2019application des privatisations d\u00e9cid\u00e9es par la loi du 02\/07\/1986 \u00bb.\u00a0Le r\u00e9gime juridique des privatisations est ainsi tiraill\u00e9 entre la loi du 02\/07\/1986 qui pose le principe et celle du 06\/08\/1986 qui d\u00e9crit les modalit\u00e9s et qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9e par la loi du 19\/07\/1993.<\/p>\n
147. \u2013 La privatisation est mise en place par la Direction du Tr\u00e9sor.\u00a0L\u2019op\u00e9ration n\u00e9cessite \u00e9galement l\u2019intervention de la Commission de privatisation, charg\u00e9e d\u2019\u00e9valuer la banque.\u00a0La Commission d\u00e9cide sur la base des rapports d\u2019\u00e9valuation \u00e9tablis par les banques du Conseil du Tr\u00e9sor.\u00a0Il d\u00e9termine la valeur minimale des entreprises \u00e0 privatiser, avec l\u2019aide d\u2019expertises externes.\u00a0Ces \u00e9valuations sont r\u00e9alis\u00e9es en tenant compte, selon une pond\u00e9ration appropri\u00e9e \u00e0 chaque cas, de la valeur de march\u00e9 du titre, de la valeur des actifs, des b\u00e9n\u00e9fices r\u00e9alis\u00e9s, de l\u2019existence de filiales et des perspectives d\u2019avenir.\u00a0Une approche \u00ab multicrit\u00e8res \u00bb est donc consacr\u00e9e.\u00a0Le prix d\u2019offre ou de vente est fix\u00e9 par le ministre charg\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9conomie, qui ne doit pas \u00eatre inf\u00e9rieur \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9valuation donn\u00e9e par la commission.\u00a0Enfin,<\/p>\n
148. \u2013 Toutefois, l\u2019intervention des autorit\u00e9s bancaires est apparue incertaine (a).\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, la prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re dans les proc\u00e9dures de privatisation est indiscutable (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ L\u2019intervention incertaine des autorit\u00e9s bancaires dans les privatisations<\/p>\n
149. \u2013 Il convient de pr\u00e9ciser que les comp\u00e9tences de la Commission et du Comit\u00e9 des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit et des entreprises d\u2019investissement peuvent se heurter lors de privatisations bancaires.\u00a0En effet, ils visent tous deux \u00e0 maintenir le bon fonctionnement et la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire et financier.\u00a0La Commission est ainsi comp\u00e9tente pour \u00e9valuer la banque, intervenir lorsque le statut de la banque publique change et choisir les acqu\u00e9reurs.\u00a0Le Comit\u00e9 est comp\u00e9tent pour autoriser les prises de participation.\u00a0A cette occasion, son contr\u00f4le se concentre sur les actionnaires.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, les deux autorit\u00e9s interviennent pour d\u00e9cider du changement d\u2019actionnaires.<\/p>\n
Cette r\u00e9partition des r\u00f4les n\u2019a pas permis de surmonter un certain nombre de difficult\u00e9s et de carences li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019ing\u00e9rence de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire dans ce m\u00e9canisme de restructuration.\u00a0En effet, les autorit\u00e9s en charge de la d\u00e9finition et de la supervision bancaires n\u2019ont pas vu leur r\u00f4le pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 dans le cadre de ces op\u00e9rations.\u00a0Ainsi, cela peut sembler, \u00e0 premi\u00e8re vue, relativement secondaire.<\/p>\n
Le choix des membres des groupes d\u2019actionnaires associ\u00e9s ne rel\u00e8ve pas des comp\u00e9tences du CECEI, qui est seul charg\u00e9 de l\u2019approbation, du contr\u00f4le de l\u2019actionnariat bancaire et de l\u2019autorisation de franchir le seuil fix\u00e9 au vote.\u00a0Toutefois, dans le cadre de l\u2019autorisation de prise de contr\u00f4le ou de franchissement de seuil, ces derni\u00e8res auraient pu conditionner ces autorisations \u00e0 un certain nombre de mesures visant \u00e0 prot\u00e9ger de mani\u00e8re efficace le syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Ce n\u2019\u00e9tait pas le cas.\u00a0Pr\u00e9cisons tout d\u2019abord que le Directeur du Tr\u00e9sor est membre du CECEI.\u00a0Pourtant, il est \u00e0 l\u2019origine du montage de l\u2019op\u00e9ration.\u00a0En outre, le Pr\u00e9sident du Comit\u00e9 est le Gouverneur de la Banque de France.<\/p>\n
150. \u2013 Par ailleurs, la Commission bancaire aurait d\u00fb intervenir dans le but de prot\u00e9ger le syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En effet, dans un certain nombre de cas, les pertes des banques publiques s\u2019accumulaient.\u00a0Il y a eu des retards de provisionnement, des fonds propres insuffisants et le non-respect des ratios prudentiels.\u00a0Toutefois, la Commission bancaire ne s\u2019est pas prononc\u00e9e sur l\u2019opportunit\u00e9 de retirer l\u2019agr\u00e9ment des \u00e9tablissements d\u00e9faillants, notamment les filiales d\u2019entreprises bancaires et les entreprises financi\u00e8res publiques de premier ordre.\u00a0Cela aurait pu lui permettre de faire pression sur le choix du Tr\u00e9sor et du gouvernement dans la proc\u00e9dure de privatisation.<\/p>\n
b\/ La prise en compte des sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s bancaires et financi\u00e8res dans les proc\u00e9dures de privatisation<\/p>\n
151. \u2013 The taking into account of the banking and financial specificity was carried out within the framework of privatization procedures on the financial markets (a) as well as in the context of off-market privatization procedures (b).<\/p>\n
\u03b1\/ Privatization procedures on the financial markets<\/p>\n
152. \u2013 These procedures are subject to specific rules. Banking regulation only appears in these hypotheses in a very incidental way.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Rules specific to privatizations on the financial markets<\/p>\n
153. \u2013 This method consists of the State offering the shares of the privatized company to the financial market. The operation is in a way a reverse takeover bid, ie a public sale offer. It is the direct result of the public offering procedure provided for by the general regulations of the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers. A notice is published. It indicates the number of titles offered for sale as well as the price. Interested persons have a deadline to respond to this offer, indicating the number of securities they wish to purchase.<\/p>\n
154. \u2013 It should be specified that Article 4-1 of Law No. 86-912 of 06\/08\/1986 provides that transfers made by the State \u201cmay be subject to payment in installments\u2026\u201d However, the implementing decree for this text was delayed since it was only published in 1997. Its scope is limited since it only concerns privatization operations which result in a transfer of control according to the procedures of the financial market.<\/p>\n
155. \u2013 Without going into the details of the decree, it is however appropriate to dwell on the conditions of implementation of the right granted to the State in the event of default of payment by a shareholder. With regard to payment defaults, the procedure provides that \u201cwhatever the cause of the default, the registration in the account of the bearer of the shares whose due date has not been honored is automatically canceled. The new account entry is made in the name of the State by the issuing legal entity or the authorized financial intermediary without the bearer having been given prior formal notice to have to settle his debt\u201d. The solution is as brutal as it is effective.<\/p>\n
156. \u2013 It seems to us that such a legal retention of title could have been dangerous for the stability of the banking system. The State could again have shares in credit institutions in the event of non-payment. He would then have been able to sell them again. The banking authorities would certainly have had to intervene with the aim of protecting the banking system. This incursion would have highlighted the consideration of banking regulation.<\/p>\n
\u2013 Consideration of banking regulation<\/p>\n
157. \u2013 The privatization of a bank must in principle be subject to the prior authorization of the CECEI.\u00a0Indeed, according to Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996, any transaction involving the transfer of holdings in a credit institution, when this transaction has the effect of allowing a person or a group of persons to acquire the effective power to control the management of the company or to acquire one-third, one-fifth or one-tenth of the voting rights, must be authorized.\u00a0Thus, it is indisputable that the privatization of a bank must be authorized by the CECEI.\u00a0Banking specificity therefore interferes in the privatization procedure.<\/span><\/p>\n158. \u2013 Sin embargo, cabe precisar que en los t\u00e9rminos del Reglamento No. 96-16 de 20\/12\/1996, s\u00f3lo son v\u00e1lidas las transferencias que permitan a una persona o a un grupo de personas adquirir por lo menos el 10% de los derechos de voto. previa autorizaci\u00f3n del CECEI.\u00a0As\u00ed, en determinadas operaciones de privatizaci\u00f3n bancaria, los adquirentes no han alcanzado el umbral del 10% de participaci\u00f3n.\u00a0Por lo tanto, el Comit\u00e9 no fue informado por el Tesoro.\u00a0En realidad, las operaciones de privatizaci\u00f3n que dieron lugar a la remisi\u00f3n al CECEI son aquellas que se realizaron parcialmente en los mercados financieros.<\/span><\/p>\n159. \u2013 Correlativamente, las enajenaciones que se produjeron en el marco de procedimientos de privatizaci\u00f3n fuera del mercado involucraron al CECEI.<\/span><\/p>\n\u03b2\/ Procedimientos de privatizaci\u00f3n fuera del mercado<\/span><\/p>\n160. \u2013 Se puede transferir el control de un banco p\u00fablico fuera del mercado.\u00a0En determinados casos, este procedimiento \u00fanico se ha utilizado con el fin de formar un grupo conocido como \u201caccionistas estables\u201d.\u00a0Puede demostrarse una consideraci\u00f3n de la especificidad bancaria y financiera en las reglas aplicables a la privatizaci\u00f3n.\u00a0Adem\u00e1s, se puede destacar una particularidad de las diversas privatizaciones bancarias fuera del mercado.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 Tener en cuenta la especificidad bancaria y financiera en las normas aplicables a la privatizaci\u00f3n<\/span><\/p>\n161. \u2013 Under the terms of article 4 of law n\u00b0 86-912 of 06\/08\/1986, in its wording resulting from law n\u00b0 93-923 of 19\/07\/1993, the transfer or exchange of securities, sales of preferential rights or waivers of such rights are carried out according to financial market procedures.\u00a0However, the Minister in charge of the Economy may decide to appeal to off-market buyers.\u00a0The choice of the purchaser(s) and the terms of sale are determined by the Minister for the Economy, with the assent of the Privatization Commission, which has become the Participations and Transfers Commission.\u00a0This also provides the valuation of the company.\u00a0A Council of State decree sets in particular the publicity rules to which these decisions are subject and the cases in which a call for tenders is used.\u00a0Furthermore, article l of decree n\u00b0 93-1041 of 03\/09\/1993,\u00a0modified by decree n\u00b0 95-947 of 25\/08\/1995 specifies that, for the application of the provisions of the second paragraph of n article 4 of the law of 06\/08\/1986, private sector holdings in the capital of public companies are subject to certain rules.\u00a0The decision to sell or exchange over-the-counter securities or rights of public companies is publicized by publication in the Official Journal.\u00a0When specifications governing the operation are established, this insertion informs potential buyers so that they send their offer accompanied by their financial references.\u00a0The drafting of the specifications in bank privatizations is the subject of specificities.\u00a0It is recalled that the economic role of the bank to be privatized must be preserved in the country’s banking organization so as not to undermine the stability and security of the financial system.\u00a0It is specified that prospective acquirers must explain how they intend to develop the bank while respecting the requirements of the specifications.\u00a0In other words, they must commit to an industrial project and not just seek capital gains on a transitional equity investment.\u00a0These specific provisions aim to protect the banking and financial system.\u00a0When no specifications are provided, the Minister for the Economy appoints an independent personality whose name is made public.\u00a0This establishes a report on the conditions and progress of the operation.\u00a0This report is submitted to the Minister and to the Privatization Commission.\u00a0Potential buyers must send their offer accompanied by their financial references.<\/span><\/p>\n162. \u2013 We have demonstrated the interference of banking and financial specificity in the rules applicable to privatization. Correlatively, in practice, the various off-market banking privatizations have been specific compared to other economic sectors.<\/p>\n
\u2013 The specific nature of the various off-market banking privatizations<\/p>\n
163. \u2013 Concerning the privatization of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, law no. Provision has been made for the purchase of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole by the regional banks for 90% of the capital and by the group\u2019s employees for 10% of the capital.<\/p>\n
164. \u2013 Article 4 of this law provided that the valuation of the fund should be carried out according to the procedure provided for by law no. 86-912 of 06\/08\/1986. After the vote of the law of 18\/01\/1988, the Privatization Commission therefore issued an opinion on 19\/02\/1988. The complexity of the relationship between the regional banks and the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole has been taken into account, as well as the specific nature of the risks weighing on the whole. It is for this reason that the Commission has set the minimum value of the Caisse Nationale at 7 billion francs.<\/p>\n
165. \u2013 This valuation gave rise to controversy because it could have been higher. In fact, the Commission relied on the net assets of the Fund which it evaluated at 8.1 billion francs at 31\/12\/1986. This amount was obtained by adding the State allocation, the consolidated results and the 1986 result. this savings was not assimilated to equity. However, this provision is considered by the Banking Commission as capital for the calculation of prudential ratios, in particular the risk coverage ratio and the reserve requirement ratio. The provision for home savings was also recorded in equity in an information note made available to the public during a financial operation set up by Unicredit, a subsidiary of the Caisse Nationale. This document, endorsed by the Stock Exchange Commission and drafted by the National Fund, specified that these equity capital amounted to 14.12 billion francs. Furthermore, a particular point relating to the nature of the guarantee fund was not the subject of any comment in the Privatization Commission\u2019s estimate. This fund, amounting to 2.4 billion at the end of 1986, made up of contributions from regional mutuals, guarantees deposits in the event of failure of a local or regional mutual. The law provided for its absorption by the National Fund but its amount was not added to that of equity. Conversely, this decision therefore contradicted the specific provisions of the Rural Code applicable to Cr\u00e9dit Agricole. Indeed, it is provided that \u201cin the event of dissolution, the surplus assets [of the common guarantee fund] are allocated to the Cr\u00e9dit Agricole endowment\u201d.<\/p>\n
166. \u2013 Without taking this controversy into account, on 25\/02\/1988 the Ministers of Economy and Agriculture issued the decree provided for in article 5 of the law of 18\/01\/1988. This notably provided for the sale price of Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole shares to employees as well as to the regional mutuals. The price retained is the minimum value proposed by the Privatization Commission. In our opinion, it is the fear of a financial weakening of the regional funds that guided this measure. The substantial objective is to protect the solvency of the regional banks as well as the structure of the banking system as a whole. This appears indisputably because it is provided that the latter do not have to mobilize all of their own funds. Moreover, part of the financing can be achieved through a public call for savings through investment certificates, equity securities or bonds. Finally, a last specific provision, aiming at the same objective, has been organized. With regard to the regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, at least 50% of the shares had to be paid in cash, the payment of the balance being scheduled for a later date. Thus, the decree therefore granted time limits to the funds that so wished when their risk coverage ratio was less than 5.5% on 30\/06\/1987. These were authorized to settle 33.3% of the shares at maturity of one year, 33.3% of the shares at maturity of two years and 33.4% of the shares at maturity of three years, on the anniversary dates of the cash payment. In practice,<\/p>\n
167. \u2013 This privatization therefore led to the takeover of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole by the regional banks. The Caisse Nationale was transformed into a public limited company governed by the law of 07\/24\/1966. Incidentally, the transformation of the status of the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole raised the question of the compatibility of that of the regional banks which are the new owners. Can the latter remain civil companies with variable capital and engage in commercial activities and equity investments that generate profits? In our opinion, these questions remain fundamentally undetermined, but article 625 of the Rural Code, which exempts the Cr\u00e9dit Agricole funds from registration in the trade and companies register, seems sufficient to avoid a more in-depth debate.
Thus, we have demonstrated that the privatization of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole was special.<\/p>\n
168. \u2013 This was also the case with the privatization of BFCE. The decree of 12\/12\/1995 authorized the transfer to the private sector of BFCE, in which the State only indirectly holds a majority stake. The operation was carried out by private sale without specifications, with an expert\u2019s report and the opinion of the Privatization Commission. By an opinion of the Minister of Economy and Finance published in the Official Journal of 13\/12\/1995, Mrs Hagelsteen, State Councillor, was instructed to draw up a report on the conditions and progress of this operation of privatization. The Privatization Commission issued a favorable opinion on Cr\u00e9dit National\u2019s offer.<\/p>\n
169. \u2013 The Credit Institutions Committee has been seized of the file. It gave its authorization on 12\/21\/1995 on the condition, however, that Cr\u00e9dit National obtains a solvency ratio of 9.2% after the acquisition. This condition set by the banking regulatory authority was intended to preserve Cr\u00e9dit National\u2019s sound financial situation. The primary objective was indeed the protection of the banking system.<\/p>\n
170. \u2013 By order of 01\/23\/1996, on the assent of the Privatization Commission, the Minister authorized the transfer of BFCE to the private sector, thus allowing Cr\u00e9dit National to take control.<\/p>\n
171. \u2013 Cr\u00e9dit National still had to supplement its own funds to meet the requirements of the CECEI and it had to increase them from 8.85% to 9.2%. To fill this gap, an issue of 500 million perpetual subordinated securities, eligible as quasi-equity in the solvency ratio, was organised. The AGF subscribed to it for 340 million francs. The balance of 140 million francs was covered by the CDC. Ultimately, Cr\u00e9dit National\u2019s Cooke ratio was indeed increased to 9.2%, but its core capital ratio fell from 8.7% to 6.2%. This value was considered insufficient given the range and type of the group\u2019s activities and given its dependence on the cost of refinancing on the market. Cr\u00e9dit national-BFCE\u2019s rating was downgraded by the Standard and Poor\u2019s agencies,<\/p>\n
172. \u2013 The privatization of SMC did not lead to such a deterioration in the ratings of the buyer because the State carried out several recapitalizations before the sale to the private sector.<\/p>\n
173. \u2013 The government decided by decree of 26\/10\/1995 to transfer the State\u2019s stake in the SMC to the private sector through a procedure of transfer by mutual agreement without specifications. At the end of 1996, the Minister appointed Mr. Maugars, Inspector General of Finance, as an independent figure to investigate the privatization file. Several times suspended and resumed, the privatization operation encountered many difficulties, in particular when the Korean group Daewoo proposed to buy out SMC for the symbolic sum of 1 franc.<\/p>\n
174. \u2013 A government notice dated 04\/21\/1998 relaunched the procedure for the transfer of SMC by sale by mutual agreement, without specifications but with the obligation for the purchaser to present an industrial recovery project. the bank. The overriding objective was to secure the future of the bank in order to avoid further difficulties. More broadly, the purpose was to protect the structure of the banking system. After competition between four candidates for the takeover of SMC, BNP, Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Caisse d\u2019\u00e9pargne Provence-Alpes-Corse and Banque Chaix, a subsidiary of CCF, the latter alone submitted a final offer to \u2018purchase. On 12\/06\/1998, she signed a contract to take over SMC shares.<\/p>\n
175. \u2013 Following the assent of the Participations and Transfers Commission and the prior authorization of the CECEI, the government decided by decree of 22\/10\/1998 to transfer ownership of the SMC to the private sector. This transfer took place by sale of the entire capital to Banque Chaix following the last recapitalization of SMC by the State in the amount of 2.9 billion francs. The amount of the transaction, symbolic given the sad state of the bank, was 10 million francs.<\/p>\n
176. \u2013 It should be noted that while these privatization operations were carried out without specifications, other operations were organized within the framework of calls for tenders on the basis of specifications. Thus, the transfer procedure and the specific obligations to be respected have been specified. These obligations may have varied depending on the objectives sought. It could, in particular, be a temporary inalienability of the securities acquired and a right of pre-emption. Finally, the Minister chose the purchaser(s) based on the offers and guarantees provided, with the assent of the Commission.<\/p>\n
177. \u2013 This procedure was the source of significant litigation initiated by potential buyers not chosen by the minister. Thus, it is this procedure which was the basis of the appeal brought before the Council of State by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, BNP and CCF during the privatization of CIC.<\/p>\n
178. \u2013 Let us first recall the facts. CIC was privatized in 1998 under an off-market procedure. By decree n\u00b0 96-681 of 07\/30\/1996, the Prime Minister decided to transfer from the public sector to the private sector the majority stake held by the State, in the financial company of CIC and the European Union . The Minister of Economy and Finance then chose to carry out this transfer through a tender procedure, governed by specifications. Seven candidates were declared admissible, by the Minister, to submit an offer. Five of these candidates have actually filed a purchase offer. By a decision made public on 23\/03\/1998 the Minister authorized Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, ABN-Amro and the Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, to the exclusion of BNP and CCF, to continue the selection procedure. In a decision made public on 04\/14\/1998, the minister appointed the Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel as the buyer. By an order of 24\/04\/1998, it then set the terms of the transfer from the public sector to the private sector.<\/p>\n
179. \u2013 It is the terms of this transfer which have been the subject of an appeal by certain unsuccessful applicants. Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, BNP and CCF jointly requested, on 12\/06\/1998, the annulment for abuse of power of various administrative decisions: the decision of the minister declaring admissible the offer of the Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, that of 03\/12\/1998 of the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee authorizing a possible takeover of Compagnie Financi\u00e8re du CIC et de l\u2019Union Europ\u00e9enne by Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rative du Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, the decisions of the Minister for 23 \/03 and 14\/04\/1998, the decree of 24\/04\/1998 and the opinions issued by the Privatization Commission during the privatization procedure. In summary, the first challenge related to the illegality of the procedure. The second objection was based on the fact that, according to the applicants, the buyer being a mutual bank, its status prohibited it from taking over an AFB bank. Finally, the third argument maintained that the procedure for transfer to the private sector should be based, with regard to the principle of equality, solely on the content of the offers. Thus, the applicants considered first of all that the provisions allowing a transfer according to the off-market procedure had not entered into force. Indeed, the decree of application concerning the cases of implementation of a call for tenders had not been published. However,<\/p>\n
Next, the applicants also complained about the takeover by a mutual institution of a bank known as \u201cAFB\u201d. To challenge this choice, they based their argument on a specificity of the banking system. They considered on the one hand, that the provisions of the banking law would have opposed the takeover of a bank affiliated to the AFB by a mutual bank. They also asserted that the provisions governing the operation of Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, and more particularly those of Article 2 of Ordinance No. 58-966 of 16\/10\/1958 under the terms of which \u201cthe Caisses de Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel exclusively for the purpose of mutual credit\u201d, would have obstructed the takeover by these funds of a credit institution not affiliated to the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network. The Council of State refutes the argument. It \u201cappears from the documents in the file that BFCM, the candidate selected by the Minister to acquire the State\u2019s stake in the Compagnie financi\u00e8re du CIC et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9en, is itself affiliated to the AFB and not to the network of Credit Mutuel\u201d. The solution provided by the Council of State is, moreover, very interesting. In fact, by rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument because BFCM was itself affiliated with AFB, the latter suggests that if the economic entity had been affiliated with the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network, the takeover could have been contested. The solution provided by the Council of State is, moreover, very interesting. In fact, by rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument because BFCM was itself affiliated with AFB, the latter suggests that if the economic entity had been affiliated with the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network, the takeover could have been contested. The solution provided by the Council of State is, moreover, very interesting. In fact, by rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument because BFCM was itself affiliated with AFB, the latter suggests that if the economic entity had been affiliated with the Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel network, the takeover could have been contested.<\/p>\n
Finally, concerning the terms of transfer to the private sector by way of a call for tenders for a State participation in a public company, the applicants maintained that the choice between the candidates could not be legally justified, with regard to the principle of equality, only on the content of their offers. The applicant banks maintained that the specifications did not respect the principle of equality between candidates. Firstly, it did not define with sufficient precision the concepts of \u2018firm offer\u2019 and \u2018definitive offer\u2019. The same applied to the conditions and limits under which the candidates could modify, when formulating their \u201cfinal offer\u201d, the content of their \u201cfirm offer\u201d. On the other hand, it restricted access to certain information only to candidates admitted to make a \u201cfinal offer\u201d. The key to reading these expressions is in the specifications. Thus, under the terms of article 5-3 of these specifications, \u201cthe firm offer will constitute an irrevocable commitment to acquire the stake sold for a period of six months, subject, where applicable, to any amendments contained in the offer. final\u201d. Similarly, under the terms of article 7-3 of the same specifications \u201cthe final offer must include the elements of the firm offer, as well as the draft sales contract. In the event that amendments are proposed to the firm offer or to the draft sales contract, all the necessary justifications must be attached to the final offer\u201d. The Council of State observes that it results from the preceding provisions and, in particular, from the need to justify any amendment made to the firm offer, that each candidate must, as soon as his firm offer is formulated, set out the conditions under which he undertakes irrevocably to acquire, if selected, the transferred interest. It thus clarifies the meaning to be given to the expressions \u201cfirm offer\u201d and \u201cdefinitive offer\u201d. According to the High Court, the applicant is only authorized to adjust his final offer in relation to his firm offer to the strict extent of new elements brought to his attention after the filing of the firm offer within the framework of the organized procedure. by the specifications. Consequently, \u201cthe provisions of the specifications,<\/p>\n
Other means, linked to the Livret bleu, were also invoked. These included the exclusive distribution of this Livret bleu. In addition, reference was made to the existence of a procedure initiated by the European Commission which would not have been brought to the attention of the Privatization Commission. Both were rejected on the grounds that they had no influence on the regularity of the privatization procedure.<\/p>\n
180. \u2013 Ultimately, this appeal made before the High Administrative Court by the ousted establishments was an opportunity for the case law to clarify certain points of the procedure for the transfer to the private sector of shares held by the State when this this takes the form of an off-market sale.<\/p>\n
181. \u2013 These clarifications certainly facilitated the privatization of Banque Hervet. This is the last French bank to have been privatised. The procedure was launched on 11\/07\/2000 after several previous failed attempts. The government first decided to sell its holdings through a public offering. Finally in November 2000, the latter preferred to opt for a private sale procedure similar to the privatization of CIC.<\/p>\n
182. \u2013 The State shareholder sold the bank to CCF for 530 million euros. The Ministry of Economy and Finance was therefore not arrested by the majority shareholder of CCF, who is nevertheless British. The State has therefore shown impartiality in the choice of the buyers of Banque Hervet without interfering with nationalist criteria. This seems to mark a pledge of goodwill on the part of the French authorities in the creation of a true single banking market. They chose the proposal that best met the four criteria of the specifications in order to efficiently protect the banking system. This takeover by CCF was a strategic move for HSBC. First, the takeover of CCF in July 2000 enabled it to acquire a banking platform in France. Secondly, the takeover of Banque Hervet strengthened it in France, in particular thanks to geographical complementarity. The CCF was in fact totally absent from the four favorite departments of Banque Hervet.<\/p>\n
183. \u2013 Having demonstrated the taking into account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of control of public banks, we will attempt to highlight the same phenomenon during the acquisition of control by a mutual or cooperative bank.<\/p>\n
3\/ The taking into account of the banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of control by a mutual or cooperative bank<\/p>\n
184. \u2013 The cooperative or mutual banks could be considered as having a significant handicap in the acquisition of a European size or even global. Originally, the overriding problem was that they could not carry out cross-shareholdings or pay in shares for their takeovers. Thus, when cash is the only possible method of payment for external growth operations, the equity ratios of the buying mutual banks can only suffer.<\/p>\n
185. \u2013 However, it should be noted that takeover operations were nevertheless carried out. The external growth of mutual or cooperative banks has even taken on an unexpected scale. Indeed, these have succeeded in acquiring vehicles listed on the stock exchange allowing them to benefit from market capitalizations. For example, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole was able to launch a public offer on Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais shares thanks to the stock market listing of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole SA.<\/p>\n
186. \u2013 It is therefore appropriate to highlight the consideration of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of hybrid control (a) as well as in external growth between mutual banks (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the acquisition of hybrid control<\/p>\n
187. \u2013 The definition of hybrid takeover should be clarified. This is a concentration between a mutual bank and a bank of another status. This operation involves taking account of the banking specificity because it concerns two banks belonging to different statutes and being subject to different legal rules. In addition, the takeover is financial because it concerns a mutual bank, with a theoretically disinterested vocation, which binds itself financially to a capitalist company with the aim of growing and reaching a critical size. This specificity has consequences.<\/p>\n
188. \u2013 Indeed, in joint-stock companies, there is a category of agents specialized in the function of owner: the shareholders. They also have a function of providing capital.<\/p>\n
189. \u2013 Mutual banks are consumer cooperatives. The property rights are devolved to the members, the members of the mutual, who are contributors of equity, but who in all cases are also part of the clientele. This confusion between members and customers is likely to modify the objective of the company. It is no longer necessary to optimize the situation of the owner of the shares, therefore to maximize the financial profitability, since the latter is also the client. The cooperative is thus, in theory, more oriented towards satisfying the needs of the customers, which can modify the commercial relationship.<\/p>\n
190. \u2013 The property rights of members of cooperative banks are limited compared to those of shareholders. In mutuals and cooperatives, the owners of shares cannot exchange them. In addition, decisions are taken in general assembly democratically which implies that \u201cone man corresponds to one vote\u201d. Thus, the members\u2019 rights of control over the managers are much more diluted than in public limited companies, because it is impossible for an individual or a group of individuals to accumulate enough shares to have a significant influence on decisions. In French cooperative banks, this rule is however not always applied to the letter, but the voting rights of a member, even institutional, are capped. This limitation of the rights of the members is also manifested by the limitation of the return on capital. This does not take the form of dividends distributed or that of an increase in the value of the share, but that of interest paid. It is the general meeting which decides annually on the rate of remuneration of the shares, after proposal of the board of directors. Compared to public limited companies, the remuneration of the owners of the capital therefore appears to be lower.<\/p>\n
191. \u2013 Consequently, there is an important difference between the legal status of the shareholder and the member.<\/p>\n
192. \u2013 These hybrid takeovers lead to a partial opening of the mutualist structure thanks to financial links. Shareholders enter the mutualist structure and potentially have a greater right to remuneration than members. Logically, the entry of shareholders into these groups poses the problem of the recognition of members. Indeed, they have never derived any value from their shares. In addition, such operations lead to the use of funds collected by banks from their members. Thus, when Cr\u00e9dit Agricole took control of Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais, this massive use of the money collected from members, via the regional banks, was denounced.<\/p>\n
193. \u2013 Ultimately, it is possible to consider that the mutual bank loses its soul by opening up to capitalism. Indeed, it frequently strays from its original missions. Correlatively, it would be logical that the members no longer support the group\u2019s policy, which abandons the values \u200b\u200bthat preceded its constitution.<\/p>\n
194. \u2013 Some have considered these hybrid takeovers to be the start of a creeping demutualization process. In other words, banking mutualism would be self-destructing.<\/p>\n
195. \u2013 However, it seems that mutualist groups have succeeded in reconciling mutualist and capitalist structures.<\/p>\n
196. \u2013 Cr\u00e9dit Agricole notably took control of Indosuez in 1996. This operation was an opportunity for the green bank, hitherto centered in France on its traditional activities of financing agriculture, SMEs and individuals , to settle in trades and markets that are completely new to it. Thus, it has intervened with the clientele of large international companies, in the business of investment banking abroad or even the financing of assets and projects, the traditional hunting grounds of investment banks. To achieve its objectives, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole has exploited the international presence of Indosuez. Indeed, if the group today has many direct establishments in the world via subsidiaries or branches, this is largely thanks to the contribution of Indosuez. Consequently, on the one hand, there was a local generalist bank, with a mutualist culture and a very decentralized structure. On the other, was an investment bank geared towards large companies and large financial operations. Its culture was profit-oriented. However, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole has succeeded in combining its mutualist structure with a capitalist structure while avoiding major conflicts.<\/p>\n
197. \u2013 In 1997, the Banques Populaires group took control of Natexis while retaining a free float allowing the bank to be listed on the stock exchange. Natexis-Banques Populaires has become the cooperative group\u2019s wholesale bank. The banking group is therefore made up of three levels: the regional banks, the Banques Populaires federal bank and the capital structure that is Natexis-Banques Populaires. More specifically, the Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires owns more than half of Natexis-Banques Populaires. The regional banks, Casden Banque Populaire and Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif hold 98% of the Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires. In addition, the regional banks have a 25% stake in Natexis-Banques Populaires. In total, 77% of the capital of Natexis-Banques Populaires is held by the Banques Populaires group. The latter succeeded in reconciling a mutualist and capitalist structure. The chairman of the group also insists on the possibility given to members to also become shareholders of the structure to which they are already attached. Shareholders and members are therefore now part of the life of the group.<\/p>\n
198. \u2013 Finally, Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel acquired CIC in 1998. The latter is an AFB bank listed on the stock exchange. However, Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel has not demutualized from the inside insofar as the control it holds allows it to ensure that the cooperative logic prevails over the subsidiary logic. According to Mr. Etienne Pfimlin, President of the National Confederation of Cr\u00e9dit Mutuel, it does not seem healthy to erect \u201cChinese walls\u201d which would prevent cooperative banks from equipping themselves with the tools necessary to adapt to a competitive environment. According to him, the prosperity of the subsidiaries has no other justification than to reinforce that of the parent companies to enable them to continue to provide the best services to the members.<\/p>\n
199. \u2013 We have just highlighted the consideration of the banking and financial specificity in the acquisitions of hybrid control. The same phenomenon can be observed in the external growth of mutual banks.<\/p>\n
b\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the external growth of mutual banks<\/p>\n
200. \u2013 The concentration of mutual banking groups is specific. To make them grow, it is enough that another group adheres to them. This is how the Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif group was integrated into the Banques Populaires group in 2002.<\/p>\n
201. \u2013 Thus, the merger of the two groups was based on the implementation of the potential of their cooperative status coupled with the provisions of the banking law applicable to mutualist networks.<\/p>\n
202. \u2013 Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif therefore adopted the legal form of a Banque Populaire limited cooperative company and was affiliated as the parent company. It is therefore associated with the destiny of the group through a stake in the capital and the deliberative bodies of the Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires. The Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires replaced the Caisse centrale de Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif as the central body of the Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif group for all of its affiliates.<\/p>\n
203. \u2013 Toutefois, aux termes de l\u2019article L. 512-11 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier, la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires est charg\u00e9e :<\/p>\n
1\/ d\u00e9finir la politique et les orientations strat\u00e9giques du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire ;
2\/ n\u00e9gocier et conclure des conventions nationales et internationales pour le compte du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire ;
3\/ agr\u00e9er les dirigeants des Banques Populaires et d\u00e9finir les conditions de cet agr\u00e9ment ;
4\/ approuver les statuts des Banques Populaires et leurs modifications ;
5\/ assurer la centralisation des exc\u00e9dents de tr\u00e9sorerie des Banques Populaires et leur refinancement ;
6\/ prendre toute mesure utile \u00e0 l\u2019organisation, au bon fonctionnement et au d\u00e9veloppement du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire et appeler les contributions n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019accomplissement de ses missions d\u2019organe central.<\/p>\n
204. \u2013 Enfin, aux termes de l\u2019article L. 512-12 du code mon\u00e9taire et financier, la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires doit prendre toutes les mesures n\u00e9cessaires pour garantir la liquidit\u00e9 et la solvabilit\u00e9 du r\u00e9seau Banque Populaire en d\u00e9finissant et mettant en \u0153uvre les m\u00e9canismes internes de solidarit\u00e9 financi\u00e8re n\u00e9cessaires.\u00a0Ces dispositions concernant les Banques Populaires visent plus largement \u00e0 prot\u00e9ger la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.<\/p>\n
205. \u2013 Par cons\u00e9quent, cet organe central unique a une mission politique et une mission financi\u00e8re.\u00a0Cette structure est la synth\u00e8se entre une organisation politique, dans laquelle les dirigeants sont les repr\u00e9sentants des soci\u00e9taires, et la direction, puisque le conseil d\u2019administration de la Banque f\u00e9d\u00e9rale est compos\u00e9 des pr\u00e9sidents et directeurs g\u00e9n\u00e9raux des Banques Populaires.<\/p>\n
206. \u2013 Compte tenu des pr\u00e9rogatives \u00e9tendues de la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires, celle-ci exerce incontestablement ce que l\u2019on peut qualifier de contr\u00f4le sui generis sur le Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif.\u00a0Notre argumentation est confirm\u00e9e par le ministre de l\u2019Economie.\u00a0Selon ce dernier, \u00ab cette op\u00e9ration, en ce qu\u2019elle entra\u00eene le transfert du contr\u00f4le du groupe Cr\u00e9dit Coop\u00e9ratif au profit de la Banque F\u00e9d\u00e9rale des Banques Populaires, constitue une concentration au sens de l\u2019article L. 430-1 du Code de commerce. \u201d .<\/p>\n
207. \u2013 Il est clair que les reprises que nous venons d\u2019\u00e9tudier sont exclusives.\u00a0Certaines reprises peuvent \u00eatre r\u00e9alis\u00e9es conjointement par deux \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 2 : Prise en compte des sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s bancaires et financi\u00e8res dans l\u2019acquisition du contr\u00f4le conjoint<\/p>\n
208. \u2013 Les OPA sont des formes privil\u00e9gi\u00e9es de concentration entre banques.\u00a0L\u2019objectif est d\u2019atteindre la \u00ab taille critique \u00bb qui permet de mieux r\u00e9sister \u00e0 la concurrence en s\u2019unissant.\u00a0Elles correspondent \u00e0 des situations o\u00f9 aucun des partenaires ne souhaite se retirer du march\u00e9, ou dans lesquelles aucun des deux n\u2019a les moyens d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir la part de l\u2019autre.<\/p>\n
209. \u2013 Ces m\u00e9canismes permettent de limiter les risques d\u2019investissement des banques, alors que leurs ressources en capital sont rares et ch\u00e8res.<\/p>\n
210. \u2013 La prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re se v\u00e9rifie \u00e0 travers les notions permettant la qualification d\u2019OPA (A) ainsi que dans la r\u00e9alisation de l\u2019OPA (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ La prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire et financi\u00e8re dans les concepts permettant la qualification de prise de contr\u00f4le en commun<\/p>\n
211. \u2013 Concerted action constitutes an element of the definition of joint control (1) making it possible to highlight the takeover control (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Action in concert, an element of the definition of joint control<\/p>\n
212. \u2013 Action in concert is subject to a definition in company law (a). The definition of banking law seems different, which reflects the consideration of banking specificity (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ The definition of company law<\/p>\n
213. \u2013 Since the adoption of the law on new economic regulations, concerted action constitutes an element of the definition of joint control.<\/p>\n
214. \u2013 The control exercised by a concert results from a double presumption. Indeed, article L. 233-10 of the Commercial Code, modified by the law of 11\/12\/2001, is used to presume the existence of an action in concert. Persons who have entered into an agreement with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights or with a view to exercising voting rights, in order to implement a policy vis-\u00e0-vis the Company \u201c. Such an agreement is presumed to exist: between a company, the chairman of its board of directors and its managing directors or the members of its management board or its managers; between a company and the companies it controls within the meaning of Article L. 233-3; between companies controlled by the same person or persons; between the partners of a simplified joint-stock company with regard to the companies that it controls. Persons acting in concert are jointly and severally bound by the obligations imposed on them by law and regulations.<\/p>\n
b\/ The interference of banking specificity<\/p>\n
215. \u2013 The notion of concerted action is also defined by banking law in Article 4 of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996. The latter provides that \u201cpersons who have entered into an agreement with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights or with a view to exercising rights to implement a common policy vis-\u00e0-vis the subject undertaking\u201d.<\/p>\n
216. \u2013 At first sight, the wording of this article seems to be close to that given in company law. However, by rigorously analyzing this provision, the differences appear significant and highlight a specificity of banking law.<\/p>\n
217. \u2013 First of all, the law of 11\/12\/2001 on urgent economic and financial reform measures modified the definition of concerted action in company law. A fundamental comma has been added after the words \u201cfor the purpose of exercising voting rights\u201d. This reform clarified the wording of Article L. 233-10 of the Commercial Code. It is therefore now certain that company law places the incident relating to the common policy as a common factor of the two objects of the agreement. Thus, it is distinguished, among the agreements with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights, those whose purpose is to implement a common policy and those which do not have this purpose.<\/p>\n
218. \u2013 However, banking law has not undergone the same modification. There is therefore a difficulty of interpretation concerning the purpose of the linking of the words \u201cto implement a common policy\u201d. The text refers to two types of agreements, one with a view to acquiring or transferring voting rights, the other with a view to exercising rights. In the presence of this distinction, it is possible to consider that the incidental \u201cto implement a common policy\u201d relates exclusively to agreements with a view to exercising rights. From this, it may follow that all agreements to acquire or dispose of constitute actions in concert, without there being any reason to ask whether their purpose is to implement a common policy.<\/p>\n
219. \u2013 Admittedly, it may seem excessive to take advantage of such a formal observation. However, it confirms an analysis authorized by Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996. The latter, considering action in concert, specifies \u201cin order to exercise rights\u2026\u201d. However, company law refers to the exercise of voting rights. The difference is essential. Once again, it seems that banking law retains an extensive definition of the agreements concerned. It is not just about agreements to exercise voting rights to implement a common policy. It could be contracts made between people allowing them to benefit from certain rights within the bank concerned.<\/p>\n
220. \u2013 The interference of banking specificity is therefore evident in the definition of legal concepts. In addition, the specific definition of banking law logically entails a broad application of Article 2 of Regulation No. 96-16 of 20\/12\/1996. Indeed, it provides that any person or group of persons acting together must obtain authorization from the CECEI when a stake greater than one-tenth of the voting rights is acquired or sold. Its authorization is fundamental because if the CECEI opposes the operation, the project will have to be abandoned. This authorization is intended to protect the banking system. The CECEI verifies that there is consultation between the parties in order to avoid conflicts between shareholders and guarantee the stability of the entity. So, it makes its authorization subject to the conclusion of a formal agreement guaranteeing the cohesion of the block of shareholders. Finally, he ensures the existence of a clear and viable industrial project, always with the aim of avoiding disruption of the banking system. Indeed, acting in concert can result in a joint takeover.<\/p>\n
2\/ Qualification of joint control resulting from concerted action<\/p>\n
221. \u2013 Not every concert can constitute control. Article L. 233-3 paragraph 3 of the Commercial Code resulting from the law relating to new economic regulations and modified by the law of 11\/12\/2001 allows the exercise of joint control to be presumed. This provides that \u201ctwo or more persons acting in concert are considered to jointly control another when they in fact determine the decisions taken at the general meeting\u201d. The objective of the legislator was thus to introduce a provision aimed at recognizing the existence of control held in concert. The law therefore adjusts to the realities of power within societies.<\/p>\n
222. \u2013 In banking law, there is no provision defining joint control. However, the persons considered to be acting together are not apprehended in the same way in banking law and company law. This lack of banking law is a source of questioning.<\/p>\n
223. \u2013 A fundamental question therefore arises in the context of joint banking subsidiaries. To what extent can joint control be qualified?<\/p>\n
224. \u2013 In general, on this issue, no fundamental divergence has emerged between company law, banking law, securities law and competition law. We can therefore highlight the criteria of joint control without having to distinguish between these different rights.<\/p>\n
225. \u2013 There is a joint takeover when the controlling companies must agree on the major decisions concerning the controlled company.<\/p>\n
Thus, there is joint control, when two partners each own half of the capital of a joint venture, each control half of the voting rights in meetings and therefore have the right to appoint half of the members of the management bodies. In such a situation, the partners are obliged to come to an agreement in order to avoid reciprocal blocking during votes on decisions concerning the activity of the joint venture. However, joint control is likely to exist, even in situations where the distribution of capital is not egalitarian, when a sufficiently significant common interest emerges from the analysis of all the factual and legal circumstances. .<\/p>\n
Such reasoning, which takes into account all the legal and factual circumstances for the purpose of recognizing a minority partner\u2019s participation in joint control, must be generalized to joint ventures under the influence of more than two partners. In its Communication on concentration and cooperation operations, the European Commission thus indicates that a joint venture may be controlled by a multiplicity of undertakings when the latter are able to bring together a majority of the capital, seats or votes in the joint undertaking\u2019s decision-making bodies. However, joint control can only be presumed if the factual or legal circumstances, in particular a convergence of economic interests, tend to demonstrate the existence of a deliberate common policy of the parent undertakings with regard to the joint undertaking. In practice, this is deduced from the existence of veto rights obliging each of the companies to agree on the management of the joint venture.<\/p>\n
226. \u2013 On the other hand, it should be specified that a company would not be considered to exercise joint control if it benefited from prerogatives aimed solely at protecting its financial interests. It is clear that in practice such a distinction is not without posing delicate problems of appreciation. Indeed, the question of the existence or not of joint control does not always call for an obvious answer in practice, given the complexity of certain factual and legal situations.<\/p>\n
227. \u2013 The above developments show that this process is halfway between financial links and cooperation agreements. Indeed, banks that control joint subsidiaries are not necessarily financially linked. However, financial links still exist, but only between the parent bank and the subsidiary. We are therefore faced with a funnel-shaped diagram and not the classic pyramid-shaped diagram with a bank having several subsidiaries. This assertion will appear very clearly in the study of the realization of the joint takeover.<\/p>\n
B\/ The taking into account of banking and financial specificity in the realization of the joint takeover<\/p>\n
228. \u2013 It is necessary to demonstrate the taking into account of the banking and financial specificity in the negotiations of joint takeover of control (1) as well as than the heterogeneity of situations in the banking system (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Taking account of the banking and financial specificity in the negotiations for the joint takeover<\/p>\n
229. \u2013 The Governor of the Banque de France intervened on several occasions to force negotiations so that banking law would be respected.<\/p>\n
230. \u2013 For example, in the 1990s, Banque Pallas found itself in great difficulty because of the real estate crisis. An audit was carried out in 1991. The Salustro report revealed that out of the 4.9 billion francs in assets whose pledges were appraised, the potential risk of loss was 882 million francs.<\/p>\n
Estando el banco en una situaci\u00f3n catastr\u00f3fica, se organiz\u00f3 una reuni\u00f3n en desastre en el Gobernador de la Banque de France con los principales accionistas de Pallas Holding, \u201cpara tratar lo m\u00e1s urgente y prestar dinero al banco\u201d.\u00a0El gobernador de la Banque de France exigi\u00f3 que el banco respetara los coeficientes de solvencia previstos por la ley bancaria.\u00a0Presion\u00f3 a este \u00faltimo para encontrar una soluci\u00f3n r\u00e1pidamente.<\/span><\/p>\nPor tanto, Pallas se comprometi\u00f3 a acercarse a Bred creando una filial conjunta.\u00a0La operaci\u00f3n se llev\u00f3 a cabo r\u00e1pidamente sin que se informara a la c\u00e1mara sindical de los Banques Populaires, el organismo supervisor de Bred.\u00a0Este organismo act\u00faa como \u00f3rgano central de las Banques Populaires.\u00a0Como tal, cabe recordar que garantiza la seguridad del sistema, de los dep\u00f3sitos realizados en los distintos establecimientos miembros de la red y realiza funciones de inspecci\u00f3n.\u00a0El Comit\u00e9 de Entidades de Cr\u00e9dito dio su acuerdo a la fusi\u00f3n sin solicitar el acuerdo de la C\u00e1mara Sindical.\u00a0De hecho, en ese momento, no necesitaba el acuerdo legal formal de un tercero para decidir.\u00a0Es costumbre que sus miembros se aseguren de que el establecimiento en cuesti\u00f3n informe a su organismo de control.\u00a0El Comit\u00e9 s\u00ed le pidi\u00f3 a Bred que hablara sobre su proyecto al presidente de la c\u00e1mara sindical, pero este \u00faltimo lo hizo muy tarde.\u00a0Cuando el presidente se enter\u00f3, no pudo hacer nada m\u00e1s.\u00a0Se le present\u00f3 un hecho consumado.\u00a0La flexibilidad de la normativa ha ayudado al Banque de France, que ha actuado para que esta operaci\u00f3n se lleve a cabo.\u00a0De hecho, quer\u00eda evitar la quiebra de un banco vinculado a la crisis inmobiliaria.<\/span><\/p>\nAs\u00ed, el 20\/01\/1992, se firm\u00f3 un protocolo entre los dos bancos.\u00a0Esto preve\u00eda la creaci\u00f3n de una filial conjunta: Bred-Pallas Financement Immobilier.\u00a0Bred pose\u00eda el 51% a trav\u00e9s de Cofibred, Banque Pallas France el 49%.<\/span><\/p>\n231. \u2013 Este ejemplo plantea una pregunta.\u00a0\u00bfA qu\u00e9 grupo debe pertenecer la entidad cuyo control conjunto se negocia?\u00a0A esta pregunta no se le puede dar una respuesta definitiva.\u00a0Debe demostrarse que detr\u00e1s de la apariencia de unidad de esta noci\u00f3n se esconde una heterogeneidad de situaciones.<\/span><\/p>\n2\/ La heterogeneidad de las situaciones de control conjunto en el sistema bancario<\/span><\/p>\n232. \u2013 The operations allowing the implementation of joint control are heterogeneous.\u00a0Banks can decide to establish an equal or unequal control.\u00a0Thus, Mr. Dupuy suggests examining the representation of mothers on the board of directors of the subsidiary, in other words to observe interpersonal relations.<\/span><\/p>\n233. \u2013 However, for Mr. Dupuy, interpersonal relations must be treated with caution.\u00a0Indeed, while there is no doubt that they indicate the presence of influence in the broad sense, their ability to reveal command relationships is more doubtful.\u00a0Unquestionably, everything depends on the attitude adopted by the participants in the board of directors and supervisors.\u00a0However, this attitude obviously depends on the objectives pursued by the companies or organizations represented.<\/span><\/p>\n234.- Seg\u00fan el se\u00f1or Parent, estar\u00edamos en presencia de una especie de s\u00faper grupo donde los v\u00ednculos son s\u00f3lidos pero dejan mucha libertad.\u00a0De hecho, los bancos matrices deben trabajar juntos para hacer que una subsidiaria trabaje en conjunto, cuya actividad y estrategia determinar\u00e1n conjuntamente.\u00a0Por tanto, podr\u00eda considerarse que la entidad formada por los bancos socios y su filial conjunta constituye un \u00fanico grupo.<\/span><\/p>\n235. \u2013 Algunos autores no est\u00e1n de acuerdo con esta opini\u00f3n, en particular el Sr. Ruffini.\u00a0Este \u00faltimo escribe que no se trata de confundir la filial conjunta de varios bancos con el concepto de grupo.<\/span><\/p>\n236.- Por nuestra parte, creemos que las teor\u00edas antes expuestas son correctas.\u00a0Sin embargo, para tener una visi\u00f3n precisa, es necesario tener en cuenta la heterogeneidad de las operaciones conjuntas de toma de control.<\/span><\/p>\n237. \u2013 Indeed, some of them are intended to allow the development of banking activities that are still non-existent or even not very widespread. In this case, the joint venture constitutes, without any hesitation, the joint subsidiary of several groups. In banking, this very flexible mode of development has been very successful. Groupama and Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale signed an agreement in 2001 creating a common multi-channel bank. The 8 million members and customers of Groupama and the individual customers of Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale thus have access to the products offered by the two groups. The creation of this joint bank therefore enabled Groupama to develop its banking activities after it had just failed to take over Banque Hervet.<\/p>\n
238. \u2013 The joint venture may also combine the majority of the activities of two or more groups. It seems that the operation then leads to the creation of a super group. This is probably often a common core relating to certain activities, while other activities are carried out by the participating groups themselves. However, the common core is generally of considerable importance and the turnover of the joint subsidiary often exceeds that of the activities of its members. This type of joint venture has been successful at the national level.<\/p>\n
239. \u2013 Let us mention the creation of the joint venture called Compagnie financi\u00e8re Eulia. The latter groups together the majority of the assets of the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations as well as of l\u2019Ecureuil. During his hearing by the Finance Committee of the National Assembly on 06\/27\/2001, the managing director of the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations insisted on the scope of the merger between his institution and the Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The objective is \u201cto reach critical mass on a global scale in the sectors of banking, finance, insurance and markets, marked by fierce competition. While the trend is towards concentration, it was appropriate to bring together the activities, assets and teams of the two groups in the competitive banking sector, in order to pursue European development from a very strong domestic base\u201d. The new entity therefore constitutes a powerful French public and semi-public banking center.<\/p>\n
240. \u2013 The implementation of the operation required the establishment of three major working groups. The first group worked on finalizing the transaction. He drew up the contribution agreements and prepared the files for the Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee, the specific body for controlling the structure of the banking system. The second group worked on setting up the common company, in particular its organization, its services and its operation. This team had to reflect on the mode of governance of the holding company vis-\u00e0-vis its subsidiaries. Finally, the third group piloted the strategic project. He had to establish a two-year business plan providing for many synergies on existing businesses.<\/p>\n
241. \u2013 The two groups only pooled their competitive activities. The company is 50.1% owned by Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations and 49.9% by Ecureuil. This group, staffed by 48,000 people, controls a perimeter of 17.7 billion euros in equity. The joint venture provides strategic management of the financial businesses of the two former groups and holds the interests they have in common in four markets: retail banking, investment and corporate banking, insurance and real estate. . For retail banking, the groups contributed all the stakes held in the specialized subsidiaries and the cooperative investment certificates issued by the Caisses d\u2019Epargne network. The investment and corporate banking division was supplied by 53% of CDC Ixis, subsidiary of the CDC, through interests of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne in CDC Ixis Capital Market and in CDC Ixis Asset Management as well as through the financial division of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The capital markets businesses have been grouped together in a single CDC Ixis division. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. through investments of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne in CDC Ixis Capital Market and in CDC Ixis Asset Management as well as by the financial division of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The capital markets businesses have been grouped together in a single CDC Ixis division. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. through investments of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne in CDC Ixis Capital Market and in CDC Ixis Asset Management as well as by the financial division of the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. The capital markets businesses have been grouped together in a single CDC Ixis division. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners. The insurance branch has been supplemented by the participation of the CGE in Ecureuil Vie and its surety company, SACCEF, as well as the participations of the two groups in Ecureuil Iard. Lastly, activity in the real estate branch was made up of 40% of Cr\u00e9dit Foncier de France held by the CGE and the subsidiaries jointly held by the two partners.<\/p>\n
242. \u2013 This concentration operation enabled the new entity to offer very diversified products. The latter was thus able to offer a full range of financial services: from consumer credit to home loans, including personal loans, life insurance, mutual funds and traditional personal insurance products. The lack of integration, optimization and strategy from which the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignation and l\u2019Ecureuil undeniably suffered in the face of integrated financial entities such as BNP-Paribas or Dresdner-Allianz has therefore been able to be resolved. In addition, the creation of this joint venture made it possible to significantly increase the concentration of the French banking system. Finally, this association has opened the door to new concentrations. These have, in particular,<\/p>\n
Section 2: Merger operations<\/p>\n
243. \u2013 Ces op\u00e9rations d\u00e9coulent de la pratique, puis sont reconnues par la jurisprudence.\u00a0Une premi\u00e8re d\u00e9finition de la fusion est issue d\u2019un arr\u00eat de la chambre commerciale de la Cour de cassation du 28\/01\/1946.\u00a0Ensuite, la loi du 24\/07\/1966 sur les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s commerciales a consacr\u00e9 quelques articles aux fusions et scissions, mais uniquement pour les SARL et les SA.\u00a0Ces dispositions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9es et compl\u00e9t\u00e9es par les lois du 04\/01\/1978 et 05\/01\/1988 qui ont \u00e9tendu la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019utiliser ces op\u00e9rations \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
244. \u2013 L\u2019ensemble de ces textes permet de d\u00e9finir un ensemble coh\u00e9rent de r\u00e8gles permettant le traitement juridique des op\u00e9rations de fusion.\u00a0Ainsi, les op\u00e9rations de fusion sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement d\u00e9finies par l\u2019article 1844-4 du Code civil, qui a vocation \u00e0 s\u2019appliquer \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
245. \u2013 A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la fusion, il y a la scission.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration consiste en un apport d\u2019actifs \u00e0 deux ou plusieurs soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 scind\u00e9e disparaissant.<\/p>\n
246. \u2013 A ces op\u00e9rations s\u2019ajoute l\u2019apport partiel d\u2019actifs soumis au r\u00e9gime de la scission, sur option.\u00a0Cette derni\u00e8re permet \u00e0 une entreprise d\u2019apporter une partie de son patrimoine \u00e0 une autre, \u00e0 condition que cette derni\u00e8re constitue une branche d\u2019activit\u00e9 ind\u00e9pendante.\u00a0S\u2019op\u00e8re alors une transmission universelle des droits, biens et obligations qui s\u2019attachent \u00e0 cette branche d\u2019activit\u00e9.\u00a0Mais il reste une diff\u00e9rence essentielle par rapport \u00e0 une scission : la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 qui r\u00e9alise cette op\u00e9ration ne dispara\u00eet pas.\u00a0Toutefois, cette op\u00e9ration peut \u00eatre soumise \u00e0 la proc\u00e9dure de scission.\u00a0Cependant, le r\u00e9gime de la scission est tr\u00e8s proche de la fusion, les techniques de transmission des actifs \u00e9tant similaires.\u00a0Nous n\u2019\u00e9tudierons donc pas sp\u00e9cifiquement ces deux derni\u00e8res techniques.<\/p>\n
247. \u2013 Enfin, les op\u00e9rations de dissolution par fusion de biens permettent \u00e0 l\u2019associ\u00e9 unique de recevoir la totalit\u00e9 de l\u2019actif de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 dont il d\u00e9tient la totalit\u00e9 des actions sur simple d\u00e9claration faite au greffe du tribunal de commerce.\u00a0Cette op\u00e9ration permet de r\u00e9aliser une transmission universelle de patrimoine avec un formalisme simplifi\u00e9 par rapport aux fusions dites simplifi\u00e9es.\u00a0L\u2019absorption d\u2019une filiale d\u00e9tenue \u00e0 100 % b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie ainsi d\u2019un r\u00e9gime simplifi\u00e9 pr\u00e9vu \u00e0 l\u2019article L. 236-11 du Code de commerce.\u00a0La dissolution par regroupement d\u2019actifs permet la disparition des filiales d\u00e9tenues \u00e0 100 % sans qu\u2019il soit n\u00e9cessaire de convoquer une assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale extraordinaire de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorbante, sans l\u2019intervention d\u2019un commissaire aux apports et sans accord de fusion, \u00e0 la diff\u00e9rence d\u2019une fusion simplifi\u00e9e.\u00a0Lorsqu\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est devenue actionnaire unique d\u2019une de ses filiales, le recours \u00e0 la consolidation de patrimoine lui permet d\u2019appr\u00e9hender, au moyen d\u2019un formalisme simplifi\u00e9, l\u2019ensemble du patrimoine de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 dissoute sans sa liquidation.\u00a0Nous ne d\u00e9velopperons pas ce mode de restructuration car ses effets sont \u00e9quivalents \u00e0 ceux d\u2019une fusion.\u00a0De m\u00eame, nous n\u2019aborderons pas les \u00ab fusions \u00e0 l\u2019anglaise \u00bb qui ne sont qu\u2019un mode d\u2019apport de parts sociales soumis \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime particulier en mati\u00e8re de droits d\u2019enregistrement.\u00a0Nous ne d\u00e9velopperons pas ce mode de restructuration car ses effets sont \u00e9quivalents \u00e0 ceux d\u2019une fusion.\u00a0De m\u00eame, nous n\u2019aborderons pas les \u00ab fusions \u00e0 l\u2019anglaise \u00bb qui ne sont qu\u2019un mode d\u2019apport de parts sociales soumis \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime particulier en mati\u00e8re de droits d\u2019enregistrement.\u00a0Nous ne d\u00e9velopperons pas ce mode de restructuration car ses effets sont \u00e9quivalents \u00e0 ceux d\u2019une fusion.\u00a0De m\u00eame, nous n\u2019aborderons pas les \u00ab fusions \u00e0 l\u2019anglaise \u00bb qui ne sont qu\u2019un mode d\u2019apport de parts sociales soumis \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime particulier en mati\u00e8re de droits d\u2019enregistrement.<\/p>\n
248. \u2013 Ainsi, seul le cadre juridique de la fusion nous retiendra.\u00a0Celui-ci comporte trois syst\u00e8mes occupant en quelque sorte trois cercles concentriques.\u00a0Le r\u00e9gime \u00ab rudimentaire \u00bb est repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par l\u2019article 1844-4 du Code civil.\u00a0Le r\u00e9gime de droit commun est applicable \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s commerciales d\u00e9finies par les articles L. 236-1 \u00e0 L. 236-6 du Code de commerce.\u00a0Enfin, le r\u00e9gime \u00ab d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 \u00bb est applicable aux fusions entre soci\u00e9t\u00e9s anonymes pr\u00e9vues par les articles L. 236-8 \u00e0 L. 236-22 du code de commerce.\u00a0Le cadre juridique des fusions a longtemps \u00e9t\u00e9 diff\u00e9rent selon qu\u2019il s\u2019agissait d\u2019une fusion entre banques AFB ou d\u2019une fusion entre banques coop\u00e9ratives.\u00a0Les premi\u00e8res \u00e9taient soumises \u00e0 la loi du 24\/07\/1966, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire au r\u00e9gime de droit commun mais surtout, compte tenu de l\u2019importance de ces banques, au r\u00e9gime \u00ab d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 \u00bb.\u00a0Ces derniers \u00e9taient soumis au r\u00e9gime \u00ab rudimentaire \u00bb que repr\u00e9sente l\u2019article 1844-4 du Code civil, notamment pour les Caisses r\u00e9gionales de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole.\u00a0Cette disposition l\u00e9gislative a lourdement pes\u00e9 sur les op\u00e9rations de fusion des caisses r\u00e9gionales.\u00a0Elle a permis de souligner, une fois de plus, la prise en compte de la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire dans ces instruments de concentration.<\/p>\n
249. \u2013 In fact, before 1984, there were more than thirty different statuses of credit institutions, often giving their beneficiaries a monopoly on the exercise of certain activities, frequently accompanied by tax and financial advantages. This banking specificity has been the subject of a reform. The banking law of 01\/24\/1984 partially unified banking statutes and recognized the universal vocation of credit institutions. This measure favored the process of concentration by limiting the number of existing statutes. This relative trivialization of statutes was of paramount importance for the organization of the profession. Indeed, once they are no longer subject to a special legal regime,<\/p>\n
250. \u2013 However, despite this unification of banking statutes, this law does not have a totally universal vocation. It is a compromise law that respects the various interests involved. Thus, if a unique legal framework has been established, this does not mean that the statutory specificities of cooperative or mutual banks have disappeared. This therefore necessarily has an impact on banking concentrations.<\/p>\n
251. \u2013 Since credit institutions cannot freely choose their status without depending on a parliamentary or administrative decision, mergers of banks belonging to different legal statuses are problematic. Nevertheless, such operations remain possible but their implementation is so complex that they are generally carried out between credit institutions of the same statutory nature.<\/p>\n
252. \u2013 Logically, this coexistence of different statuses within credit institutions leads to a distinction between mergers of commercial banks (\u00a7 1) and mergers of mutual or cooperative banks (\u00a7 2).<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1: Mergers of commercial banks<\/p>\n
253. \u2013 The legal regime applicable to these mergers was modified by the law of 05\/01\/1988. This development was justified by the desire to harmonize French legislation with the provisions contained in European directives.<\/p>\n
254. \u2013 This law certainly favored the process of concentration in the banking system. We give as proof of this the large number of bank mergers after 1988, whereas this number was much lower previously.<\/p>\n
Thus, Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de CIC merged with Banque de l\u2019Union Europ\u00e9enne in 1990. Sogebanque was absorbed by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale in 1991. Banque Gravereau was also absorbed by Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale in 1992. BFCE and the Cr\u00e9dit National gave birth to Natexis in 1995. Compagnie Bancaire, Compagnie Financi\u00e8re de Paribas and Banque Paribas merged in 1998. Finally, BNP and Paribas merged in 2000.<\/p>\n
255. \u2013 Compared to previous provisions, the 1988 law has the merit first of all of providing a definition of merger. This is now defined as the transmission by one or more companies of their assets to an existing company or to a new company that they constitute.<\/p>\n
256. \u2013 La fusion entre deux ou plusieurs soci\u00e9t\u00e9s emporte transmission universelle de l\u2019actif de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorb\u00e9e au profit de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorbante ou de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle cr\u00e9\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de la fusion.<\/p>\n
257. \u2013 En outre, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorb\u00e9e est syst\u00e9matiquement dissoute, sans qu\u2019il soit n\u00e9cessaire de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 la liquidation de cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\u00a0Cependant, il convient de noter qu\u2019il existe ici un conflit entre le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s et le droit bancaire.\u00a0En effet, cette derni\u00e8re pr\u00e9voit qu\u2019en cas de fusion, l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit voit son agr\u00e9ment retir\u00e9 et entre en liquidation.\u00a0La loi du 02\/07\/1996 n\u2019a pas r\u00e9solu ce probl\u00e8me.\u00a0Elle indique seulement, \u00e0 ce sujet, que l\u2019\u00e9tablissement ne peut effectuer que les op\u00e9rations bancaires et de placement strictement n\u00e9cessaires au r\u00e8glement de sa situation.\u00a0Ce dernier texte reste donc impr\u00e9cis et peut impliquer que cette op\u00e9ration entra\u00eene la liquidation de l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Il y a donc ici conflit de lois internes.\u00a0Selon nous,<\/p>\n
258. \u2013 Par cons\u00e9quent, l\u2019application distributive du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s et du droit bancaire est d\u00e9licate.\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, il faut arriver \u00e0 prendre en consid\u00e9ration la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire lors du processus de rapprochement des actifs, qu\u2019il s\u2019agisse de la p\u00e9riode ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 la fusion (A) ou de la d\u00e9cision de fusion proprement dite (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ La p\u00e9riode de pr\u00e9-fusion<\/p>\n
259. \u2013 La p\u00e9riode pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant la fusion comprend deux phases distinctes.\u00a0Une premi\u00e8re phase, de dur\u00e9e variable, n\u2019est autre qu\u2019une \u00e9tape de rapprochement (1).\u00a0La deuxi\u00e8me phase est un moyen pour les entreprises de mat\u00e9rialiser leur volont\u00e9 de fusion.\u00a0Cette phase est l\u2019occasion d\u2019\u00e9laborer et de signer le projet de fusion (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ La fusion d\u2019entreprises<\/p>\n
260. \u2013 La phase des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s candidates \u00e0 la fusion est tr\u00e8s variable d\u2019une fusion \u00e0 l\u2019autre.\u00a0Elle varie d\u2019ailleurs tant par sa dur\u00e9e que par son contenu.<\/p>\n
261. \u2013 Ce qu\u2019il y a de commun, en effet, entre la fusion de deux soci\u00e9t\u00e9s qui ne se connaissent pas, et la fusion de deux filiales dans le cadre de la restructuration d\u2019un groupe impos\u00e9e par la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e8re.\u00a0Dans le premier cas, il est pratiquement n\u00e9cessaire de prendre contact et de faire connaissance.\u00a0Dans le second cas, au contraire, on peut tr\u00e8s vite en venir \u00e0 la signature du projet de fusion, comme ce fut le cas lors de la restructuration du groupe bancaire Lazard.<\/p>\n
262. \u2013 Cette phase de fusion comporte deux aspects : d\u2019une part, des n\u00e9gociations interentreprises (a) et, d\u2019autre part, une intervention fr\u00e9quente des pouvoirs publics qui constitue une sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ N\u00e9gociations inter-entreprises<\/p>\n
263. \u2013 Les fusions d\u2019entreprises sont des op\u00e9rations \u00e0 g\u00e9om\u00e9trie variable.\u00a0Les entreprises participant \u00e0 une fusion peuvent \u00eatre extr\u00eamement nombreuses ou bien il ne peut y en avoir que deux.\u00a0De la m\u00eame mani\u00e8re, des fusions peuvent avoir lieu entre des entreprises de taille, de structure, de rentabilit\u00e9 ou d\u2019activit\u00e9 diff\u00e9rentes.<\/p>\n
264. \u2013 Juridiquement, la fusion peut avoir lieu entre des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s de formes diff\u00e9rentes.\u00a0En outre, une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 en liquidation peut participer \u00e0 une op\u00e9ration de fusion \u00e0 la condition toutefois que la r\u00e9partition de l\u2019actif de cette soci\u00e9t\u00e9 entre les associ\u00e9s n\u2019ait pas fait l\u2019objet d\u2019un commencement d\u2019ex\u00e9cution.<\/p>\n
265. \u2013 Quelles que soient les diff\u00e9rences entre les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s qui se regroupent, la phase de n\u00e9gociation n\u2019est soumise \u00e0 aucun formalisme juridique pr\u00e9cis.\u00a0Les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s organisent ainsi librement les modalit\u00e9s de leur fusion.<\/p>\n
266. \u2013 This phase of rapprochement is often secret, at least initially. Secrecy is fully justified in the banking system. Indeed, banks are generally listed on the stock exchange. In most bank reconciliations, this phase has therefore remained secret so as not to cause disturbances in the financial markets.<\/p>\n
267. \u2013 The content of this merger phase is extremely variable from one merger to another. In some cases, this stage gives rise to the carrying out of studies intended to better understand the companies involved: commercial diagnosis, evaluation of bank assets, social audit, financial analysis, etc. This diagnosis should allow companies to determine whether they are pursuing or not the initiated merger and, if so, to decide what will be the best legal support.<\/p>\n
268. \u2013 The lawyer must make the most judicious choice and for this he must carry out an interdisciplinary analysis. Correlatively, it must take into account the specificity of the banking activity, as it is obvious that the efficient choice of the instrument of concentration will be different from that which could have been selected in another economic sector. For example, in the context of the takeover of a structure with a human component, specialized in mergers and acquisitions, the merger may not be a good decision. Indeed, imposing a culture on this type of structure would lead to destroying it in favor of a homogeneity that would have no meaning. The bank\u2019s essential human resources would be forced to resign. Gold, it is essential to note that the conservation of human heritage is fundamental in the banking sector. Thus, it seems more interesting, in the case presented, to adopt another strategy in order to avoid endangering the entity concerned.<\/p>\n
269. \u2013 It is therefore generally at this stage that the decision is made whether or not to move towards a merger. If this is the case, the representatives of the banks continue the negotiation phase by endeavoring to establish the essential conditions of the operation. This supposes the evaluation of the banks in presence (\u03b1) and the determination of the parity (\u03b2).<\/p>\n
\u03b1\/ Taking account of banking and financial specificity in the evaluation of the entities involved<\/p>\n
270. \u2013 The evaluation of the entities involved is certainly one of the most difficult problems to resolve in terms of mergers. Indeed, it is necessary to determine the respective weight of each company. It is therefore necessary to proceed with the evaluation of the companies involved, seeking to get as close as possible to the value representative of their economic reality. To do so, it is necessary to take into consideration the specificity of banks compared to traditional companies.<\/p>\n
271. \u2013 There are many methods for valuing banks, in particular:
\u2013 valuation at book value;
\u2013 valuation at market value;
\u2013 valuation at net asset value;
\u2013 valuation using the earnings capitalization method;
\u2013 valuation based on cash flows;
\u2013 evaluation based on forecasts of activity or results;
\u2013 evaluation based on the mathematical value;
\u2013 valuation at value in use;
\u2013 valuation at insurance value;
\u2013 the valuation based on the corrected net assets\u2026<\/p>\n
272. \u2013 In matters of mergers, there are no rigid methods to be followed in order to assess companies. It is advisable to retain several evaluation criteria without their number being excessive. The criteria retained must be selected in such a way as not to duplicate each other. The valuation methods must be applied in the same way to the different companies involved. The criteria selected must be significant. The forecast results can only be used as a valuation method under certain technical conditions guaranteeing the reasonable nature of the valuations. Similarly, the use of discounts, fixed allowances or weighting coefficients is rejected.<\/p>\n
273. \u2013 The diversity of criteria used to assess companies can be a source of dispute, particularly between majority and minority shareholders. If this evaluation is a source of dispute, it is because it is a delicate exercise. The complexity is all the more marked in the banking system because of the existence of banking specificities. Indeed, some criteria for evaluating banks differ from ordinary companies. Four of them are particularly important: net banking income, the Cooke ratio, the evolution of deposits and the \u201creturn on equity\u201d. The net banking income is the equivalent of the turnover of a traditional company. These are the interest margin, commissions and fees. To judge its evolution and the orientations of the bank, it is necessary to analyze the net banking income of each of the four main business lines: retail banking, financial services, private banking and asset management as well as investment banking. The second important criterion is the Cooke ratio which describes the solvency of the establishment. This is the ratio between equity and outstanding loans. It must be at least 4% for the ratio of \u201chard\u201d equity and weighted assets. It must be 8% for the ratio of total equity and weighted assets. The evolution of deposits indicates, in turn, the commercial success of an institution, particularly in its ability to attract deposits from its customers. However, this does not provide any information on profitability. The latter is assessed with the study of the \u201creturn on equity\u201d, ie the return on equity.<\/p>\n
274. \u2013 The difficulty of evaluation is all the greater for the banks as there is significant diversity in the application of accounting rules. Generally, the most widely used approach today, based on modern financial theory, is that of determining the discounted future net cash flows of each of the entities.<\/p>\n
As far as credit institutions are concerned, a more traditional approach based on ratios is still sometimes used. The data that is used comes from the financial statements and is therefore based on accounting rules. Benchmarking generally does not disregard past performance, examined from balance sheets and income statements. Accounting data is therefore a privileged source of information. For the analyzes and conclusions drawn from them to be relevant, the accounting data must be comparable. This comparability is subject to the use of identical accounting rules or leading to slightly different valuations, if the methods are not strictly similar.<\/p>\n
The accounting regulatory framework imposed on credit institutions in France is set relatively strictly. The rules for valuing and presenting the accounts are defined by the regulations and instructions of the Banking and Financial Regulation Committee, supplemented, where applicable, by interpretations published in the bulletin of the Banking Commission. Since 1999, the regulations drawn up by the banking section of the National Accounting Council have been applied.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it might seem, a priori, that French credit institutions apply identical rules and methods that allow their accounts to be compared without restatements and without significant risk of error. Experience leads, on the contrary, to highlight many and varied sources of differences.<\/p>\n
275. \u2013 The origins of the distortions existing in the evaluation of the accounts of credit institutions can be grouped by type.<\/p>\n
276. \u2013 First of all, there are discrepancies arising from the different application of the rules. Generally accepted accounting principles require fixed assets to be depreciated and provisions to be made for asset depreciation and\/or provisions under the conditions set by law. However, there is a specificity in the banking system because the policies for provisioning real estate risks from one institution to another are not identical. The very definition of real estate assets requiring an evaluation and, if necessary, an impairment is not common to all.<\/p>\n
The same observation can be made for country risks. The definition of the bases to be subject to a provision sometimes turns out to be different from one institution to another. However, each bases its analysis on precise written provisions transmitted annually by the Banking Commission. The differences concern whether or not all or part of short-term transactions are taken into account, and whether certain guarantees are taken into account. Even before the harmonization of the depreciation rates, it is therefore more fundamental to question the comparison of the definition of the risk base.<\/p>\n
With regard to doubtful debts, beyond the classic causes of differences, it was noted, for example, in 1996 that certain establishments decided to initiate an accounting provisioning of the credit risk as soon as a loan was granted . This \u201cearly\u201d taking into account of the risk necessarily has significant consequences on the comparability of the performance of the establishment which practices it in relation to those which, more traditionally, only provision for risks arising.<\/p>\n
277. \u2013 Secondly, there are discrepancies stemming from the options offered by the texts or the rules themselves.<\/p>\n
The accounting rules in force sometimes leave institutions the choice between several possible methods or offer them the possibility of certain accounting practices. Of course, the fund for general banking risks should be mentioned. This is a real provision of a reserve nature, constituted or reversed by the income statement and which should, of course, be restated in the perspective of a valid comparison between several establishments. The hybrid nature of this position has raised a number of questions about its treatment. The new methodology for banks\u2019 consolidated accounts seems to resolve these difficulties by specifying that it is not an identifiable liability:<\/p>\n
Les provisions pour pensions qui, en France, peuvent \u00eatre constitu\u00e9es ou non, totalement ou partiellement, sont \u00e9galement une source notoire et valable de distorsions.\u00a0Les frais d\u2019\u00e9mission d\u2019emprunt peuvent, sur option, \u00eatre amortis sur la dur\u00e9e de vie de l\u2019emprunt, ce qui est le cas le plus courant, mais de nombreux \u00e9tablissements comptabilisent imm\u00e9diatement ces frais en charges.<\/p>\n
278. \u2013 Troisi\u00e8mement, il existe des divergences li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019absence de dispositions pr\u00e9cises dans les textes.<\/p>\n
Une analyse plus d\u00e9taill\u00e9e des pratiques comptables des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit et plus particuli\u00e8rement des op\u00e9rations bancaires met en \u00e9vidence, dans certains cas, des diff\u00e9rences de traitement dont l\u2019impact sur les r\u00e9sultats et les capitaux propres n\u2019est pas n\u00e9gligeable.\u00a0Ils n\u00e9cessitent donc des retraitements d\u2019harmonisation pour r\u00e9aliser une analyse comparative pertinente et fiable.\u00a0Le fait g\u00e9n\u00e9rateur de la prise en compte du r\u00e9sultat d\u2019exploitation est d\u00e9terminant.\u00a0Sa d\u00e9termination peut entra\u00eener des d\u00e9calages dans le temps dans la comptabilisation des produits ou des charges.<\/p>\n
De nombreux services bancaires sont r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9s sous forme de commissions, qui peuvent \u00eatre pay\u00e9es d\u2019avance, in fine ou en plusieurs fois.\u00a0D\u2019un point de vue comptable, la prise en compte du r\u00e9sultat des commissions doit \u00eatre li\u00e9e \u00e0 la nature des prestations fournies et aux obligations qui en d\u00e9coulent.\u00a0Ainsi, la r\u00e9glementation pr\u00e9voit que les commissions assimil\u00e9es \u00e0 des int\u00e9r\u00eats sont assimil\u00e9es \u00e0 ces derniers.\u00a0Mais il existe un certain nombre d\u2019autres commissions qui ne sont pas comparables \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat.<\/p>\n
Certains \u00e9tablissements n\u2019enregistrent les commissions qu\u2019\u00e0 la date de r\u00e9ception ;\u00a0d\u2019autres, au contraire, attendent syst\u00e9matiquement la fin des prestations ;\u00a0d\u2019autres, enfin, r\u00e9partissent tout ou partie des commissions dans le temps sur la dur\u00e9e de la prestation.\u00a0Les commissions, qui constituent une part croissante du produit net bancaire et des r\u00e9sultats bancaires, doivent donc faire l\u2019objet d\u2019un examen approfondi, afin d\u2019harmoniser les faits donnant lieu \u00e0 leur prise en compte, selon leur sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9.<\/p>\n
En ce qui concerne les titres, si les r\u00e8gles d\u2019\u00e9valuation sont strictement d\u00e9finies en fonction du type de portefeuille auquel elles se rattachent, l\u00e0 encore il existe des sources de distorsions.\u00a0Par exemple, les modalit\u00e9s d\u2019amortissement des d\u00e9cotes\/primes relatives aux titres \u00e0 revenu fixe peuvent varier.\u00a0Elles sont parfois pratiqu\u00e9es sur la dur\u00e9e restant \u00e0 courir jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9ch\u00e9ance du titre, tandis que certains \u00e9tablissements utilisent une m\u00e9thode de calcul actuariel, selon la nature du titre.\u00a0Enfin, d\u2019autres proc\u00e8dent \u00e0 un \u00e9pandage lin\u00e9aire syst\u00e9matique.<\/p>\n
Par ailleurs, les modalit\u00e9s de d\u00e9termination des r\u00e9sultats de cession des titres du portefeuille d\u2019investissement ne sont pas toujours identiques d\u2019un \u00e9tablissement \u00e0 l\u2019autre.\u00a0Certains utilisent la m\u00e9thode FIFO, d\u2019autres celle du prix moyen pond\u00e9r\u00e9, d\u2019autres encore proc\u00e8dent \u00e0 une \u00ab s\u00e9lection \u00bb des gammes commercialis\u00e9es.<\/p>\n
Les remboursements anticip\u00e9s d\u2019emprunts donnent g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement lieu, sur une base contractuelle, au versement d\u2019indemnit\u00e9s financi\u00e8res compensatoires par les clients ou les \u00e9tablissements.\u00a0Les pratiques adopt\u00e9es consistent soit \u00e0 prendre en compte imm\u00e9diatement ces indemnit\u00e9s, soit \u00e0 les \u00e9taler sur la dur\u00e9e restant \u00e0 courir de l\u2019ancien pr\u00eat voire sur la dur\u00e9e du financement de remplacement, lorsqu\u2019il existe.<\/p>\n
Dans le domaine des produits d\u00e9riv\u00e9s, une certaine diversit\u00e9 des pratiques peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre soulign\u00e9e.\u00a0Par exemple, l\u2019\u00e9valuation \u00e0 la valeur de march\u00e9 ou \u00e0 la \u00ab juste valeur \u00bb des instruments financiers auxquels cette m\u00e9thode s\u2019applique peut \u00eatre prise en compte.\u00a0Les modalit\u00e9s de calcul des frais de gestion futurs des swaps et autres instruments valoris\u00e9s \u00e0 la valeur de march\u00e9 prennent en compte une part plus ou moins importante des frais indirects.\u00a0De plus, la d\u00e9finition des co\u00fbts directs eux-m\u00eames peut varier.\u00a0Enfin, la notion m\u00eame de couverture ne peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme d\u00e9finie de mani\u00e8re uniforme.\u00a0Les difficult\u00e9s li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019application de la notion de couverture conduisent \u00e9galement certains normalisateurs comptables \u00e0 ne plus reconna\u00eetre la comptabilit\u00e9 de couverture.<\/p>\n
279. \u2013 It is obvious that the differences in accounting methods result in non-homogeneous valuations and influence the results. This diversity of methods in the context of an establishment merger has consequences. Only a detailed analysis or audit work can make it possible, on the one hand, to identify the differences between two or more establishments, and on the other hand, to measure the possible impact of these divergences. Furthermore, when performance is analyzed over certain previous years, it is necessary to measure this impact for each of the periods examined.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ The determination of the parity<\/p>\n
280. \u2013 The determination of the parity therefore implies the concretization of the balance of power which exists between the banks. The parity is the exchange ratio of the shares decided most often, but not exclusively, from the evaluations of the banks. The determination of parity calls for a few remarks.<\/p>\n
281. \u2013 Firstly, the reference made to the valuation of companies, although it is frequent in practice, does not have the effect of freezing the determination of the exchange ratio. Indeed, the parties involved can introduce other parameters intended to achieve the most equitable balance of power.<\/p>\n
282. \u2013 Secondly, the parity will set the terms according to which the partners of the acquired company will become partners of the acquiring or new company. However, it is possible that, taking into account the parity adopted, the shareholders or partners are not entitled to receive a whole number of shares of the acquiring or new company. Consequently, in practice, companies will have to resort to the so-called fractional trading procedure.<\/p>\n
283. \u2013 However, in order not to burden the merger operation with such negotiations, which may prove to be lengthy in the event of dilution of the capital, companies may use palliatives, including the possibility of payment of a balance in species.\u00a0This technique, which received legal sanction with the law of 05\/01\/1988, no longer has the effect of causing the operation to lose its nature of amalgamation, on the condition, however, that this balancing payment does not represent more than 10% of the nominal value of the shares or shares remunerating the contributions.<\/span><\/p>\n284.- Las empresas tambi\u00e9n tienen la opci\u00f3n de hacer una distribuci\u00f3n excepcional de dividendos.\u00a0Permite reequilibrar las paridades y abaratar la absorci\u00f3n de una empresa.\u00a0En efecto, al pagar tal dividendo, el futuro absorbido reduce proporcionalmente su patrimonio neto, lo que permite a la sociedad absorbente limitar el n\u00famero de valores a emitir para remunerar su adquisici\u00f3n.\u00a0Por lo tanto, las distribuciones de dividendos excepcionales se utilizan regularmente.<\/span><\/p>\n285. \u2013 Las negociaciones entre las sociedades solicitantes de la fusi\u00f3n son, por tanto, un elemento esencial.\u00a0Sin embargo, en el sistema bancario, la intervenci\u00f3n del gobierno tambi\u00e9n es muy importante.<\/span><\/p>\nb\/ Tener en cuenta la especificidad bancaria en las negociaciones: intervenci\u00f3n de los poderes p\u00fablicos<\/span><\/p>\n286. \u2013 Taking account of banking specificity materializes both through the intervention of political power (\u03b1) and the banking authorities (\u03b2).<\/span><\/p>\n\u03b1\/ The intervention of political power<\/span><\/p>\n287. \u2013 There is a specificity to reconciliation negotiations in the banking system.\u00a0Indeed, these take place between the economic actors, but the public authorities also frequently intervene in the negotiation.<\/span><\/p>\n288. \u2013 Tomemos el ejemplo de la fusi\u00f3n entre la Banque Nationale du Commerce et de l’Industrie y el Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris.\u00a0El gobierno intervino para liderar las negociaciones de fusi\u00f3n.\u00a0Michel Debr\u00e9 lo deja muy claro \u201c(\u2026) la competencia econ\u00f3mica global y la influencia econ\u00f3mica, pero tambi\u00e9n la pol\u00edtica de Francia exig\u00eda que tuviera instrumentos de acci\u00f3n y de dimensi\u00f3n internacional.\u00a0Cre\u00e9 el BNP para servir a la influencia econ\u00f3mica y nacional de nuestro pa\u00eds\u201d.\u00a0Por abrupta y dirigida que sea, la decisi\u00f3n del Estado de asociar el BNCI y la CNEP en 1966 pretende estimular el sector bancario y constituir una verdadera \u201cfuerza de choque financiera, el BNP\u201d.\u00a0En efecto,<\/span><\/p>\nDuring the negotiation of this merger, the public authorities were really very present.\u00a0They mobilized all their energy to push the BNCI to accept the principle of merger.\u00a0They thus highlighted the complementarity of the goodwill of the CNEP, active with large companies, and the BNCI, very present with small and medium-sized companies.\u00a0They also indirectly highlighted the interest of creating a new major bank, alongside Cr\u00e9dit Lyonnais and Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale.<\/span><\/p>\nAs soon as the choice was made, the government quickly decided on the principles to be applied in order to carry out the operation, in order to ensure maximum efficiency and to avoid any rumors or possible pressure.<\/span><\/p>\nOn 05\/04\/1966, the merger between the BNCI and the CNEP was publicly announced: \u201cThe Council of Ministers today approved the merger of the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l\u2019Industrie and the Comptoir National d\u2019Escompte of Paris into an establishment which will take the name of Banque Nationale de Paris\u201d.<\/p>\n
289. \u2013 After this operation, the State took part in many other mergers which, moreover, did not necessarily constitute mergers stricto sensu. For example, in 1999, during BNP\u2019s public exchange offer for Paribas and Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 G\u00e9n\u00e9rale, which resulted after the merger of BNP and Paribas, the public authorities intervened on several occasions. This interference took place in a confidential and public manner. It should be verified that this same phenomenon characterizes the intervention of the banking authorities.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ The intervention of the banking authorities<\/p>\n
290. \u2013 The intervention of the banking authorities was carried out in order to promote the merger of banks in difficulty with the aim of protecting the banking system. Indeed, the failure of a bank can generate a systemic risk. The merger of a failing bank with a healthy credit institution is one of the solutions favored by the banking regulatory authorities.<\/p>\n
291. \u2013 In the case of Banque Pallas, the Governor of the Banque de France intervened. Given that the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 des Banques Suisses was asking for authorization to create a new subsidiary in France, he strongly encouraged the directors of the SBS to hold talks with the directors of Pallas. \u201cThe governor\u2019s encouragements are received five out of five. The Swiss allow their arm to be twisted and run\u201d. Negotiations between companies are therefore influenced by the Banque de France. The agreement providing for the merger of Comipar and Pallas Holding, as well as that of Banque Pallas with Banque Stern was signed at the end of March 1992.<\/p>\n
292. \u2013 Consequently, in a classic merger, the preparatory phase is essentially a matter of negotiations between the representatives of the companies involved. However, in the banking system, this phase frequently involves the public authorities. It is clear that once the decision has been taken to resort to merger, the managers must adopt the measures made necessary by the development of the merger project. To do this, the companies must essentially convene and meet the bodies responsible for drafting the project. Regularly convened, the directors will be able to proceed with the development of the merger project.<\/p>\n
2\/ The merger project<\/p>\n
293. \u2013 There is no doubt that this act goes beyond the talks. These are completed when the merger project is completed. Moreover, in the event, frequent in practice, where the shareholders\u2019 meetings decide in favor, this project will become the agreement itself. This is why it is possible to affirm that this act already constitutes the agreement, specifying however that its effectiveness is suspended on one condition: the approval of the shareholders\u2019 meetings. This analysis undoubtedly has the merit of clarity. However, it has a major drawback. Until the agreement is approved, it has no legal effect. This means that in case of refusal, it would be necessary to consider that there was no agreement. This conclusion clashes with reality. The draft agreement not only concretizes an agreement in principle between the parties but even confirms this agreement on the details of the operation. Therefore, another analysis of the merger project is preferable. This can be viewed as an agreement which binds neither the partners nor the companies but only the managers of these companies as such. They are now required to make every effort to ensure that the partners of their company accept the merger under the conditions determined by the project. It goes without saying that this obligation is only an obligation of means. This can be viewed as an agreement which binds neither the partners nor the companies but only the managers of these companies as such. They are now required to make every effort to ensure that the partners of their company accept the merger under the conditions determined by the project. It goes without saying that this obligation is only an obligation of means. This can be viewed as an agreement which binds neither the partners nor the companies but only the managers of these companies as such. They are now required to make every effort to ensure that the partners of their company accept the merger under the conditions determined by the project. It goes without saying that this obligation is only an obligation of means.<\/p>\n
294. \u2013 Thus, the draft merger is indeed the \u201cofficial\u201d starting point for the operations which should result in the merger of two or more companies. Centerpiece in the merger, it is necessary to study the adoption of the merger project (a) and the repercussion of the merger project (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Adoption of the draft merger<\/p>\n
295. \u2013 The draft merger is a document made compulsory by the law of 05\/01\/1988 and the content of which was clarified by the decree of 22\/04\/1988.<\/p>\n
296. \u2013 When the managers of the companies involved have decided on the final terms of the merger project, they must, if necessary, grant a delegation to the legal representative of the company, or to any person authorized for this purpose to proceed with the signing of the project. .<\/p>\n
297. \u2013 The draft is established in a number of copies which varies from one merger to another. In principle, the recipients of the project are each of the companies participating in the operation, the merger auditors, the registry of the Commercial Court, the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers and the CECEI. The communication of the merger project to the latter constitutes a banking specificity. Indeed, the merger concerning credit institutions generates the intervention of the banking regulatory authority. It is therefore essential that the latter be informed of the operations that it must control.<\/p>\n
298. \u2013 In addition, the merger plan must be circulated within the bank. The draft must, in particular, be made available to shareholders with a view to holding extraordinary meetings to decide on the merger operation. It must also be made available to the works council. Employers must provide reasoned answers to questions asked by members of the works council, in particular with regard to the repercussions of the proposed merger.<\/p>\n
b\/ The repercussions of the merger plan<\/p>\n
299. \u2013 Once the merger plan has been signed by the representatives of the different companies, the merger operation must be approved by the meetings of the partners of each of the companies. However, for the partners, or shareholders, to be able to decide with full knowledge of the facts, it is necessary to submit the conditions of the operation beforehand to the control of external and independent experts. This need requires the intervention of merger auditors.<\/p>\n
300. \u2013 The merger commissioner, which appeared with the law of 05\/01\/1988, is appointed by order of the president of the Commercial Court. This ordinance is taken at the request of the managers of the various banks which are merging without limitation of time.<\/p>\n
301. \u2013 The intervention of the merger auditor is required only in joint-stock companies and in limited liability companies. The strict application of the texts, and particularly of Articles L. 236-1 and L. 236-2 of the Commercial Code, leads to the conclusion that only transactions between public limited companies and\/or SARLs are concerned by the appointment of a merger commissioner. This designation is not required in the context of an operation involving a company of another legal form.<\/p>\n
302. \u2013 It should be specified that the merger of banks incorporated in the form of LLCs is impossible. Although the banking law does not specify that LLCs are excluded from the banking profession, this is the case in practice. Indeed, under the terms of Article L. 511-10 paragraph 2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, the CECEI \u201cverifies the adequacy of the legal form of the company to the activity of the credit institution\u201d. Thus, the CECEI has always refused to approve a bank incorporated in this corporate form. However, a distinction should be made between banks and finance companies. Indeed, the CECEI agrees to approve financial companies incorporated in the form of limited liability companies. Mergers between them are therefore possible.<\/p>\n
303. \u2013 Furthermore, the mission of the merger auditor is defined by Article L. 236-10 of the Commercial Code. It is invested with a double mission. It must issue an opinion on the determination of the values \u200b\u200battributed to the shares or units of the companies participating in the operation and on the fairness of the exchange ratio. It must also formulate an opinion on the value of contributions in kind and special benefits.<\/p>\n
304. \u2013 At the end of this assignment, the merger auditor is required to write a report.<\/p>\n
305. \u2013 Finally, to carry out the merger operation, the companies involved must move on to the stage of final completion of the operation.<\/p>\n
B\/ The merger decision<\/p>\n
306. \u2013 This last step concerns the approval of the operation. The approval of the merger by the assemblies obeys different rules depending on whether it is a merger-absorption operation (1) or a merger by creation of a new company (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Approval in the case of a merger-absorption<\/p>\n
307. \u2013 Approval of the merger by the shareholders of the companies presupposes the calling of the meeting.<\/p>\n
308. \u2013 The decision approving the merger must be taken under the conditions provided for the amendment of the articles of association. It follows that in the SA, the decision is within the competence of the extraordinary general meeting. The rules for calling this meeting must be respected. Without going into the details of these rules, it should be remembered that the notice of meeting is generally preceded by a notice of meeting, published in the Bulletin of mandatory legal notices with regard to bank mergers. Indeed, as commercial banks generally make public calls for savings, this constitutes an obligation towards them.<\/p>\n
309. \u2013 The convocation is carried out by applying the provisions contained in the statutes. Notwithstanding these provisions, the company must respect the obligation to insert the notice of meeting with mention of the agenda in a journal of legal announcements. In addition, the notice must be sent to the company\u2019s auditors.<\/p>\n
310. \u2013 In order to be able to make an informed decision, shareholders must have specific information. Thus, during the 30 days preceding the general meeting called to rule on the merger operation, the shareholders must be able to consult at the registered office or obtain a certain number of documents on simple request.<\/p>\n
311. \u2013 Finally, the partners of the absorbed company rule on the merger project under the conditions provided for the modification of the articles of association, ie by a majority of 2\/3 in the SA. However, if the merger has the effect of increasing shareholders\u2019 commitments, the decision to approve the operation must be taken unanimously. Depending on the prospects of the operation, the majority in the assembly is more or less large. For example, during the merger between BNP and Paribas on 05\/23\/2000, the shareholders approved the merger by 99.72%.<\/p>\n
312. \u2013 Au-del\u00e0 de ces r\u00e8gles g\u00e9n\u00e9rales de fonctionnement de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e en cas de fusion, la d\u00e9cision de l\u2019assembl\u00e9e appelle un commentaire.\u00a0Les associ\u00e9s ne sont pas tenus de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 l\u2019approbation ou au rejet pur et simple du projet de fusion qui leur est soumis.\u00a0Ils ont la possibilit\u00e9 de modifier les termes de ce projet.\u00a0Toutefois, si tel est le cas, la modification doit \u00eatre \u00e9tendue \u00e0 toutes les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s participant \u00e0 la fusion, dans la mesure o\u00f9 les assembl\u00e9es qui statuent sur l\u2019op\u00e9ration doivent adopter le m\u00eame texte.<\/p>\n
313. \u2013 Par ailleurs, la loi bancaire doit \u00eatre appliqu\u00e9e.\u00a0L\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit absorbant doit modifier son agr\u00e9ment en raison, par exemple, de l\u2019extension de ses activit\u00e9s.\u00a0Parall\u00e8lement, l\u2019\u00e9tablissement absorb\u00e9 doit demander son retrait d\u2019agr\u00e9ment au CECEI.\u00a0Le retrait d\u2019agr\u00e9ment prend effet \u00e0 la date de r\u00e9alisation de l\u2019absorption.\u00a0Enfin, en cas de fusion par cr\u00e9ation de soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle, une demande d\u2019agr\u00e9ment doit \u00eatre introduite aupr\u00e8s du CECEI.<\/p>\n
2\/ Agr\u00e9ment en cas de fusion avec cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle<\/p>\n
314. \u2013 Cet agr\u00e9ment est r\u00e9gi par les r\u00e8gles bancaires (a) ainsi que par les r\u00e8gles du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Encadrement par les r\u00e8gles bancaires<\/p>\n
315. \u2013 Ce type de fusion entra\u00eene la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une nouvelle entit\u00e9 juridique.\u00a0Ainsi, les \u00e9tablissements concern\u00e9s doivent solliciter, aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019autorit\u00e9 de r\u00e9gulation bancaire, simultan\u00e9ment le retrait de leur agr\u00e9ment ainsi qu\u2019un agr\u00e9ment pour la nouvelle entit\u00e9.<\/p>\n
316. \u2013 Les associ\u00e9s doivent approuver les \u00e9l\u00e9ments constitutifs de la nouvelle banque.\u00a0L\u2019ing\u00e9rence des r\u00e8gles bancaires entra\u00eene une atteinte au libre choix de la forme sociale par les associ\u00e9s.\u00a0En effet, comme nous l\u2019avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9, la constitution d\u2019une banque sous forme de SARL est impossible car cette forme sociale n\u2019est pas en ad\u00e9quation avec les besoins du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Les banques devant disposer de fonds propres importants, le recours aux SARL est exclu.<\/p>\n
317. \u2013 En outre, la r\u00e9glementation bancaire d\u00e9roge aux dispositions du droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s concernant le capital minimum des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s par actions.\u00a0En effet, selon le droit des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s, il \u00ab doit \u00eatre d\u2019au moins 225 000 euros si l\u2019entreprise fait un appel public \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9pargne et d\u2019au moins 37 000 euros sinon \u00bb.\u00a0Cependant, la loi bancaire pr\u00e9voit que le capital minimum que doivent avoir les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit est pr\u00e9cis.\u00a0Donc,<\/p>\n
\u2013 les banques, les banques mutualistes ou coop\u00e9ratives, les caisses populaires \u00e0 statut large et les \u00e9tablissements financiers sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9s doivent disposer d\u2019un capital d\u2019au moins 5 millions d\u2019euros ;<\/p>\n
\u2013 les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s financi\u00e8res, \u00e0 quelques exceptions pr\u00e8s, doivent avoir un capital d\u2019au moins 2,2 millions d\u2019euros ;<\/p>\n
\u2013 les caisses populaires qui limitent leur activit\u00e9 au nantissement corporel des pr\u00eats et les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s financi\u00e8res dont l\u2019agr\u00e9ment est limit\u00e9 \u00e0 la pratique des op\u00e9rations de cautionnement doivent disposer d\u2019un capital au moins \u00e9gal \u00e0 1,1 million d\u2019euros.<\/p>\n
318. \u2013 Enfin, l\u2019absence d\u2019assembl\u00e9e constitutive a pour effet de transf\u00e9rer aux assembl\u00e9es g\u00e9n\u00e9rales des banques qui fusionnent l\u2019obligation de choisir les premiers administrateurs et commissaires aux comptes.\u00a0Concernant la nomination des commissaires aux comptes, le Code mon\u00e9taire et financier a pris en consid\u00e9ration la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0Ainsi, il a impos\u00e9 la nomination de deux commissaires.\u00a0Cela se fait \u00ab\u00a0apr\u00e8s avis de la Commission bancaire\u00a0\u00bb qui peut \u00e9galement \u00ab\u00a0nommer un commissaire aux comptes suppl\u00e9mentaire lorsque la situation le justifie\u00a0\u00bb.\u00a0L\u2019\u00e9tablissement de cr\u00e9dit doit communiquer \u00e0 la Commission bancaire les noms des commissaires aux comptes qu\u2019il se propose de nommer.\u00a0Celui-ci dispose d\u2019un d\u00e9lai de deux mois pour faire conna\u00eetre son avis sur la proposition de nomination du commissaire aux comptes.\u00a0S\u2019il l\u2019estime n\u00e9cessaire, il peut demander des informations compl\u00e9mentaires.\u00a0Lorsque son avis est d\u00e9favorable ou sujet \u00e0 r\u00e9serves, il doit \u00eatre motiv\u00e9.\u00a0Elle ne peut \u00eatre prise qu\u2019apr\u00e8s que le commissaire aux comptes propos\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 invit\u00e9 \u00e0 faire conna\u00eetre ses observations.<\/p>\n
319. \u2013 Moreover, this designation can only be made within the framework of the new company\u2019s articles of association, which must be approved by the extraordinary general meetings of the companies taking part in the operation. This last rule demonstrates the fundamental connection that should be made between the rules of banking law and company law.<\/p>\n
b\/ Rules of company law<\/p>\n
320. \u2013 In theory, the merger entailing the creation of a new bank, it would be advisable to respect all the rules and formalities related to the constitution of a company, whatever the form of the company. news thus created.<\/p>\n
321. \u2013 However, in order to facilitate the carrying out of merger operations, the legislator has introduced various simplification measures. These provisions essentially apply when the new company is formed without any contributions other than those of the merging companies.<\/p>\n
322. \u2013 If the new company is an SA, Article L. 236-12 of the Commercial Code provides that this company may be incorporated without any contributions other than those made by the merging companies. In this case, the statutes of the future company are approved by each of the general meetings of the companies which disappear on the occasion of the merger. Similarly, it is not necessary to proceed with the meeting of the constituent assembly of the new company. The abolition of this meeting essentially results in concentrating the carrying out of merger operations within the framework of the extraordinary general meetings of the merging companies. Most of the other incorporation formalities are however maintained, but their fulfillment is largely transferred to the level of the companies that are disappearing.<\/p>\n
323. \u2013 Once the merger has been approved, it is necessary to publicize the merger decision. These are the rules applicable to commercial bank mergers. These differ in many respects from the rules in force in mergers involving cooperative banks.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 2: Mergers involving cooperative or mutual banks<\/p>\n
324. \u2013 There are two different types of mergers involving cooperative or mutual banks. On the one hand, there may be mergers internal to the cooperative or mutualist group (A). On the other hand, some mergers occur with banks outside the cooperative or mutualist group (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ Internal mergers within the cooperative or mutualist group<\/p>\n
325. \u2013 Internal mergers within mutualist groups have been numerous. We will distinguish between the merger of the Cr\u00e9dit Agricole regional banks (1) and the merger of the savings and provident funds (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Taking into account the banking specificity in the merger of the regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole<\/p>\n
326. \u2013 The regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole have not escaped the changes in the banking system which take on a particular dimension for them due to the structural characteristics of the institution of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole and the specificities of their activity. It should be specified from the outset that the network banking activity is carried out through the intermediary of regional mutuals. These are independent legal persons with as many organized structures to achieve their corporate purpose of fundraising and granting credit. This departmental fragmentation of the exercise of their activity turned out to be unsuited to the constraints of the European financial economy. It is to deal with this that the national fund has launched a major movement to bring together the regional funds. These mergers have left only a limited number of funds satisfying rigorous and precisely defined criteria. The implementation of these operations has raised particular problems, both practical and theoretical, which are commensurate with the specificity of this institution.<\/p>\n
327. \u2013 The old structural organization of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole cannot, however, make us forget the evolution that the institution has known since 1920. Originally, exclusively focused on the financing of agriculture, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole has gradually seen its expand their areas of expertise. Many elements are indicative of the phenomenon of trivialization experienced by the institution:
\u2013 financial autonomy, which was granted to the national fund by the State in 1966; \u2013 corporate tax liability of the national fund and the regional funds from 1979;
\u2013 the increased role of banking transformation played by the national mutual, by placing available cash from the regional mutuals on the money market; \u2013 the integration of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole into the common framework for banking activity, by the banking law of 01\/24\/1984;
\u2013 the \u201cpooling\u201d of the national fund, whose capital is now held by the regional funds.<\/p>\n
328. \u2013 Thus, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole had to adapt. The regional banks are characterized by their monopoly of distribution of subsidized loans. However, they had to deal with the abolition of these same bonuses. Then, these banks are strongly collectors. Consequently, they must bear the significant cost of their networks in terms of personnel, geographical locations and administrative management. In addition, since these are geared towards the exploitation of a traditional market, they must bear the cost of setting up management tools and commercial techniques likely to enable them to impose themselves on the technical markets. banking news. Finally, as banks specialized in the agricultural sector, they must face the probable new transformation of French agriculture,<\/p>\n
329. \u2013 These phenomena of trivialization and exposure of the activity of the regional mutuals have led them to seek solutions to the imperatives of competitiveness and strengthening of their own funds, without the satisfaction of which their sustainability cannot be ensured. To meet these challenges, many Cr\u00e9dit Agricole regional banks have merged. The merger therefore appeared for the regional mutuals as the privileged element in the constitution of banking establishments of a sufficiently large size to meet the challenges of the European financial economy.<\/p>\n
330. \u2013 The implementation of these merger operations is specific in that they concern establishments which have a banking activity (a) and which are subject to the rules of cooperation (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ The specificity of the merger linked to the banking activity<\/p>\n
331. \u2013 The completion of the merger requires the prior harmonization of the accounting information processing methods. Indeed, one of the first practical consequences of the final completion of a merger lies in the obligation for the fund resulting from the operation to be able to produce financial and accounting statements which take into account all the operations of the new company, while satisfying the imperatives of speed and reliability essential in the banking system.<\/p>\n
332. \u2013 The objective of obtaining a single general accounting, with a single computerized processing system, based on a single chart of accounts, generated by single files and according to identical procedures, is fundamental. It therefore presupposes that a work plan be put in place with a schedule providing for the merging of computer files and the definition of a uniform chart of accounts. Experience shows that this objective can only be achieved in a progressive manner and by giving priority above all to pragmatism. The following approach can be retained as likely to be used in the context of operations to merge regional mutuals. In a first step, it is a question of issuing the accounts of the fund resulting from the merger by adding the accounts of the funds involved in the operation. This solution makes it possible to draw the consequences of the retroactivity clauses generally printed on merger operations, and to immediately provide the banking authorities with the summary statements and the statistical elements required. It assumes that the charts of accounts have been harmonized beforehand and that an unambiguous relationship between the accounts of the regional mutuals has been established in order to allow the computer production of a \u201cthird\u201d account. At the end of this transitional period, the merger of the files must be carried out, which must in any case end at the end of the current financial year at the time of the definitive completion of the merger. Finally, accounting procedures must be put in place that allow harmonization of the respective practices of the funds,<\/p>\n
333. \u2013 Furthermore, it should be noted that the French banking system has developed a set of rules and principles allowing the computerization of interbank data. Provision is made for the allocation to each establishment of a specific codification allowing it to be recognized in computer communication networks. This is how transfer and payment orders between different banks can be \u201caddressed\u201d and processed electronically. Each institution is responsible for setting up a computer recognition and coding system compatible with interbank rules. It is clear that the management of this problem is of extreme importance given the magnitude of the flows processed daily and the nature of the potential problems generated in the event of a malfunction.<\/p>\n
334. \u2013 It is therefore all the specificities specific to the banking activity of the regional mutuals that must be taken into account in the context of their merger. Consideration should also be given to their cooperative status.<\/p>\n
b\/ The specificity of the merger linked to the applicability of the rules of cooperation<\/p>\n
335. \u2013 The regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole are cooperative companies and are therefore placed under the empire of the legislation applicable to cooperation. This specific legal provision weighed heavily on the merger operations of the regional mutuals (\u03b1). It is for this reason that the law relating to the modernization of cooperative enterprises has made fundamental changes with a view to facilitating these merger operations (\u03b2).<\/p>\n
\u03b1\/ The heaviness of the legal regime prior to the law of 07\/13\/1992<\/p>\n
336. \u2013 Mergers of regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole were subject in principle to the rules of article 1844-4 of the Civil Code. Thus, they could only exceptionally, in the event of a conventional agreement, be subject to the law of 07\/24\/1966.
\u2013 The principle application of the rules of the Civil Code<\/p>\n
337. \u2013 The implementation of the operations to merge the regional mutuals required taking into consideration their character as a specific banking establishment. The reform introduced in France by the banking law of 01\/24\/1984 took this specificity into account. Thus, this law has not been to the end of its logic of universality. Indeed, it left the specificities of the various particular networks and \u201ccentral bodies\u201d responsible for running them. It is therefore through the Caisse Nationale de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole that requests for approval of mergers pass. However, the funds must comply with the rules laid down by the banking authorities with regard to changes in their mode of operation and seek the necessary approvals from the CECEI.<\/p>\n
338. \u2013 Firstly, an observation clearly marks the major distinction between a mutual company and a commercial company. Obeying the rule according to which \u201cone man equals one vote\u201d, the deliberations of the general meetings of the regional mutuals are governed by this rule. This wants each member of the cooperative to be equal to any other. It is true that, in practice, objective factors such as the technical nature of banking and the cumbersome nature of the organizations that the regional banks have become temper the rigor of this principle. The fact remains that the sensitivities of members must necessarily be taken into consideration in the context of mergers in order to ensure the successful completion of operations.<\/p>\n
339. \u2013 Next, the members are unable to claim to receive from the funds in which they hold shares other than the payment of interest or the reimbursement of their contributions in the event of withdrawal from the fund from which they hold shares. have joined. This completely changes the economy of the operation compared to a merger of commercial companies.<\/p>\n
340. \u2013 Indeed, in terms of commercial companies, the valuation of each of the participating companies constitutes the obligatory stage in determining the exchange ratio. Once this ratio has been set, the calculation of the amount of the capital increase to be carried out to remunerate the shareholders of the absorbed company makes it possible to determine the possible merger premium. The amount of the latter represents the difference between the value given in the contribution agreement to the net assets contributed and the amount of the capital increase of the company receiving the contributions.<\/p>\n
341. \u2013 This logic could not be adopted with regard to the merger of regional mutuals. First of all, it was laid down in principle that each member of the absorbed fund could only receive shares in the absorbing fund for the nominal value of the shares he held before the merger operation. Consequently, in the event that each of the regional mutuals had a share capital made up of shares of the same nominal amount, the exchange parity was necessarily established at one share of the absorbing mutual for one share of the absorbed mutual. . The amount of the capital increase of the absorbing regional fund is therefore, in this case, equal to the amount of the capital of the contributing fund.<\/p>\n
342. \u2013 This logic necessarily finds its limit in the existence of cooperative investment certificates issued by the absorbed fund. Created by the law of 06\/17\/1987, cooperative investment certificates are indeed transferable securities without voting rights representing pecuniary rights attached to a share of share capital. They cannot be analyzed as resulting from the dismemberment of the social share. Nevertheless, the holders of these certificates have a right to the net assets of the regional mutual in proportion to the capital that they represent. It is clear that this provision is an important departure from the principles laid down by the law on cooperation. It raises for the funds participating in merger operations, after issuing certificates, the problem of the exchange of securities of cooperative investment certificates in the same terms as commercial companies. In addition, it is noteworthy that, insofar as cooperative investment certificates are issued through a public call for savings, any merger operation then presupposes control by the Autorit\u00e9 des March\u00e9s Financiers over that -this.<\/p>\n
343. \u2013 The direct consequence of the double constraint constituted by the impossibility of taking into consideration the respective weights in terms of net assets of the regional mutuals participating in the merger operation and by the application of the rule \u201cone man equals one voice\u201d poses the problem of the policies of each of the funds in terms of membership. Indeed, a merger operation can bring together a regional mutual with few reserves but with many members. However, a fund, having a significant economic weight but a policy leading to having few members, necessarily sees the first having power in general assembly.<\/p>\n
344. \u2013 Subsequently, it appears that the management of the number of members is one of the problems that must be examined before the merger operations are launched. One solution consists in bringing together the members of each of the funds participating in the operation in intermediate structures, so as to balance or modulate the powers.<\/p>\n
345. \u2013 Finally, the problem of the scope of the mission of the auditors in the regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole is an old problem. The banking law has made the regional mutuals responsible for having an auditor.<\/p>\n
346. \u2013 The same does not apply to contributions auditors and merger auditors, since no legislative or regulatory provision provides for their intervention in the context of the merger of regional mutuals. Asked about this problem, the National Company of Auditors took a position in 1986. In the absence of express reference in the law of 01\/24\/1984 and in the Rural Code to the provisions of the law of 07\/24\/1966 with regard to contributions auditors, since a regional mutual is not a commercial company, these mergers do not have to be submitted for the approval of an contributions auditor. For the same reasons, the auditor of the regional mutual concerned would not have to issue a report on the consideration for the contributions. Although part of a reformed legislative framework, this response, in our view, retains its full value. Indeed, no legislative or regulatory text has imposed on the regional mutuals the obligation to have recourse to a contributions auditor. This leads to the conclusion for the same reasons that there was no intervention by a merger auditor. It is clear that the importance of the stakes and the character of the regional mutuals as a banking institution make it desirable, in this matter, to modify the applicable texts, so as to confer on these mergers all the necessary security.<\/p>\n
347. \u2013 En consecuencia, el estatuto original de los bancos regionales de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole les prohib\u00eda en primer lugar tomar prestado de sociedades mercantiles los proyectos de fusi\u00f3n que han sido consagrados en textos legales y reglamentarios de conformidad con las directivas comunitarias adoptadas en la materia.\u00a0Luego, pudieron aplicar voluntariamente la ley del 24\/07\/1966.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2013 La aplicaci\u00f3n voluntaria de la ley de 24\/07\/1966 reconocida por la jurisprudencia<\/span><\/p>\n348. \u2013 Como sociedades no comerciales, los bancos regionales de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole no estaban originalmente sujetos a las disposiciones aplicables a las sociedades comerciales.\u00a0El \u00fanico texto aplicable, en materia de fusi\u00f3n, a las sociedades no comerciales, era el art\u00edculo 1844-4 del C\u00f3digo Civil modificado por la ley del 01\/04\/1978.\u00a0En esta ocasi\u00f3n, el legislador generaliz\u00f3 el principio de las operaciones de fusi\u00f3n en un marco jur\u00eddico de inter\u00e9s para todo tipo de sociedades, inspir\u00e1ndose en gran medida en los t\u00e9rminos previstos por la ley de 24\/07\/1966.\u00a0No obstante, nos quedamos con este texto al nivel de los principios, sin abordar los mecanismos de este tipo de operaciones.\u00a0Cabe se\u00f1alar entonces que ni el C\u00f3digo Rural ni la ley de 10\/09\/1947 conten\u00edan disposici\u00f3n alguna sobre operaciones y mecanismos de fusi\u00f3n.<\/span><\/p>\n349. \u2013 As\u00ed, determinadas sentencias aceptaron inicialmente que las normas de la ley de 1966 relativas a las fusiones pod\u00edan aplicarse a las sucursales de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, que por su condici\u00f3n no estaban sujetas al dominio de esta ley.<\/span><\/p>\n350. \u2013 En la sentencia citada, el derecho de oposici\u00f3n previsto en el art\u00edculo L. 236-14 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio se ejerci\u00f3 contra un banco regional de Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, cuando este \u00faltimo se fusion\u00f3 con la caja de un departamento vecino.\u00a0No obstante, el art\u00edculo L. 236-14 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio se sit\u00faa en un apartado titulado \u201cDisposiciones relativas a las sociedades an\u00f3nimas\u201d.\u00a0Adem\u00e1s, los bancos regionales Cr\u00e9dit Agricole son sociedades cooperativas de capital y personal variable, sujetas al C\u00f3digo Rural.\u00a0Seg\u00fan el art\u00edculo 618 de este c\u00f3digo, su capital no puede estar constituido por suscripci\u00f3n de acciones.\u00a0Debe ser adquirida por los socios por medio de acciones nominativas, de las que s\u00f3lo pueden apropiarse determinadas categor\u00edas de portadores, definidas en el art\u00edculo 617, por su integraci\u00f3n en el mundo agr\u00edcola.\u00a0Entonces,<\/span><\/p>\n351. \u2013 These bodies therefore have profound differences with public limited companies.\u00a0However, their financial activity tends to link them to the commercial world or, at least, to the economic world.\u00a0In addition, the law of 18\/01\/1988 made the Caisse Nationale a public limited company, while the law on new economic regulations of 2001 authorized Cr\u00e9dit Agricole to acquire a vehicle listed on the stock exchange.\u00a0Finally, the mergers of regional mutuals revealed a rise in power at the regional level, which distanced these mutuals from their mutual bases.<\/span><\/p>\n352. \u2013 It is quite clear that the judgment of 15\/07\/1992 did not justify the application of the law of 24\/07\/1966 by the commercial nature of the regional funds. Indeed, in its response to the first branch of the first plea, it approved the Court of Appeal which admitted that Article 381 of the law of 07\/24\/1966 was normally inapplicable to a merger between regional funds. But he considered that \u201cin the silence of the law establishing the status of the Cr\u00e9dit Agricole funds, it was not prohibited\u201d for these funds to \u201callow creditors to assert their rights by implementing the opposition provided for by the 381\u201d.<\/p>\n
353. \u2013 This judgment recognized the contractual application of the 1966 law. The assertion was both useful and timely. Useful, because it was not easy to extend the scope of a law designed for commercial companies. Appropriate, because the absence of specific legislative provisions and the insufficiency of article 1844-4 of the Civil Code, made it desirable to provide the partners of the merging entities with protection comparable to that existing in public limited companies. This was all the more necessary when the non-commercial company carried out a financial activity.<\/p>\n
354. \u2013 It should however be recognized that this judgment did not seek to determine precisely the conditions for a conventional application of the 1966 law. The interpreter was led to suppositions and deductions when he had to say which entities could abide by rules designed for commercial companies. Moreover, the embarrassment was not less great in front of the need to sort, among the provisions of the law of 1966, those which could be retained and those which were appropriate only for the commercial companies.<\/p>\n
355. \u2013 It is in particular because of the legal problems posed by the absence of compulsory application of the law of 24\/07\/1966 to mutual banks that the law of 13\/07\/1992 was adopted.<\/p>\n
\u03b2\/ Amendments resulting from the law of 13\/07\/1992<\/p>\n
356. \u2013 The provision of the law concerning mergers only applies to cooperative banks. It was requested by Cr\u00e9dit Agricole to facilitate such operations. It is intended to increase the legal certainty of the latter.<\/p>\n
357. \u2013 It provides that these companies are henceforth subject to the provisions of the law of 24\/07\/1966 on commercial companies with regard to mergers, demergers and partial contributions of assets.<\/p>\n
358. \u2013 In this respect, the regime for mergers, spin-offs and contributions of public limited companies provided for in Book II of the Commercial Code is applicable to cooperative banks, with the exception of Article L. 236-10 of the Commercial Code in assuming that the cooperative has not issued any securities giving rights to the net assets.<\/p>\n
359. \u2013 Thus, the legal bases of regional mutual merger operations are more clearly defined. In practice, however, the application of the law has not led to any fundamental changes for Cr\u00e9dit Agricole\u2019s bank merger operations. Indeed, as we have already explained, in the absence of applicable texts, the rules enacted by the law of 1966 were generally retained voluntarily.<\/p>\n
360. \u2013 It should be noted that the regional mutuals issuing securities giving a right to the net assets were led, within the framework of a merger operation, to appoint a contribution auditor and a merger auditor. This practice, already used by the caisses that issued cooperative investment certificates and that merged, to ensure the protection of the interests of their security holders, was therefore confirmed by law.<\/p>\n
361. \u2013 This law constitutes a fundamental modification of the general statute of cooperation. It has enabled the issue of new securities representing capital, the modification of the remuneration paid to capital contributors and the profound transformation of the social structures of cooperative societies.<\/p>\n
362. \u2013 The above developments have highlighted the specificity of mergers of cooperative banks through the study of the situation of the regional banks of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole. Banking specificity is also taken into account in the mergers of savings and provident funds.<\/p>\n
2\/ Taking account of banking specificity in the merger of savings and provident funds<\/p>\n
363. \u2013 A law of 10\/07\/1991 organized mergers between savings and provident funds. This law applies specifically to savings and provident funds. It therefore highlights the existence of a specificity of these merger operations.<\/p>\n
364. \u2013 In addition, Article L. 512-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that \u201cmutual or cooperative banks are subject to the regime for mergers, demergers and contributions of public limited companies provided for in Book II of the Commercial Code (\u2026 )\u201d. As the savings and provident funds have become cooperative banks since the law of 25\/06\/1999, these provisions are undoubtedly applicable to them. However, the legislator has taken into account the specificity of these banks by providing that Article L. 236-10 of the Commercial Code is not applicable to those establishments which have not issued securities giving a right to the net assets.<\/p>\n
365. \u2013 Finally, the law on urgent economic and financial reform measures of 11\/12\/2001 also provided for provisions aimed at facilitating the merger of savings and provident funds.<\/p>\n
366. \u2013 The legislator thus decided to exempt local savings companies from the obligations to set aside available sums provided for in article 16 of the law of 10\/09\/1947 on the status of cooperation.<\/p>\n
367. \u2013 In addition, Article L. 512-90 of the Monetary and Financial Code has also been amended. This provides that \u201csavings and provident funds are run by a management board under the control of a supervisory board. The latter takes the specific name of guidance and monitoring council. The Orientation and Supervisory Board is made up of seventeen members. It includes, under the conditions provided for by the articles of association:<\/p>\n
1\u00b0 Members elected directly by the employee members of the savings and provident fund;
2\u00b0 Members elected directly by local authorities, members of local savings companies affiliated to the savings and provident fund; 3\u00b0 Members elected by the general meeting of members of the savings and provident fund. Are not eligible as such the local authorities or the employees of the savings and provident fund\u201d.<\/p>\n
368. \u2013 In the event of a merger of the savings and provident funds, the number of members of the orientation and supervisory board of the fund resulting from the merger may be greater than seventeen, for a maximum period of three years. from the date of the merger. In this case, the board of directors and supervisor cannot be composed of more than thirty-four members. The number of members elected by the employees and that of the members elected by the local authorities cannot exceed six.<\/p>\n
369. \u2013 In the absence of agreement between the funds concerned, the total number of members of the orientation and supervisory board, as well as the distribution of the latter by fund and by category, may be fixed by the Caisse nationale des caisses d savings and pensions.<\/p>\n
370. \u2013 Thus, a derogation is possible with regard to the maximum number of members of the orientation and supervisory board resulting from a merger. The number can thus reach 34 people, almost double the legal maximum. However, a reserve is provided. It is advisable to respect the distribution between the different categories of members, that is to say the representatives of the employee members, the representatives of the local authorities and the representatives of the members. This therefore facilitates agreements in the context of mergers between savings and provident funds. Indeed, these provisions should avoid conflicts between the two merging entities when it is appropriate to determine the composition of the management board.<\/p>\n
371. \u2013 It is obvious here that banking specificity interferes with the mechanism of the merger. The objective is to facilitate the merger of savings and provident funds but above all to avoid blockages during these concentration operations.<\/p>\n
372. \u2013 The operations that we have just studied concern the legal framework for internal mergers within the cooperative or mutualist group. Mergers with a bank outside the cooperative or mutualist group should also be examined.<\/p>\n
B\/ Merger with a bank outside the cooperative or mutualist group<\/p>\n
373. \u2013 These mergers are specific because they occur between banks with different statuses. Banking specificity must therefore be taken into consideration because the legal rules applicable to entities with separate statutes are not harmonised. A cumulative application of the legislative and regulatory provisions in force is therefore necessary. Logically, this cumulative application of the rules of law increases the complexity of these mergers.<\/p>\n
374. \u2013 We will first refer to operations which do not constitute mergers stricto sensu. Indeed, the concentration was carried out in the first place by means of a takeover. However, it is appropriate to refer to it because certain entities of the groups concerned have merged.<\/p>\n
375. \u2013 Thus, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole notably took control of Indosuez in 1996. The integration was carried out gradually. The merger between Cr\u00e9dit Agricole and Indosuez was completed on a legal level in 1997. Cr\u00e9dit Agricole-Indosuez became a subsidiary of the Caisse Nationale du Cr\u00e9dit Agricole, grouping together its business banking and major international customers. Interesting developments have occurred. Indosuez had a network of twelve branches in the provinces. They lacked financing capacity and some operations escaped their control. After the merger, thanks to the contribution of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole\u2019s financial capacities, Cr\u00e9dit Agricole-Indosuez was able to participate in an increased number of financing transactions. Conversely, thanks to the expertise of Cr\u00e9dit Agricole-Indosuez,<\/p>\n
376. \u2013 As regards the concentration between the Banques Populaires and Natexis, this took place in several stages. First, the Banques Populaires group took control of Natexis. Then, the subsidiaries of the two groups exercising the same businesses were merged. For example, in the field of employee savings, Natexis transferred its subsidiary Vitalia Epargne to the Inter\u00e9pargne subsidiary of the Banques Populaires group. In the equipment leasing activity, the two networks have combined their specialized subsidiaries within Bail Banques Populaires. Finally, the merger was achieved through an operational integration. In 1999, the Caisse centrale des Banques Populaires transferred its operational activities to Natexis SA and gave birth to a new entity, Natexis Banques Populaires. On 06\/28\/2000,<\/p>\n
This concentration has enabled the Banques Populaires group to be more active internationally. Indeed, the group was not very present on the international scene. Thus, the merger with Natexis made it possible to support a desire to go beyond borders. It has provided a better international image and a presence in new businesses: structured finance, trade or project finance through establishments, for example in Asia, the United States or Europe. Above all, Natexis-Banques Populaires has very broad financing lines abroad, particularly in terms of export financing and documentary credit confirmations.<\/p>\n
377. \u2013 Finally, the financial company Eulia, jointly controlled by the Caisse des D\u00e9p\u00f4ts et Consignations and the Caisse d\u2019Epargne group, in a first stage, merged in a second stage. Indeed, Eulia first merged with the Caisse Nationale des Caisses d\u2019Epargne. Then, the latter absorbed CDC Ixis. Thus, the Caisse d\u2019Epargne group is now the third largest banking network in France. This external growth operation allows L\u2019Ecureuil to constitute a complete mutualist group which also has an investment banking activity.<\/p>\n
378. \u2013 The sale of Eulia constitutes the last transfer from a public bank to the private sector. The domestic concentration of the major French networks is therefore almost complete. Correlatively, reconciliations of credit institutions must now be carried out at European level.<\/p>\n
Chapter 2: European mergers<\/p>\n
379. \u2013 Tangible manifestations of the reality of the single market and the globalization of the economy, cross-border restructuring is on the increase. In search of critical size in order to remain competitive, companies are concentrating.<\/p>\n
380. \u2013 Merger constitutes one of the modalities of such mergers. The need to allow mergers between companies having their registered office in different Member States was affirmed by the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community in its Article 220. This provides that \u201cMember States shall enter into where necessary, negotiations with a view to ensuring in favor of their nationals the possibility of mergers of companies governed by different national legislations\u201d.<\/p>\n
381. \u2013 Thus, in theory, there is nothing to prevent such mergers from being carried out. However, the directive on the legal aspects of intra-Community mergers is still under discussion. In addition, in practice, the existence of significant discrepancies between national legislation raises serious obstacles to the realization of these international mergers. Indeed, not all the States of the European Union recognize the mechanism of the merger, yet an essential condition for the realization of an international merger is the recognition of the universal devolution of the heritage. Some authors therefore do not hesitate to conclude that mergers between companies of different nationalities are impossible when there is incompatibility of the applicable legislation. Finally, even when there is no incompatibility of legislation, the lack of harmonization of the notions of merger, takeover and takeover bid is also a source of legal problems. For example, the notion of merger does not have the same meaning in English law as in French law. The concept is much broader in England. It encompasses both the creation of concentrative joint ventures and lease-management operations. Consequently, uncertainties as to the qualification of the merger transaction or public takeover bid may arise. This is likely to cause reconciliations to fail. Indeed, in the first case, the initiator can proceed as he wishes, in particular by exchange of securities. However, if the last hypothesis is retained, certain legislations require the buyer to offer the possibility of payment in cash.<\/p>\n
382. \u2013 Carrying out mergers between companies of different nationalities therefore raises significant difficulties. However, European banks have every interest in merging. Indeed, credit institutions have an interest in operating abroad through branches rather than through subsidiaries because of the importance of the guarantees they are required to provide. It should be specified that when they act by branches, these guarantees are assessed solely at the level of the head office, whereas each subsidiary would be required to present its own guarantees. Thus, it is necessary to take into consideration the banking specificity to understand that the simple takeover is less advantageous than the international merger.<\/p>\n
383. \u2013 Nevertheless, the obstacles to international mergers being very high, companies try to find other legal means. The practice essentially retains two reconciliation techniques. However, these concentration instruments are complex and the lack of European harmonization of legislation also constitutes an obstacle.<\/p>\n
384. \u2013 It is possible to simply take a majority stake in the capital of the target. The solution, which often leads to holding almost all of the capital of the target company, nevertheless also has drawbacks. First of all, these equity investments, even by a large majority, do not produce effects comparable to mergers. If they make it possible to ensure control of the target company, they do not lead to the confusion of assets which characterizes the merger. Then, certain legislations subject to very strict controls the acquisition of holdings by foreign partners.<\/p>\n
385. \u2013 Concernant le jumelage, il s\u2019agit d\u2019une technique o\u00f9 les entreprises conservent leur autonomie juridique et leur nationalit\u00e9 mais les d\u00e9cisions collectives sont prises par une commission r\u00e9unissant les dirigeants des diff\u00e9rentes entreprises.\u00a0C\u2019est une sorte de comit\u00e9 de pilotage supranational qui fonctionne de mani\u00e8re conventionnelle.\u00a0Un exemple peut \u00eatre cit\u00e9 dans le secteur bancaire.\u00a0Le Cr\u00e9dit Local de France et le Cr\u00e9dit Communal de Belgique ont opt\u00e9 pour cette solution en 1996. Cela leur a permis d\u2019\u00e9viter de changer de nationalit\u00e9.\u00a0Le montage juridique adopt\u00e9 a conduit \u00e0 la cr\u00e9ation de deux soci\u00e9t\u00e9s holding d\u00e9tenant \u00e0 parts \u00e9gales les deux soci\u00e9t\u00e9s d\u2019exploitation.\u00a0Pour ce faire, les deux \u00e9tablissements, fin 1996, ont commenc\u00e9 par filialiser leurs activit\u00e9s op\u00e9rationnelles.\u00a0Les deux soci\u00e9t\u00e9s m\u00e8res n\u00e9es de cette op\u00e9ration, baptis\u00e9es Dexia-France et Dexia-Belgique,\u00a0ont ensuite proc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 un \u00e9change d\u2019actions de leur filiale afin d\u2019en d\u00e9tenir chacune 50 %.\u00a0La valorisation du Cr\u00e9dit Local de France \u00e9tait cependant sup\u00e9rieure de 626 millions de francs \u00e0 celle du Cr\u00e9dit Communal de Belgique.\u00a0Pour que les actionnaires de la premi\u00e8re banque ne soient pas l\u00e9s\u00e9s, il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre, les fusions transfrontali\u00e8res sont possibles.\u00a0ont ensuite proc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 un \u00e9change d\u2019actions de leur filiale afin d\u2019en d\u00e9tenir chacune 50 %.\u00a0La valorisation du Cr\u00e9dit Local de France \u00e9tait cependant sup\u00e9rieure de 626 millions de francs \u00e0 celle du Cr\u00e9dit Communal de Belgique.\u00a0Pour que les actionnaires de la premi\u00e8re banque ne soient pas l\u00e9s\u00e9s, il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre, les fusions transfrontali\u00e8res sont possibles.\u00a0ont ensuite proc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 un \u00e9change d\u2019actions de leur filiale afin d\u2019en d\u00e9tenir chacune 50 %.\u00a0La valorisation du Cr\u00e9dit Local de France \u00e9tait cependant sup\u00e9rieure de 626 millions de francs \u00e0 celle du Cr\u00e9dit Communal de Belgique.\u00a0Pour que les actionnaires de la premi\u00e8re banque ne soient pas l\u00e9s\u00e9s, il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre, les fusions transfrontali\u00e8res sont possibles.\u00a0La valorisation du Cr\u00e9dit Local de France \u00e9tait cependant sup\u00e9rieure de 626 millions de francs \u00e0 celle du Cr\u00e9dit Communal de Belgique.\u00a0Pour que les actionnaires de la premi\u00e8re banque ne soient pas l\u00e9s\u00e9s, il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre, les fusions transfrontali\u00e8res sont possibles.\u00a0La valorisation du Cr\u00e9dit Local de France \u00e9tait cependant sup\u00e9rieure de 626 millions de francs \u00e0 celle du Cr\u00e9dit Communal de Belgique.\u00a0Pour que les actionnaires de la premi\u00e8re banque ne soient pas l\u00e9s\u00e9s, il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre,\u00a0les fusions transfrontali\u00e8res sont possibles.\u00a0il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre, les fusions transfrontali\u00e8res sont possibles.\u00a0il a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de conserver 626 millions de francs de tr\u00e9sorerie dans Dexia-France lors de sa filialisation puis de les distribuer sous forme de dividende.\u00a0Il est \u00e0 noter que ce type de rapprochement est complexe et peut avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 contest\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est la raison pour laquelle, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9t\u00e9 1999, Dexia-France et Dexia Belgique ont finalement fusionn\u00e9.\u00a0Cela prouve que malgr\u00e9 les difficult\u00e9s de mise en \u0153uvre,<\/p>\n
386. \u2013 Consequently, incontestably, legal obstacles to European mergers exist (section 1). However, a number of developments are likely to favor these concentrations (section 2).<\/p>\n
Section 1: Legal obstacles to European mergers<\/p>\n
387. \u2013 Compared to national mergers, cross-border banking mergers remain exceptional for the time being. It seems that this is linked to cultural differences, geographical distance, language, which make it more difficult to group resources and in particular back offices. Synergies emerge less easily on the commercial level, in particular because of the additional difficulty of homogenizing geographically dissociated brands. But in our view, the fundamental difficulties lie in the protections afforded to the activities of banks and in the application of different legislation.<\/p>\n
388. \u2013 Thus, companies from different Member States wishing to group together are faced with an obstacle resulting in particular from the insufficiency of rules from a European source (\u00a71). Also, the economic constraint leads these companies to seek the means of reaching this objective by having recourse to the rules of conflict of laws (\u00a72).<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1: The insufficiency of the rules of European source in terms of cross-border banking concentrations<\/p>\n
389. \u2013 This insufficiency is materialized by the absence of coordination of the European rules governing concentrations with banking law (A), by the insufficient coordination of provisions applicable to banks in Europe (B) as well as the absence of a legal regime for cross-border mergers (C).<\/p>\n
A\/ The lack of coordination of European rules governing mergers with banking law<\/p>\n
390. \u2013 Currently, national banking laws are often very strict and sometimes divergent. Nordic banking laws provide that a public bank offer to be valid must obtain at least 90% of the securities of the target company. Other laws provide for very complex rules which aim to prevent the takeover of national banks by foreign banks. This is the case of Italy but also of Portugal. The taking into account of banking specificity is obvious.<\/p>\n
391. \u2013 Thus, in certain cases, the general mechanisms governing concentrations cannot be applied correctly to banks. It is therefore necessary to solve this delicate problem so that the European rules governing concentrations can be applied effectively to credit institutions in all the Member States of the European Union.<\/p>\n
392. \u2013 Moreover, banking supervision is currently the responsibility of the home State of the bank carrying out the operation. However, it should be noted that this rule does not apply correctly. In fact, in certain cases, the national banking regulatory authorities have transferred responsibility for supervision to each other. This led to a situation of inefficiency. In addition, the home authority finds it increasingly difficult to carry out efficient control when the entity concerned acquires a multinational dimension and carries out its activities in many States.<\/p>\n
393. \u2013 Finally, currently, when a credit institution takes control of another entity in the European Union, it must comply with the law applicable to the company it takes control of. For example, when Consors was taken over by Cortal, German law was intended to apply. However, given that there are significant differences between company law, stock market and banking law in the various Member States, European mergers remain very complex.<\/p>\n
394. \u2013 It is therefore necessary to seek solutions, taking account of banking specificities, in order to solve this problem. A European regulation or directive, intended to modify all national laws, could be adopted. The aim would be to define new, more effective rules concerning banking supervision and stock market regulation. We suggest that Member States transfer these powers to European supervisory authorities.<\/p>\n
B\/ Insufficient coordination of provisions applicable to banks in Europe<\/p>\n
395. \u2013 Banking rules must be reformed for the sake of efficiency. The various national banking laws (1) as well as European banking law and French banking law (2) must be subject to closer coordination.<\/p>\n
1\/ A necessary strengthening of the coordination of the various national banking laws<\/p>\n
396. \u2013 The banking sector clearly suffers from a lack of overall coherence within the European Union. The different banking arrangements appear as so many kaleidoscopic figures, given the divergent or dissimilar situations from one country to another. Undeniably, efforts have been made in recent years to bring things together. Nevertheless, multiple differences remain between the nations of the European Union.<\/p>\n
397. \u2013 This lasting lack of homogeneity is due to the nature and legal value of the directive itself as well as to the way in which it is adapted into the domestic law of each country. Community law thus establishes a fundamental distinction between regulations and directives, only regulations having direct effect in all Member States and being binding in their entirety. On the other hand, the directives fix objectives and only oblige the States on the only results to be reached and not on the means. Consequently, the directives do not constitute sources of law directly applicable in domestic law, but they must, each time, be specified by the laws or regulations adopted by the public authorities of each country.<\/p>\n
398. \u2013 Consequently, the legislators of the Member States were able to adopt distinct positions. There are therefore a multitude of different banking rights in the European Union even if everyone agrees to pursue common objectives. For example, the UK has consistently sought to change its law only to the bare minimum necessary to transpose directives.<\/p>\n
399. \u2013 Concerning the legal definition of credit institutions, it was therefore impossible to update a common conception.\u00a0The very notion of bank does not necessarily cover the same meaning or the same entity in all countries.\u00a0According to French banking law, credit institutions are \u201clegal persons which carry out banking operations as their usual profession\u201d.\u00a0It is specified that \u201cbanking operations include the receipt of funds from the public, credit operations, as well as the provision to customers or the management of means of payment\u201d.\u00a0The criteria established by this definition are alternative and not cumulative as in Community law.\u00a0Thus, the granting of credit is considered, on its own, as a banking operation, whereas the laws of the other Member States only subject this activity to approval if it is accompanied by the collection of deposits.\u00a0In addition, while some states, such as France, Germany and Portugal, reserve the lending activity to approved and supervised establishments, other European countries leave this activity completely free.\u00a0This is notably the case of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium.<\/span><\/p>\n400. \u2013 It is above all with regard to leasing and factoring that French banking legislation differs from that of other Member States.\u00a0In France, to carry out leasing transactions, you must be a credit institution.\u00a0However, in the other countries of the European Union, such approval is not required.\u00a0Similarly, a French factoring company must be approved as a credit institution to exercise its activity, which is not the case for factors governed by the law of other Member States.\u00a0In Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, in particular, leasing and factoring are admittedly assimilated to credit operations but not to banking operations.\u00a0In these countries, these activities may be carried out by financial institutions that do not have a credit institution licence.\u00a0Gold, these financial institutions are subject to less strict rules than credit institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n401. \u2013 Adem\u00e1s, la ley bancaria francesa cita entre las operaciones bancarias la provisi\u00f3n o gesti\u00f3n de medios de pago.\u00a0No obstante, seg\u00fan la legislaci\u00f3n espa\u00f1ola, la actividad de emisi\u00f3n y gesti\u00f3n de medios de pago no es monopolio de las entidades de cr\u00e9dito y esta actividad forma parte de la que pueden ejercer las entidades financieras.\u00a0As\u00ed, una simple entidad financiera puede emitir y gestionar medios de pago en Espa\u00f1a, mientras que una empresa francesa s\u00f3lo puede realizar esta actividad si ha sido previamente homologada como entidad de cr\u00e9dito.<\/span><\/p>\n402. \u2013 En consecuencia, en caso de concentraci\u00f3n bancaria, la aplicaci\u00f3n de la ley francesa perjudica al operador econ\u00f3mico mientras que la aplicaci\u00f3n de la ley espa\u00f1ola constituye una fuente de flexibilidad.\u00a0Tales disparidades dentro de Europa aumentan la complejidad de las fusiones y adquisiciones europeas.<\/span><\/p>\n403. \u2013 Lastly, as State laws differ with regard to the definition of a credit institution, this results in legal uncertainty concerning the designation of the competent authority to control the concentration operation. 404. \u2013 It would therefore be essential to unify the rules applicable in the various European States. The solution certainly lies in a deepening of coordination. This would eliminate any uncertainty regarding the designation of the competent authority.<\/p>\n
405. \u2013 In addition, certain national laws grant aid to credit institutions to promote their concentration. This is the case of Italy. This aid scheme results from the application of law n\u00b0 461 of 02\/12\/1998 as well as decreto legislativo n\u00b0 153 of 17\/05\/1999, which provide for certain tax incentive measures applicable to concentration operations banking. The purpose of such provisions is to promote the national concentration of credit institutions. Logically, these measures constitute a source of distortion of competition.<\/p>\n
406. \u2013 Thus, it is appropriate to propose that such measures be removed from all national laws. This would restore an egalitarian situation in all countries. This would undeniably favor European mergers.<\/p>\n
407. \u2013 To achieve this objective, it is necessary to systematically attack these aid schemes on the basis of Article 87 of the Community Treaty, which prohibits State aid incompatible with the common market.<\/p>\n
408. \u2013 If the European Commission considers that the aid is illegal, it may order the recovery of the aid. Since the decision is retroactive, the State is forced to recover the sums unduly paid.<\/p>\n
409. \u2013 As the banks in question did not want to repay the aid, a dispute developed. The Associazione Bancaria Italiana therefore appealed to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities on 21\/02\/2002. The applicant requested the annulment of the Commission\u2019s decision of 11\/12\/2001 \u201cfor breach of essential formalities and\/or for lack of contradictory character and\/or lack of reasoning, within the meaning of Article 253 EC, read in combination with Articles 87 and 77 EC and Council Regulation 659\/1999\/EC\u2026\u201d.<\/p>\n
410. \u2013 In our opinion, the decision of the European Commission considering the State aid scheme as incompatible with the common market is entirely justified. The condemnations of the aid put in place by the Member States will dissuade the latter from setting up such mechanisms. This will promote competition within the European Union and cross-border banking concentrations. To achieve this objective, a strengthening of the coordination of European banking law and French banking law is necessary.<\/p>\n
2\/ A necessary strengthening of the coordination of European banking law and French banking law<\/p>\n
411. \u2013 First of all, there is a lack of coordination in the definition of a credit institution between Community law and French law. The credit institution is, according to the first banking coordination directive of 12\/12\/1977, a company whose activity consists in receiving deposits or other repayable funds from the public and in granting loans for its own account. It is to this definition that the second banking coordination directive of 15\/12\/1989 expressly refers. However, Article L. 311-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code defines the notion of credit institution differently. Thus, \u201ccredit institutions are legal persons which carry out banking operations as a regular profession. Banking operations include receiving funds from the public,<\/p>\n
412. \u2013 Thus, in Community law, contrary to French rules, an institution which is only intended to carry out one of the two activities does not have to be qualified as a credit institution. Consequently, a company can be qualified as a credit institution under French law, and not under Community law.<\/p>\n
413. \u2013 In the absence of coordination of the definitions of credit institutions and financial institutions, the question is which definition to use in the context of a cross-border concentration. Is this the definition as it results from the banking directives codified in the 2000 directive? In the absence of coordination between Community law and French law on this point, the definition to be retained may be that of domestic law. But textually none is necessary. Community texts give no indication and allow any interpretation. In our opinion, it would be appropriate, in the event of a European concentration, to apply the definition appearing in the banking directives codified in the 2000 directive.<\/p>\n
414. \u2013 The consistency and rigor necessary for the proper functioning of the single banking market require the adoption of the same definitions of the concept of credit institution and financial institutions in Community law and in domestic law. Thus, a removal of this inaccuracy is desirable. It would therefore be essential to find a compromise to uniquely define the notion of credit institution. Indeed, a conflict between Community law and French law could occur.<\/p>\n
415. \u2013 In addition, the rules applicable to financial institutions are less stringent than those governing credit institutions. Given that a French company can be qualified under internal law as a credit institution but be a financial institution under another legal system respecting Community law, conflicts may arise between these two laws concerning the applicable prudential rules. The fundamental question is therefore to know what prudential rules should be applied when acquiring holdings in financial companies. The national rules applicable to banking concentrations are likely to be invoked to prevent these operations. The problem is that Community law has only achieved minimal harmonization in this area. National laws may therefore be more stringent. The question of the application of prudential rules is therefore fertile ground for conflicts of law, particularly in the event of a merger.<\/p>\n
C\/ The lack of harmonization of the legal regime for cross-border mergers<\/p>\n
416. \u2013 A first attempt to provide cross-border mergers with a harmonized legal regime in Europe took the form of an international convention concluded between the then six Member States. This was to organize the legal regime for international mergers, but this project, published in 1973, was not ratified.<\/p>\n
417. \u2013 It was not until the following decade that a directive was proposed, inspired in large part by the aborted convention of 1973. This initiative was confined to the traditional method and principles of private international law. It applied distributive or cumulative solutions depending on the case.<\/p>\n
418. \u2013 The proposal for a directive on cross-border mergers of capital companies, drawn up in 2003, uses a similar method. In its explanatory memorandum, it starts from the observation that it seems essential to provide for regulations for mergers involving companies governed by the laws of different Member States.<\/p>\n
419. \u2013 This proposal for a directive on cross-border mergers is intended to apply for France only to capital companies and their counterparts in other Member States.<\/p>\n
420. \u2013 On the substance, in the very many cases where the procedures for carrying out the internal merger and that of the cross-border merger agree, the text merely refers to the national provisions. Therefore, this proposal for a directive is limited to the elements which, in the cross-border merger, differ from the internal merger or which are necessarily added to it. Indeed, the text does not provide otherwise.<\/p>\n
421. \u2013 Member States shall provide that each management or administrative body of each of the merging companies draws up a common cross-border merger plan. The proposed directive lists the elements that must be included in this draft.<\/p>\n
422. \u2013 It is possible to provide for a single expert report for all the partners. In most cases, this expert is a notary.<\/p>\n
423. \u2013 After having read the experts\u2019 report, the general meeting of each of the merging companies approves the joint cross-border merger project.<\/p>\n
424. \u2013 A preventive control of legality is applicable. Each Member State designates the competent authorities to control the legality of the merger for the part of the procedure relating to each of the merging companies and which is subject to its national legislation. In each Member State concerned, the competent authorities deliver to each of the merging companies and which come under its national legislation, a certificate conclusively attesting to the correct accomplishment of the acts and formalities prior to the merger.<\/p>\n
425. \u2013 The legislation of the Member State to which the company resulting from the merger is subject determines the date on which the cross-border merger takes effect.<\/p>\n
426. \u2013 The publicity and the formalities required, for the opposability to third parties, of the transfer of certain assets, rights and obligations, are carried out in accordance with the legislation of each Member State.<\/p>\n
427. \u2013 The proposal for a directive thus aims to ensure the protection of the interests of creditors.<\/p>\n
428. \u2013 Nevertheless, the nullity of a cross-border merger that has taken effect cannot be pronounced. This is to avoid calling into question the cross-border merger for the purpose of legal certainty.<\/p>\n
429. \u2013 It is regrettable that the proposal for a directive, which constitutes the inseparable complement of the directive on internal mergers, has still not entered into the positive law of the various legislations of the Member States. There would then exist in Europe a real common law on mergers, both internal and cross-border, transposed into the internal laws of all the Member States. Obstacles related in particular to the transfer of the registered office and the change of nationality of the acquired company would be removed and the legal certainty of such operations ensured.<\/p>\n
430. \u2013 It should be noted that the European Regulation on the European company does not solve the problem of the legal aspects of cross-border mergers. Indeed, this allows the legal person resulting from this merger to be housed in this Community instrument that is the European company. However, the legal process of cross-border concentration remains unclear. Also, it is necessary to resort to the complex rules of private international law.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 2: The necessary recourse to the rules of private international law<\/p>\n
431. \u2013 In the absence of international conventions and national or European rules governing cross-border mergers, the only solution for carrying out these operations is to apply the rules of conflict of laws private international law. Indeed, a cross-border merger necessarily involves companies subject to different national laws. However, before looking for the conflict rule (B), it should be ensured that the legislation of each of the Member States to which the companies involved in the merger are attached meets certain prior conditions (A).<\/p>\n
A\/ Taking account of banking specificity in the preconditions relating to the legislation of the Member States concerned<\/p>\n
432. \u2013 Each of the legal systems applicable to companies participating in the merger must recognize the existence of participating foreign credit institutions (1 ). In addition, the legislation of each of the Member States concerned must not contain any provision opposing the merger (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Mutual recognition of the credit institutions participating in the operation<\/p>\n
433. \u2013 The domestic law of each of the States where the registered office of the companies taking part in the merger is located must recognize the existence of credit institutions subject to the legislation of another State. An international convention signed on 02\/29\/1968 was supposed to lead to the automatic recognition, by the signatory States, of companies belonging to another Member State of the European Community, but this text has not entered into force.<\/p>\n
434. \u2013 Bank specificity should be taken into consideration. The banking rights of the Member States have only been subject to minimal harmonisation. Thus, as we have already specified, there are differences in the definition of credit institutions. A State may therefore not recognize the existence of a foreign company but in addition a foreign law may qualify a banking company whereas the banking law of the State of origin of the acquired company does not result in such a result. These qualification difficulties are of major importance because the formalities for setting up a credit institution differ from those of a traditional company.<\/p>\n
435. \u2013 Consequently, credit institutions wishing to carry out a European merger must check that the legal systems applicable to the companies taking part in the merger recognize the existence of foreign establishments. If this first prerequisite is met, companies must then ensure that there are no provisions hostile to cross-border mergers.<\/p>\n
2\/ The absence of provisions hostile to cross-border mergers<\/p>\n
436. \u2013 The legal systems of the companies participating in the operation must not contain any provision whose purpose or effect is to oppose international mergers. In this case, any risk of rejection of a law of a Member State by the international public order of another Member State seems to have been eliminated since the transposition of the various European directives and, more particularly, of the third. Moreover, countries, such as Italy or Spain, expressly recognize in their law the possibility of carrying out such operations. Others, without having adopted specific provisions, such as France, do not oppose it. Some, however, still appear reluctant. This is the case with Germany, which no doubt fears<\/p>\n
437. \u2013 Thus, these two preconditions are necessary. However, they are not sufficient, since it is also necessary to determine the legal regime applicable to the operation, taking into consideration the legal systems to which the companies involved in the merger are subject.<\/p>\n
B\/ The distribution key between the distributive and the cumulative<\/p>\n
438. \u2013 It is first necessary to seek the rule of conflict of law applicable in the two legal systems. This will be determined by taking into account the fact that all legal systems in the Member States retain the lex societatis which can be defined as the national law applicable to the company. This governs, in particular, the constitution, the formalities of publication, the issue of securities and their regime, the internal organization, the functioning, the ability to contract, the powers of the bodies, the dissolution and the liquidation of the Company. The application of the law of the real seat or the law of incorporation as the case may be, leads to this conclusion indiscriminately.<\/p>\n
439. \u2013 The law applicable to the operation must then be determined. In this respect, this identification is delicate because of the difficulty linked to the participation of companies of different nationalities, this obstacle not being solved by the identification of the lex societatis.<\/p>\n
440 \u2013 Indeed, several laws are intended to apply to the principle, the effects and the conduct of the merger. If we reason within the framework of a cross-border merger involving two companies, the respective national laws are necessarily in competition. This affirmation is valid at each stage of the operation: the lex societatis of the new company or of the absorbing company, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that of any absorbed company. But these laws will not, in principle, be applied cumulatively; in other words, it will not be necessary for each company to fulfill all the conditions required by the various laws. It will suffice for the absorbing company to observe the rules of its own personal status to integrate the other company.<\/p>\n
441. \u2013 It will then be appropriate to proceed with a distributive application of the laws for internal procedures (1). This remains the case most commonly encountered, during the various stages leading each of the companies to approve the operation and allow it to be carried out. On the other hand, we will have to make a cumulative application of the two rights involved, when it comes to the elements of the merger of interest to the two companies on a bilateral basis, that is to say when the relations between the parties are directly in question. (2). This is essentially the case with the content and form of the merger agreement.<\/p>\n
1\/ The distributive application of the laws of the companies concerned to internal procedures<\/p>\n
442. \u2013 Distributive application consists in applying to the operations carried out within each of the companies participating in the merger their respective national law alone. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between the situation of the acquiring company (a) and the situation of the absorbed company (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ The situation of the acquiring company<\/p>\n
443. \u2013 The lex societatis of the absorbing company governs the operations to be carried out in order to enable it to receive the assets of the absorbed. This law alone will apply to the various decisions that the acquiring company must take, as well as to the formalities that it must complete during the merger process. Thus, for a company governed by French law, this concerns the appointment by the competent court of a contribution auditor, the convocation and the meeting of the board of directors deciding on the principle of the merger and convening the meeting. It is also about the establishment of the reports of the board of directors, the auditor of the contributions and the auditors, the methods of convocation, the quorum and majority rules relating to the extraordinary general meeting as well as all the formalities to be carried out by the acquiring company. The provisions of the Commercial Code and the decree of 03\/23\/1967 are then applicable.<\/p>\n
444. \u2013 Although, in accordance with the third directive, the universal transfer of assets is recognized by the various Member States, some of them apply it only in the case of internal mergers. This is the case with English law, which admits this concept when it comes to a merger between two companies incorporated in the United Kingdom, but does not recognize it in the case of a cross-border merger. Thus, for example, when the acquiring company is a company governed by English law and the absorbed company a company governed by French law, English law allows that the latter, once absorbed, will cease to exist. However, insofar as French law will apply to the transmission of assets, English law will recognize that these are to be deemed to have been transferred under the terms of the merger agreement. The same will not apply to the liabilities of the absorbed company. Also, the solution to obtain an effect equivalent to that resulting from the universal transmission of the assets, with regard to the liabilities, then consists in having the acquiring English company, party to the merger agreement, subscribe to a unilateral and irrevocable commitment. Under the terms of the latter, called \u201cdeed poll\u201d, this company will undertake to assume all the liabilities of the absorbed company. then consists in having the acquiring English company, party to the merger agreement, subscribe to a unilateral and irrevocable commitment. Under the terms of the latter, called \u201cdeed poll\u201d, this company will undertake to assume all the liabilities of the acquired company. then consists in having the acquiring English company, party to the merger agreement, subscribe to a unilateral and irrevocable commitment. Under the terms of the latter, called \u201cdeed poll\u201d, this company will undertake to assume all the liabilities of the absorbed company.<\/p>\n
445. \u2013 It is this solution that was implemented during the merger by absorption of Barclays SA by Barclays PLC. This case concerns the completion of an international merger of companies resulting from the absorption by an English parent company, Barclays Bank PLC, of \u200b\u200bits French subsidiary, Barclays Bank SA, incorporated as a public limited company.<\/p>\n
The extraordinary general meeting of shareholders of Barclays Bank SA on 06\/25\/1993 took note of the merger project of 05\/18\/1993 and its amendment of 06\/22\/1993. Barclays Bank SA transferred, by way of merger, to Barclays Bank PLC all of its assets for a net amount of 1,549,087,424.99 francs. It was noted that Barclays Bank PLC holding all the shares of Barclays Bank SA, there was no need for a capital increase of Barclays Bank PLC, nor for an exchange of Barclays Bank SA shares for Barclays Bank PLC shares. . Thus, the merger project was purely and simply approved. The board of directors of Barclays Bank PLC has taken note of the approval by the extraordinary general meeting of Barclays Bank SA of the merger absorption.<\/p>\n
This merger was therefore approved and finalized on 06\/30\/1993 with retroactive effect from 01\/01\/1993. It resulted in the automatic dissolution of Barclays Bank SA without any liquidation operation, all of its assets having been transferred to Barclays Bank PLC.<\/p>\n
In this case, the merger was carried out in accordance with the provisions of article 1844-4, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code and articles 371 and following of the law of 07\/24\/1966 on commercial companies.<\/p>\n
446. \u2013 A second more recent cross-border merger can be mentioned. This is the merger of Sema Group plc and Financi\u00e8re Sema under which the former, a company listed on the London Stock Exchange, absorbed the latter, a public limited company governed by French law which itself held 41% of the former .<\/p>\n
Like the aforementioned operation, this merger was subject to Article 1844-4, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code and to Articles 371 et seq. of the law of 07\/24\/1966.<\/p>\n
In this case, the purpose of the proposed merger was such that, through the effect of the universal transfer of the assets of Financi\u00e8re Sema to Sema Group plc, the latter should have received its own shares as a contribution. However, English company law does not allow a company to acquire its own shares and hold them until they can be cancelled. Consequently, it was necessary to proceed simultaneously with the universal transfer of the assets of Financi\u00e8re Sema and the cancellation by Sema Group plc of its own shares previously held by Financi\u00e8re Sema. This cancellation was carried out in accordance with English law pursuant to a \u201cscheme of arrangement\u201d, concluded between Financi\u00e8re Sema, its shareholders and Sema Group plc, and governed by Section 425 of the Companies Act applicable to the latter company.<\/p>\n
The cancellation resulted in the accounts of Sema Group plc by the reduction of the issued share capital item with, in return, the creation of a reserve item. The company governed by English law simultaneously issued new shares to Financi\u00e8re Sema shareholders by deducting the entire amount from this reserve item.<\/p>\n
The merger, which was linked to the fulfillment of conditions and, in particular, to the effective cancellation of the shares of Sema Group plc held by Financi\u00e8re Sema, was automatically carried out on the date on which the \u201cscheme of arrangement \u201c.<\/p>\n
447. \u2013 A third example of a merger in the banking sector between two companies subject to different rights can be found in the press specializing in legal announcements. This concerns the absorption of a company governed by Portuguese law, PSA Credito Sociedade Financeira Para Aquisicoes a Credito SA (PSA Credito) by its parent company governed by French law, Banque PSA Finance Holding (BPSAFH).<\/p>\n
Due to the status of banking institution granted to BPSAFH, and in application of the second European directive 89\/646 of 15\/12\/1989 on banking coordination, this merger had a purpose. The aim was to strengthen the coordination of the credit activities of the subsidiaries of this company by replacing them with branches.<\/p>\n
The merger project was approved by the extraordinary general meeting of BPSAFH shareholders held on 06\/16\/1997. In addition, it noted that the merger would take place without a capital increase of BPSAFH, in accordance with Article 372-1, paragraph 2-1\u00b0 of the law of 07\/24\/1966, BPSAFH being the owner of 100% of the capital of PSA Credito.<\/p>\n
Subjecting the operation to the provisions of article 372-1 of the law of 07\/24\/1966, the merger agreement provided that PSA Credito transmitted to BPSAFH all the elements making up its assets, in the state in which they would be on the final completion date of the merger. This resulted from the registration, on 01\/07\/1997, at the registry of the Commercial Court of Lisbon, of the deed received by the Portuguese notary noting the fulfillment of the condition precedent set out in the merger contract. This operation was carried out without retroactivity. The effective date having been fixed for 01\/07\/1997, it was on this date that the merger-absorption was carried out and that the company PSA Credito was automatically dissolved.<\/p>\n
448. \u2013 Finally, a fourth example of international merger can be cited. This is the merger-absorption, during the summer of 1999, of Dexia-France by Dexia-Belgium.<\/p>\n
449. \u2013 All these international mergers concerned the banking and finance sector. As we have already specified, these establishments have indeed an interest in establishing themselves abroad by means of branches because of the importance of the guarantees required in their regard. When they act through branches, these guarantees are assessed at head office level, whereas each subsidiary would be required to present its own guarantees. Thus, it is necessary to take into consideration the banking specificity to understand the multiplication of these European mergers in the banking system.<\/p>\n
450. \u2013 The realization of these operations has confirmed practitioners and academics in the opinion that international mergers are not always practically impossible. In the current state of positive law, carrying out such operations demonstrates that despite the obstacles they come up against, in the absence of specific European regulations, they nevertheless appear possible. The law applicable to the foreign company party to the merger must then recognize the validity of such an operation. In addition, the requirements set out by the two laws applicable to the acquiring company and to the absorbed company must be complied with on a distributive basis.<\/p>\n
b\/ The situation of the absorbed company<\/p>\n
451. \u2013 The resolutions relating to the approval of the merger and the decision to dissolve which will be adopted by the general meeting of the absorbed company which will disappear as a result of the merger are subject to its own lex societatis. Only the internal law of the absorbed is then intended to apply.<\/p>\n
452. \u2013 A pitfall may nevertheless arise for this company when its capital is not wholly owned by the absorbing company. According to a classic conception, the absorption of a French company by a foreign company entails a transfer of the head office and therefore a change of nationality because the absorbed company extends into the absorbing company. This transaction must therefore, pursuant to Article L. 225-97 of the Commercial Code, be authorized by the extraordinary general meeting of the absorbed company ruling, not by a two-thirds majority, but by unanimity.<\/p>\n
453. \u2013 Tal an\u00e1lisis puede ser discutido.\u00a0En efecto, la sociedad adquirida se disuelve y desaparece por el propio efecto de la fusi\u00f3n.\u00a0Por lo tanto, es dif\u00edcil ver c\u00f3mo podr\u00eda mantenerse su personalidad jur\u00eddica.\u00a0S\u00f3lo subsiste su patrimonio, que a su vez fue objeto de una transmisi\u00f3n universal en beneficio de la sociedad absorbente.\u00a0Por lo tanto, el art\u00edculo L. 225-97 del C\u00f3digo de Comercio no puede aplicarse a una fusi\u00f3n transfronteriza porque no puede haber traslado del domicilio social ya que la sociedad absorbida se disolvi\u00f3 durante esta operaci\u00f3n.\u00a0Por lo tanto, la decisi\u00f3n de la junta general de los absorbidos debe tomarse por la mayor\u00eda requerida para una decisi\u00f3n de disoluci\u00f3n.<\/span><\/p>\n454. \u2013 Tambi\u00e9n podr\u00eda argumentarse, con base en los principios del derecho comunitario, que ser\u00eda discriminatorio exigir un qu\u00f3rum y una mayor\u00eda m\u00e1s altos para una fusi\u00f3n entre dos empresas de la UE que para una fusi\u00f3n interna.\u00a0Pero este argumento no pudo ser recibido favorablemente, debido a la posici\u00f3n adoptada por el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas en la sentencia Daily Mail.\u00a0Seg\u00fan esta decisi\u00f3n, \u201clos art\u00edculos 52 y 58 del Tratado\u2026 no confieren, en el estado actual del derecho comunitario, ning\u00fan derecho a una sociedad constituida de conformidad con la legislaci\u00f3n de un Estado miembro y que tenga su domicilio social en \u00e9l, para trasladar su sede de direcci\u00f3n a otro Estado miembro\u201d.\u00a0As\u00ed, en el estado actual de la jurisprudencia europea,<\/span><\/p>\n455. \u2013 No obstante, indiscutiblemente, se pretende aplicar el derecho interno de la sociedad adquirida.\u00a0Adem\u00e1s, los dos ordenamientos jur\u00eddicos deben tenerse en cuenta de forma acumulativa en lo que se refiere a elementos vinculados al fondo de la operaci\u00f3n, como el contrato de fusi\u00f3n.<\/span><\/p>\n2\/ Aplicaci\u00f3n acumulativa de las leyes de las sociedades concernidas al acuerdo de fusi\u00f3n<\/span><\/p>\n456. \u2013 El m\u00e9todo acumulativo consiste en aplicar los ordenamientos jur\u00eddicos de que se trate combin\u00e1ndolos.\u00a0Este ser\u00e1 el caso cuando las empresas involucradas en la operaci\u00f3n suscriban el o los convenios en los que se establezcan los distintos t\u00e9rminos de la fusi\u00f3n en s\u00ed.\u00a0As\u00ed, la exigencia de un acuerdo de fusi\u00f3n y, en su caso, de un contrato posterior, su forma, bajo firma privada o notarial, su contenido, la fecha de efectos de la fusi\u00f3n, o las nulidades que puedan afectar a estos contratos, se regir\u00e1n por las disposiciones acumulativas de los dos ordenamientos jur\u00eddicos en cuesti\u00f3n.\u00a0En caso de diferencias entre las disposiciones de estas leyes, se aplicar\u00e1n las normas m\u00e1s restrictivas.<\/span><\/p>\n457. \u2013 With regard to the form of the merger contract and, where applicable, the subsequent contract, certain legal systems require an authentic act, unlike French law.\u00a0It is therefore appropriate to apply the two legal systems cumulatively.\u00a0Logically, if a company from a Member State prescribing the authentic form merges with a company subject to the legislation of another State which does not impose such a formalism, the merger contract must take the authentic form.\u00a0This implies the participation of the notary of the country whose legislation requires such intervention.<\/span><\/p>\n458. \u2013 Por lo tanto, parece que las fusiones transfronterizas tropiezan con numerosos obst\u00e1culos que, en la mayor\u00eda de los casos, dificultan su realizaci\u00f3n.\u00a0De hecho, subsisten muchos obst\u00e1culos para la realizaci\u00f3n de tales transacciones, el principal derivado de la necesidad de obtener el acuerdo un\u00e1nime de los accionistas de la empresa adquirida.\u00a0Todas las dificultades a las que se enfrentan las fusiones transfronterizas en la Uni\u00f3n Europea solo pueden eliminarse realmente con la adopci\u00f3n de la d\u00e9cima directiva o un texto equivalente.\u00a0Finalmente, una vez superados estos obst\u00e1culos a la concentraci\u00f3n transfronteriza, quedar\u00e1 un \u00faltimo problema: la internacionalizaci\u00f3n de las operaciones bancarias y financieras.\u00a0Las entidades financieras tendr\u00e1n que aprender a controlar los riesgos asociados a las situaciones jur\u00eddicas,\u00a0econ\u00f3micos y financieros diferentes a los de su pa\u00eds de origen y, a menudo, de car\u00e1cter multinacional.\u00a0Los especialistas legales tendr\u00e1n entonces que proponer los cambios necesarios para enfrentar este nuevo desaf\u00edo.<\/span><\/p>\nSection 2: Developments likely to favor European banking concentrations<\/p>\n
459. \u2013 The adoption of new European business groups (\u00a7 1) and the directive on public offers (\u00a7 2) constitute favorable developments for European banking concentrations.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1: The adoption of new European business groupings taking account of banking specificity<\/p>\n
460. \u2013 Two new business groupings will certainly encourage European banking concentrations. This is on the one hand the European Society (A) and on the other hand the European Cooperative Society (B).<\/p>\n
A\/ The European company<\/p>\n
461. \u2013 Various proposals for regulations or directives on the European company were presented by the European Commission to the Council. These were discussed at length, then blocked and rejected due to disagreements between member states on the issue of worker participation in administrative bodies.<\/p>\n
462. \u2013 Indeed, Spain did not want to see a method of employee participation imposed on it that did not correspond to its \u201ccorporate culture\u201d. However, the draft directive provided that in the event of a merger between two European companies, the employee participation model could prevail, provided that 25% of the employees concerned by the merger already benefited from a management participation scheme of the company. Spain refused this \u201cpremium\u201d for participation and wanted the choice of employee status to be made by majority vote.<\/p>\n
463. \u2013 Enfin, apr\u00e8s trente ans d\u2019un d\u00e9bat infructueux suscit\u00e9 par le volet social, opposant d\u2019une part un mod\u00e8le allemand, inspir\u00e9 par la cogestion, et un mod\u00e8le latin plus lib\u00e9ral, le r\u00e8glement sur la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne, comme nouvel instrument communautaire, a fait l\u2019objet d\u2019un accord politique surprise au sommet europ\u00e9en de Nice le 08\/12\/2000.\u00a0Cet accord a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 l\u2019adoption du r\u00e8glement communautaire n\u00b0 2157\/2001 du 08\/10\/2001.\u00a0Celle-ci est accompagn\u00e9e d\u2019une directive 2001\/86 du 08\/10\/2001 compl\u00e9tant le statut de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne en ce qui concerne l\u2019implication des travailleurs.\u00a0Un compromis a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 trouv\u00e9.\u00a0Elle pr\u00e9voit que les pays qui le souhaitent, en l\u2019occurrence l\u2019Espagne, ne peuvent transposer dans leur l\u00e9gislation nationale les dispositions de la directive relatives \u00e0 la r\u00e8gle des 25 %.\u00a0En retour,\u00a0aucune soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne pr\u00e9parant une fusion n\u2019a le droit d\u2019\u00e9tablir son si\u00e8ge social en Espagne.\u00a0L\u2019Allemagne craignait que des entreprises allemandes ne s\u2019enregistrent en Espagne pour \u00e9chapper \u00e0 un syst\u00e8me restrictif.<\/p>\n
464. \u2013 Le statut de soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne constitue ainsi un apport fondamental pour la r\u00e9alisation des concentrations bancaires europ\u00e9ennes (1).\u00a0Par ailleurs, il convient de souligner que la sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 bancaire est prise en compte dans ce m\u00e9canisme de concentration (2).<\/p>\n
1\/ Une contribution fondamentale \u00e0 la r\u00e9alisation des concentrations bancaires europ\u00e9ennes<\/p>\n
465. \u2013 Cet apport est li\u00e9 aux sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne qui constitue un m\u00e9canisme de concentration (a) permettant l\u2019europ\u00e9anisation (b).<\/p>\n
a\/ Un m\u00e9canisme de concentration sp\u00e9cifique<\/p>\n
466. \u2013 L\u2019article 2 \u00a7 1 du r\u00e8glement communautaire n\u00b0 2157\/2001 du 08\/10\/2001 dispose que \u00ab les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s anonymes \u00e9num\u00e9r\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019annexe I, constitu\u00e9es selon le droit d\u2019un \u00c9tat membre et ayant leur si\u00e8ge statutaire soci\u00e9t\u00e9 et leur si\u00e8ge social l\u2019administration de la Communaut\u00e9 peut constituer une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne par voie de fusion si au moins deux d\u2019entre elles sont r\u00e9gies par le droit d\u2019\u00c9tats membres diff\u00e9rents \u00bb.<\/p>\n
467. \u2013 La fusion pr\u00e9vue \u00e0 l\u2019article 17 du r\u00e8glement peut prendre la forme soit d\u2019une fusion-absorption, soit d\u2019une fusion par constitution d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 nouvelle.<\/p>\n
468. \u2013 La sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9 de la fusion envisag\u00e9e par le r\u00e8glement est que l\u2019op\u00e9ration s\u2019accompagne n\u00e9cessairement de la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne.\u00a0Ainsi, lorsque la fusion consiste en l\u2019absorption d\u2019une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 par une autre, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 absorbante doit n\u00e9cessairement se transformer en soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne lors de l\u2019op\u00e9ration de fusion.\u00a0Lorsque la fusion entra\u00eene la disparition des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s qui fusionnent pour donner naissance \u00e0 une nouvelle soci\u00e9t\u00e9, cette nouvelle soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est n\u00e9cessairement une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne.\u00a0Il en d\u00e9coule une premi\u00e8re cons\u00e9quence : en toutes circonstances la date de r\u00e9alisation de la fusion est n\u00e9cessairement la m\u00eame que la date d\u2019immatriculation de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n
469. \u2013 Il convient de noter que la r\u00e9glementation proc\u00e8de, conform\u00e9ment au principe de subsidiarit\u00e9, \u00e0 une large attribution de comp\u00e9tence aux lois nationales.\u00a0Ainsi, la protection de tous les int\u00e9r\u00eats susceptibles d\u2019\u00eatre affect\u00e9s par une fusion leur est laiss\u00e9e.<\/p>\n
470. \u2013 Quant \u00e0 ce dont traite le r\u00e8glement lui-m\u00eame, il apporte de nombreuses simplifications.\u00a0Il d\u00e9crit en d\u00e9tail le contenu du projet de fusion.<\/p>\n
471. \u2013 Les simplifications de fond sont particuli\u00e8rement visibles.\u00a0Par exemple, l\u2019obligation de d\u00e9signer ce que la loi fran\u00e7aise appelle un commissaire \u00e0 la fusion dans chaque soci\u00e9t\u00e9 participant \u00e0 l\u2019op\u00e9ration peut \u00eatre remplac\u00e9e par la d\u00e9signation d\u2019un expert ind\u00e9pendant unique.\u00a0Ceci \u00e0 la seule condition que cet expert soit d\u00e9sign\u00e9 par une juridiction ou une autorit\u00e9 administrative.<\/p>\n
472. \u2013 Furthermore, when the merger is complete, ie when the resulting European company has been registered, the nullity of the operation can no longer be pronounced. This solution is made possible by the existence of a procedure involving the purging of defects in the constitution of the European company. This is the establishment of a prior control of the legality of the merger. This control must be carried out by a court, a notary or any authority that national law would like to invest. The accomplishment of this control is materialized by the delivery of a certificate of legality. This document is required for the registration of the European company resulting from the merger. Only the lack of legality control could lead to a merger being called into question,<\/p>\n
473. \u2013 If the European company is a concentration mechanism, it is correlatively an instrument of Europeanisation.<\/p>\n
b\/ A specific instrument of Europeanization<\/p>\n
474. \u2013 This regulation on the European company is essential to promote European banking concentration. This will indeed allow the creation of a common statute for public limited companies, within the European Union, essential within the framework of a single market and a single currency so that the banks of different Member States merge . This removes one of the obstacles to bank mergers. Many banks will certainly adopt this European company statute. This will thus allow all the subsidiaries and employees of a transnational group to live according to the same legal and financial rules wherever they are located in Europe.<\/p>\n
475. \u2013 The fundamental new element is the existence of a society which is not linked to the nationality of a particular State. European society is \u201cat home everywhere\u201d in the Community territory. She has a real European nationality. This is important both practically and in principle. Concretely, the company which will adopt the social form of European company will be able to act in the States without having to constitute national subsidiaries for each of the countries. This corresponds to pecuniary savings but also to a kind of economy of legal means because it will not have to manage the multiplicity of national laws. Finally, in terms of principles, it should be noted that for the first time legal persons of European nationality have been created. This is fundamental for the banks because of the protectionism of the Member States in the face of transnational banking concentrations. This last argument highlights the need to take account of banking specificity.<\/p>\n
2\/ A necessary taking into account of banking specificity<\/p>\n
476. \u2013 Concerning the constitution of the European company, a minimum capital of 120,000 euros is provided for. Banking specificity implies the non-application of this provision to banks. Indeed, a derogation is provided for in sectors where certain Member States require a higher capital. This is indeed the case for French banks which must have a minimum capital equal to 5 million euros.<\/p>\n
477. \u2013 In addition, Article 9 \u00a7 3 of the Regulation provides that if the nature of the activities carried out by a European company is governed by specific provisions of national legislation, these apply in full to this company. Thus, the Regulation confirms the essential role of national mandatory laws. It is therefore devoted to the application of specific provisions to banking activities. These relate to access to banking activity and the supervision of these activities.<\/p>\n
478. \u2013 Concerning the functioning of this European company, Community law has sometimes purely and simply renounced regulating a matter. It therefore referred directly to the national law of the Member State of the seat, subject to the application of such and such a directive. This is the case of article 62 relating to the annual accounts of European companies operating credit institutions or financial institutions which enshrines a banking specificity. This provides that European companies \u201cwhich are credit institutions or financial institutions are subject, with regard to the preparation of their annual accounts and, where applicable, their consolidated accounts, including the management report accompanying them, their control and their publicity, the rules provided for in the national law of the Member State of the registered office pursuant to Directive 2000\/12\/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20\/03\/2000 concerning access to the activity of credit institutions and its exercise \u201c. Thus, the European companies that will emerge will all come from the same normative texts, ie Community Regulation No. 2157\/2001 of 08\/10\/2001 and Directive 2001\/86 of 08\/10\/2001. However, they will hardly look alike. Indeed, different corporate and banking rules may apply depending on the applicable national law. the European companies that will be created will all come from the same normative texts, ie Community Regulation n\u00b0 2157\/2001 of 08\/10\/2001 and Directive 2001\/86 of 08\/10\/2001. However, they will hardly look alike. Indeed, different corporate and banking rules may apply depending on the applicable national law. the European companies that will be created will all come from the same normative texts, ie Community Regulation n\u00b0 2157\/2001 of 08\/10\/2001 and Directive 2001\/86 of 08\/10\/2001. However, they will hardly look alike. Indeed, different corporate and banking rules may apply depending on the applicable national law.<\/p>\n
479. \u2013 Moreover, it is indeed a capital company with a corporate name and a registered office, located in the State where the company actually has its administrative headquarters. The possibility of merging is therefore only open to joint-stock companies. This excludes SARL, general partnerships and limited partnerships. Concerning SARLs, the difficulty can be ruled out from the outset because due to the specificity of credit institutions, this type of structure is not accepted for the exercise of banking activities. Concerning general partnerships and limited partnerships, these should first be transformed into public limited companies before being able to obtain the status of European company.<\/p>\n
480. \u2013 Finally, from an internal point of view, the resemblance to the public limited company scheme with shareholders\u2019 meetings, a management body and a president able to represent the company towards third parties is enshrined. . Nevertheless, the corporate functioning must necessarily take into consideration the banking specificity. Indeed, according to French banking law, the effective determination of the orientation of the activity of credit institutions must be ensured by at least two people. This precautionary principle requires the appointment of two accountable managers.<\/p>\n
481. \u2013 Consequently, the creation of the statute for a European company constitutes an essential development for Community law. The same applies to the adoption of the statute for a European cooperative society.<\/p>\n
B\/ The European cooperative society<\/p>\n
482. \u2013 Community Regulation No. 1435\/2003 of the Council of 22\/07\/2003 as well as Community Directive 2003\/72 EC of the Council of 22\/07\/2003 allow cooperative enterprises operating in the territory of several Member States to acquire a single legal personality. The European cooperative society is defined as a company having legal personality and whose capital subscribed by its members is divided into shares. Its head office, fixed by the statutes, must be located within the Community and must correspond to the place where its central administration is located. The European cooperative society has legal personality from its registration in the State of its headquarters.<\/p>\n
483. \u2013 A true legal statute for the European cooperative society is thus put in place. Indeed, these new texts allow the creation of a cooperative by persons residing in different Member States or by legal entities established in different Member States. The European Cooperative Society therefore has the possibility of carrying out its activities throughout the internal market with a single legal personality, rules and structure. It can therefore expand its cross-border operations without having to set up a network of subsidiaries. This is a time and money saving factor.<\/p>\n
This new status of European cooperative society is parallel to that of the European company, but takes into account the specific characteristics of cooperatives. Thus, unlike the European Company, a European Cooperative Society can be created from scratch but also by merger or conversion of an existing company. Cooperatives from several countries can now merge in the form of a European cooperative society and a national cooperative, having activities in a Member State other than that in which it has its registered office, can be converted into a European cooperative without prior dissolution.<\/p>\n
484. \u2013 The main purpose of the European cooperative society is to meet the needs and\/or develop the economic and\/or social activities of its members. An evolution of the capital requires neither modification of the statutes, nor publicity. The bodies of the European cooperative society are the general assembly and a dual management\/supervision system. The management body is appointed and dismissed by the supervisory body. Certain operations, such as acquisitions, require the authorization of the supervisory body or a deliberation of the general meeting. The European Cooperative Society may offer for subscription to any interested person shares which do not confer on their holders the right to vote. Finally, the European cooperative society is subject to the legislation of the state of its headquarters.<\/p>\n
485. \u2013 Banking specificity must necessarily be taken into account. Indeed, the Regulation provides for a minimum capital of 30,000 euros to set up such a company. However, it specifies that the legislation of a Member State providing for a higher subscribed capital for legal entities carrying out certain types of activities applies to European cooperative societies having their registered office in that Member State. Consequently, French cooperative banks wishing to adopt this social form must have a minimum capital equal to 5 million euros.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, the creation of new European business groups constitutes an essential development for Community law. The adoption of the directive on public offers is also fundamental.<\/p>\n
\u00a7 2: The directive on public offers<\/p>\n
486. \u2013 The lack of harmonization between the various European regulations relating to public offers and the difficulties of arriving at a thirteenth European directive on public offers have often been criticized.<\/p>\n
487. \u2013 These criticisms are now outdated, since, after more than ten years of discussions, the directive on public offers has been adopted.<\/p>\n
488. \u2013 It is obvious that the transposition of this directive remains essential in order, in particular, to harmonize the conditions of jurisdiction between the various national authorities in charge of public tender procedures. It is part of a legal environment that should promote the smooth running of public offers. It must also facilitate cross-border public offers with the aim of consolidating the single European market. Indeed, the trend towards cross-border concentration will only be able to flourish fully if economic operators have a single set of regulations to carry out these operations.<\/p>\n
489. \u2013 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ambitions of the Community authorities have been gradually scaled down. Several versions of the directive have been proposed: the first in 1989 and amended in 1990, the second in 1996 and amended in 1997, the third in 2002. While the three versions state the same general principles for the conduct of takeover bids and the protection of minority shareholders, they are distinguished by the method used. The 1989\/1990 version aimed to establish detailed and uniform common rules and thus specified the conditions for applying the principles set out, whereas the latest versions no longer include provisions specifying these procedures. They merely set out the principles and ask the Member States to establish their mode of application.<\/p>\n
490. \u2013 Thus, Member States must ensure, in the event of acquisition of control of a company, that the rules in force either require the launch of a bid or provide for an equivalent mechanism. It is up to the Member States to set the method of calculating the percentage of voting rights conferring control. They are also responsible for ensuring compliance with the following principles:<\/p>\n
\u2013 all holders of securities of the target company who belong to the same category must benefit from equivalent treatment; in addition, if a person acquires control of a company, other security holders must be protected;<\/p>\n
\u2013 the recipients of the offer must have sufficient time and information to be able to make an informed decision on the offer; when advising the holders of securities, the administrative or management body of the target company must present its opinion on the repercussions of the implementation of the offer on employment, employment conditions and company business sites;<\/p>\n
\u2013 the administrative or management body of the target company must act in the interest of the company as a whole;<\/p>\n
\u2013 there must not be any distorted markets for the securities of the offeree company, the offeror company or any other company concerned by the offer so that the rise or fall in the prices of the securities becomes artificial and the operation markets are disrupted;<\/p>\n
\u2013 an offeror should announce an offer only after satisfying itself that it can supply the full consideration in cash, if such consideration has been offered, and after having taken all reasonable steps to ensure the supply of any other kind counterparty;<\/p>\n
\u2013 the target company must not be hampered in its activities by an offer for its shares beyond a reasonable time.<\/p>\n
491. \u2013 Domestic law is already in harmony with the Thirteenth Directive, which was moreover taken into account in the 1989 reform. As the latest version leaves much more latitude than the 1989-1990 version, its adoption will not result in a change in domestic law. But not all Member States are in harmony with this draft directive.<\/p>\n
Conclusion of Title 1:<\/p>\n
492. \u2013 We have tried to demonstrate that the banking and financial specificity is taken into account in the concentration mechanisms in domestic and Community law.<\/p>\n
493. \u2013 In national law, this banking specificity first materializes through an independent understanding of the concept of control. Then, this banking and financial specificity is taken into consideration in the process of implementing the takeover. Indeed, concerning the restructuring of defaulting capital, when the objectives of the law of insolvency proceedings no longer agree with those of the law of financial activities, derogatory provisions are added to the common law still applicable. The same applies to, in particular, public offers and privatizations. Finally, specific banking and financial provisions are intended to apply during the merger implementation process. For example, the banking and financial specificity is taken into account in the evaluation of the entities and in the constitution of the new company resulting from the merger. Thus, the consideration of banking rules entails an attack on the free choice of the corporate form by the partners. Moreover, the banking rules derogate from the provisions of company law concerning the minimum capital of joint-stock companies.<\/p>\n
494. \u2013 In Community law, the protectionism of certain Member States reveals the specificity of banking. Moreover, the significant obstacles to European mergers are, in particular, linked to the insufficiency of rules from a European source. This is materialized by the absence of coordination of the European rules governing mergers with banking law, by the insufficient coordination of the provisions applicable to banks in Europe as well as by the absence of a legal regime for cross-border mergers. Nevertheless, developments, such as the adoption of new European business groupings taking account of banking specificity are likely to favor these European banking concentrations.<\/p>\n
495. \u2013 Banking and financial specificity are therefore taken into account in concentration mechanisms. Correlatively, the specificity of the controls applicable to these operations is legitimized by the protection of the banking and financial system.<\/p>\n
Title 2: The specificity of controls legitimized by the protection of the banking and financial system<\/p>\n
496. \u2013 The law of 24\/01\/1984, known as the banking law, replaced a framework that had become unsuitable with provisions common to all establishments now under the authority of the same supervisory bodies. It was modified by the law on the modernization of financial activities of 02\/07\/1996 which enshrines the unity of the financial market while maintaining the specificity of financial intermediation in relation to credit businesses. This has profoundly transformed the sector by establishing imperfect competition, but which has allowed the development of the movement of concentration.<\/p>\n
497. \u2013 Thus, free competition is instituted, but this freedom is corrected by a series of controls tending to control and regulate it. The regulation allows the organization, the maintenance and the durability of a balance in a whole. \u201cRegulation is then a kind of support for the economy between abandonment and being put under guardianship\u201d. A balance in the sector is built and maintained by regulation because the sector is both open to competition and not abandoned to competition.<\/p>\n
498. \u2013 On parle de droit r\u00e9glementaire parce qu\u2019on observe un nouveau rapport entre le droit et l\u2019\u00e9conomie.\u00a0C\u2019est une relation d\u2019organisation et de contrainte d\u00e9tach\u00e9e du passage oblig\u00e9 par l\u2019Etat et son organisation administrative.\u00a0Cette loi de r\u00e9gulation est une loi r\u00e9gie par l\u2019analyse t\u00e9l\u00e9ologique avec les dangers qu\u2019elle repr\u00e9sente.\u00a0Au sens technique du terme, cela signifie que la fin justifie et cr\u00e9e les moyens.\u00a0La m\u00e9thode requise est donc avant tout guid\u00e9e par l\u2019efficacit\u00e9, qui est le corollaire de l\u2019instrumentalisation du droit.\u00a0Par cons\u00e9quent, l\u2019objectif r\u00e9glementaire \u00e9tablit les pouvoirs de ce droit.\u00a0En m\u00eame temps, il les fonde et il les limite.\u00a0Les autorit\u00e9s en charge de la r\u00e9gulation doivent disposer de tous les pouvoirs n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 la r\u00e9gulation, mais uniquement de ceux qui sont indispensables.\u00a0De la m\u00eame mani\u00e8re,\u00a0la loi est un instrument parmi d\u2019autres pour atteindre les objectifs recherch\u00e9s.\u00a0Logiquement, la pr\u00e9servation de l\u2019\u00e9quilibre justifie des solutions non directement d\u00e9duites de la loi mais sans lesquelles la r\u00e9glementation est invalide.<\/p>\n
499. \u2013 Si la doctrine est unanime \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer que le droit boursier constitue incontestablement un droit de r\u00e9gulation, l\u2019affirmation est moins claire pour le droit bancaire.\u00a0En effet, le syst\u00e8me bancaire est traditionnellement tr\u00e8s r\u00e9glement\u00e9.\u00a0N\u00e9anmoins, en se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant aux d\u00e9finitions de la r\u00e9gulation propos\u00e9es par Mme Frison-Roche, on peut souligner que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est r\u00e9gul\u00e9.\u00a0En effet, dans un premier sens du terme, la r\u00e9gulation serait \u00ab une intervention de nature politique dans un secteur qui l\u2019exige parce que les int\u00e9r\u00eats de la Nation sont en jeu \u00bb.\u00a0Sans aucun doute, les r\u00e8gles applicables au secteur bancaire visent \u00e0 prot\u00e9ger le syst\u00e8me bancaire et, corr\u00e9lativement, \u00e0 d\u00e9fendre les int\u00e9r\u00eats de la nation.\u00a0Dans un deuxi\u00e8me type d\u2019utilisation,\u00a0la r\u00e9gulation interviendrait dans la mesure o\u00f9 \u00ab un secteur serait amen\u00e9 \u00e0 se d\u00e9ployer autour d\u2019une r\u00e8gle \u00e9conomiquement non spontan\u00e9e \u00bb.\u00a0Incontestablement, le respect des r\u00e8gles prudentielles n\u2019est pas spontan\u00e9.\u00a0C\u2019est pour cette raison que le l\u00e9gislateur a cr\u00e9\u00e9 des autorit\u00e9s bancaires charg\u00e9es de contr\u00f4ler leur application effective.\u00a0La troisi\u00e8me d\u00e9finition de la r\u00e9gulation propos\u00e9e en fait un \u00ab moyen dynamique de faire passer un secteur d\u2019un \u00e9tat \u00e0 un autre \u00bb.\u00a0Cependant, certes, la loi bancaire ainsi que les textes \u00e9labor\u00e9s par la suite ont g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 un processus de d\u00e9r\u00e9glementation permettant le passage d\u2019un syst\u00e8me bancaire r\u00e9gul\u00e9 \u00e0 un syst\u00e8me r\u00e9gul\u00e9.\u00a0Continuons notre argumentation.\u00a0\u00ab La r\u00e9gulation peut aussi \u00eatre la cons\u00e9quence d\u2019une d\u00e9cision politique,\u00a0lorsque le Parlement a jug\u00e9 opportun de laisser se d\u00e9velopper des comportements concurrentiels mais aussi jug\u00e9 n\u00e9cessaire de maintenir le secteur sous des imp\u00e9ratifs qui lui sont \u00e9trangers \u00bb.\u00a0La r\u00e9gulation est alors le \u00ab moyen dynamique de maintenir les grands \u00e9quilibres d\u2019un secteur \u00bb.\u00a0Elle constitue un ensemble de techniques d\u00e9finitivement rattach\u00e9es au secteur concern\u00e9.\u00a0A notre avis, l\u2019objectif du l\u00e9gislateur \u00e9tait d\u2019introduire une concurrence entre les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Cependant, il a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 guid\u00e9 par des imp\u00e9ratifs non concurrentiels lors de la conception des contr\u00f4les visant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, on peut consid\u00e9rer que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est r\u00e9gul\u00e9 par des autorit\u00e9s appliquant les proc\u00e9dures et r\u00e8gles prudentielles pr\u00e9vues par le Code mon\u00e9taire et financier.\u00a0La r\u00e9gulation est alors le \u00ab moyen dynamique de maintenir les grands \u00e9quilibres d\u2019un secteur \u00bb.\u00a0Elle constitue un ensemble de techniques d\u00e9finitivement rattach\u00e9es au secteur concern\u00e9.\u00a0A notre avis, l\u2019objectif du l\u00e9gislateur \u00e9tait d\u2019introduire une concurrence entre les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Cependant, il a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 guid\u00e9 par des imp\u00e9ratifs non concurrentiels lors de la conception des contr\u00f4les visant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, on peut consid\u00e9rer que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est r\u00e9gul\u00e9 par des autorit\u00e9s appliquant les proc\u00e9dures et r\u00e8gles prudentielles pr\u00e9vues par le Code mon\u00e9taire et financier.\u00a0La r\u00e9gulation est alors le \u00ab moyen dynamique de maintenir les grands \u00e9quilibres d\u2019un secteur \u00bb.\u00a0Elle constitue un ensemble de techniques d\u00e9finitivement rattach\u00e9es au secteur concern\u00e9.\u00a0A notre avis, l\u2019objectif du l\u00e9gislateur \u00e9tait d\u2019introduire une concurrence entre les \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit.\u00a0Cependant, il a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 guid\u00e9 par des imp\u00e9ratifs non concurrentiels lors de la conception des contr\u00f4les visant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, on peut consid\u00e9rer que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est r\u00e9gul\u00e9 par des autorit\u00e9s appliquant les proc\u00e9dures et r\u00e8gles prudentielles pr\u00e9vues par le Code mon\u00e9taire et financier.\u00a0elle a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 guid\u00e9e par des imp\u00e9ratifs non concurrentiels lors de la conception des contr\u00f4les visant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, on peut consid\u00e9rer que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est r\u00e9gul\u00e9 par des autorit\u00e9s appliquant les proc\u00e9dures et r\u00e8gles prudentielles pr\u00e9vues par le Code mon\u00e9taire et financier.\u00a0elle a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 guid\u00e9e par des imp\u00e9ratifs non concurrentiels lors de la conception des contr\u00f4les visant la stabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me bancaire.\u00a0En cons\u00e9quence, on peut consid\u00e9rer que le syst\u00e8me bancaire est r\u00e9gul\u00e9 par des autorit\u00e9s appliquant les proc\u00e9dures et r\u00e8gles prudentielles pr\u00e9vues par le Code mon\u00e9taire et financier.<\/p>\n
500. \u2013 Pr\u00e9cisons tout de suite que ce qui nous int\u00e9resse rel\u00e8ve de la r\u00e9gulation bancaire et boursi\u00e8re.\u00a0S\u2019agissant de la r\u00e9glementation bancaire, c\u2019est la r\u00e9glementation de l\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la profession qui est mise en \u0153uvre.\u00a0Celui-ci s\u2019exerce \u00e0 travers l\u2019agr\u00e9ment des \u00e9tablissements de cr\u00e9dit et le contr\u00f4le des participations qui prend la forme d\u2019une v\u00e9rification du maintien de l\u2019agr\u00e9ment initial.\u00a0S\u2019agissant donc du syst\u00e8me de r\u00e9gulation boursi\u00e8re, c\u2019est la r\u00e9gulation du march\u00e9 lui-m\u00eame qui est en cause.\u00a0En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, seule la r\u00e9gulation des offres publiques est demand\u00e9e.<\/p>\n
501. \u2013 Les op\u00e9rations de concentration sont donc soumises au contr\u00f4le de la loi bancaire qui veille g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement au bon fonctionnement du syst\u00e8me bancaire et \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la client\u00e8le.\u00a0Celle-ci pr\u00e9voit les conditions d\u2019autorisation des prises de participation dans les banques.<\/p>\n
502. \u2013 In addition, stock market law intervenes in favor of the proper functioning of the financial markets.\u00a0It provides for the conditions of admissibility of public offers and their conduct.\u00a0In general, it oversees the protection of savings, the quality of investor information, the equality of shareholders, the fairness of transactions and the transparency of the financial markets.<\/span><\/p>\n503. \u2013 Ahora bien, los dos objetos particulares que acabamos de identificar presentan una diferencia en especie.\u00a0La regulaci\u00f3n de las ofertas p\u00fablicas es una regulaci\u00f3n de medios, mientras que la regulaci\u00f3n de las participaciones en el capital de una entidad de cr\u00e9dito es una regulaci\u00f3n de fines.\u00a0En efecto, las disposiciones bancarias implementadas est\u00e1n directamente interesadas en las instituciones que integran el sistema bancario.\u00a0Su objetivo es protegerlos a trav\u00e9s de controles prudenciales.\u00a0Es un conjunto de reglas, ratios y umbrales que las autoridades nacionales competentes controlan para garantizar la buena salud financiera de las entidades de cr\u00e9dito.\u00a0Por el contrario, la ley de ofertas p\u00fablicas es en gran medida desinteresada en el destino de las empresas iniciadoras o de destino.\u00a0S\u00f3lo se ven afectados indirectamente.\u00a0Efectivamente, el coraz\u00f3n del derecho de oferta p\u00fablica es el mercado.\u00a0Por lo tanto, las empresas solo est\u00e1n preocupadas en la medida en que su comportamiento afecta a este mercado.\u00a0El objetivo es eliminar todos los obst\u00e1culos para una decisi\u00f3n de mercado informada.<\/span><\/p>\n